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Author's abstract 
Integrated Pest Management (IPM) became a widely supported approach in the 
control of pests and diseases in crops. This study describes IPM policy and imple-
mentation, a.o. by the FAO Inter-Country Programme for the Development and 
Application of IPM in Rice in S and SE Asia, in Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand. 
A brief description of agricultural development in the three countries serves to 
understand their priorities in crop production and protection, the origin of their 
institutions, their main pest and disease problems and their achievements in the 
public and private sectors. Examples demonstrate the ingenuity of colonial 
research in solving major obstacles in estate agriculture. A comparison of methods 
of pest management in pre-World War II agriculture without synthetic pesticides 
with modern IPM technology reveals some essential differences. In SE Asia in the 
1960s, large scale intensification programs in rice production on the basis of Green 
Revolution technology led to serious outbreaks of secondary pests and virus epi-
demics. The Regional and National IPM programmes induced a political commit-
ment to IPM in Indonesia and Malaysia. Large scale IPM training following the 
FFS extension method had reached about 1 million Indonesian farmers by 1996. 
The effect of the FAO IPM programmes on the pesticide markets of the three coun-
tries is evident in Indonesia, but not in Malaysia and Thailand. 
Preface 
This study evolved in the course of the past three years, a period of learning and 
reflection. It deals with the experiences which marked my career in developing 
countries and in Europe. Over the years, I met with many inspiring people who 
taught me new ideas and helped me to never lose my curiosity. I had an adventur-
ous career that allowed me to see agricultural practices in all but one continent. The 
study might be seen as an end-of-career effort of sharing experience and as a token 
of gratitude to the people of SE Asia for the hospitality bestowed upon me. 
Of great value for the research has been my supervisor at the Wageningen 
Agricultural University, Dr. J.C. Zadoks, emeritus professor of ecological phy-
topathology who, as an IPM expert and former member of the FAO/UNEP Panel 
for Integrated Pest Management, became personally acquainted with the envi-
ronment and pest problems of SE Asia. Professor Zadoks showed me new per-
spectives of Pest Management and ways to lead my manifold impressions into 
effective grooves of thought. His detailed, accurate and demanding commentaries 
enabled me to write this dissertation. 
My sincere thanks go to Mr. Ewoud Pierhagen (M.Sc), director of the Division 
of International Affairs, Ministry of Agriculture, Nature Management and 
Fisheries, The Netherlands, for his generous encouragement since the time I left 
my position in his division to write this book. The facilities and support provided 
by Mr. Pierhagen were crucial for the successful completion of the study. 
A grateful acknowledgement goes to Dr. Hans-Jurgen Schonlau and Annik 
Dollacker (M.Sc), Bayer AG, Business Group Crop Protection, Monheim, 
Germany, for providing a detailed analysis of the pesticide markets in three SE 
Asian countries covering 16 years. By confiding in me and giving professional 
advice, Dr. Schonlau and Mrs. Dollacker made a substantial contribution to this 
study. 
I mention with respect the inspiring work of Dr. Peter E. Kenmore, at the time 
Chief Administrator of the FAO Inter-Country Programme for the Development 
and Application of Integrated Pest Control in Rice in S and SE Asia. 
I thank Prof. Mohd. Yusof Hussein, Dean, Faculty of Agriculture, Universiti 
Pertanian Malaysia, for his hospitality in enabling my study in Malaysia. 
A special word of thanks goes to Bram van Weeren for his invaluable help with 
computer technology and art work. 
I also appreciated the support given by Liesbeth and Ab Lycklama-Oudejans, 
Ticia and Mauke van der Haer-Rueb during the final weeks. 
Last but in no way least, I thank with all my heart my beloved wife, Ansje, for 
her ever lasting confidence and patience. 
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A/. • i 
Stellingen behorende bij het proefschrift van Jan H.M. Oudejans getiteld 
"Studies on IPM Policy in SE Asia. Two Centuries of Plant 
Protection in Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand" 
te verdedigen op vrijdag 26 februari 1999 te vier uur. 
Stelling 1. 
In Indonesia ligt het cruciale probleem niet in het maken van IPM beleid, maar in het 
continueren van de uitvoering ervan. 
(hoofdstuk 2 van dit proefschrift) 
Stelling 2. 
In Maleisie heeft IPM zijn duidelijkste uitingsvorm gekregen in de gei'ntegreerde bestrijding 
van onkruiden in rijst in de grote irrigatie-prqjecten. 
(hoofdstuk 3 van dit proefschrift) 
Stelling 3. 
In Thailand komt het ontbreken van politieke aandacht voor IPM in rijst niet als een 
verrassing omdat in de 20ste eeuw de rijstproductie meer gericht was op de export dan op de 
nationale voedselvoorziening. 
(hoofdstuk 4 van dit proefschrift) 
Stelling 4. 
Tijdens de koloniale periode van Indonesie leverde regelgeving een grotere bijdrage aan 
IPM dan in het heden. 
(hoofdstuk 5 van dit proefschrift) 
Stelling 5. 
Generieke bestrijdingsmiddelen zijn de dood voor IPM. 
Stelling 6. 
Merkwaardig genoeg getuigt het massaal uitbreken van de wereng coclat (Nilaparvata 
lugens Stahl.) op Java van de grote technische vooruitgang in het spuiten van insecticiden 
met vliegtuigen sedert het eind van de 1960-er jaren. 
Stelling 7. 
Het Directoraat-Generaal voor Internationale Samenwerking (DGIS) van het Ministerie van 
Buitenlandse Zaken pleegt kapitaalvernietiging wanneer het de grote investeringen in IPM 
voor rijst in ZO Azie niet onderhoudt. Dit IPM programma vormt een der weinige concrete 
invullingen van Agenda 21. 
(Bron: Beleidsvoornemens in zake toepassing van criteria op het vlak van structurele 
bilaterale hulp. Brief van de Minister voor OS aan de Voorzitter van de Tweede Kamer der 
Staten-Generaal, 5 November 1998). 
Stelling 8. 
Met het relatief snel prijs geven van de eertijds befaamde Nederlandse expertise inzake 
tropische landbouw en plattelandsontwikkeling verliest het Ministerie van Landbouw, 
Natuurbeheer en Visserij de PR-waarde van zijn OS-georienteerde instellingen voor het op 
de markt brengen van de Nederlandse landbouwkennis, diensten en produkten. 
(Bronnen: "Schouders eronder: IAC en 1LRI als versterking van Wageningen UR 
internationaal. Rapport van de Commissie Bukman, Kok en van der Lely, November 1998; 
Eindrapport strategische herorientatie LNV OS-beleid. Ministerie van Landbouw, 
Natuurbeheer en Visserij, November 1995). 
Stelling 9. 
Naarmate de verantwoordelijkheid voor beleid en uitvoering van technische 
ontwikkelingssamenwerking meer wordt toegewezen aan de sectordeskundigen op de 
ambassades, neemt de mogelijkheid voor Nederlandse ontwikkelingsdeskundigen af om 
kwalitatief en kwantitatief bij te dragen aan het ontwikkelingswerk. 
(Bron: De Herijking van het Buitenlands Beleid. Nota van de Minister van Buitenlandse 
Zaken, 11 September 1995) 
Stelling 10. 
In de Directoraten-Generaal van de Europesche Commissie lijkt onvoldoende coordinatie en 
deskundigheid aanwezig om een zorgvuldig bestedingsbeleid te voeren in zaken die 
toewijzing en gebruik van pesticiden in ontwikkelingslanden betreffen. (Bron: Verslagen 
van de European Workinggroup on 1PM). 
Stelling 11. 
In een tijd die van vluchtigheid aan elkaar hangt ontstaat vanzelf behoefte aan 
grondslagenonderzoek. 
(Bron: Recensent Paul Scheffer in NRC van 26.02.1997 over de uitspraak van Rudiger 
Safranski 's "Naar de grondslagen vragen betekent omkijken "). 
Stelling 12. 
Het acronym SAIO (senior assistent in opleiding) is niet alleen een grapje. Juist oudere 
deskundigen, die hun in de praktijk opgedane ervaring willen analyseren en vastleggen, 
hebben wetenschappelijke en technische ondersteuning nodig om doeltreffend te kunnen 
werken. 
Chapter 1 
Introduction: From Paradise to Paradigm 
1.1. Rationale 
The title of this chapter refers to man's dream of an Arcadian agriculture (The 
idyll of the "sauvage noble', JJ Rousseau, 1712-78) and to the development of 
Integrated Pest Management (IPM) into a kind of paradigm (Kenmore 1996; Kuhn, 
1970). The theme of this book, the development of crop protection in three coun-
tries of SE Asia, is inspired by a personal motive. My professional career as an 
agronomist confronted me with conflicting concepts and activities concerning 
ways and means to control pests and diseases of agricultural crops. For 30 years, I 
carried out my tasks dutifully under the given circumstances with the knowledge I 
had acquired at the time. Fortunately, the course of events enabled me to learn and 
to apply new insights in various professional positions. The present study is an 
effort to record and understand approaches and achievements in plant protection in 
the context of agricultural development in SE Asia. My interpretations and con-
clusions are based on research, experience in the field and over sixty hours of 
recorded interviews. 
1.2. Serving two masters? 
The author began his career with CIBA AG, Agro-chemical Division (which 
ultimately merged into Novartis, Basel, Switzerland), from 1966 to 1975. Five 
years of company representation and product trials in E Pakistan and Turkey and 
four years of world-wide research on aerial and ground application techniques 
brought valuable knowledge about company interests, product performance and 
spray droplet behaviour, but none about the ecological consequences of the work 
done so conscientiously. Doubts awoke during the following four years of service 
with a Dutch company, assisting in the management of some 4,000 ha of Cinchona 
(source of quinine), coffee, cardamom and other crops planted on the company's 
estates in Zaire, Rwanda and Guatemala. Outbreaks of Helopeltis bugs, coffee 
berry borer and caterpillars were treated by calender spraying with low efficacy 
and high incidence of intoxication of labourers. However, in the late 1970s, the 
validity of chemical control was not questioned in the world of industry. The pes-
ticide oriented course was continued in the service of the Netherlands Directorate 
General for International Development Cooperation (DGIS), 1979-83.1 was com-
missioned to the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and 
the Pacific (ESCAP), Bangkok, with the task of developing training capacity with-
in the ARSAP Project. ARSAP, the Agricultural Requisite Scheme for Asia and the 
Pacific, was a long-term, Dutch financed, program to facilitate, increase and widen 
the domestic use in ESCAP countries of more productive agro-chemical inputs by 
small-scale producers of food and cash crops. 
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Duties in later years, with the Dutch Ministry of Agriculture, Nature 
Management and Fisheries, 1984-96, gave access to the world of biological con-
trol. Participation in various FAO/Netherlands missions dealing with Integrated 
Pest Management (IPM) in cotton (Sudan), rice (S and SE Asia), migratory locust 
control (Sahel) and FAO Code of Conduct implementation (C America) placed the 
questions of ecological balance and sustainability in the limelight. 
The same Dutch Directorate General of International Development Cooperation, 
that once funded the pesticide use promoting ARSAP project, became the major 
donor of the FAO Inter-Country IPM Programmes for Rice and Vegetables in S and 
SE Asia and for the Development and Application of IPM in Cotton in the Sudan. 
The opportunity to participate on both sides, promotion of pesticides and promo-
tion of IPM, raised the question: 'Did I serve two masters?' If so, what did I learn 
from it? SE Asia offered a good possibility, by availability of documentation and 
personal exposure, to search for an answer. 
1.3. Crop protection: need and realisation in SE Asia 
Before the 17th century, sufficient native crops could be grown in SE Asia to 
enable the settlement of numerous immigrants in the sparsely populated region of 
SE Asia. From the early 17th century on, trade in agricultural produce developed 
and foreign crops began to arrive. European trading companies exacted delivery of 
rice and sugar and imposed the cultivation of commodity crops by Indonesian and 
Malay farmers. In the 18th and early 19th century, enforced planting on a large 
scale, often as monocultures, under poor technical supervision of the colonial 
administration resulted in a low productivity. The shift to private plantation agri-
culture created a need for controlling the pests and diseases which threatened the 
huge investments. Scientific knowledge was not available. Public and private fund-
ing enabled the founding of endeavouring agricultural research, first in the Dutch 
East Indies and later in Malaya. In Thailand, there was little interest to improve 
productivity before the Second World War due to the absence of foreign investment 
in agriculture. 
Through diligent research in the Dutch East Indies and Malaya, able scientists 
succeeded, among others, in developing methods for adequate pest and disease 
management. The solutions were sufficiently effective to enable an almost continu-
ous growth of production in terms of quantity and quality and a high return on 
investment. Chemical means of pest control were limited to the application of only 
few botanical and chemical products. Pest management tools included breeding 
and selection for resistance, cultural control, employment of natural enemies, qua-
rantine, sanitation and other elements of control. With these means certain sectors 
of plantation agriculture, in particular the sugar industry, in SE Asia attained a level 
of productivity unmatched after World War II. Pest and disease management had 
achieved a state of the art that continuation of scientific and financial support was 
never questioned by politicians or financiers. 
Early in the 20th century, the dual character of agriculture, existing of a commer-
cial export-oriented sector and an indigenous, almost self-sufficient production 
sector, was recognized. The build-up of knowledge concerning improvement of 
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production, loss prevention and pest management had, in these two sectors, devel-
oped along separate lines and at a very different pace. The necessity to improve the 
productivity of indigenous agriculture and the income of the small farmers led to 
the establishment of Departments of Agriculture in the Dutch East Indies and 
Malaya in the same year, 1905. 
The institutionalization of agriculture offered an opportunity to separate pest 
and disease management from crop husbandry and to shape it into a separate field 
of action. Protection of production and products became an independent subject of 
government attention. Hence, a Plant Protection Division was set up within the 
Departments of Agriculture. For the first time, public funds were allocated to the 
scientific improvement of production and protection methods for indigenous food 
crops. Agricultural Extension Services were created to test and demonstrate the 
findings of research in the farmers' fields. 
In Thailand, where agriculture was regarded as a producer of export commodities 
only, scientific improvement of indigenous food crops only began after World War II. 
1.4. The introduction of synthetic pesticides 
The invention of DDT before and strategic research on synthetic organochlorine 
compounds during the Second World War gave agriculture access to biocides with 
a great potential for an almost instantaneous control of organisms noxious to crops. 
Between 1945 and 1960, research on chemical control of pests, diseases and weeds 
occupied the great majority of researchers and captured the bulk of funds, thereby 
leaving little resources for further development of non-chemical methods of control. 
Pesticide use was advertised and generally acknowledged as a reliable, cheap, eas-
ily applicable and possibly final solution to pest problems in agriculture. Due to the 
exodus of labourers from agriculture and rising labour costs, chemical control 
became the norm in agriculture in developed countries. Similarly, overseas com-
panies promoted the use of chemical pesticides in plantation crops as a way to cut 
production costs and to reduce the need for labour. In contrast, pesticide use in 
indigenous agriculture remained limited till the 1960s. 
The Green Revolution of the 1960s introduced high-yielding varieties, subsidized 
agro-chemicals, accelerated mechanization, and extended irrigation and credit 
facilities. International research agencies and international foundations, which 
financed the development of the Green Revolution technology, convinced politi-
cians and national experts that pesticides were an essential ingredient. Donors 
offered ample financial and technical assistance, usually in support of food crop 
production, which almost routinely carried a substantial pesticide component. The 
pesticide message was passed on to the farmers through the agricultural extension 
services. 
The chemical industry installed impressive sales networks and succeeded in 
transforming the rice sector into the biggest insecticide consumer in agriculture. 
Asian governments made pesticides available at village level through subsidies and 
logistic means. Two decades (1960s and 1970s) of intensive advertisement through 
private distributors, extension agents and politicians convinced a whole generation 
of farmers that they were likely to loose their crop if they did not apply insecticides. 
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Within a few years, population densities of pest organisms increased in major 
food and cash crops, and outbreaks and epidemics occurred more frequently than 
ever before. Since the causes of these phenomena were not understood, farmers in 
Asia and elsewhere were induced to increase the dosage of pesticides and the 
frequency of application. 
1.5. The development of Integrated Pest Management (IPM) 
In the 1950s, similar problems of increased pest outbreaks were encountered in 
N and C America in cotton, citrus, maize and alfalfa. In California, USA, funda-
mental entomological research on pest occurrence in alfalfa became a classic 
example of IPM technology. The alfalfa case inspired scientists, such as V.M. 
Stern, R.F. Smith and R. van den Bosch, to formulate definitions for IPM and 
Economic Threshold Level (ETL) (Flint & van den Bosch, 1981). A significant 
difference with pre-war colonial research was the pesticide-induced nature of the 
outbreaks in alfalfa. Initially minor pests, such as the spotted alfalfa aphid, became 
important when their natural enemies were killed. It was recognized that pest insect 
populations survived through a rapid build-up of pesticide resistance (van den 
Bosch era/., 1959). 
Novel was the experimentation with insecticide dosage levels and the search for 
target-specific insecticides with the objective to spare natural enemies if insecti-
cide usage was deemed unavoidable. Monitoring for pests and natural enemies and 
the application of ETL values for taking chemical control decisions was not entire-
ly new. Around 1920 in Indonesia, S. Leefmans developed ETL-values to decide 
on spraying, biological control or cutting of infested palm fronds for control of 
coconut moth outbreaks (Kalshoven, 1951). An important difference was that the 
Californian farmers had great interest in following the IPM recommendations, 
whereas the Indonesian smallholders at the time did not understand the measures. 
Innovative too in the Californian work was the fitting together of information, 
decision-making criteria, methods, and materials with naturally occurring pest 
mortality into effective pest-management systems aimed at the maintenance of the 
agro-ecological balance (Stern etal, 1959). The capturing of a set of technicalities 
bearing great significance to sensitive issues such as food security, human health, 
environmental quality, and public reassurance simultaneously into a workable con-
cept proved to be decisive. Politically minded scientists, such as R.F. Smith and 
P.E. Kenmore, transformed Integrated Pest Management from a mere technology 
into a pattern of thinking (paradigm) about the consequences of a growing depend-
ency on chemicals in agriculture. 
European researchers contributed particularly through the development of IPM 
technology for insect pest control in greenhouse crops (van Lenteren, 1995), and 
of guidelines for supervised or guided pest control in field crops and orchards on 
the basis of surveillance and ETL-values (de Fluiter, 1969b; Zadoks, 1986). 
1.6. The appearance of donors 
Throughout the second half of the 20th century, large funds became available 
for technical cooperation with developing countries. The motives of the donors 
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consisted of a blend of cold-war strategy, feelings of colonial guilt, solidarity and 
trade opportunities. The so-called Overseas Development Administration (ODA) 
of individual donors called on their constituency for advice concerning targets and 
ways for dispensing the donor funds. Because of the prominent place of agricul-
ture in the Third World economy and as a consequence of their accumulated expe-
rience in tropical agriculture, the United States of America and European countries, 
in particular the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and France, offered govern-
ments of developing countries, through multilateral or bilateral channels, an array 
of agricultural development programs. 
Many of these programs included a significant plant protection and pesticide sup-
ply component. Donors also contributed to agricultural development programs of 
United Nations Agencies, International Development Banks and Foundations. The 
founding of the International Agricultural Research Centres (I ARCS) [e.g. for rice 
(IRRI) and for wheat and maize (CIMMYT)] under the aegis of the Consultative 
Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR) led to a break-through in 
food production and agricultural technology, the 'Green Revolution'. S and SE 
Asia were richly endowed with financial and technical assistance. The Nether-
lands, for instance, earmarked a relatively large part of its development funding for 
Indonesia. 
In the 1960s, The United Nations Agencies for Food and Agriculture (FAO) and 
Environmental Protection (UNEP) set up a 'Panel of Experts on IPC and launched 
the FAO/UNEP Global Programme for the Development and Application of 
Integrated Pest Control in Agriculture. Increasing pest problems in Green 
Revolution rice varieties led to the establishment of a FAO Inter-Country 
Programme for Development and Application of Integrated Pest Control in Rice in 
S and SE Asia, 1979-99, in which initially seven countries participated. Since the 
1980s, the Inter-Country Programme succeeded in installing National IPM in Rice 
Programmes in the participating countries. The programs in Indonesia, Vietnam 
and India became particularly successful in the 1990s. FAO implemented similar 
regional IPM programs in vegetables and cotton in S and E Asia. 
Australia (in line with the Australian-Asian alliance treaties) and the Netherlands 
contributed considerably, in terms of grants and expert assistance, to the FAO 
Inter-country IPM Programmes in S and SE Asia. In the Netherlands, ample avail-
ability of expertise in tropical agriculture and IPM technology and the historal rela-
tion with Indonesia were factors which influenced ODA-budget allocation to the 
FAO IPM programs. The Dutch modus of contributing through a FAO trust-fund 
enhanced the opportunity for direct involvement of Dutch experts in the FAO IPM 
Programmes in SE ASIA, Sudan and Nicaragua. In view of the ever increasing fo-
cus on environmental issues, the Dutch Government financed, in 1991, the joint 
'FAO/Netherlands Conference on Agriculture and the Environment'. The resulting 
'Den Bosch declaration', which reaffirmed the importance of IPM, served as major 
input for the United Nations Conference on the Environment and Development 
(UNCED, Rio de Janeiro, 1992) (IOCU, 1993). 
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1.7. Inter-Country and National IPM Programmes in SE Asia 
The FAO Inter-Country Programme in Rice was launched at a time that brown 
planthopper outbreaks and virus epidemics threatened the hard-won self-sufficien-
cy in rice production in S and SE Asia. In 1982, field studies of Kenmore et al. 
(1984) at IRRI in the Philippines established the pesticide-induced nature of brown 
planthopper outbreaks and the importance of natural enemy population dynamics 
in balancing insect pests in rice. These findings, pushed with persuasion by FAO 
Inter-Country Programme administrators, drew the attention of politicians and 
national scientists. 
In 1985-86, the governments of Indonesia, the Philippines and India declared IPM 
as their national policy for rice production (Zadoks et al., 1986). The primary 
impact of the IPM policy was the uncoupling of rice production intensification 
from pesticide procurement, the withdrawal of pesticide subsidies and a drastic 
reduction in the number of insecticide applications by rice farmers. The develop-
ments in Indonesia and Vietnam, where National IPM Programmes took the initia-
tive, set the example. Through the adoption of the Farmer Field School method of 
extension (Roling & van de Fliert, 1994), impressive results were obtained in the 
training of plant protection and extension cadres, field trainers and farmers. 
Farmers, empowered by a season-long FFS training, reduced the number of insec-
ticide treatments in rice. Next, they began to experiment with reducing treatments 
in non-rice crops, and selection in local varieties (van de Fliert et al, 1995, 1996; 
van Huis & Buurma, 1998). 
International development agencies, o.a. the United States Agency for 
International Development (USAID), the World Bank and Asian Development 
Bank (ADB) acknowledged the achievements of Indonesia in adopting IPM tech-
nology in rice-based cropping systems by accepting them as a valid collateral for 
agricultural loan embursement. The World Bank provided a 32 M US$ loan to 
Indonesia for IPM extension. (WorldBank, 1993a). 
Contrary to Indonesia and Malaysia, the government of Thailand did not 
officially proclaim IPM as national agricultural policy. Malaysia and Thailand did 
not ban rice insecticides for ecological reasons. The implementation of the 
FAO-IPM Programme has as yet failed to get a strong foothold in either Malaysia 
or Thailand (Whitten, 1998). 
1.8. Organisation of the book 
This book reviews the development of agriculture and plant protection in 
Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand. These three countries were chosen as a sample 
from SE Asia because they show comparable traits in historical and agricultural 
development, importance of rice as a staple food and of horticulture as a growth 
industry, the growth of the pesticide market, and participation in international IPM 
initiatives. A period of two centuries is described because the 19th century marks 
the beginning of agricultural development on the basis of scientific experimenta-
tion in botanical gardens and plantations in Indonesia and Malaya. 
The book describes pest and disease problems and their control (Box 1.8) in 
rice, vegetables and fruits, and several major estate crops. The choice of these 
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Box 1.8 
Definition of Crop Protection 
For the purpose of this book 'Crop Protection' is defined as the collective 
knowledge and expertise concerning the relationship between noxious 
organisms, crops and produce, mechanisms and means of control, the agro-
ecosystem and the environment. 
Crop protection is dealt with at two levels, the individual and the institu-
tional. At the individual level, the farmer/entrepreneur manages pests and 
diseases with the methods of cultural, chemical or biological control known 
and available to him, with the objective to optimize the financial results of 
his cropping activities. 
At the institutional level the following parties and issues play a role. 
1. The national government is responsible for regulation and inspection, 
product registration, quarantine, research and extension concerning pesti-
cides, health of seeds and planting material and other relevant inputs, 
public health, environmental quality, and for financial instruments such as 
subsidies, tariffs and price controls. Responsibilities of national govern-
ments are increasingly shared or taken over by international bodies of 
government. 2. The international pesticide industry is responsible for 
supply and distribution of pesticides and extension in compliance with the 
regulations. 3. Certain non-governmental organisations (NGOs) represent 
the interests of consumers, producers or the environment and object against 
externalities resulting from pesticide use. 
Relatively recent issues in the field of plant protection are mondial 
agreements concerning sustainable environment and agriculture, trade and 
tariffs among which the FAO International Code of Conduct with the Prior 
Informed Consent clause. 
The above definition and its elaboration mean to include all aspects dis-
cussed in the book, not to supersede better-phrased definitions which 
emphasise particular interests, as in the case of the IPM definitions adopt-
ed by the FAO/UNEP Panel of Experts in 1966 (Brader, 1979). 
crops was based on the following criteria: a. importance of the crop as a basic 
source of food for the population or as a commodity crop grown mainly on estates 
for export; b. origin of the crop as a native species or as an exotic species intro-
duced from another region of the world; c. annual or perennial crop; d. providing 
illustrative examples of pest and disease problems and their management before 
and after World War II. 
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The chosen crops are listed in table 1.8. Rice and vegetables are target crops of 
IPM programs to be discussed. Two main approaches to pest control, biological 
and chemical, are presented in their historical sequence. Other crops are discussed 
when appropriate. The present dominance of chemical control in agriculture and 
the resistance against it by protagonists of a balanced agro-ecosystem is evaluated 
with the help of relevant records of the pesticide market. 
Chapters 2, 3 and 4 describe and analyze the development of plant protection in 
respectively Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand. They deal with the emergence of 
crop protection, departing from unstructured aggregated expertise obtained by re-
search and practice to its institutionalized form, in the context of agricultural deve-
lopment. Answers are sought to questions such as 'Where, when and how was crop 
protection recognized as an essential entity requiring political and financial atten-
tion?'; 'To what extent did the differential pace of development in indigenous and 
industrial agriculture influence policy making and investment in plant protection?, 
and 'What results were achieved by the various ways and means of controlling 
pests and diseases'. Chapter 5 probes for the origin and meaning of the concept 
'Integrated Pest Management'. How did the colonial agricultural industry manage 
to achieve profitable levels of production without the employment of synthetic 
chemical pesticides? How novel is today's knowledge and practice of biological 
control? The chapter describes the international and national initiatives for the 
development and implementation of integrated pest management (IPM) in rice and 
vegetables in S and SE Asia. What conditions might favour the sustainability of 
IPM in SE Asia? Chapter 6 highlights the development and problems of horticul-
ture, since this sector shows a high dependence on pesticides. Chapter 7 analyses 
the pesticide markets in each of the three countries in an effort to measure the 
effect of international and national IPM programs on actual pesticide use between 
1980 and 1996. What do sales figures reveal about political commitment, conflict-
ing commercial interests and environmental concerns? Chapter 8 is an epilogue 
with a personal touch and chapter 9 gives a summary of conclusions. 
Table 1.8. Selection of 
Farming type 
Estate 
Smallholder 
crops 
Origin 
Native 
Introduced 
Native 
Introduced 
Annual 
Sugarcane 
Tobacco 
Rice 
Vegetables, fruits 
Perennial 
Cacao, oil palm 
Coconut 
Coffee 
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Chapter 2 
Development of agriculture in Indonesia 
2.1. Introduction 
The Indonesian archipelago consists of more than 13.600 islands which bridge 
the distance between Asia and Australia over about 5,000 kilometres, from the 
north point of Sumatera to Irian Jaya. On these islands lives an ethnically diverse 
population estimated at 205 million in 1998 (FAO Yearbook, 1997). Since about 
64% of the population resides on Java, Madura and Bali -which occupy about 7.2% 
of the country's total land area- the population density of these islands is among 
the highest in Asia. The islands of Sumatera, Sulawesi, Kalimantan, and Maluku 
are far more lightly settled. The archipelago is dominated by the Sunda mountain 
system, one of the largest coherent belts of mountains and submarine ridges. Along 
its entire range run two parallel belts of mountain arcs of which the inner range is 
volcanic whereas the outer is not. Java has many types of soils of which those of 
volcanic origin are generally very fertile. The lowlands of the Outer Islands con-
sist mainly of alluvial and marshy plains. 
The climate of Indonesia is characterized by high uniform temperatures, abun-
dant rainfall, high humidity and light winds. This uniformity is largely due to the 
fact that virtually the entire area lies within the equatorial belt. The narrowness of 
the islands allows the tempering influence of the surrounding seas to penetrate 
deeply inland. However, the sharp changes in temperature and precipitation with 
altitude cause marked local differences. Average annual temperature at sea level is 
a little above 26°C for the whole archipelago and is fairly uniform throughout the 
year. Commonly, rainfall amounts to over 2,000 mm in the coastal plains and over 
3,000 mm in mountain areas. Humidity is intense with two peaks occurring at the 
height of the monsoons in April and November. In eastern direction the seasonal 
distribution of rainfall between wet and dry seasons becomes progressively more 
apparent. The SE part of Indonesia has a very dry season and also Java may suffer 
in parts from occasional extreme droughts (Khan, 1974). 
The high population densities now found in Inner Indonesia are a relatively 
recent phenomenon. The population of Java increased from 10.3 in 1815 (table 2.1) 
to 42 million in 1930, when the first reliable census was conducted in Indonesia. 
There are reasonably reliable data available for regions other than Java since 1930. 
Until World War II, the outstanding feature of Indonesia's agriculture was its 
dual nature. Indigenous agriculture (bevolkingslandbomv), although of enormous 
importance, was inconspicuous and largely self-sufficient. The Dutch colonial 
administration imposed a policy of agricultural exploitation during most of the 
18th and 19th century, whilst impeding private enterprise. In the 1860s, the system 
of forced cultivation was gradually withdrawn and replaced by estate agriculture 
financed by foreign capital. Indigenous agriculture remained underdeveloped and 
neglected until the beginning of the 20th century. Concerned with the general 
decline of the people's well-being, the government entrusted a new Department of 
Wageningen Agricultural University Papers 99-1 (1999) 
Agriculture with the task of improving indigenous agriculture in general and rice 
production in particular. About the same time, major irrigation works were under-
taken to expand the area for wet rice cultivation. 
In the 1920s and 1930s, scientifically managed European estate agriculture 
flourished and supplied 60% of total agricultural export value whilst utilizing only 
7% of the cultivated area (Metcalf, 1952). The latest technical innovations were 
adopted, yields were high, and sizable profits were accumulated in good years. 
However, the system lacked flexibility, for it was highly dependent on the con-
junctural cycles of world trade and general prosperity (Feuilleteau de Bruyn, 
1941). Smallholders' agriculture, which came up in the wake of estate agriculture, 
lacked resources but could react more flexibly. At the time of low prices the small-
holders moved away from their export crops, which they interplanted with food 
crops till conditions changed again. 
The gross national income of the Dutch East Indies in 1939 was an estimated 
1.6 billion US$>. Of this GDP 70% went to Indonesians, who constituted 97% of 
the population, and 30% was either earned by resident foreigners or by overseas 
stockholders. At that time, Indonesian per caput income was about 20 US$/y, 
which tallied with the prevailing pattern of subsistence farming and the concealed 
unemployment all over the islands. Pricing policies for rice and major food crops 
played an important role in the development of indigenous agriculture throughout 
the 20th century. However, food price policy and the rice market fall outside the 
scope of this study. 
After World War II, agricultural policy focused entirely on rice production 
(Anonymous, 1991). Only after 1980, more emphasis was placed on production of 
secondary food crops. After Independence, Indonesia's research and extension suf-
fered for decades from lack of skilled manpower, funding and facilities. After 1975 
research was drastically reorganized and improved. Presently, the Indonesian 
government aims at an accelerated development of other sectors of the economy, 
Table 2.1. Population and growth rates of Indonesia, 1880-1990 Sources: Booth, 1988; 
World Bank (1994); Central Bureau for Statistics, population census reports, 1961 and 1990. 
Island Population (million) 
1815 1930 1961 1990 
Java 10 
Sumatera 
Kalimantan 
Sulawesi 
Outer Islands 
Indonesia - 60 97 181 
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2 
8 
2 
4 
4 
63 
16 
4 
7 
7 
108 
37 
9 
13 
14 
such as manufacturing, trade and public services, to solve the problem of rural 
poverty and under-employment. Agriculture's share in employment decreased 
from over 75% in 1900 to less to about 50% in 1990. Indonesia remains a low-
income country and some 50 million people still live in absolute poverty, but it has 
great potential as most of the younger Indonesians received adequate education. 
2.2. Early history 
The early development of Indonesia can only be understood against the back-
ground of maritime trade and Indonesia's position along the ancient trade routes 
between the highly developed civilisations of India and China. Many early immi-
grants followed sea-lanes or passed ancient landbridges which once must have 
connected the Indonesian archipelago with the Asian continent. Possibly during the 
fourth millennium B.C. the ancestors of the Malays now inhabiting Java and 
Sumatera arrived. By the first millennium small communities had formed which 
engaged in food gathering or growing rice, bananas, leafy vegetables and root 
crops such Diascorea and Colocasia spp (taro). 
In Indonesia with its complex geographical structure not all ethnical groups 
reached the same technical level at the same time. Many had developed their dis-
tinctive pattern of social and cultural life and early forms of government (Fonteyn, 
1992). Early in the fourth century A.D., some Indonesian principalities came into 
contact with new ideas and techniques from the higher developed civilisations of 
India. Since the basis of an authentic culture had been developed, these prin-
cipalities reacted with an astonishingly creative response to the Indian influence. 
The first important Indonesian principality, Sriwijaya, had its centre in the area 
of today's Palembang, S Sumatera. Sriwijaya was governed by the powerful Sai-
lendra dynasty which extended its influence over the Indo-Malay archipelago. 
During the eighth century, the Buddhist Sailendra dynasty ruled over Java where 
great architectural activity was developed over the next two centuries. Between 
730 and 930 A.D., the Javanese built large temple complexes such as Candi Kala-
san and Borobudur and hundreds of smaller temples. At about 860, the Sailendra 
lost control of Central Java to a dynasty from East Java called Mataram, which left 
its mark in the Hindu temple complex of Prambanan. The Sailendras withdrew to 
their maritime powerbase Sriwijaya in Sumatera (Map 2.2). 
During the 13th century the last Hindu-Javanese kingdom of Majapahit gained 
overlordship over many of the archipelago's principalities but that kingdom lasted 
barely a century. The Majapahit's way of administration, which introduced a sys-
tem of levies in produce and labour to be supplied by the villages to their lords 
instead of paying taxes, continued well into the 19th century (Palmier, 1965). 
Palmier distinguished two types of political power. Sriwijaya as a maritime power 
controlled shipping lanes and ports, whereas Majapahit as an agrarian power 
organized the labour force of a relatively compact population. 
Probably in the 14th century, improved means of transportation brought an 
increasing number of traders from India and Persia to the, Indonesian islands to buy 
pepper, spices, precious wood and other produce before going on to China. 
Merchants from Gujarat in NW India brought the Islam which may have been 
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adopted by certain coastal princes to counter the threat of the Portuguese who 
brought Christianity. The first important Islamic state was Melaka in Peninsular 
Malaya. In the 15th century, Islam spread gradually over Sumatera and Java and 
finally reached the Maluku archipelago. Inner Indonesia (consisting of most of 
Java, Madura, S Bali and W Lombok) and Outer Indonesia (consisting of S W Java 
and the other islands) were characterized by different agro-ecosystems. In Inner 
Indonesia, lowland agriculture was predominant whilst swidden cultivation close-
ly related to the tropical forest ecosystem characterized Outer Islands. Depending 
on soil fertility, village societies left the stage of subsistence farming and became 
involved in barter trading, first at local and later at regional level. 
For instance, on the Maluku islands the staple food sago was gathered from 
surrounding islands such as Seram and Papua New Guinea. Spices, growing in the 
wild in N Moluku, were gathered for export. When traders introduced clove and 
nutmeg as barter goods to the Ambonese islands, the planting of clove trees there 
marked a transition to more permanent land use, improved purchasing power, and 
higher population growth. As clove cultivation competes with food crops in terms 
of arable land and labour, a need arose to import sago from Seram and rice from 
Java. Between 1450 and 1520, groups of immigrants arrived in Maluku from Java 
and Sulawesi as the trade network extended. A lively regional maritime trade 
evolved which attracted ever more merchants from far away. 
2.3. Arrival of European contenders in Indonesia 
2.3.1. The Portuguese and the English. Early in the sixteenth century a Portu-
guese fleet sailed to E Asia in search of the wealth of the spice lands. Vasco da 
Gama reached the coast of India in 1498. In 1509, the Portuguese conquered the 
important port of Goa in India and two years later the Muslim stronghold Melaka. 
From that port they directed their ships to the Moluku archipelago, the source of 
spices. In the second half of the sixteenth century the Spaniards had reached the 
Philippines sailing the Pacific from S America. From the Philippines, the Spaniards 
fought the Portuguese and the Maluku sultans to obtain a share of the spice trade. 
Around 1580, an English squadron under Francis Drake passed through 
Indonesian waters on his westward circumnavigation of the world. Drake stopped 
at Ternate and took home a cargo of clove. Thereupon, the English, as the Dutch, 
wanted to be directly involved in the spice trade. In 1600, Queen Elizabeth I gran-
ted a charter to the English East India Company (EIC) and the English advance in 
Asia began. In 1604, the second EIC voyage under Commander H. Middleton 
reached Maluku. No contender could achieve the monopoly of the spice trade as 
too many strong parties had entered the scene (Palmier, 1965). 
2.3.2. The Dutch. Towards the end of the 16h century, Dutch seamen who had 
sailed to the East on Portuguese vessels became acquainted with the sea routes and 
the lucrative trade opportunities. Enterprising merchants in Holland equipped 
fleets of which one squadron under the command of Cornells de Houtman arrived 
in Lampung, S Sumatera, in June, 1596. The mission failed and the battered ships 
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returned home after eight months without reaching the Maluku spice islands (Lu-
bis, 1979). In 1598, another Dutch expedition reached Ambon and sailed home 
with a rich cargo of spices2. The success triggered a rage in Holland in establish-
ing companies for the spice trade which soon created fierce competition. In 1602, 
the United Dutch East India Company (Generate Vereenichde Geoctroyeerde Oost-
Indische Compagnie, VOC) was founded by a merger of the competing companies. 
The first VOC foothold in Indonesia was the island of Ambon (Amboina), occu-
pied in 1605 (Palmier, 1965). In 1609, the Board of Directors (HeerenXVII) of the 
VOC established the post of Governor-General3 to direct the affairs in Asia. At that 
time, Java was largely governed by the powerful Muslim dynasty of Mataram in C 
Java. The only serious opponent of Mataram was the Muslim port-state of Banten 
which controlled the Sunda Strait of W Java. Continuous hostility of Banten in the 
west and Mataram in the east, inevitably drew the VOC under the Governor-Gene-
ral J.P. Coen into armed confrontation which disrupted agriculture and cut off the 
supply of rice to the VOC (Ricklefs, 1981). Without strong opposition on the seas 
and by alliance with the weaker parties in the continuous wars on Java, the VOC 
gradually succeeded in outmanoeuvering the European and local powers and con-
trolling the network of sea routes with Batavia as the centre of power (Palmier, 
1965). Throughout its operation in the Indonesian archipelago the VOC pursued 
the goal of establishing strategical strongholds and trading posts (factories, fak-
torijeri) from where it could dominate the lucrative maritime trade between Europe 
and the Far East. By the middle of the 17th century, after Melaka fell to the Dutch, 
the VOC became master of the shipping lanes from India to Japan. 
Initially, the VOC limited its interest in agriculture to safeguarding the supply 
of food to its personnel and ships, which was mainly achieved through the exac-
tion of tribute in cash, produce and labour for public works from submitted or 
allied rulers. The Company's next objective was the acquisition of agricultural pro-
duce for export at the lowest possible price. According to an agreement concluded 
in 1678 between Mataram and the VOC, by which almost the entire Priangan was 
ceded to the Company, Javanese peasants were forced to sell their rice to the VOC. 
Ten years later, the VOC demanded exclusive loyalty from the Priangan heads who 
had to pay tribute in kind. When the VOC derived less profit from trade, it used its 
newly gained political power to dominate the spice trade and to exact levies in 
natura such as spices, coffee, sugar and rice. 
2.3.3. Agricultural commodity trade under the VOC. Commodities which were 
particularly attractive for the VOC were cloves, coffee and cane sugar. 
2.3.3.1. Cloves. The clove tree4 (Syzygium aromaticurri) was introduced to the 
Seramese Island of Himoal around 1510 and from there in the following twenty 
years to the Ambonese Islands. By 1560, the Islands of Maluku produced more 
than 74 tonnes of cloves (Deinum, 1948). From 1600 onwards, the VOC tried to 
obtain the monopoly of the clove and nutmeg trade by concluding contracts, but 
not at fixed prices, which led to strong competition with the English East India 
Company and with Asian traders5. 
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A monopoly6 was effectively enforced in 1656 and was terminated in 1864 
only. Forced planting of clove trees on Ambon increased production rapidly, but 
after its highest level in the period 1700-05 the VOC ordered limitation of produc-
tion. After 1800, when the Dutch East Indies government had taken over the 
monopoly from the Company, the government added directives on cultivation 
(teeltvoorschrifteri) to the planting orders and increased the price as an incentive 
for improving clove production (Taale, 1988). 
2.3.3.2. Coffee. In the beginning of the eighteenth century the heads of the 
Faktorijen in their search for export commodities began to pay more attention to 
local production. In the area surrounding Batavia, the VOC encouraged agricultu-
re by issuing land and draft cattle for ploughing and by granting freedom from tax-
ation. In 1696, the Company brought the first seedlings of Coffea arabica from 
India to be planted in W Java. Production took off only when coffee was planted 
in Priangan, the mountainous region of SW Java. In the Priangan regencies, the 
local authorities, called regents (bupati), had enforced the planting so that they 
could meet the levies in kind demanded by the company. This separate arrange-
ment7 for taxation in coffee became known as the Priangan Scheme (Preanger 
Stelsel) (Mansvelt & Creuzberg, 1975). For a long time Priangan, and the higher 
parts of Cirebon and Pekalongan were by far the most important coffee producing 
regions of Indonesia. 
Because of growing demand8, the VOC in the 1720s began to enforce the plant-
ing of coffee on newly opened hillsides (growing coffee on 'high authority') which 
caused an overproduction of some 6,000 tonnes by 1724 already. Through mani-
pulation of the purchasing price for coffee9, compulsory planting, extirpation 
orders and requiring tributes to be delivered in coffee, the VOC tried unsuccessful-
ly to match supply and demand throughout the 18th century. Only in the later part 
of the 18th century, the VOC took steps to intensify the cultivation through the ap-
pointment of an Inspector of Cultivation and of European overseers to assist the 
regents in organizing the production and the maintenance of the coffee gardens 
(van Hall, 1939). 
2.3.3.3. Sugar. Sugarcane was one of the earliest estate crops in Indonesia grown 
by Chinese and European farmers in the 'private' lands S of Batavia and along the 
N coast of Java from the beginning of the 17th century. Some 50 years later, speci-
alized cane sugar cultivation existed in several parts of W, C and E Java. VOC 
regulations mentioned the existence of 99 sugar mills by 1750 (Deinum, 1948). 
Sugar production for export remained small until the beginning of the 19th centu-
ry as the product was too cheap in relation to its bulk to be paying for transporta-
tion overseas by sailing vessels (Mansvelt & Creuzberg, 1975). 
2.3.4. Decline of the VOC. Under the VOC administration the Dutch had achieved 
control over coastal areas of Java and Maluku. They had penetrated into the inte-
rior of Java and succeeded in splitting the kingdom of Mataram into insignificant 
states, but their authority remained marginal. Meanwhile the Company's policy of 
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forced levies was bringing steady impoverishment in Java and Maluku which 
ruined the economy and destabilized the native states. Outside Java, the Dutch 
barely controlled the important ports of Ternate, Menado, Makassar and Palem-
bang. In Sumatera, Aceh's might had declined after the Company broke its control 
of the pepper trade around 1680. 
Towards the end of the 18th century the political situation in Europe greatly influ-
enced the balance of power in the Indonesian-Malayan archipelago. The Netherlands 
were drawn into their fourth maritime war with England (1780-84) so that the VOC 
in Batavia was isolated from its homeland. Following defeat in 1784, the Dutch were 
forced to cede the VOC possessions in India and Ceylon to England and to allow the 
English free trade on Ambon. During the 1790s, when the VOC had to request for 
financial support from the Netherlands, the government ordered an investigation of 
the Company's affairs. The investigation revealed scandal and mismanagement10 in 
all quarters of the VOC and a state of acute bankruptcy. The Board of the VOC was 
dismissed in 1796 and the Company itself formally dissolved on 1 January 1800. The 
government of the Netherlands took possession of all the Company's11 territorities 
and rights. There was little immediate change in Indonesia, for the personnel remai-
ned in function and persued its old ways (Ricklefs, 1981). 
2.3.5. Dutch and British administration between 1800 and 1816. In 1795, 
France invaded the Netherlands12 and the Dutch stadtholder William V fled to 
England. From there he issued, in 1795, instructions (known as the 'Kew letters') 
to the Dutch colonial officials to surrender their territories in Indonesia to the 
English, to keep them out of French hands13. In the following years, the English 
used this authority as a pretext to attack VOC ships and to invade Java (Collins, 
1966; Ricklefs, 1981). 
In 1807, the French-dominated Dutch government under King Louis Napoleon 
appointed General H.W. Daendels, a Dutch aristocrat with a great interest in agri-
culture, as the Governor-General. In spite of British blockades, Deandels reached 
Batavia whereby the East Indies came under direct control of the Dutch govern-
ment. Daendels put the entangled administration in order, began to build fortifi-
cations in Banten and constructed a 1,000 km post-road along the N coast. 
According to instructions received in 1808, Daendels continued the VOC policy of 
enforced cultivation of rice, sugar and coffee in W Java and of pepper in S 
Sumatera in a harsh way. Daendels new policy was not to treat the Javanese aristo-
cracy as lords over their society, but as officials of the European administration 
with reduced power and income. Such exertion of sovereignty offended the 
Javanese kings and was the cause of many conflicts which sparked off the Java War 
(Ricklefs, 1981). Following the example set by the VOC, which sold land and even 
villages to Chinese merchants to remedy its budget deficit14, Daendels sold large 
tracts of communal land to private European and Chinese entrepreneurs. 
In 1810, a British fleet took the islands of Maluku, Banda and Ternate. In 
August, 1811, the Britsh conquered Jakarta and easily defeated the Dutch colonial 
forces defending Java. Soon, the Dutch colonial government capitulated and the 
English administered Indonesia for five years. Thomas S. Raffles succeeded 
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Daendels as Lieutenant-Governor from 1811-16 (Collins, 1966; Ricklefs, 1981). 
Raffles abandoned the system of enforced planting and product levies and replaced 
it by a system of land rent15. Factually, the English administration could not do 
without the income from product levies. When in 1816, the Dutch resumed power, 
little was maintained of the English reforms. 
2.4. Agriculture in the Dutch East Indies between 1816 and 1870 
2.4.1. Restoration of the Dutch administration. After the defeat of the French 
Emperor Napoleon16, the Netherlands were liberated from French occupation and 
King William I ascended the throne. The Dutch resumed the administration over 
the colony which, till Independence in 1945, was referred to as the Dutch East 
Indies. The return of the Dutch was met with fierce resistance throughout the archi-
pelago. The sultan pretender of Jogyakarta, Prince Dipa Negara, waged war on the 
Dutch after obtaining the support of many Javanese sultans and aristocrats and the 
people of Madura. The savage Java War17 broke out in 1825 and ended in 1830 
with the arrest of Dipa Nigara by the Dutch General de Kock during cease-fire 
negotiations. 
On Sumatera, between 1818 and 1825, reinstatement of the Dutch administ-
ration required several military expeditions to Bangka and Palembang. The unrest 
was fuelled by Raffles who sought to maintain England's hold on Padang and 
Bangkulu. The defeat of the sultans by the Dutch forces signalled the end of the 
Sultanate of Palembang (Woelders, 1921). On the W coast, in the Minangkabau 
districts, Dutch expansionism clashed violently with the first major Islamic revival 
movement in 1819. The Padri war, which coincided with the Java war (1825-
1830), lasted from 1821-38 due to strong support from Aceh to the Padris 
(Ricklefs, 1981). 
2.4.2. The Cultuurstelsel. By 1830, the Dutch had achieved political dominance 
throughout Java. For the first time, they were in a position to exploit and control 
the whole island, and to try to make their involvement profitable. Profit from Java 
was essential because the state of public finance and private enterprise in the 
Netherlands East Indies had become desperate. A global economic depression, that 
began in 1819 in the aftermath of the Napoleonic Wars in Europe, caused a fall in 
prices of agricultural commodities, in particular of coffee. Not only had the colo-
nial government to incur additional debts18 in order to pay for the military expedi-
tions on Sumatera and Java, but also the total value of the exports declined from 
15.25 M NGL in 1825 to 6.4 M NGL in 1830. In the Netherlands, already impov-
erished by the French occupation, the economic situation further deteriorated when 
the Dutch-Belgian Union, created by the Congress of Vienna in 1815, collapsed in 
the Belgian revolt of 1830. In 1839, the Netherlands had to recognize the indepen-
dence of Belgium, and thereby lost the more industrialized southern part of its 
territory (Ricklefs, 1981). 
The Netherlands Government ordered L.P.J, (burggraaf) du Bus de Ghisignies, 
Commissioner-General from 1826 to 1830, to collect locally the means to pay for 
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both inland expenses and contributions to the national income of the Netherlands 
(Reinsma, 1955). Various proposals19 for Java were considered, all sharing a gene-
ral aim of somehow procuring tropical produce at the right volume and price to 
make a profit. Cash crops such as 'Java' coffee (C. arabica), tea, indigo, pepper, 
kapok, gambir, areca, sugar and tobacco showed promise but could not be collect-
ed in sufficient quantities20. The objectives were clear. The colonial government 
should meet its own expenses, repay debts to the Netherlands and, at the same 
time, create local purchasing power to increase the market for Dutch produce such 
as textiles (Mansvelt & Creuzberg, 1975). 
To make the colony pay its way, Count J. van den Bosch, Counsellor to King 
William I, in 1829 designed a clever compulsory cultivation system, the so-called 
cultuurstelsel based on the following principle. The Javanese villages owed a land 
tax21 (landrente) to the government, normally calculated as 40% of the villages' 
main crop, usually rice. As the land tax could not be collected from individual pea-
sants, it was imposed on the villages and the local authorities were made respon-
sible for the collection. Because of inadequate administrative resources and 
shortage of coins, the local administration, from the beginning, had to accept 
payment of taxes in kind. The supervision over the payment of the forced levies 
was entrusted to European civil administrators (Ricklefs, 1981). 
Van den Bosch proposed that each village should set aside part of its land to 
produce export crops - especially coffee, sugar and indigo - for sale at fixed prices 
to the colonial government. Van den Bosch estimated that the produce of 1/5 of the 
sawah, calculated at a labour input of 66 days per ha per year (Fasseur, 1977), 
would suffice to cover the village's land tax commitment. For the village there 
should be a trade-off between payment of land tax based on rice production and 
acquiring a cash income from sales of export crops to the government. Instead of 
an uncertain land tax revenue the government would acquire tropical produce so 
cheaply that it could compete on the world market. The produce would be shipped 
to Europe by the Netherlands Trading Company (NHM: Nederlandsche Handel-
Maatschappij). This company was set up in 1824 upon the King's initiative with 
the objective of breaking English and American dominance of shipping in the 
Malay-Indonesian area and bringing transportation revenues to the Netherlands. 
King William I accepted van den Bosch's proposal and appointed him as the 
Governor-General (1830-33). 
In practice, there were wide variations in the application of van den Bosch's ideas 
from one area to another on Java. His concept of benefit for all turned into one of the 
more purely exploitative episodes of colonial history. Local officials, both Dutch and 
Indonesians, set both the land tax assessment and the level of crop production for 
each village, then compelled the village to produce. Crop payments substantially 
increased the amount of cash in circulation and the specialisation of labour. As the 
payment for the crop rose, officials used this as a justification to increase land tax 
assessment, so that much of the extra crop payment flowed back into the hands of the 
government. The cultuurstelsel developed into forced delivery (dwangcultuur) of 
export crops to the government, rather similar to the system which the VOC had 
imposed for coffee deliveries in Priangan in the 18th century. In 1826, the colonial 
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government made a credit of 1 M NGL available to initiate sugar production on high 
authority22 by large plantations (Mansvelt & Creuzberg, 1975). 
The officials, both Dutch and Indonesian, who had to implement the new 
scheme, were paid percentages on crop deliveries. The aristocratic elite throughout 
Java made great profits through the percentage money, their position became more 
secure and hereditary succession to official posts became the norm. The percent-
age allowance made them, however, directly dependent upon Dutch rule for their 
position and income, and unloved by their subjects as they had to organize the 
coercion needed for the cultuurstelsel to function. The allowance became a source 
of corruption and abuse and a stimulus to extortionate demands upon the villages. 
As a system of land exploitation the cultuurstelsel covered only a small per-
centage of total arable land on Java. Excluding areas for coffee grown on land not 
suitable for rice, only 6% of cultivated land was involved in 1840. There were 
major regional variations, but the highest official figures were for Bangelen and 
Pekalongan, where 15% of the land was committed to government crops in 1840. 
The investment of Javanese and Sundanese labour was massive. Fasseur (1977) 
calculated that in all of Java 57% of the labour force was involved in production 
of government crops in 1840 (Ricklefs, 1981). Van Niel (1968) concluded for the 
period of 1837-51 that over 70% of farmer families were producing export crops, 
over half of them coffee. 
The results of the cultuurstelsel for the Dutch were obvious. The system led to 
a dramatic acceleration in the production of export crops on Java so that, at long 
last, steady and immense profitability was achieved. By 1831, the colonial budget 
was balanced, and thereafter the old debts of the VOC were paid off and enormous 
remittances were sent to the Netherlands. The impact of the cultuurstelsel on the 
welfare of the peasantry became visible during the 1840s. Signs of hardship among 
the Javanese and Sundanese began to appear, rice production showed a continuous 
decline while prices rose sharply. The situation worsened when the colonial gov-
ernment further increased the land tax and other impositions to meet financial 
crises occurring in the Netherlands Trading Company and the Java budget. An 
ensuing mass flight from villages led to even more rice land falling out of pro-
duction. The expansion of the cultuurstelsel had reached its limits. Between 1845-
50 exports of coffee, indigo and sugar decreased. 
Opposition to the cultuurstelsel now grew in the Netherlands (Reinsma, 1955). 
The Dutch government began to doubt whether the system was still tenable, 
despite its renewed profitability. In 1848, a liberal constitution gave the Dutch 
Parliament (States-General) a position of influence in colonial affairs. Fasseur 
(1980) observed that the liberal criticism increased just at the time when the 
cultuurstelsel accumulated more revenue for the Dutch treasury than at any time 
before. This explains why the liquidation of the cultuurstelsel took so much politi-
cal fighting. 
The result of the debate in the Netherlands was the piecemeal dismantling of 
the cultuurstelsel throughout the Netherlands East Indies. The first to go were the 
least profitable crops, pepper in 1862, clove and nutmeg in 1864, indigo, tea and 
cinnamon in 1865, and tobacco in 1866. After 1850, profits from coffee and sugar23 
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rose sharply as the world prices of these commodities went up. Coffee and sugar 
contributed 96 per cent of total profits of the cultuurstelsel between 1850 and 1860 
(Fasseur, 1977) and they were the last to be abolished. The Sugar Law of 1870 
decreed that the government withdraw from sugar cultivation over 12 years24, 
beginning in 1878. Coffee cultivation on high authority, retained in a much less 
rigid form, was abolished slowly from the 1870s. It finally came to an end in Pri-
angan - where it had begun a hundred years earlier - in 1917, and along the N coast 
of Java in 1919 (Ricklefs, 1981). 
2.4.3. The rise of private estate agriculture. In the first decade of the 19th cen-
tury, under Governor-General Deandels, large tracks of communal land had 
already been sold to Chinese and European planters. By 1811, it had become com-
mon practice for apanaged25 persons in the Principalities of C Java to lease large 
complexes of their alloted land to Western entrepreneurs, and to supply them with 
labour: the so-called Vorstenlandsche Huurlanden or 'Principality Leaseholds'. 
Apanaged persons saw the advantage of letting extensive sections of their land for 
the purpose of cultivating commercial crops on plantations (Mansvelt & 
Creuzberg, 1975). Thus around 1835, quite a number of coffee plantations were 
operated by private enterprise on rented and private lands. From 1856 onwards, 
lands outside the sultanates of C Java were rented out, 30,000 ha being let by 1870. 
Several government imposed cultures could only exist through the collabora-
tion of private enterprise. In the case of sugarcane, for example, after several fail-
ures with sugar factories under government control, the processing of cane was 
contracted to private entrepreneurs who built the installations to produce sugar. 
Usually, the government provided interest-free advances26 for the construction and 
installation of sugar factories, which had to be repaid in the form of processed 
produce27. Aided in this way by public establishment and harvest credits the sug-
arcane contractors accumulated a great deal of experience in large-scale agricul-
ture. When the Government regime began to loosen its hold in the 1850s and when 
after 1856 wasteland could be let to large agricultural enterprises, the sugar 
contractors endeavoured to develop new, non-sugar enterprises such as tobacco 
and tea (Koningsberger, 1948). 
The year 1870, in which the "Agrarian Legislation' was enacted, marks the 
beginning of the plantation industry. The Act enabled to contract long leases28 on 
uncultivated land for the purposes of estate agriculture. The upland estates planted 
coffee, tea, cinchona and cassava on land that had been newly opened up. The low-
land plantations grew sugarcane, cocao and tobacco. According to the Sugar Act, 
the sugar industry was handed over to private contractors in steps from 1870 to 
1891 (Reinsma, 1955). 
In the 19th century it was mainly Java where the large agricultural enterprises 
grew up (Wormser, 1942). By 1860, private and government exports from all over 
the Netherlands East Indies were roughly equal in value, but by 1885 private 
exports were ten times those of the government. The number of European civilians 
in Java increased rapidly, from 17,285 in 1852 to 62,477 in 1900 (Ricklefs, 1981). 
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2.4.4. The state of indigenous agriculture (bevolkingscultuur). In the 1850s, the 
plight of the rice farmers in the irrigated areas under the Cultuurstelsel had become 
quite unbearable. Inspector of Cultures H. van der Poel (1864) noted that seed beds 
and sawahs were poorly irrigated and tilled and weeds little controlled. The seed 
was of inferior quality and seedlings were transplanted much too early and too 
close. The best rice lands were requisitioned for growing sugarcane, indigo and 
tobacco. The time required for maturation and harvesting of the sugarcane, and the 
competition for irrigation water, made it difficult to achieve a steady rotation with 
rice. Rice shortages appeared, and the price of rice fluctuated widely. The people 
were exposed to frequent natural disasters such as inundations, prolonged droughts 
and pests which made total crop failure a common phenomenon. Serious inciden-
ces of famine and epidemics diseases ravaged C Java, particularly in the residen-
cies Cirebon and Semarang (regencies Grobogan and Demak29) (de Bruijn, 1869). 
Between 1847-64, the Department of Internal Affairs dispatched numerous direc-
tives30 to the local administrators for the improvement of rice cultivation. Some 
socially-minded civil administrators31 and planters advocated extension and tech-
nical assistance. The planter K.F. Holle32 wrote various instructional leaflets on 
rice cultivation and edited a periodical 'The friend of the Javanese farmer'. 
The colonial administration began to adjust its policy on indigenous agriculture 
(Lohnis, 1895). In 1866, the obligation of storing rice seed in communal stores was 
terminated in view of common corruption, theft and seed spoilage. Farmers stored 
and traded their own seed for better quality. In the 1870s, several commissions 
were installed for the improvement of rice production. In 1873, Chief Inspector of 
Cultures J.H.F. Sollewijn Gelpke (1874) was sent to Italy to study modern rice 
cultivation. From 1877 onwards, experiments were undertaken with introduced 
other crops such as groundnut, cassava, soybean and some European vegetables. 
Sollewijn Gelpke (1874) noted that the area planted to rice and non-rice food crops 
(palawija) was underestimated. In the uplands, palawija and garden production 
was more important than rice. In 1882, the number of inspectors was doubled to 
demonstrate single grain and row seeding of rice. In 1886, the colonial government 
sanctioned field demonstrations for farmers on account of the public budget. 
2.5. Scientific development in agriculture between 1870 and 1945 
2.5.1. The beginning of agricultural research. The founding, in 1817, of the go-
vernment's Botanical Gardens ('s Lands Plantentuiri) at Bogor33 by C.G. Rein-
wardt34 can be viewed as the beginning of agricultural research in Indonesia 
(Koningsberger, 1917). Although its objective was the collection35 and study of 
useful and scientifically interesting plants, the scientists at the botanical garden ini-
tially had no eye for practical issues in farming. These were left to local civil 
administrators {Binnenlandsch Bestuur), who were explicitly given the task of 
supervising the cultivation of food crops in 184736. During the years 1837-44, the 
garden's living collections were replanted and arranged in strict systematical order. 
In the 1850s, the collection was expanded with food and commercial crops. In 
1868, under its second director, R.H.C. Scheffer, the Plantentuin became an 
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independent institution. More scientists were employed and the laboratory and gar-
den facilities were extended (Treub 1892; Koningsberger, 1917). 
In 1876, as the oldest part of the Agricultural Research Institution at Bogor, the 
economic gardens (cultuurtuin) were established for testing of newly introduced 
species and varieties of rice, coffee, cocoa, rubber and shade trees (e.g. Albizia and 
Eucalyptus). In 1876, an Agricultural School was opened in the Cultuurtuin, which 
had separate divisions for Indonesian and European students (Treub, 1892, 1899). 
After 1880, when Melchior Treub37 was appointed Director of the Plantentuin, 
the application of science to crop production developed rapidly (Anonymus, 1954). 
When, in 1880, Treub started the search for the causal agent of sereh, a devastat-
ing disease of sugarcane, the emphasis of the research changed from taxonomical 
work to practical cultivation problems38. Treub never identified the causal agent, 
but his way of addressing the problem led to much development work in sugarca-
ne and great results later on. In 1883, a zoologist began to study insects and an 
agronomist investigated the diseases of Deli tobacco (Koningsberger, 1895, 1898, 
1903; Zehntner, 1903; Dammerman, 1918, 1919). 
In 1884, the Foreigners' Laboratory of the Plantentuin was founded as the first 
botanical station in the tropics. Between 1883 and 1935 this Bogor station 
accommodated more than 250 visiting scientists. Initially, there were but few 
Dutch scientists39 among them, because in the Netherlands research was not 
encouraged for lack of interest and doubt about its usefulness to society. It is 
Treub's foresight and merit to involve the Plantentuin in the development of biolo-
gical science at large (Treub 1899). 
In 1890, a Laboratory for Soil Research and a 'Botanical Laboratories' depart-
ment were added to the Plantentuin, the latter for the study of the ecology and 
anatomy of tropical economic plants and their diseases. Since the emphasis was on 
plant diseases the botanical laboratory was often referred to as the Phytopatholo-
gical Laboratory (Dammerman, 1919, Mededeelingen, 1915). In 1901, a new Zool-
ogical Museum was built and, in 1903, a Museum for Technical and Commercial 
Botany. About the same time an agro-chemical laboratory was erected, the Pharma-
cological (later Phytochemical) Laboratory. In 1910 a separate Department for Plant 
Pathology was instituted, so that the botanical laboratories could henceforth be used 
for general botanical studies (Mededeelingen 1-35, 1912-18). In 1914, a new 
foreigners' laboratory, named 'Treub Laboratory' in honour of the famous Dutch 
scientist, was funded by former visiting scientists (Koningsberger, 1917). 
2.5.2. Private research stations. The institution of the Agrarian Law, and of the Long 
Lease Ordinance in particular, caused a rapid development of estates, mostly owner-
operated. Regional planters' associations were created, the first in 1881. Apart from 
engaging in social activities, the associations discussed technical problems. Soon, the 
regional associations held annual or bi-annual meetings which, amongst others, invit-
ed scientists to give their views on important problems. Proceedings were printed and 
circulated and it was not long before certain associations pooled resources to employ 
one or more scientists. The estate owners frequently consulted the Plantentuin insti-
tutions, in particular the agro-chemical and botanical laboratories, for technical advice. 
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In 1881, the Java sugar industry was endangered by the sereh disease of cane, 
and by low sugar prices due to heavy competition from the European beet sugar 
industry. The sugarcane planters decided to finance research on the cause of sereh 
and on the improvement of sugar quality. They founded three private sugar re-
search stations in Tegal, W Java (1885), Semarang, C Java, (1886) and Pasuruan, 
E Java (1987). The three stations collaborated ever more on solving disease and 
resistance problems. In 1925, two stations remained which were merged into the 
Central Association for Sugar Research with a chemical-technical department in 
Pekalongan, W Java, and a Cultivation department in Pasuruan, E Java. The latter 
became the Central Research Centre for the Java Sugar Industry at Pasuruan, E 
Java (Koningsberger, 1948; Hadiwigoeno, 1985; Handojo et al, 1987). 
In the 1890s, Treub became convinced that the other planters' associations 
should also establish private research centres. Treub wanted each commodity 
group to organize the funding needed to operate its own research station within the 
fold of a future Department of Agriculture4*'. Treub argued that a period of prepa-
ration would be needed to make the transition from a centralized research and 
extension capacity at Bogor to independent centres41. The colonial government 
authorized Treub to employ for the time being scientists who, although being paid 
by private organizations, would work under his supervision (Koningsberger, 
1917). 
The tea industry was the first to make an agreement with Bogor for chemical 
research. The tobacco planters from Deli, who struggled with a persistent seedling 
disease42 in the nurseries, were second to found, in 1896, a private research station 
in cooperation with Treub. The Plantentuin pathologist J. van Breda de Haan was 
appointed director of the Tobacco Experiment Station of the Deli Planters' 
Association {Deli Planters Vereeniging, DPV) at Medan (Jochems et al, 1931; 
Modderman et al, 1929). The third semi-private institution was the zoological re-
search laboratory at Bogor, established in 1894, for which the funding was provi-
ded by banks and other institutions with interests in the sugar and coffee industries 
(Koningsberger, 1917). 
Around the turn of the century an experimental station (proefstatiori) was set up 
for each export commodity crop, often as a result of cooperation with the Bogor 
institutions in the 1890s. Research stations for coffee and cacao at Salatiga (1901), 
tea in Bogor (1902), tobacco in Klaten (1907), coffee in Malang (1910), tobacco 
in Jember (1911), rubber in Bogor and Medan (1916). Apart from the internation-
ally renown Deli Tobacco Research Station and the Rubber Research Station43 at 
Medan, N Sumatera, the development of the private research institutes generally 
was a turbulent process. The main cause of the turbulence was that employed staff 
were usually scientists with little experience in the very practical issues plantation 
managers were interested in, such as land preparation, seeding, fertilising, com-
batting diseases, and processing. It took until the 1920s before the stations had 
established a balance between fundamental research and more practical extension-
like activities. As long as it was unclear what members would get for their money, 
many of the smaller owner-operated plantations did not join the research associa-
tions (Van der Eng, 1993). 
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Each proefstation had its Proefstation Vereeniging, the association of estate 
owners providing the funds. Most private research stations remained very small, 
their staff not numbering more than ten senior scientists even in the 1920s. The 
Sugar Research Institute was the biggest with 35 European staff at Pasuruan, 15 
more at regional centres and about 200 Indonesian staff in charge of the POJ field 
experiments (Handojo et al, 1987; Pawirosemadi & Wirioatmodjo, 1986) 
2.5.3. Establishment of the Department of Agriculture. At the end of the 19th 
century, over 75% of the labour force was entirely dependent on indigenous agri-
culture for its income. Indigenous agriculture was, in spite of its indispensable sta-
bilizing influence on the Netherlands East Indies' society as the producer of major 
food crops, very much neglected. A comparable situation existed in the Nether-
lands, where the society became concerned about the standard of living of the 
farmers. During the 1890s, greater efforts on agricultural research, education and 
extension began to yield promising results for the Dutch farmers. This increased 
interest in the possibility of furthering peasant agriculture in the Dutch East Indies 
too through systematic research and through extension by means of demonstration 
fields. When Treub advanced his initiatives for a Department of Agriculture, there 
was a dearth of fundamental knowledge on many aspects of indigenous agricul-
ture. There was a need for research in all directions, such as on pests, diseases, soil 
fertility, crop varieties and physiology. Treub was convinced that varietal selection 
and field experimentation could not be entrusted to farmers (Treub 1899, 1902). 
Farmers could neither bear the risk of crop failures nor could they sufficiently con-
trol the variables to obtain meaningful test results (Van der Eng, 1993). 
On January 1st, 190544, the Department of Agriculture (Do A) was established 
and Melchior Treub was appointed as the first Director (Box 2.5.3). DoA's fore-
most task was the improvement of indigenous agriculture, animal husbandry and 
fisheries. Between 1905-10, the Plantentuin institutions45, which before had 
worked primarily for the large estate crops, served as the core of the Department. 
In the following years, sections of other departments were transferred to DoA, such 
as agricultural education and the Veterinary Service from the Department of 
Education, and the sections for government coffee and cinchona plantations from 
the Department of Internal Affairs (Treub, 1902; Bernard, 1930). 
New research institutes were founded, among which the Experiment Station for 
Rice and Second Food Crops (Proefstation voor Rijst en Tweede Gewasseri) in 
1907. Agricultural extension remained the responsibility of the local civil 
administration46. It was, however, Treub's conviction that the result of research 
should be brought to the farmers through a network of demonstration fields rather 
than directly via extension (Treub, 1910). 
Treub stepped down as Director of Agriculture in 1909. His successor, H.J. 
Lovink47, had more practical ideas about the working of DoA. He favoured direct 
contacts with farmers so that researchers and extension would gather field experien-
ce (Bernard, 1930). In 1910, Lovink upgraded DoA's section in charge of the demon-
stration fields to Agricultural Extension Service and expanded the tasks of the 
department. The Plantentuin institutions were re-assigned to fundamental research, 
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Box 2.5.3 
Treub's initiatives for a Department of Agriculture 
In 1899 Melchior Treub, director of the Plantentuin since 1880, pleaded for 
the establishment of a separate Department of Agriculture (DoA). The 
Departments of Agriculture, Industry and Trade and of Cultures had admin-
istrated the sector, but they had little technical expertise and had no voice in 
the planning of irrigation projects. Treub contended that the local civil 
administration {Binnenlandsch Bestuur) had no capacity to improve farm 
agriculture. Treub (1902) proposed an organisation modelled after the DoA 
of the United States of America. The American department was organized as 
a technical institute with a strong basis in agricultural research, and without 
much involvement in administrative work. In Germany and England, a DoA 
had predominantly an administrative task and, at the most, technical control 
over experimental stations and data collecting institutions. Scientific research 
was taken care of by universities. Treub's proposal was two-pronged: 
a. research on tropical agriculture should be undertaken in situ because its 
problems were location specific, and; b. in the Netherlands Indies funda-
mental research was mainly done by or in collaboration with the Plantentuin 
institutions. Similar to the U.S. DoA, the Plantentuin included divisions for 
botany, chemistry, vegetable physiology, phytopathology and entomology, 
soil science, and weather. Treub reminded that the Plantentuin, not in the 
least through its Foreigner's Laboratory, had acquired international fame and 
had contributed substantially to the rise of plantation agriculture. Henceforth, 
Treub recommended to establish DoA from within the Plantentuin at Bogor 
by expanding its infrastructure. His ideal was that the Department would 
become the nucleus of agricultural extension for the entire Netherlands East 
Indies, both for European plantation and for farm agriculture. 
whilst other institutes were set up to solve the practical problems of peasant agri-
culture. When estate organisations gradually established their own research institutes 
(Roepke, 1920; Meijer, 1936), DoA terminated its work on coffee, tea and tobacco at 
the botanic garden laboratories. But it continued the research for minor estate and 
smallholder crops, such as kapok, sisal, citronella and coconut (van Gorkum, 1917). 
DoA expanded rapidly and became involved in the preparation and implemen-
tation of Government policies. An example was DoA intervention in a financial cri-
sis of the Experimental Stations for the Bergcultures due to failing contribution by 
estate companies. The problem was solved through the founding of the General 
Syndicate of Highland Crops (Algemeen Syndicaat voor Bergcultures) in 1925. 
DoA joined the Syndicate with all government-owned estates for cinchona, coffee, 
tea and rubber, and supported all measures taken in the interest of the bergcul-
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fares48 (Meijer, 1936; Toxopeus & Wessel, 1983). During World War I and imme-
diately after, and especially during the 1930s, a range of economic policies occu-
pied DoA's officials. Their activities soon extended beyond agriculture with the 
establishment of new services for trade and industry. 
2.5.4. Development of peasant and smallholder agriculture. At the end of the 
19th century the peasant farmers of Java, Madura and Bali grew rice as the main 
crop (van der Veer, 1948). The common system of production on their labour inten-
sive, mini-sized farms was directed at self-sufficiency, but its massive scale pro-
vided a stable basis for further development of the export cultures and other eco-
nomic expansion (Hasselman, 1914; Vink, 1941). Production for self-sufficiency 
made the farmers relatively independent of fluctuating market prices. Labour 
participation and yield sharing were socially integrated to an extent that capital and 
profit remained of minor prominence at village level. However, under influence of 
European-controlled agriculture and commerce, money had begun to play a grea-
ter role in the peasant society. The improvement of infrastructure and transport and 
payment of wages created markets and thereby the wish for more purchasing 
power. The change to market production required an adaptation of traditional far-
ming methods (Hasselman, 1914; Scheltema, 1931; Bottema, 1995). Initially the 
farmers tried to compensate the shortage of cash money and credit by rationali-
sation in labour intensity, without engaging other production factors. Paying less 
care to soil tillage, weeding and planting caused the yields per hectare to decrease, 
but did not necessarily affect financial returns of farming. Demonstrations of the 
'system Holle' (single grain seeding to reduce seed requirement, dry seed beds, 
row planting to allow use of weeding tools, and cultivar selection) in the 1880s and 
1890s showed farmers ways of efficient cost reduction (Hasselman, 1914). Inten-
sification, for instance through use of selected rice seed and fertilizer, came with-
in their reach through the development of credit systems (Van der Stok, 1910, 
1926; Bottema, 1995). A bank at Purwokerto was the first, in 1899, to offer credit 
to farmers. From 1901 onwards, a chain of agricultural credit banks was set up on 
Java and the Outer Islands. In 1903, the old system of village rice seed stores was 
reintroduced to guarantee seed supply to farmers in famine stricken areas such as 
the regencies Demak and Grobogan. In 1906, funds were released to intensify field 
demonstrations of non-rice food (palawija) crops in the same areas (Hasselman, 
1914; Hirsch, 1929). Such concerted government efforts to improve farm agricul-
ture made farmers more enterprising and receptive for technical advise. 
Intensification became very evident in the changing character of farmers' home 
gardens (erfkultuur) on Java and Madura. Mixed home garden crops were grown 
with such skill that surplus production of fruits, native vegetables, spices, etherical 
oil grasses (citronella, vetiver and sereh) and herbs added substantially to farmers' 
income. Gradually, commercial fruit orchards and enterprises for European type 
vegetables and flowers with a highly specialized and localized character came into 
existence (ch 6.2). These new types of cultivation greatly increased trade turn over, 
especially at the local level, which does not appear in export statistics (Van der 
Stok, 1926). 
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On the Outer Islands, intensification became visible in the growth of indige-
nous rubber and coffee smallholdings, particularly on land formerly reserved for 
ladang cultivation. Smallholders tended to invest more in export crops so that their 
rubber, coffee and sugercane gardens produced yields comparable to those of the 
estates (Thee, 1969). Growing tobacco and oil palm was more difficult for small-
holders and was moreover opposed by the planters' associations. Smallholding 
cultivation became the source of rapidly increasing purchasing power of the peo-
ple on the Outer Islands. Acceptable data on smallholder agriculture are only avai!-
able for the islands of Java and Madura (Scheltema, 1931). 
2.5.5. Food production by farmers. Early in the 1920s, indigenous food produc-
tion in Indonesia fell behind in comparison with population growth. In 1921, more 
than 475,0001 of milled rice and over 90,000 t of soybeans had to be imported by 
the Dutch East Indies. The annual import requirement for rice remained at the same 
high level during the whole decade 1926-35. When, moreover, the global econo-
mic crisis of the mid-1930s curtailed the market for Indonesia's traditional planta-
tion exports, the colonial administration introduced a price policy in support of 
domestic food production. The setting of floor prices for rice assured the farmers 
a fair return and hence encouraged indigenous production. By subjecting imports 
to price-equalizing duties in 1934, the influx of cheap rice from Burma, Indochina 
(Vietnam) and Siam could gradually be stemmed. On Java, rice production increa-
sed and, by 1936, local supply exceeded demand, the surplus being shipped to the 
Outer Islands. In 1941, Indonesia as a whole became a net exporter of rice notwith-
standing the mean annual population growth of 1.5% (Metcalf, 1952). 
Self-sufficiency was achieved both through an expansion of the area harvested 
and an increase in production per hectare. In the period 1921-41, the area planted 
was extended by more than 1.5 M ha (Bolhuis, 1950). Since not much wild land 
was left, the greatest expansion was achieved from rotating non-rice food crops 
(palawija) with rice. The cropping rate on most of the irrigated land, in 1900 a lit-
tle over 100%, increased to 140% around 1940. The cropping rate of dry soils 
increased only from 74% in 1928 to 87% in 1938. The most important food crops 
in order of hectareage were sawah rice, maize, cassava, soybean, dry rice, ground-
nut and sweet potato (Bolhuis, 1950). 
Sawah rice production increased about 10% over the said period due to 
improved cultivars, better irrigation, chemical fertilizer, and crop protection. 
Farmers had learned to prefer high-yielding, more resistant rice cultivars over 
superior consumer quality. Row planting permitting a lower seed rate and impro-
ved weed control with hand tools was by now widely adopted (Kouters, 1992). The 
most important rice pests, rice stem borers and rats, were respectively controlled 
by regulation of the time of sowing49 and by baiting (Gutteling, 1913; 
Dammerman, 1918; Van der Goot, 1925; Van der Stok, 1926). 
2.5.6. Research for peasant and smallholder agriculture. In 1923, the 
Experiment Station for Rice and Other Food Crops and several other research insti-
tutes, among which the botanical garden laboratories and services at Bogor, were 
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amalgamated into the General Agricultural Research Institute (Algemeen Proef-
station voor de Landbouw, APL) (Meijer, 1936). This station consisted of four 
institutes dealing with botany, land management, soils, and phytopathology, 
respectively. As a division of the Agricultural Service of the DoA, the General 
Experiment Station aimed to solve the problems of peasant agriculture. It was 
involved with export crops only in as far as smallholders were concerned (Toxopeus 
&Wessels, 1983). 
Research at the time was not targeted at the development and adoption of pest-
resistant, fertiliser-responsive superior rice varieties. Rather, research was spread 
over a range of fields, which often did not benefit smallholder agriculture directly 
(Breman, 1983). There was simply not enough knowledge about indigenous agri-
culture to identify the major constraints to development, nor to decide on research 
priorities. Although there were no interdisciplinary research programs, personal 
contacts between senior staff, mostly graduates from Dutch Universities working 
in different sections at Bogor, and frequent publication of results enabled exchange 
of views and openmindedness (van Bijlert, 1921). Dialogue between researchers 
and extensionists was encouraged (Geerts, 1931; Kuijper, 1932). 
The greatest increase in production per hectare was usually achieved in those 
crops for which intensive selection work at the General Agricultural Research 
Station of Bogor was supported by the agricultural extension service with field tri-
als, demonstrations and publicity. The value of the surplus in production obtained 
through the collaboration of research and extension was such that it could easily 
pay for the operational costs of these services (Bolhuis, 1950). 
Selection and breeding work was no longer restricted to the Cultuurtuin in 
Bogor because the ex situ results obtained there in earlier years had caused many 
disappointments in rice and other food crops. Selection trials on different locations 
and soil types {in situ) gave better practical information on growth duration, fertil-
izer demand, cultivar suitability and resistance to pests and diseases (Schwartz & 
Hartley, 1927). In 1942, the General Research Station maintained 31 experimental 
gardens throughout Java (Van der Eng, 1993). Early in the 1940s, tens of improved 
rice cultivars were available for testing of which several cultivars became popular 
(Bolhuis, 1950). DoA operated 57 seed farms on Java but their capacity was still 
too low to satisfy the demand for high quality seed. Inevitably, the amazingly large 
number of rice cultivars available in the villages throughout the archipelago 
disappeared in the process of modernization. 
2.6. Rice production in Independent Indonesia, 1946-present 
During the Japanese occupation, Dutch civil servants were imprisoned and 
most Indonesian personnel forced to seek other employment. The situation after 
August 1945 was chaotic and it took many months before the public and private 
sectors came back into operation. In the following years, the Indonesian demand 
for Independence led to a military confrontation with the Dutch army. The fighting 
inflicted more damage to agricultural installations and estates and foreign agricul-
tural activities almost came to halt. 
Indonesia obtained its Independence on December 27, 1949, but remained con-
28 Wageningen Agricultural University Papers 99-1 (1999) 
nected with the Netherlands in a Union relationship till 1956. The new nation 
established its authority over all islands which belonged to the former Dutch East 
Indies. New Republican Institutions were established, among which a Ministry of 
Agriculture (MoA). Finally, the rehabilitation of agriculture could begin. 
2.6.1. Food production after World War II. Many problems facing Indonesian 
agriculture after Independence were similar to those existing during colonial days. 
Therefore, the new government's approach to their solution largely continued the 
policy and programs initiated under the Dutch colonial administration. Thus, the 
Indonesians continued with agricultural extension, technical research and experi-
mentation along the same patterns of operation as before (Honig & Verdoorn, 
1945; Verdoorn, 1945; Coolhaas, 1948). 
Under the Japanese occupation, 1942-45, large numbers of draft animals for 
ploughing were slaughtered, the heavy military requisitions for rice reduced the 
farmers' willingness to work and the elaborate irrigation systems were not kept in 
good repair. Hence, in 1945 rice production on Java was 20% less than before the 
war. During 1946/47, a severe drought caused wide-spread crop failures which 
worsened the food shortage. After 1948, rice production improved again, but the 
need to import rice became bigger due to the growing population. Shortages rose 
to 425,000 t of milled rice (beras) in 1951. Rice was imported from Thailand, 
Burma and the United States of America under the Mutual Security Agency 
allocations (Metcalf, 1952). 
Throughout the 1950s, the basic problem facing smallholder agriculture 
remained the production of sufficient food to keep up with the rapid population 
growth. In 1949, the Government of Indonesia (Gol) launched an Economic 
Urgency Plan, called the 'Special Welfare Plan for Smallholder Agriculture and 
Fisheries' which had as its main objective to improve rice cultivation in Indonesia. 
The recommended measures included rehabilitation of irrigation systems, use of 
improved seeds, fertilizers, crop protection and the conversion of estate lands to 
rice cultivation. Six research stations, 200 seed farms, 230 demonstration farms 
and over 1,000 farmer training centres would be set up. The pre-war practice of 
establishing transmigration schemes in the Outer Islands was brought up again 
(Metcalf, 1952). 
Several pre-conditions had to be fulfilled before such a far-reaching Plan could 
implemented. The agricultural research apparatus should be strengthened, exten-
sion improved and the farmers' communities organized. To begin with, MoA revi-
talized the pre-war cooperative movement by providing credit and grants to exist-
ing and new agricultural cooperatives. By 1950, the cooperative movement count-
ed more than 4,000 societies (Metcalf, 1952). 
2.6.2. Agricultural research since Independence, 1949. The work at the Central 
Agricultural Research Station (Algemeen Proefstation voor de Landbouw, APL) at 
Bogor could be resumed in 1947 only. Many of the European and Indonesian 
experts had died or did not come back (Verdoorn, 1945; Honig & Verdoorn, 1945). 
A great deal of the research equipment, collections of plant species and germ-
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plasm, archives, herbaria and books had disappeared and parts of the gardens had 
been destroyed. Colonial agriculture, however, left Indonesia a class of highly 
experienced garden-, plantation- and factory attendants {mandur) who contributed 
enormously to the restauration of the public and private sectors. In 1948, the three 
experimental stations for highland crops (bergcultures) on Java were merged into 
one institute, the Central Association of Research Stations (Centrale Proefstation 
Vereeniging, CPV) in Bogor (Toxopeus & Wessel, 1983). It had experimental gar-
dens50 for testing of selected cultivars and the propagation of budwood and seed, 
and a strong extension service. The CPV stations served all highland crop estates 
in Indonesia, except in NE Sumatera which had its own Research Institute of the 
Sumatera Planters Association (RISPA, formerly AVROS). 
Research too was interrupted by the struggle for independence. The Central 
Agricultural Research Station (APL) lost four-fifth of its Dutch senior staff mem-
bers and there were few qualified Indonesians to take their place. After Indepen-
dence, some Dutch scientists returned to Bogor under FAO technical assistance 
projects, whilst the United States sponsored a few experts for fundamental re-
search. Some Indonesians were sent to degree courses abroad, many others attend-
ed crash courses at the Agricultural College. This did not solve the problem since 
many of the agricultural graduates preferred employment by private research stati-
ons or agribusiness to lowly paid positions in the civil service. On the whole, there 
was a structural shortage of qualified manpower well into the 1970s. Research 
went into a state of general neglect because budgets were largely spent on salaries 
and institutional capacity, whilst personnel was scattered around in frequent reor-
ganisations. Foreign assistance gave some relief but could not reverse the decline. 
Matters began to improve in the late 1960s. The administrative fragmentation 
of research institutes was reversed with the re-establishment of the Central Re-
search Institute for Agriculture (CRIA)51 in Bogor and its sub-stations. In view of 
the importance of the agriculture for the economy of Indonesia, the budget for agri-
cultural research was increased. Extra funds were made available for overseas 
eduction, local training and rehabilitation of research facilities (van der Eng, 1993). 
2.6.3. Policy development, rice and other food crops 
2.6.3.1. Rice production and the National Five-year Plans 1950-70. In the 
1950s, the area on Java and Madura planted with rice amounted to some 3.5 M ha 
of which 90% sawah and 10% upland rice (padi gogo). At the time, only 17% of 
sawah land was double cropped because of lack of water. The total area of rice in 
the Outer Islands was estimated at about 2.4 M ha annually. The 1951 production 
of rough rice (padi) on Java and Madura was estimated at 6.5 M tonnes with an 
average yield of about 2.2 t/ha. Total padi production in Indonesia was estimated 
at 10 M tonnes, almost equal to the pre-war annual production level. Since the 
growth in production did not keep up with the growth in population, the per caput 
rice output declined from 200 kg in 1880 to 130 kg in 1965 (Booth, 1985). 
During the 1950s and early 1960s, Indonesia went through a period of eco-
nomic and political instability. Rural development stagnated and the Gol had to 
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import up to 10% of the domestic rice consumption (Mears, 1981). By 1965/66, 
the high import requirements for food, fertilizer and other inputs had exhausted the 
treasury's foreign currency reserve. Rice imports dropped drastically causing 
severe food scarcity, rampant inflation and price increases of over 500%. The en-
suing political turmoil brought a transition of political leadership. President 
Sukarno was ousted and President Suharto formed a new government (Palmier, 
1965). 
The 'New Order' government launched, in 1969, a series of National Five-year 
Development Plans52 (Pelitas), intended to improve the living standard of the poor 
and to create an economically balanced development. Agriculture for food secur-
ity and export commodity production became a priority sector. The first Five-year 
Plan (Repelita I, 1969-74) named the following research objectives: a. self-suffi-
ciency in production of rice, corn and other palawija crops to be attained by 1979; 
b. increased production of agricultural export commodities and import substitution 
products; c. more effective use and conservation of land and water resources, and; 
d. improved social and economic well-being of the farmers through more equitable 
distribution of benefits. 
Institutions for research and extension were almost continuously reorganized 
because responsibility for agricultural research and development in DoA had been 
divided over five Directorates General, i.e. Food Crops, Estate Crops, Forestry, 
Fisheries and Animal Husbandry. This resulted in bureaucracy and inefficiency. To 
improve research management a special Agency for Agricultural Research and 
Development (AARD) was established within the MoA by Presidential Decree in 
1974 (AARD, 1981, 1986; Anonymous, 1986b). 
AARD's mandate and organizational structure were specified in a Ministerial 
Decree of 1975. AARD's research programs reflected the priorities set out in the 
National Five-Year Development Plans. AARD was financed by the government 
and obtained additional funds from international and foreign national agencies 
through loans and grants. During the period 1981-86, the government allocation 
amounted to 230 M US$ and donor funding to 170 M US$ 170. 
2.6.3.2. Intensification efforts in rice production. To implement the govern-
ment's program not only the research institutions but also the Agricultural 
Extension Service had to be reorganized. Demonstrations to show the farmers 
innovations in cultivation technology, as done before World War II, had no effect. 
The Extension Service was understaffed and poorly trained, had a small budget and 
stuck to its old ineffective methods. To break the deadlock, the Gol undertook a 
series of intensification programs which were all based on the same principles but 
differed in implementation. These principles included a. improved extension to 
encourage farmers to grow improved varieties, use more fertilizers and pesticides, 
control pests, adopt better cultivation technology and make better use of water; b. 
provision and distribution of the needed input factors; c. organisation of a farmer 
credit system with repayment in harvested produce; and d. price stabilisation and 
improvement of marketing. 
Three campaigns were initiated prior to 1965, the Padi Centres Program from 
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1959 to 1962; an Action Research project in 1963/64, and; a Demas (Demonstrasi 
masal, mass demonstration) campaign in 1964/65. However, these programs cov-
ered such limited hectareage that they had no effect on the national rice production. 
In 1965, the Gol launched two nation-wide intensification programs in rice, Bimas 
(Bimbingan masal, Mass guidance) and Inmas {Intensifikasi masal, Mass 
intensification). In 1968, the first real large scale program called Bimas Gotong 
Royong ('Gotong royong' = mutual cooperation) was implemented (Hadisapoetro, 
1970). 
A brief discussion of these programs is given below because they were the 
cause of later pest outbreaks and IPM programs in Indonesia. The Padi Centres 
Program commenced in 1959 with the installation of ten padi centres in C and E 
Java. The target was to establish 250 centres for coordination of all project activi-
ties by 1962 on an area of 1.5 M ha. Right from its start, the project lacked expe-
rienced manpower, logistic means and funds needed to run such a complicated 
input distribution, credit and repayment scheme. Repayment of loans by farmers, 
in the form of dry padi53 collected after harvest, proved to be a bottleneck. Even 
after the terms of repayment and interest rates were revised, repayment stagnated, 
falling to 52% in W Java in 1960. The Ministry of Agriculture terminated the Padi 
Centres project in 1963 and transferred their task, in particular input distribution, 
to the state-owned enterprise P.N. Pertani54. Birowo (1975) drew attention to the 
low repayment capacity of the farmers and the need for a thorough pre-loan analy-
sis in credit schemes. 
During the wet season of 1963/64, the Institute of Agriculture in Bogor initiat-
ed an 'Action Research' experiment on 100 ha irrigated sawah in W Java. Twelve 
students, who were assigned in pairs to live in villages, should persuade farmers to 
apply the principles of rice intensification. The experiment yielded on average 50% 
more rice than the adjacent non-included farms. The success was primarily attribu-
ted to the continuous attendance of the students even though these were not expe-
rienced extension workers. The experiment was expanded in the wet season 
1964/65 under the name Demas (Demonstrasi masal, Mass demonstration). This 
time, 440 students from 9 agricultural schools were stationed in 220 villages to 
oversee an area of 10,000 ha. Overall supervision was entrusted to the Departments 
of Agriculture and Education. Since the yields achieved in Demas project were said 
to be about three times higher than the national average of 2.3 t/ha, the Gol decid-
ed to transform the experiment into a national program under the name Bimas55. 
2.6.3.3. The Bimas-Inmas programs, 1965-67. The Bimas program was imple-
mented during the wet and dry seasons of 1965-66 on an area of 332,617 ha of 
sawah in Java. Some 1,200 students were posted in villages with good irrigation 
and road facilities. DoA procured the seeds, fertilizers and pesticides and delegat-
ed their distribution to P.N. Pertani. An important feature of Bimas was that credit 
was offered to farmer groups through their village cooperatives (Koperasi Unit 
Desa, KUD) or village headmen. Any farmer living in a Bimas area could qualify 
for credit without collateral. In the first season, the loans were administered by the 
People's Credit Bank (Bank Rakyat Indonesia) (Birowo, 1975). The farmers 
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received the credit partly in cash to cover living expenses and partly in the form of 
vouchers. Against these vouchers they could draw fertilizers, seed and pesticides 
from the village retail outlets (kiosks) of P.N. Pertani. During the first season, the 
farmers received the pesticides free of charge and the use of insecticides was 
actively promoted (Hadisapoetro, 1970; Birowo, 1975). 
Since the average yield reaped by Bimas farmers was reported to be twice as 
high (4.9 t/ha oipadi) as average yields elsewhere, the Bimas effort was extended 
to 0.55 M ha in 1966-67. In 1966, BULOG56 participated in financing for the main 
provinces W and E Java and N Sumatera. Cash funds were routed through the 
provincial governor (bupati) to the village headmen for disbursement to farmers, 
whilst the farm inputs were supplied by P.N. Pertani as usual. 
During 1967/68, serious problems began to appear. The Bimas loan packages 
were significantly increased in size, but the technical supervision became totally 
insufficient. Loan disbursement was poorly controlled since, at times, the People's 
Credit Bank, BULOG and P.N. Pertani were all issuing loans in cash or kind. 
Meanwhile the village cooperatives, which generally had a low standard of organi-
zation, education and financial management, had to collect the repayments (Biro-
wo, 1975). Whilst distribution and supply of inputs stagnated, enforcement of 
repayments in kind invoked discontent and passive resistance. In the field, not 
enough students were available to attend to the farmers, whereas the agricultural 
officers were too busy with arranging deliveries, cutting yield samples, reporting 
and group meetings. 
Meanwhile, Inmas (Mass intensification) was launched as a parallel program to 
Bimas for farmers who could pay in cash for subsidized seeds and agro-chemicals. 
The underlying idea was that Bimas farmers who had sufficiently raised their pro-
duction and income would no longer need credit but only advice. The only criteri-
on needed for sharing the Inmas benefits was that Inmas farmers would plant 
improved cultivars and use fertilizers and pesticides. The rate at which Inmas farm-
ers adopted these technical improvements could, however, never be properly 
checked. Nor were special measures taken to strengthen the extension service in 
accordance with the Inmas program needs. Together, the Bimas and Inmas pro-
grams covered more than 1.6 m ha during the seasons of 1967/68. The considerable 
expansion of intensification areas did not cause an important increase of national 
rice production. Birowo (1975) suggested that the reports on the Inmas program 
may have merely served the purpose of filling the gap between target and 
accomplishment in Bimas. 
2.6.3.4. The Bimas Gotong Royong Program, 1968-70. In the course of 1967, the 
Gol became disappointed and decided upon a new approach to intensification. It 
doubted the capability of P.N. Pertani to serve as the main distributor of farm in-
puts. The government solved various problems at one stroke by contracting seven 
chemical companies57 on the basis of payment deferred one year. The foreign 
companies supplied and distributed fertilizers, insecticides and some equipment at 
a fixed price per hectare. The People's Credit Bank issued the credit58 in cash and 
vouchers. Repayment in produce would be handled by BULOG. 
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Responsibility for program implementation was charged to the same authorities 
who directed Bimas and Inmas. The bupati was made coordinator and the provin-
cial DoAs selected the areas, provided seeds and liaised with local staff. The multi-
nationals were responsible for the distribution of inputs unto village level, but 
subcontracted Indonesian private firms for this huge task. The companies also 
provided technical advice to farmers, and supplied equipment such as sprayers, 
vehicles, and water pumps (Van Hees, pers. comm., 1996 ). 
Farmers of the selected villages, which participated in this Bimas Inmas 
Gotong-Royong program, accepted the standard package59 of input and credit 
(table 2.6.3.4.a). Growers of high yielding Peta Baru (=IR) cultivars received a 
higher loan package than farmers planting local varieties. The program covered 
about 4 M ha in the wet seasons of 1968/69 and 1969/70 (table 2.6.3.4.b.). 
At the end of the two-year program, the Gol had spent 68 M US $ (22.4 billion 
Rp) on credit and additional costs of administration (Birowo, 1975)). The Bimas 
Gotong Royong program, probably the most expensive one ever executed in SE 
Asia, was considered a failure when compared to earlier program results and allo-
cated means. Had the acceptance of deferred payment against hard loan terms been 
the proper solution? The year before Bimas Gotong Royong began, RN. Pertani 
had imported the largest quantities of fertilizers and pesticides of the decade. Ac-
cording to Birowo (1975), the fear for lack of foreign currency, which prompted 
the decision to engage the foreign companies, proved to be unfounded. Afiff & 
Timmer (1971) summed up the major problems of the Bimas Gotong Royong pro-
Table 2.6.3.4.a. Composition and value of the Bimas (1968) and Bimas Gotong-Royong 
(1970) credit package per hectare planted to HY IR-rice cultivars. Source: Badart 
Pembina BIMAS, Jakarta, Bank Rakyat Indonesia. 
Composition 
Seeds 
Urea 
TSP 
Insecticides 
Rat poison+bait 
Spraying cost 
Techn. assistance 
Cash allowance 
Total 
Weight 
(kg) 
25 
150 
80 
1 
-
-
-
-
-
Bimas 
Value 
(US$) 
3.07 
12.65 
5.98 
4.60 
-
-
0.10 
3.22 
29.62 
Bimas Gotong Royong 
Weight 
(kg) 
25 
200 
45 
2 
1 
-
-
-
-
value 
(USS) 
3.07 
16.32 
3.67 
11.04 
0.43 
2,15 
2.17 
n.a. 
38.85 
TSP = Triple Sodium Phosphate; 1 USS = 326 Rps (1968) 
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gram. The program had a disruptive effect on the natural development of market 
structures and credit institutions, because it neglected existing trade links. P.N. 
Pertani was almost eased out of the picture. The normal growth of the extension 
service was interrupted. The lending activities of the People's Credit Bank were 
curtailed. Some village headmen and rice farmers sold a part of the subsidized fer-
tilizers and pesticides to growers of non-subsidized crops. Repayment rates fell 
below acceptable standard and planned collection procedures were neglected (table 
2.6.3.4.c). As foreign contractors were not involved in collection of repayment, 
low rates did not affect them. Farmers got used to non-repayment of loans60. The 
Table 2.6.3.4.b. Indonesia, expansion of subsequent rice intensification programs and 
their effect on average yields on program farms, 1963-70. Sources: Hadisapoetro, 1970; 
Afiff&Timmer, 1971. 
Year 
1963/64 
1964/65 
1965/66 
1966 
1966/67 
1967/68 
1968/69 
1969/70 
Project 
a. 
b. 
c. 
c. 
c. 
d. 
e. 
e. 
Season 
wet 
wet 
wet 
dry 
wet 
wet 
wet 
wet 
Program 
area (ha) 
105 
9,985 
172,488 
160,129 
462,520 
1,596,200 
2,258,700 
1,748,600 
Yield 
Program 
6.7 
7.3 
5.3 
4.5 
4.9 
4.0 
3.2 
4.3 
in rough rice in t/ha 
Non-
program 
4.3 
3.4 
2.7 
2.5 
3.2 
1.9 
2.3 
2.3 
Increase 
2.4 
3.9 
2.6 
2.0 
1.7 
2.1 
0.9 
2.0 
Index: Rice intensification projects: a. Pady Centres Project; b. Demas Program; c. Bimas 
Program; d. Bimas/Inmas Program; e. Bimas Gotong-Royong Program. 
Table 2.6.3.4.C. Indonesia. Contract values and credit released (M USS) and reported 
repayment rates of Bimas Gotong Royong loans in 1969 and 1970. Source: Bank Rakyat 
Indonesia, Posisi Kredit Bimas Goting Royong per 31 December, 1970. 
Year/season 
1969 wet 
dry 
1970 wet 
dry 
Totals 
Contract 
value 
12.1 
28.1 
20.0 
8.0 
68.2 
Credit 
released 
13.5 
23.5 
21.4 
5.6 
64.0 
Repayment 
rate in % 
30 
20 
12 
7 
17 
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Indonesia, hectareage infested by brown planthopper 
and relative subsidy on pesticides, 1974-90 
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Figure 2.6.3.4.d. Indonesia, alleged relationship of rice hectareage damaged by BPH outbreaks and 
assiociated virus epidemics with the replacement of BPH sensitive rice cultivars by BPH biotypes 1 and 
2 resistant cultivars and the withdrawal of pesticide subsidy, 1974-90. The FAO ICP-IPM in Rice 
Programme issued the illustration to promote adherence to implementation of the national IPM policy. 
INPRES/3 = Presidential Instruction 1986/3. 
negative results brought about a change of government policy and a close to the 
Bimas Gotong Royong program at the end of 1970. 
Notwithstanding its shortcomings, Bimas Gotong Royong had made significant 
contributions to agricultural development. For the first time, seeds and agro-chem-
icals were made widely available in the countryside. The wide publicity and the 
forceful extension methods accelerated the adoption of improved technology 
(Jatileksono, 1983; Prosterman & Riedinger, 1987). The autocratic style of gov-
ernment61 and the dual function of the army in the society created the conditions 
to execute such massive campaigns. The replacement of the favourite traditional 
rice selections by less tasty HY-varieties was not readily accepted by the farmers. 
But another observation also deserves to be made. Before the program started 
there were not more than 30,000 working knapsack and motor sprayers available 
in the country (James & Reddy, 1977a). The multinationals supplied thousands of 
sprayers, but never there was enough equipment to treat the millions of hectares 
under the program. Several companies, therefore, organized extensive aerial spray-
ing operations62. Control of rice stemborers was the main objective, the need was 
established with light trap catches. Large rice areas were sprayed two to three times 
in both seasons of two successive years with accurately executed Ultra Low 
Volume (ULV) treatments (van Hees, projectleader W Java, pers. comm., 1998). 
Since the pilots usually achieved good coverage and fair to good deposit rates on 
continuous stretches of scrwah, the environmental effect of this aerial spraying, 
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although scarcely recognized at the time, must have been dramatic63. It is a strik-
ing coincidence that, since 1970, the brown planthopper (Nilaparvata lugens, 
BPH) developed from a minor rice pest to a real problem (fig. 2.6.3.4.d). Although 
by 1973 the yield losses in different BPH outbreak areas varied considerably, the 
average yield loss was estimated at 46%. The damages due to Grassy Stunt Virus 
(GSV) and Ragged Stunt Virus (RSV), both transmitted by BPH and leafhoppers, 
and 'hopperburn' were included in this estimate. 
2.6.3.5. Pest surveillance and emergency control operations. The Directorate of 
Food Crop Protection operated a Surveillance and Forecasting Service for rice 
since 1975. The work was delegated to the Crop Protection Divisions at the provin-
cial and district level. In 1977, some 336 surveillance officers monitored blocks of 
10,000 ha of rice each. The data were processed by the Directorate in Jakarta which 
reported on infestation and crop losses and decided whether control measures were 
needed. Brown planthopper and Grassy Stunt and Ragged Stunt Viruses, rice stem-
borers, rice case worm and rats caused the most problems. Average loss due to 
insects was estimated at about 18% in both seasons (James & Reddy, 1977a). Each 
province could mobilize three to five Units of the Crop Protection Brigade, 
equipped with power sprayers, pesticides and transportation, for emergency con-
trol in outbreak areas. If the pest outbreak covered a large area the DoA sent spray 
aircraft to do the job. The DoA managed a special outbreak budget to meet the per-
sonnel and material costs of the emergency control units. 
AARD began research on alternative ways of pest control in rice in 1976. This 
included screening of insecticides, synchronized planting, crop rotation, sanitation, 
and biological control with natural enemies64. AARD collaborated with the 'Pest 
surveillance and early warning' program of the Plant Protection Division. In late 
1979, surveillance teams of the Plant Protection Service identified the whitebacked 
planthopper {Sogatella furcifera, WBPH) in N Sumatera for the first time. 
2.6.3.6. Achievement of self-sufficiency in rice. When the Gol terminated Bimas 
Gotong Royong, it could not afford to stop intensification in food crop production 
altogether. In an attempt to find solutions primarily to the problem of credit, the 
agricultural agencies developed a National Improved Bimas {Bimas Nasionalyang 
Disempurnakan, Bimas BND). Its main feature was the abolishment of the group 
approach to credit in favour of loans to individual farmer households. In 1969/70, 
a pilot project in Jogyakarta had been successful. Therefore, with the ending of the 
foreign companies' contracts, Bimas BND was immediately expanded on a 
nationwide scale. The People's Credit Bank provided the loans in cash and voucher 
through village units which covered up to 1,000 ha worked by 2,000 to 3,000 farm-
ers from surrounding villages. The bank also organised marketing operations and 
built the needed stores for temporary storage oipadi (Birowo, 1975). 
In 1979, the Gol initiated once again a special rice intensification program 
called Insus {Intensifikasi Khusus, Intensification drive). It was similar to National 
Improved Bimas, but the farmers were grouped into production units based on irri-
gation blocks. The farmer groups decided what rice cultivars, fertilizers and pesti-
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cides suited them best, whilst DoA provided extension and credit facilities. 
The growth in per hectare yield and total rice production was generally slow 
but steady (table 2.6.3.6). In 1980, Indonesia still faced an import requirement of 
Table 2.6.3.6. Indonesia, rice area and rice production over period 1968-90. Sources: 
FAO Production Yearbooks; Central Bureau of Statistics, Indonesia; BULOG, 1984: 
Supplement to President's Report to Parliament, August 1985. (See also fig. 7.2.4.a). 
Year a b c d e f 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
Index: a. area harvested (M ha); b. area harvested Bimas/Insus (M ha); c. total production 
of rough rice (M tonnes); d. production in milled rice equivalent (M t); e. relative annual 
production (1996 = 100%); f. yield of rough rice (t/ha). 
Conversion factor rough rice to milled rice C = 0.68 (BULOG, 1984). 
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8.02 
8.20 
8.20 
8.20 
8.30 
8.40 
8.51 
8.50 
8.37 
8.36 
8.93 
8.80 
9.10 
9.38 
9.02 
9.16 
9.76 
9.90 
9.99 
9.92 
10.14 
10.30 
10.50 
10.28 
11.10 
11.10 
10.73 
11.44 
11.33 
1.60 
2.13 
-
2.77 
-
4.09 
-
4.20 
-
5.25 
-
5.86 
-
6.27 
-
6.83 
-
7.66 
-
8.04 
-
8.71 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
17.16 
18.38 
19.32 
20.22 
19.38 
21.49 
22.46 
22.33 
23.30 
23.34 
25.77 
26.28 
29.65 
32.77 
34.10 
35.30 
38.14 
39.03 
39.73 
40.08 
41.67 
43.57 
45.18 
44.69 
48.24 
48.24 
46.64 
49.74 
51.16 
11.67 
12.50 
13.14 
13.75 
13.18 
14.61 
15.27 
15.19 
15.84 
15.88 
17.53 
17.87 
20.16 
22.87 
23.19 
24.97 
25.93 
26.54 
27.01 
27.36 
28.34 
29.63 
30.72 
30.39 
32.80 
32.80 
31.72 
33.83 
34.79 
34 
36 
38 
40 
38 
42 
44 
44 
46 
46 
50 
51 
58 
64 
67 
69 
75 
76 
78 
78 
82 
85 
88 
87 
94 
94 
91 
97 
100 
2.14 
2.24 
2.36 
2.47 
2.33 
2.56 
2.64 
2.63 
2.78 
2.79 
2.88 
2.99 
3.29 
3.49 
3.78 
3.85 
3.91 
3.94 
3.98 
4.04 
4.10 
4.23 
4.30 
4.35 
4.34 
4.37 
4.35 
4.35 
4.51 
2 M t of rice but by 1986 self-sufficiency in rice was achieved due to the large scale 
adoption of resistant high yielding cultivars and higher fertilizer use (Jatileksono, 
1993). However, the mean yield in lowland rice yield stagnated at 2.5 t/ha of dry 
padi, although 4 t/ha were obtained on demonstration plots. Inadequate pest con-
trol was named as the main reason for the considerable yield gap. 
Within 18 years, Indonesian rice production had risen from 11.7 M tonnes of 
milled rice in 1968, to about 27 M t in 1985. Meanwhile the harvested area had 
increased by 20% from about 8 M ha to 10 M ha. About 13 M rice farmers had 
holdings of less than one ha, but the per capita availability of rice had increased 
from 93 kg to 137 kg per year (AARD, 1981, 1986). 
Such improvement was not only due to investments in rehabilitation and 
expansion of irrigation infra-structure and production of improved seeds by 
research and seed farms. The willingness often thousands of Indonesian rice farm-
ers to adopt the Bimas package and improved technology for better crop manage-
ment deserves much of the credit. Finally, the input and output pricing policies of 
the Gol created the conditions and incentives for implementation of the successive 
rice production intensification programs. 
2.6.3.7. Developments since 1970. Research on rice remained focused on selec-
tion and breeding for resistance against pests in high yielding rice cultivar. IRRI 
began breeding for resistance to brown planthopper in 1968. From 1973 onwards, 
high yielding IR-cultivars with resistance to BPH biotype 1 became available for 
Indonesia65 (Oka, unknown). Introduction was first made in the districts of N Su-
matera, N, C and E Java, and Bali where rice fields were heavily damaged by the 
brown planthopper. Due to the enforced introduction of improved varieties in 
Indonesia, more than 0.4 M ha were planted with high yielding BPHl-resistant 
lines in the 1975/76 wet season already. The cultivars held their BPH-resistance for 
four consecutive seasons and achieved up to 70% of their yield potential even in 
heavily infested areas (Jatileksono, 1993). Early in 1977, however, a new biotype 
2 of the brown planthopper was detected in N Sumatera which could break BPH1-
resistance of the introduced IR-cultivars66. New BPH2 resistant rice cultivars, such 
as IR32, IR36 and IR38, were soon multiplied for early replacement of the widely 
planted IR26. Since the monogenic BPH2 resistance might fail again, an interna-
tional testing program was started under coordination of IRRI in 1976. Indonesian 
breeders were able to release four cultivars with resistance against BPH biotypes 1 
and 3 (Oka, unknown). Resistance against Tungro Virus disease had already been 
introduced in popular cultivars such as IR20 and C4-63. 
Expansion of upland rice, which covered some 1,2 M ha, was hindered by 
drought and the diseases Bacterial Leaf Blight (Pseudomonas oryzae) and Rice 
Blast (Pyricularia oryzae). Six cultivars with resistance to blast were released 
since 1983, but their resistance collapsed after two to three growing seasons. 
Cultivar IR5 was better adjusted to Indonesian conditions than IR8, had moderate 
resistance to bacterial leaf blight and better consumer quality. Within five years, 
IR5 had spread to one fourth of the rice land in Indonesia and it remained the top 
variety until the mid-1970s (Prosterman & Riedinger, 1987). 
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. Indonesia, production of five major crops, 
1900-39 
b. Indonesia, production of six major crops, 
1975-97 
-Sugar 
-Tobacco 
-Coffee 
-Rubber 
-Oil palm 
- Cacao 
Figure 2.7.1. a,b. Indonesia, pre- and post World War II production of major estate and smallholder 
crops (x 1,000 tonnes), mean figures over indicatedperiods. Sources: Mansvelt & Creutzberg, 1975; 
supplement to President's Report, August 16, 1985; FAO Production Yearbooks, 1948-51). 
1848 to 1868. Export of raw sugar increased from 63,4001 in 1840 to 161,8001 in 
1868, whereas the hectareage planted increased from 22,400 ha in 1840 to 26,500 
by 1865 (Hadiwigoeno, 1985; Handojo et ai, 1987; Koningsberger, 1948). 
The upsurge of the Java sugar industry could only begin when two crucial laws 
were enacted. The Agrarian Law, passed in 1870, made the Javanese the pro-
prietors of cultivated land whilst allotting to the state all other arable land, which 
was not acquired by third parties in accordance with existing regulations70. The 
Sugar Cultivation Law implied that sugar cultivation under the Cultuurstelsel 
should be replaced by a free Javanese sugar industry. The transition was to be 
implemented from 1878 onward over a period of 13 years71 to prevent a sudden 
breakdown of the economically important sugar export. 
The new laws offered effective protection of the rights of the people. To each 
sugar factory a concession was granted which gave ownership over up to 7 ha for 
construction and which specified the maximum area of farmers' land to be planted 
per year. To safeguard the production of indigenous food crops, the sugar compa-
nies were allowed to plant sugarcane on only one-fourth of the irrigated land with-
in the allotted area. In order to prevent soil exhaustion and a resulting depreciation 
of farmers' land, only one crop of sugercane should be grown on the same soil in 
succession. Ratoon cropping over two or more years, the traditional practice on 
Java and elsewhere, was prohibited and each year the sugarcane had to be planted 
on another plot. Sugarcane was planted in a 3-year rotation with rice andpalawija 
crops on large tracts of irrigated land obtained by voluntary short lease from farm-
ers. The government determined the lease price according to soil fertility classifi-
cation and controlled the labour contracts and wages. 
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The regulation to plant sugarcane sets (bibit) in yearly rotation, with all costs 
of labour and soil preparation, was only imposed in Java and unique in the world. 
Such a costly system of sugar cultivation necessitated a very intensive manage-
ment of the crop in the field and the factory to make it profitable. Since the colo-
nial government had changed its alliance, from shareholder and supplier of cheap 
production factors for the industry to defensor of the people's rights, the planters 
had to take care of all difficulties individually. Therefore, the planters soon began 
to organise themselves, though initially only in regional associations 
(Koningsberger, 1948). 
In the early 1880s, the Java cane sugar industry was confronted with a double 
threat. First, stiff competition from the ever growing European beet sugar industry 
caused a financial crisis72 in Java. Second, a devastating disease, called sereh and 
first observed in W Java in 1881, infected sugar estates all over Java within a few 
years. The planters' associations decided to search for scientific advice to control 
sereh and to improve sugar quality. They founded three regional experiment 
stations73, i.e. Station W Java near Tegal in 1885, Station C Java at Semarang in 
1886 and Station E Java at Pasuruan in 1887. By 1907, the Semarang station had 
been closed and the other two stations merged into the 'Association of Research 
Stations for the Java Sugar Industry' (Vereeniging het Proefstation voor de Java-
Suikerindustrie) which collected the cess funds for research. The Tegal station 
under H.C. Prinsen Geerligs contributed enormously to the improvement of sugar 
quality and established of the refinery proces on Java. Research on breeding, 
agronomy and pest management was concentrated at the Sugar Station Pasuruan, 
E Java, and its subdivisions at Jokyakarta, Cirebon and Banjumas (Koningsberger, 
1948; Handojo et al, 1987). After years of research the sereh problem was solved 
through the development of resistant hybrid cultivars such as the 2878 POJ lines. 
In the first half of the 20th century, export of sugar accounted for 25% of the 
total value of exports. In the peak years, 1928-31, sugar was grown on 200,000 ha, 
i.e. 1/18 of the irrigated sawah land on Java. The combined production of 179 sugar 
factories exceeded 3 M t/y of raw sugar and Indonesia became world's largest sugar 
exporter (Anonymous, 1979; Hadiwigoeno, 1985). Capital invested in the industry 
amounted to 318 M US $, or 40% of total investment in estate agriculture at the time 
(Metcalf, 1952). Local wages and land rentals paid by the industry constituted about 
10% of the total income of the peasant households. During the great economic de-
pression of the 1920-30s, the Java sugar industry, forced by overproduction and low 
prices, signed the International Sugar Restriction Agreement, Brussels, 1931. As a 
consequence, sugar planting was reduced to about 30,000 ha/y by 1936 
(Koningsberger, 1948). Recovery was just getting under way when the Japanese 
invaded the Malay-Indonesian archipelago in 1941. After the Japanese had taken 
over the Philippines and Java and access to the world market had been cut off, Japan 
obtained more sugarcane than it needed. Production on Java was curtailed and the 
vacated land employed for the production of food and fibre. 
Indonesia's struggle for independence, in the wake of Japan's capitulation in 
1945, hampered a rapid recovery of the sugar industry and discouraged investors 
to put up the large funds needed for reconstruction. Increasing population pressure, 
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a sharp rise in land rents and wage rates and political violence prevented the 
rehabilitation of the private sugar industry in its pre-war structure. By 1950, only 
about one-third of the pre-war estate hectareage was planted, 20 sugar factories 
back into operation and sugar production only one-fifth of the 1937-39 average 
annual output (Handojo et al, 1987). Shortly thereafter, the largely Dutch owned 
sugar industry was nationalized. By 1964, the total area of estate and peasant sugar 
approached the pre-war total planted area but the production per ha of estate sugar 
had declined to just about one half as compared to 1938. Since production of pea-
sant-grown sugar could not fill the gap, export of factory sugar almost stopped to 
meet the greater domestic consumption. By the end of the 1960s, Indonesia had 
become a large importer of sugar (Hadiwigoeno, 1985). 
In 1996, sugar was grown on some 400,000 ha in Java, with some minor pro-
duction centres in Sumatera, Kalimantan and Sulawesi. The production totalled 2.2 
M t of raw sugar (FAO Production Yearbook, 1977) which was 0,7 M t below 
expected domestic demand. Hence, in 1980 the Gol launched a smallholder sugar-
cane intensification program. The Gol supported the growing of sugarcane, gener-
ally planted on high-quality land, by fixing the government procurement (floor) 
prices at trice the world market rate (Prosterman & Riedinger, 1987). The program 
was designed as a Nucleus Estate System (NES) and DoA advised growers through 
the Smallholders' Sugarcane Foundation and the Smallholders' Cane Sugar Re-
search Office. During the 1960s, damage by field rats was regarded as the most 
acute problem74 (Handojo et al, 1987). 
2.7.2. Tobacco 
2.7.2.1. 'Principalities' tobacco. The three principal areas of tobacco cultivation 
in the Dutch East Indies were the Principalities Jogyakarta and Surakarta in C Java, 
the regency Besuki in E Java and Deli on the E coast of Sumatera. The tobacco cul-
tivation in the Besuki area is the oldest and began around 1855. The Principalities 
produced the so-called 'Vorstenlandsche tabak' (Principalities' tobacco) and the 
Sumateran sultanates the "Deli-tobacco'. Both types were used as wrapper-leaf and 
filling in cigar manufacturing. 
In 1898, several tobacco companies in the Principalities established the 
Tobacco Experiment Station at Klaten, Besuki. In 1907, other companies estab-
lished a second tobacco station which resorted under the Central Experimental 
Station at Salatiga. In 1912, the two stations were merged into the Experiment Sta-
tion for Principalities' Tobacco (Proefstation voor Vorstenlandsche Tabak) at 
Klaten, E Java (Beets, 1949). 
After 1913, the area planted to tobacco on Java decreased considerably, but this 
was compensated by a strong increase in production per hectare due to better ferti-
lization and disease control (Beets, 1949). The most serious disease of Java tobac-
co was Manas' caused by Phytophthora solani. Sanitary control of lanas through 
removal of all sources of infection and selection for resistance was effective 
(Beets, 1949). 
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2.7.2.2. Deli tobacco. Around 1860, tobacco from E Sumatera attracted the atten-
tion of the tobacco trade because of its superior quality. In 1863, a Dutch compa-
ny, cultivating tobacco in Besuki, commissioned J.A. Nienhuis to undertake tobac-
co production in Deli. Not only the climate and soils appeared to be extraordina-
rily suited for tobacco, but also large tracks of land could be leased cheaply. The 
Sultan of Deli was very interested to attract investment for his underdeveloped 
state. The tobacco culture developed rapidly on the E coast75. In 1869, the first of 
the big companies, the Deli Company (Deli Maatschappy)16, was established and 
by 1889 some 170 estates were in operation on the territory of the three sultanates, 
Deli, Langkat and Serdang (Jochems et al., 1931; van der Laan, 1949). The tobac-
co industry brought great wealth to the E coast of Sumatera, Medan then being one 
of the most modern cities of E Asia. The success of the tobacco monoculture in 
Sumatera caused an over-supply of tobacco leaf and evoked import restrictions by 
the United States of America to protect the Virginia tobacco farmers. Decreasing 
prices drove a large number of estates, operating on marginal tobacco soils, from 
the market. Many planters changed to planting Liberica coffee during the 1890s 
and rubber after 1905. Around 1920, many of the surviving tobacco companies 
were amalgamated into four big companies77, which completely dominated the 
scene up to Independence. 
Pest pressure was extremely high in E Sumatera. Already in the 1880s, the Deli 
planters sought help from Treub in Bogor to find a solution for a devastating nurs-
ery disease. 
2.7.3. Coffee. The Dutch introduced, in 1699, seeds of Coffea arabica into Java and 
enforced, within a few years, the growing of coffee by farmers. The productivity of 
the extensive coffee gardens grown under the Priangan system and the Cultuurstel-
sel remained so low because the conditions78 were very disadvantageous for the 
farmers (de Bruijn, 1869). Since the colonial administration payed for the coffee far 
below its market value, revenues for the Dutch government were so high that the 
cultuurstelsel was continued for coffee longer than for any other commodity. The 
planting of government coffee was also enforced in several regions of Sumatera, 
such as Benkulu (till 1870), Sumatera's West Coast and Padang Highlands (till 
1908) and Tapanuli (till 1902). On Sumatera too, productivity remained low 
because of its scarce population, limited infrastructure, backward agricultural devel-
opment and, in particular, the people hated to maintain the crop. The dense, unweed-
ed coffee gardens suffered badly from the Coffee Leaf Rust (Hemileia vastatrix) 
disease, which arrived in Sumatera and Java in the 1880s. After 1870, the Cultuur-
stelsel was gradually withdrawn from areas where coffee cultivation was less profi-
table and officially terminated by 1915 (Reinsma, 1955; Paerels, 1949). 
In 1875, seeds of Coffea liberica were received via the Netherlands and the 
seedlings tested in the Cultuurtuin. Some private estates planted Liberica coffee 
but the production remained small because Liberica offspring was also susceptible 
to leaf rust. 
Because of its importance as an export commodity, coffee was promoted as a 
free smallholder crop during the first quarter of the 20th century. To this aim, the 
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government provided seeds and cheap credit, continued purchasing coffee, intro-
duced protective terms79 and encouraged smallholder cooperatives. In 1900, 
Coffea canephora or robusta coffee was introduced which, because of its strong 
growth and better resistance against Leaf Rust, soon replaced the other coffee 
types. Notwithstanding such government support, growing coffee as a free smallh-
older enterprise did not catch on in Java; it remained limited to some 10,400 ha 
only in E and M Java (Huitema, 1935; Paerels, 1949). For Sumateran smallholders 
growing robusta coffee in the lowlands and Arabica coffee in the highlands was 
financially attractive. The planting of robusta coffee as a cash crop under rubber or 
coconut became popular. Even during outbreaks of coffee berry borer {Hypothe-
nemus hampii) in the 1920, which caused great losses in production, the planting 
of coffee continued. 
Total Indonesian coffee production in 1932 amounted to 132,253 t of which 
47% was produced by the estates, mainly on Java, and 53% by Sumateran small-
holders. Robusta coffee covered more than 90% of the area under coffee. (Hui-
tema, 1935). 
In 1990/91, Indonesia produced 0.4 M t coffee on some 9 M ha, consisting of 
93.5% robusta and 6.5% Arabica, and all under the name 'estate coffee' (ITC, 
1992). The production came for 87% from smallholders, 8% from government 
estates and 5% from private estates (Wirjusuhardo, 1987). 
2.7.4. Cacao. The Cacao tree (Theobroma cacao) was introduced into the Philip-
pines from Latin America by the Spanish around 1665. From the Philippines, the 
cacao tree was spread throughout the Indonesian archipelago at the end of the 18th 
century. The VOC never appears to have traded in cacao, nor did it promote the 
crop as happened with coffee. During the 1850s, some 501 of dry cacao beans were 
exported annually by European, Chinese and Indonesian farmers in the Minahassa, 
NE Sulawesi, for the Manila market. Then, the cacao production increasingly ran 
into problems, due to helopeltis bugs (Helopeltis spp.) and cacao pod borer 
(Conopomorpha cramerella, CPB), which could not be solved. 
Experiments with cacao plantings in W and C Java resulted in an export of 10 
t of dry beans in 1880 (Van Hall, 1939). A decade later many estates in E Java 
replanted their Arabica coffee, which had been devastated by Coffee Leaf Rust, 
with cacao seedlings. Soon, heavy infestations by Helopeltis bugs and the cacao 
pod borer, which was detected on Java in 1895, threatened the profitability of 
cacao as an export crop in Indonesia. In 1901, the Cacao Planters Association 
founded a Cacao Research Station80 at Salatiga, C Java, primarily to find solutions 
to the insect problems (Levert, 1940; Bertrem, 1940; Oei-Dharma, 1969; 
Giesberger 1983). By 1905, the Salatiga station was enlarged and renamed to 
General Experimental Station (Algemeen Proefstatiori) at Salatiga. Its mandate was 
extended to include all highland cops (bergcultures) (Toxopeus & Wessel, 1983). 
Around 1910, planters in E Java began to give up cacao because of excessive 
helopeltis and cacao pod borer damage to the predominant Java Red Criollo vari-
ety. During the 1920s, they replanted all cacao stands to Hevea rubber and robus-
ta coffee, which were much easier to grow and more profitable than cacao. The 
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planters of C Java, however, continued to grow cacao whilst gradually replacing 
the old Java Criollo by more vigorous Trinitario cacao. They successfully applied 
sanitary control by removing all fruits, rampasansl, a method worked out at Sala-
tiga«2 (Toxopeus & Wessel, 1983)(ch 5.6.4). 
During the 1920s and 1930s, cacao was grown on large estates located in the 
Pekalongan and Semarang districts of C Java. Total exports of cacao beans from 
the estates during the period 1935-39 averaged 1,600 t/y. The major portion of this 
was Edelcacao, a premium grade hybrid cacao from the cross Forestero x Criollo. 
Smallholders' cacao production averaged only 26 t/y in that period. During World 
War II, about one-fifth of the cacao hectareage was lost through neglect and plant 
diseases. Production in 1950 was 866 tonnes, 54% of the pre-war average (Metcalf, 
1952). 
In 1995/96, cacao production in Indonesia totalled about 0.3 M t of dry beans 
with a value of 400 M US$, picked from 0.6 M ha, of which about half with mature 
fruit bearing trees. Following the expansion of cacao throughout Indonesia since 
the late 1980s (Wood, 1982), numerous outbreaks of cacao pod borer (CPB) have 
occurred. An Integrated Cacao Pod Borer Management Program was launched in 
1996 for cacao smallholders in Sulawesi, where most cacao is grown. This IPM 
programme is currently being financed by Chocolate Manufacturers' Associations 
of the United States and the United Kingdom (Mumford, 1997). 
2.7.5. Oil palm. The oil palm {Elaeis guineensis) was imported into the Dutch East 
Indies in 1848 and planted in the Cultuurtuin. In the following decades, the oil 
palm was spread throughout Java and the archipelago. In spite of many successful 
demonstrations by local civil administrators during the 1870s and 1880s, the 
Indonesian peasants were not interested in this new crop, because the familiar 
cocos palm supplied almost the same range of products without requiring mechan-
ical processing. European planters were not eager to explore the possibilities of oil 
palm either, because world demand for vegetable oils was low and the crop was 
poorly studied. In 1911, the first commercial planting of oil palm was realized on 
the E coast of Sumatera (van Heurn, 1949). In 1919, palm oil was exported from 
Sumatera in 1919 for the first time and within two decades the region became the 
world's largest exporter of palm oil and palm kernel oil. In 1938, the total area with 
oil palm in E Sumatera and Aceh amounted to 74,500 ha and the export to about 
220,000 t of palm oil and 47,500 t of palm kernel oil. In the 1990s the oil palm 
became the leading estate crop. The 1996 production yielded 5 M t of palm oil and 
1.1 M t of kernel oil (FAO Production Yearbook, 1997). 
The oil palm is little affected by diseases but some insect pests can cause seri-
ous damage. The most prominent pest is the rhinoceros beetle (Oryctes rhinocer-
os) which damages the apical bud of the oil palm. Considerable leaf damage can 
be caused caterpillars of the Limacotidae and Psichidae families. Tree rats (Rattus 
tiomanicus) can cause heavy damage too (Wood, 1982). 
2.7.6. Development of the para-statal estate sector. After the surrender of the 
Japanese army in Indonesia, several foreign companies began to rehabilitate their 
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agricultural estates and factories in Indonesia. Between 1947 and 1949, rebuilding 
was seriously hampered by the armed struggle for independence with additional 
damage to structures and plantations. In the early 1950s, business and investment 
could be resumed. Because of political disagreement between the Indonesian and 
Dutch governments concerning the territory of W Irian Jaya, the Dutch enterprises 
were nationalized by the Presidential Decree of 1957. Former Dutch plantations 
came under control of state-owned estate companies (Perusahaan Perkebunan 
Negara)^. The Perkebunan had a difficult start because of lack of expertise in 
management and research. As non-Dutch estate companies were allowed to con-
tinue independent operation, the estate sector counted numerous private enterpri-
ses. At the end of the 20th century, overseas investments are still considerable but 
Investment Laws require Indonesian majority shareholdership. 
Plantation crop research, which also included pest control and efficacy testing 
of pesticides as required by the pesticide law, was handled by both the Perkebunan 
and private sector. Initially, the mandate for research on estate crops was entrusted 
to the former colonial Research Institutes for Highland Crops (Berggcultures) at 
Bogor (W Java), Djember (E Java) and Medan (E Sumatera), which operated under 
a central research management. A Bappanas study84 showed that the state-owned 
Perkebunan and the private estate companies lost confidence in the poorly perfor-
ming Bogor and Medan Institutes and established their own research centres85. Alt-
hough in 1970, the Gol tried to mend the working relationship between the govern-
mental Estate Crop Research Institutes and the private centres, it failed to achieve 
coordination and priorization of research objectives. 
Over the years, the state-owned Perkebunan companies have developed into 
strong production units with ever expanding agricultural assets. Since 1975, 
Perkebunan enterprises assisted the government in the execution of Nucleus 
Estate and Smallholders projects (NES). The NES-program aimed at rehabilitating 
smallholders and accommodating migrant farmers in less developed areas with 
World Bank funding and government loans. The Perkebunan companies processed 
the smallholders' products, provided employment and arranged the supply of 
seeds, fertilizers and pesticides. 
2.8. Discussion, Indonesia 
The following discussion and conclusions reflect the author's perception of the sit-
uation and events in Indonesia. His perception is based on study, frequent visits to 
Indonesia, and on many hours of discussion with Indonesian experts. 
The concern of the Gol about food security and the ever growing import 
requirements for rice and agro-chemicals formed the mould for agricultural policy 
making between 1950 and 1980. It explains Indonesia's readiness to accept the 
new rice technology which was advertised as the 'Green Revolution'. The intensi-
ty with which the Gol demanded the adoption of high yielding rice varieties, often 
literally forcing the Indonesian farmers to abandon the numerous favourite local 
varieties, is unmatched in SE Asia. The Gol, by means of National Five-years 
Development Plans, allocated huge resources to the rice production programs, sub-
sidized increased use of fertilizers and pesticides in rice to the value of millions of 
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US dollars and even invited the international chemical industry to build fertilizer 
and pesticide plants in Indonesia and to take an active part in the execution of the 
Bimas Gotong Royong intensification program. 
The Gol took, upon recognizing causes and consequences of injudicious pes-
ticide use and BPH outbreaks in rice, the most drastic corrective measures. The 
1986 Presidential Instruction to ban 57 brands of insecticides in rice changed the 
pesticide market in the rice sector deeply in terms of volume and choice of products 
(ch 7.2). Such a lasting impact of governmental policy on the pesticide market can 
only be demonstrated for Indonesia. 
A similar fervour for accepting and incorporating beneficial innovations can 
been seen in the way Indonesia implemented its National IPM Programme in Rice 
(ch 5.7.4). In the decade of the 1990s, Indonesia expanded and intensified the 
extension of IPM in rice and vegetables. In SE Asia, only Indonesia and Vietnam 
continued to allocate ample national human and financial resources to IPM exten-
sion (Whitten, 1998). Indonesia abandoned the old top-down methods of extension 
in favour of participatory Farmer Field School approaches, which inevitably intro-
duce the concept of social and economical empowerment of the farmers (van de 
Fliert, 1993, 1998). 
Metcalf (1952) observed already that the cooperative movement in Indonesia 
had met with rapid success not only because of government sponsorship, but also 
because of the traditional communal character of the Indonesian rural society, which 
lends itself readily to the modern cooperative system of economic democracy and 
group participation. The eagerness with which Indonesian farmers participate in and 
contribute to season-long FFS training confirms the above observation. 
One could wonder from where, in the autocratic Indonesian society, the class 
of knowledgeable and open-minded administrators and scientists originated that 
declared itself in favour of IPM and dared to stand up against considerable per-
sonal interest at high level positions in the society. 
First, numerous Indonesian scientists and politicians have a great interest in 
agricultural and biological sciences and they are not alienated from the farmer 
class. Second, many of the agricultural high school graduates, who were program 
promoters in the villages and who witnessed the BPH and virus outbreaks during 
the 1970s, obtained influential positions in later years (Oka, Untung, pers. com-
munications, 1994). 
The Gol adhered consequently to its national IPM policy since it maintained a 
high level of budgeting throughout the 1980s and 1990 for the implementation of 
the National IPM in Rice Program. In line with the current decentralization policy 
national funds for IPM implementation are channelled through provincial budgets 
and used a.o. to cover personnel costs of extension and the costs of IPM training. 
It is crucial that this wide-spread support in federal and provincial administration 
and services is preserved for the future, particularly in the face of the economic 
recession of the late 1990s. 
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2.9. Conclusions, Indonesia 
1. Colonial research succeeded in developing an efficient and profitable agricul-
ture. Agriculture in colonial days provides an impressive example of commodity 
production without the resort to synthetic pesticides. 
2. Research in the Dutch East Indies emerged from a scientific attitude of the gift-
ed hortulani and researchers of the Botanical Gardens at Bogor ('s Lands 
Plantentuin te Buitenzorg) throughout the 19th century. In this way, Indonesia's 
research had an indigenous cradle attended to by dedicated foreign scientists. 
3. Agricultural research dealt with a variety of indigenous and introduced crops, 
and with very diverse biotopes. 
4. Colonial research was directed at practical problems in the field. The quiet pace 
of time and the open minded exchange of ideas and findings among researchers 
and planters provided a fertile setting for accurate observations and studies, and for 
finding economic solutions to pest problems. 
5. The work on selection and breeding of improved cultivars and on developing 
techniques for grafting and making clonal progenies made a valuable contribution 
to global agriculture (ch 5). 
6. Early studies in entomology and phytopathology made by scientists in Dutch 
East Indies are still regarded as standard works. 
7. Colonial research results should be guarded as a treasure of information and 
inspiration for to-day's research, e.g. on biological and regulatory control of pests. 
8. Colonial agriculture enriched Indonesia by the introduction and improvement of 
exotic crops. 
9. It left Indonesia a class of highly experienced plantation and factory attendants 
(mandurl), who formed the backbone of Indonesia's agriculture after independence. 
10. The Japanese occupation and the struggle for independence delayed agricul-
tural development in the estate sector for decades. 
11. The development in the food crop sector was probably accelerated after the 
departure of the Dutch administration. The enforced introduction of the Green 
Revolution needed a national government to deal effectively with the masses of 
discontented farmers. 
12. After 1950, the spectre of national food security falling behind the population 
growth urged the Gol to direct most available resources at the improvement of 
national rice production. 
13. The Gol adopted the improved high yielding rice varieties and the concomitant 
technology, offered by the International Agricultural Research Centres (IARCs), 
and enforced its adoption by the Indonesian fanners. 
14. Due to the dual function of the army in the country's administration, the Gol 
had the power and means to enforce the replacement of favourite local cultivars by 
HY cultivars. 
15. Since the early IRRI-varieties (e.g. IR5 and IR8) had none to low resistance to 
major rice insect pests, and fungal and virus diseases, the DoA services instructed 
the farmers to spray preventively and frequently. Insecticides were offered in vil-
lage outlets against subsidized prices. 
16. The administration of the credit and the collection of the repayments in kind 
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ipadi) were major obstacles for the implementation of the intensification pro-
grams. In particular, the low repayment rates on credit forced the Gol to replace 
disappointing programs with improved, allegedly more efficient ones. 
17. Since input distribution stagnated due to lack of infrastructure and expertise, 
the Gol requested multinational pesticide companies to assist in the implementa-
tion of the large scale programs. It also invited the industry to build pesticide for-
mulation plants in Indonesia. This involvement gave the industry a strong bridge-
head in Indonesia. Because of the huge amounts of money involved, personal inter-
ests occasionally influenced decisions. 
18. Owing to the acute shortage of sprayers, some companies undertook large scale 
aerial spraying of insecticides two to three times in each rice seasons during two 
years. These blanket applications might have greatly contributed to the outbreaks 
of minor pests, such as BPH and leafhoppers, because the natural enemies were 
killed. 
19. Shortage of sprayers were the direct reason to develop granular formulations. 
Although it added to the logistic problems, supply of granules led to increased use 
and to lower incidence of poisoning (ch 7.2). 
20. The worsening outbreak situation endangered the gains in production made. 
The seriousness of the situation made the Gol receptive to scientific council con-
cerning the pesticide-induced nature of the outbreaks. Once convinced, the Gol 
took the drastic step of banning many insecticides from use in rice and of elimi-
nating pesticide subsidies. 
21. The ban had an immediate and lasting effect on the size and composition of 
pesticide sales for use in the rice sector. It also changed the attitude of many agri-
cultural officers in research and extension. 
22. The Gol maintained its 1960s rice production intensification policy until the 
closure of the 20th century. It was consistent in allocating a major share of agri-
cultural budget, initially for the procurement of inputs and provision of credit, later 
increasingly for extension. 
23. When, early in the 1980s, self-sufficiency in rice came within reach, more 
funds were allocated to the development of non-rice crops. 
24. The estate and smallholder sectors of agriculture showed a strong increase in 
production since 1975. In particular, the growing of sugarcane and rubber by farm-
ers expanded due to sound investment of nucleus-estate type of processing indus-
try. The growth of the palm oil industry is spectacular. Oil palm is mainly a crop 
of para-statal estates. 
25. Indonesia has taken the lead in cacao production from Malaysia. The Chocolate 
Manufacturers' Associations of the United States and the United Kingdom are pay-
ing for extensive IPM programs in the main cacao production area, Sulawesi. 
Notes 
1. Calculated by J.J. Polak for the Council of the Netherlands East Indies (Metcalf, 1952). 
2. A fleet of eight vessels under commander J.van Neck reached Ambon where they concluded a con-
tract on the clove trade with the people of Hitu and established permanent trading posts (Ricklefs, 
1981). 
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3. Under the first three Governors-General (1610-19) the VOC centre was at Ambon. Jan Pieterszoon 
Coen, twice appointed as Governor-General (1617-19, 1927-29), relocated the Company's seat in 1619 
to Jakarta that had a good port. The principalities Banten and Mataram attacked the VOC fortress, 1616-
19. On the site of the destroyed settlement of Jakarta the VOC erected a new stronghold and named it 
Batavia. Coen, who placed the VOC on a firm footing, is considered to be the founder of the Colonial 
Empire (Ricklefs, 1981). 
4. The clove tree on Ambon came into production only after 10 years and grew till an age of up to 60 
years. Flowering occurs irregularly between October and January. The flower buds (cloves) must be 
picked within a few days. The labour intensive harvest interfered with food production on Ambon. 
Forced clove production brought dependency on food imports and thus a need for purchasing power. 
5. In 1621, the VOC destroyed the English factory on Ambon. As overproduction brought prices down, 
the VOC cut thousands of clove trees on Himoal. When, during the 1630s, Makassarese merchants 
obtained half of the export volume through their relations with the Himoalese, the Dutch fleet under 
Governor-General van Diemen came in action once more (Taale, 1988). 
6. The VOC monopoly in the spice trade aimed at a limited clove production to keep prices stable and 
concentration of the production on the islands of Ambon. In 1656, all clove trees on the other islands 
were felled and compensation ('recognition money') payed to the N Moluku rulers (Taale, 1988). 
Global demand for cloves amounted to about 200 tonnes, but in 1680 production increased almost 
4001. The VOC ordered the cutting (extirpation) of clove trees to adjust supply to global demand 
throughout most of the VOC period. Thus, the number of clove trees on the Island of Lease deminished 
between 1770 and 1819 with 85%, and on Ambon with 65%. Regular military expeditions cut illegal-
ly planted clove trees and combatted smuggling of cloves by private traders (Taale, 1988). 
7. The coffee growing on high authority under the Priangan Scheme was continued during the British 
Interregnum and thereafter by the Dutch colonial government until 1883 as a separate arrangement for 
taxation in coffee instead of the land rent (Mansvelt & Creuzberg, 1975). 
8. The first auction in Amsterdam of Java-coffee in 1711 fetched high prices and demand grew within 
a few years to about 500 tonnes (van Hall, 1939). 
9. The purchase price of 10 'stuiver' per pound would be paid in kind (cloth). The farmers lost interest 
and cut the coffee trees, which forced the VOC to increase prices. The priority of trade policy over farm-
ers' interest during the following decades caused a vicious cycle of overproduction, price adjustment 
and cutting (extirpation) of trees by the VOC. 
10. In the 18th century, corrupt VOC administrators began a black market in staying permits for the 
numerous Chinese immigrants and extradicted illegal immigrants. In 1740, this led to a heavy revolt 
which was suppressed at the cost of some 10,000 Chinese killed. Bands of Chinese who escaped over-
ran several VOC outposts (Ricklefs, 1981). 
11. The government of the Netherlands, called 'Batavian Republic' during the French occupation, took 
over all rights and duties of the VOC, including its debt of 134 M Dutch guilders. 
12. General Napoleon Bonaparte, Emperor of France from 1804 to 1814, invaded Holland in 1795 and 
installed a French-dominated regime in the renamed 'Batavian Republic'. In the interest of centralisa-
tion of power, Emperor Napoleon made his brother Louis Napoleon king of the Netherlands in 1806. 
The independent-minded Louis made important decisions, with collaboration of Dutch patriots, regar-
ding Dutch administration and agriculture in the Dutch East Indies. 
13. Armed with the authority of Stadtholder William V (the 'Kew letters') and with more ships and fire-
power than the VOC in Indonesia, the British proceeded to conquest Dutch strongholds. From 1795, the 
English fleet commenced a blockade of Batavia thereby effectively prohibiting Dutch ships to sail 
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freely between 1795 and 1800. Immediately, English, American and Danish vessels took over the trade 
and transport of coffee and spices, which contributed to the bankruptcy of the VOC in 1798 (Ricklefs, 
1981). 
14. The endless succession of wars on Java, Sumatera and the Molukan islands caused a continuous 
drain on the financial resources of the VOC which from a trading company had developed into a sov-
ereign state. 
15. Land rent is a taxation on basis of available sawah land. Traditional taxation in pre-nineteenth cen-
tury Java was not land-based, but population-based, reflecting the importance rulers gave to control 
over labour (Booth, 1988). Raffles replaced (at least on paper) tax obligations of the peasantry in the 
form of labour services and the enforced deliveries of produce by a taxation in money on the basis of 
agricultural land use (Reinsma, 1955). 
16. The defeat of the French Napoleonic armies at Waterloo, Belgium, in 1814, and the ensuing 
Congress of Vienna (1914-15) installed the Kingdom of the Netherlands (including Belgium) as an 
independent monarchy and brought King William I on the throne. The Dutch possessions in Indonesia 
were given back, whilst the English withdrew to the Straits Settlements, Malaya, and to the British 
occupied Regencies Padang and Bengkulu on Sumatera (Ricklefs, 1981). 
17. Prince Pangaran Dipa Negara and his able commanders fought a guerrilla war which forced the 
Dutch Governor-General to seek military and financial assistence from the Netherlands. The heavy loss 
of men (8,000 Europeans) and high cost of the Java War (over 20 M NGL) deeply changed the colonial 
policies of the Dutch government (Lubis, 1979). 
18. On top of its public debt obligation of 20 M NGL, in 1825, the Dutch East Indies government had 
to contract additional loans to pay for the Java Wars. The annual interest due on these debts increased 
thereby to 2.5 M NGL. In 1830 not enough capital was available in the Dutch East Indies to make the 
required remission (Reinsma, 1955). 
19. Commissioner-General du Bus de Ghisignies recommended the establishment of large estates under 
European management on unreclaimed land which at that time still covered 7/9 of all territory under 
direct government control. This estate plan required long term investments which would aggravate the 
existing financial crisis of the colonial government (Reinsma, 1955). 
20. One of the reasons for low production was that considerable areas of communal village-land had 
been rented out or sold to private Chinese and European merchants. As the lease contracts were usual-
ly short term ones, the planters hardly invested in growing export crops and yields remained low. 
21. Land rent is also a measure of the sum demanded from the local rulers or desa headmen in the form 
of product consignments (levies) during the time of the culture system. Product consignments consti-
tuted an effective method of levying taxes in a society with a shortage of cash money (Reinsma, 1955). 
22. The 'Government crops' mentioned in official statistics were export crops grown by peasant farm-
ers on order of the government (on high authority) on communal village grounds for marginal planting 
wages. The yields were collected by the local administration (Binnenlands Bestuur) (Mansvelt & 
Creuzberg, 1975). 
23. Over the periode 1851-70, the Netherlands treasury received twice the amount of remittances from 
cultuurstelsel profits it had received in 1831-50, whilst a deficit in the colonial budget due to military 
expenditure on the Bali War in the 1850s could be compensated (Ricklefs, 1981). 
24. To avoid a sudden shortage of labour for the important sugar industry, the process of conversion to 
free enterprise plantations was spread out over a period of 12 year. 
25. It was custom in the Principalities of C Java that, as a reward for services rendered, the control of 
smaller or larger districts or villages be conferred by the Court to deserving civil servants or relatives. 
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These allocations, called apanages, used to go with the right of apanage, i.a. taxation, disposal of vil-
lagers or communal land, commandeering labour and so on. The holders of apanages were also entitled 
to accomodate entrepreneurs with land and labour for large scale plantations (Mansvelt & Creuzberg, 
1975). 
26. By 1845, the government had advanced up to 10 M NGL on the basis of sugar, tea and coffee con-
tracts. The sugar planting credits were continued to 1845 and the harvest credits to 1860 (Fasseur, 
1980). 
27. A prescribed quantity of sugar had to be delivered to government against fixed prices, whereas the 
remainder - usually a third - could be freely sold by the manufacturer. 
28. The Agrarian Law of 1870 granted property rights on land only to Indonesians. Foreigners were 
allowed to lease land from the government for up to 75 years or from indigenous holders for periods 
from five to twenty years (Ricklefs, 1981). The Agrarian Law removed the difficulty under the old rules 
by which contracts could only be made for services and produce. 
29. The Colonial Reports (Koloniale Verslageri) of 1849-1906 mentioned in particular the three Demak 
and Grobogan famines (respectively 1849, 1873 and 1901) when padi and palawija crops failed due to 
disastrous droughts (Hasselman, 1914). 
30. Bijblad bij Staatsblad nos. 179 and 869; Circulars dated, 18 June 1846, 15 September 1848, no. 251 
and 33 August 1863, no. 251. 
31. The former Director of Public Works, H de Bruijn (1869), wrote that incessant overburdening of 
farmers' communities under the Cultuurstelsel had eroded the indigenous knowledge on rice cultiva-
tion, seed selection and even cultivar characteristics. 
32. The self-styled extensionist K..F. Holle, with his friend the Chief Pangulu of Limbangan, published 
brochures on rice seeding, palawija cultivation, terrassing of hillsides, and pisciculture in sawah. 
Holle's De vriend van den Javaanschen landman and brochures were printed and distributed by the 
colonial government. In 1872, Holle was appointed as honorary councilor for indigenous agriculture 
(Hasselman, 1914). 
33. The Dutch name of the well preserved botanical gardens at Bogor, at 60 km south of Jakarta, was 's 
Lands Plantentuin te Buitenzorg (referred to as Plantentuin). Its present name is Kebun Raya Indonesia. 
34. C.G Reinwardt, a professor of chemistry and pharmacology in Amsterdam, arrived in Jakarta as 
advisor to the Commissioner-General with the function of 'Director for Affairs of Agriculture, Arts and 
Sciences'(1815-22) (Treub, 1892). 
35. In 1863, the Plantentuin contained an assortment of 10,000 plant species which were maintained and 
described by the illustrious hortulani J.K. Hasskarl, J.E. Teysmann, S. Binnendijk and R.H.C. Scheffer. 
Teysmann served from 1830-'69 and continued as travelling collector of plants for another twenty years. The 
Gardens' bulletin was named 'Teijsmannia' (1890-1922) in honour of his great contributions (Treub, 1892). 
36. Bijblad bij het Staatsblad, No. 869 (18 June 1847). 
37. Dr. Melchior Treub, 1851-1910, was an eminent botanist who became a member of the Netherlands 
Royal Academy of Science in 1879 already. In the tropics, Treub soon saw the importance of studying 
plants and cultivation problems in situ. Being appointed as Director of the Plantentuin at an age of 28 
years he became an internationally reknown initiator of research in the Dutch East Indies and the foun-
ding father of the Department of Agriculture in 1905 (Koningssberger, 1917). 
38. When in the 1880s the Sereh disease attacked the sugarcane and the Coffee Leaf Rust the coffee, 
the Cultuurtuin had already collected accessions of and experimental results on new crops to provide 
technical aid to the planters. 
39. In order to enable Dutch botanists to work at the Foreigners' Laboratory and the other institutes at 
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Bogor, Treub managed to raise a 'Buitenzorg Foundation' and obtained an annual subsidy from the 
Dutch Government (Koningsberger, 1917). 
40. Treub contributed personally to the establishment of all research stations existing at the time. The 
Deli Research Station and the Stations for indigo, tobacco, coffee, tea, rubber and cinchona all had, dur-
ing a certain period between 1905 and 1926, a mode of factual collaboration with the Department of 
Agriculture (Koningsberger, 1917). 
41. Treub held the opinion that the independent research stations could not yet bear responsibility to 
develop their respective sector because /. communications in the Dutch East Indies were still under-
developed; 2. the planters' communities lacked the organisation required for continuity of organisation, 
and; 3. scientists with experience in applied research and management were not yet available. 
42. The scientist J. Van Breda de Haan identified Phytophthora nicotianae as the causal agent of wilt-
ing disease of tobacco seedlings and recommended removal of all infested seed beds and steaming of 
the soil of these beds. 
43. The Rubber Research Station (Rubber Proefstation) at Medan was financed by the General 
Association of Rubber Planters in Sumatra (Algemeene Vereeniging van Rubber Planters ten Oostkust 
van Sumatra, AVROS). 
AA. Koninklijk Besluit, art. 2, dated July 28, 1904, no. 28 (Indisch Staatsblad No.380). Treub's initiative was 
supported by Secretary De Graaff, who later became Governor-General and a promotor of agriculture. 
45. In 1905, the botanic gardens in Bogor, the Plantentuin, included the laboratories and experiment 
stations for rice, coffee, tea, indigo and tobacco, the herbarium, the Foreigners' Laboratory, the 
Mountain Garden at Cibodas, the Experimental Garden at Cikeumeuh and the Government's Cinchona 
Estate at Cinjiruan (Koningsberger, 1917). 
46. During the parliamentary session on the proposed bill regarding the founding of DoA in the Dutch 
Indies, the Minister for the Colonies said that the Department of Internal Affairs would remain respon-
sible for indigenous agriculture (Bijlage op de Handelingen der Staten Generaal 1903/4). 
47. H.J.Lovink was an experienced agricultural administrator when he was appointed as Director of 
Agriculture in the Dutch East Indies from 1909 until 1918. As a newcomer to Indonesia, Lovink was 
more inclined to delegate power and to merge the numerous small laboratories and units into larger 
departmental divisions (Bernhard, 1930). 
48. The Boards of the Algemeen Syndicaat voor Bergcultures and of the Sugar Syndicate advised the 
government on issues dealing with plantations on Java and S Sumatera (Toxopeus & Wessel, 1983). The 
combined Boards of AVROS (Rubber Planters' Association of E Sumatera) and the DPK(Deli Planters' 
Association) represented the interests of estates at the E coast of Sumatera. 
49. P. van der Goot in the 1920's studied the biology of white and yellow rice stemborers. His 
recommendations on synchronous planting of rice in the centres of infestation -the regencies Kerawang, 
Cirebon and Pekalongan- met with remarkable success. In the district Pekalongan, the annual waiver of 
land rent, a form of compensation for yield losses, decreased from on average 20,000 NGL/y to 3,000 
NGL/y (Mededeelingen IPZ, 1932). 
50. There were eight experimental gardens, 600 ha in all, with about 285 ha rubber, 90 ha tea, 145 ha 
coffee, 40 ha cocoa and 10 ha Cinchona. The gardens were managed by a staff of about 600 employ-
ees of which 16 technical officers (Toxopeus & Wessel, 1983). 
51. The Central Research Institute for Agriculture (CRIA or Lembaga Pusat Penelithian Partanian, 
LP3) in Bogor was supported by a network of 6 sub-stations and 23 experimental farms on Java, 
Sumatera, Kalimantan and Sulawesi. 
52. The Five-Year Development Plans were indicated Repelita I, 1969/70-1973/74 to the current Repe-
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lita VI, 1994/95-1999/2000 according the fiscal year (FY) which runs from April 1 to March 31. A Five-
Year Plan consists of annual sub-plans which enable the adjustment of policy to the domestic and 
international economic situation through feed-back of annual evaluation results. 
53. The rice trade in Indonesia uses various names to indicate degrees of treatments. These are padi for 
dried ears or unthreshed dried rice, (padi) gabah for unhusked rice, and beras for dehusked unpol-
ished/polished rice. 
54. P.N. Pertani (Perusahaan Negara Pertanian, Agricultural State Enterprise), which held a monopoly 
on fertilizer distribution, was charged with pesticide distribution for Bimas-Inmas till 1968. In 1969, the 
GOI took away the distribution task from P.N. Pertani for the Bimas Gotong Rojong program because 
of its failing management and poor price control. P.T. Pertani was then re-organized as an autonomous 
semi-government enterprise (Perseroan Terbatas, P.T.) (Afiff, 1979). 
55. Bimas was defined as 'an intensive extension campaign supported by inputs and credit facilities 
delivered down to village level, stimulated by market prices favourable to the farmers. The pilot project 
was derived from the pilot activities by students in the period 1963-66 (Adjid, 1983; van de Fliert, 1993). 
56. BULOG (Badan Urusan Logistik, National Logistics Agency) was the government agency in charge 
of padi procurement at the national and provincial level as a safeguard of supply and distribution to mil-
itary and civil government institutions. BULOG played a decisive role in subsequent food price stabili-
zation regulations. 
57. The seven foreign companies included CIBA (Swiss), Mitsubishi (Japanese), COOPA (Italian), 
Hoechst (German) and Agrar und Hydrotechnik (German). BULOG opened letters of credit in the name 
of these multinationals to be drawn on the Central Bank of Indonesia. 
58. The total volume of credit to be allocated during the program period was estimated at circa 29.5 M 
US $. The loan had to be repaid by the fanner to BULOG within one year. 
59. The credit package of the Bimas Inmas Gotong Rojong program differed for farmers growing 
improved IR-cultivars and those growing local varieties. The former received 30% higher total loans 
for seed, fertilizer, pesticides and extension. The loan component for pesticides was the same for both 
categories (11 US$ = 4,440 rupiah). For farmers using improved cultivars the pesticide component 
amounted to 35% of the total loan. 
60. The volume of padi turned in by the farmers as repayment on loans remained far below expecta-
tions. Lower than expected yields, cheating with yield declarations, low over-all rate of repayment 
(below 53% over four seasons), too easy terms of credit, and a score of other irregularities caused an 
unacceptable repayment deficit (AfifF& Timmer, 1971). 
61. With support of the army, President Sukarno dissolved, in 1959, the Constituent Assembly and 
decreed the constitution which gave him, and not an elected cabinet, supreme powers in a 'guided' 
democracy. Under the autocratic governments of the Presidents Sukarno and Suharto, the army obtained 
an all pervading influence in Indonesia's society. The political function of the army was frequently uti-
lized to impose unpopular measures upon the people (Palmier, 1965). 
62. CIBA took a contract on 400,000 ha of rice in the wet season 1969/70 at 29,50 US$/ha (100,000 ha 
in each C and E Java, and 200,000 ha in W Java). The CIBA package included insecticides and two aer-
ial applications per season. Fertilizer was not included but was supplied by P.T. Pertani (Sources: 
Pedoman 6.5.1969; Djakarta Antara 5.5.1969). 
63. Oka (1996) cited the outbreak of rice gall midge in W Java in 1979 as an example of a secondary 
pest induced through aerial spraying of phosphamidon (Dimecron® ULV) to control rice stem borer. 
64. Studies on natural enemies of BPH and whitebacked planthopper (WBPH) include amongst others 
Cyrtorhinus lividipennis, Casnoidea spp, Paedurus spp, Coccinella species, and the parasitoid Haplo-
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gonatopus orientalis. During 1975, researchers identified several parasitoids of the rice gallmidge 
(Orseolia oryzae). 
65. IRRI releases of rice cultivars possessing one dominant resistance gene (BPH1) for resistance to 
BPH biotype 1 began with IR26 in 1973, followed by IR28-IR34, IR36, IR38-IR54, IR64, and IMV2 
cultivars since 1974/75. IR32, IR36, IR38 and later issues possessed gene BPH2 with resistance to bio-
type 2. These cultivars were introduced into or cross-bred in Indonesia and replaced gradually the high 
yielding but very susceptible cultivars IR5, IR8, C4-63 and the Indonesian IMV1 hybrids Pelita 1/1,1/2 
(both from IR5 x Syntha) (Oka, unknown; Jatileksono, 1993). Hybrid cultivars (from IMV1 x other HV-
cultivars and called IMV2) comprised i.a. the popular cultivars Cisadane, Cimandiri, Citarum, Krueng 
Aceh and Semeru (Jatileksono, 1993). 
66. The new biotype BPH2 could attack IR26, IR28, IR30 and IR34. Since untill 1977, BPH2 had only 
been found in N Sumatera, IR 26 was still widely planted on Java. IRRI released the rice cultivars IR32, 
IR36 and IR38 with resistance against BPH biotype 2 (Oka, unknown). Indonesia released the four HY-
cultivars Asahan, Brantas, Serau and Citarum which possess BPH1 and BPH2 resistance. 
67. For sawah conditions medium short cultivars with erect leaves are favoured to reduce lodging and 
disease. For rain-fed rice, which suffers from greater weed competition, breeding aims at taller culti-
vars with moderately erect leaves to shade out weeds. 
68. Farmers prefer Cisadane because of its superior consumer quality, although it matures about 20 days 
later than IR36. Many farmers still grow IR36 because of its earlier maturity (110 days) and resistance 
to various pests and diseases. 
69. The Bogor Research Institute for Food Crops, founded in 1905, and the Malang Institute (E Java) 
worked in particular on secondary food (palawija) crops. Rice research was primarely the responsibi-
lity of the Institutes at Sukamandi (W Java), Ujang Pandang (S Sulawesi) and Banjabaru (S 
Kalimantan). The Sukarami Institute (S Sumatera) was focussed on dryland rice and palawija crops. 
70. Under the Agrarian Law of 1870, the indigenous landowner was authorized to lease his land for a 
certain period to non-indigenous parties. The unclaimed, so-called wild lands, could be leased out by 
the state initially for 20 to 40 years and, later, up to 75 years (hereditary long lease). 
71. According to the Sugar Cultivation Law, each year 1/13 part of the enforced sugar culture should 
be transformed into free enterprise. Thus, by 1890 all enforced cession of land and labour by peasant 
farmers came to an end. 
72. The Java sugar industry exported raw sugar of low quality to refineries in Europa and United States 
of America and lost thereby the added value. Improvement of sugar quality and processing technique 
became the main task of the Sugar Research Station W Java (Koningsberger, 1948). 
73. For reasons of regional differences between cultivation conditions and poor communications at the 
time, the sugar planters' associations of W, C and E Java established three separate research stations, 
They declined collaboration with the Plantentuin institutions at Bogor and refused government inter-
ference. 
74. An inquiry, held in 1963/64 at 28 sugar factories in district Madiun, E Java, with a total planted area 
37,000 ha, revealed 40% damage from rats to the crop (Handojo et at, 1987). 
75. The first samples of Sumatera tobacco arrived in the Netherlands already in 1864 and shipments 
were auctioned regularly from 1865 onward. In 1884, the value of the Sumatera tobacco output had 
risen to 27.5 M NGL, thereby surpassing the production of Java tobacco which valued 7.8 M NGL. 
76. The Chief-administrator of Deli Maatschappy, J.T. Cremer, who succeeded J.A. Nienhuis, founded 
the Deli Planters Vereeniging DPV (De\\ Planters' Association) in Medan in 1871, and the Deli Rail-
way Company in 1983. In later years, Cremer was appointed as Minister for the Colonies in the 
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Netherlands. 
77. The four dominant tobacco companies were Delimy, Deli-Bamy, Senembah and Arendsburg. Their 
Chief-Administrators made up the Board of the Deli Planters Vereeniging. DVP established also a 
pathological laboratory for human medicin and an immigration service for Chinese labour in Medan. 
78. The Government's coffee plantations in Priangan and elsewhere under the Cultuurstelsel were sit-
uated far away from the villages, wages for enforced service were low and supervision by European and 
local controllers entirely insufficient. Controller K.W. van Gorkom (1884) wrote that many square 
miles of coffee forests were unproductive since exclusion of light and aeration within the 'coffee jun-
gle' prohibited fruit bearing. 
79. The exploitation rights on former government coffee gardens were given to the people for a term of 
10 years. Where growing coffee was less profitable, the lands were given out for growing food or turned 
in to forestry reserves. To protect smallholders against middlemen and money lenders the leasing of free 
coffee gardens to non-Indonesian was prohibited (Huitema, 1935). 
80. The Cacao Proefstation at Salatiga was instituted in March 1901 and L. Zehntner was appointed 
Director. It was built amidst cacao estates, of which the managers (administrateurs) contributed on basis 
of area planted (cess fund). The Station's Bulletins (Mededeelingen) reported on results (Toxopeus & 
Wessel, 1983). 
81. Rampasan implies that outside the fruit-bearing season all pods are removed from the trees, and 
buried in deep holes so that all larvae inside the pods are destroyed and female adults find no pods to 
deposit their eggs on. Zehntner (1903) concluded that only rampasan controlled cacao pod borer effec-
tively. 
82. At Salatiga between 1900-06, Zehntner studied the biological control of the cacao pod borer, 
because spraying of cacao pods was to expensive due to tree size and spray frequency (every 5 days) 
(Toxopeus & Wessel, 1983). 
83. For example, Perkebunan XIII, established in 1971 by government decree no. 24, managed 19 
estates in W Java. The main crop was tea, followed by rubber, cinchona, cacao, coconut and cloves. 
Since 1980, Perkebunan XIII opened nucleus estates in SW Java and W Kalimantan with World Bank 
loans. 
84. 'Study on the improvement of plantation crop research in Indonesia', March 1971 (Bappenas 
Project ATA -4g) 
85. The group of Perkebunan and private companies set up their own research centres which were to 
work independently from the public sector institutes. These included the Gambung Research Centre for 
Tea and Cinchona, a Rubber Centre at Getas, C Java, a Tobacco Centre at Djember, and an additional 
Centre at Medan, Sumatera, for rubber, oilpalm, Deli tobacco, tea and cacao. 
58 Wageningen Agricultural University Papers 99-1 (1999) 
Chapter 3 
Development of agriculture in Malaysia 
3.1. Introduction 
The political entity 'Federation of Malaysia' came into being in 1963 and con-
sists of West Malaysia, the Malay Peninsula, and East Malaysia, the States of 
Serawak and Saba. Singapore joined the Federation initially, but separated two 
years later. W Malaysia is part of a peninsula pointing southward from the Asian 
landmass. It shares borders with Thailand to the north and with Singapore to the 
south. E Malaysia is situated in NW Kalimantan and shares borders with Indonesia 
and Brunei. The agricultural situation in E Malaysia is of little relevance for this 
study and is, therefore, not reviewed. 
From the rugged frontier area in the north of Peninsular Malaysia several 
mountain ranges run southward to form the central Malayan highlands. The heav-
ily forested main range, rising steeply from flat coastal and riverine lowlands, 
forms a formidable obstacle to the east-west communication, but in the S State of 
Malaka its altitude deminishes to about 400 m. 
Peninsular Malaysia has a hot equatorial climate with, in the lowlands, an aver-
age annual temperature varying between 25°C and 28.3°C. The rainfall determines 
the seasons, the NE monsoon prevailing between November and March, the SW 
monsoon from June to September. The rainfall pattern of Peninsular Malaysia is 
complicated. Most regions have more than 180 rain days per year. The driest peri-
ods are generally from December to March and in June and July (World Atlas of 
Agriculture, Vol.2:365). 
The NW coastal lowland, with a marked dry season, is the chief rice producing 
part of the country. The CW lowlands of Krian and Tanjung Karang, and the SW 
lowlands of Melaka have deep peat soils, which are largely opened up for oil palm, 
pineapple, vegetable and rice planting. The lowlands on the E coast are generally 
less developed, but for the Kemubu Irrigation Scheme in Kelantan. 
For centuries the peninsula was the target of Malay immigrants who arrived 
from the islands (i.a. Java and Sulawesi) of the Indonesian archipelago. Till the 
19th century, the country had no more than a quarter million inhabitants. The first 
official census of 1911 reported the population of the peninsula as 2.3 million. The 
establishment of a colonial export economy invoked two successive waves of 
immigration of Chinese and Indians which not only augmented the population 
growth but also transformed the ethnologically homogenic social structure into a 
heterogenic structure. The population composition at Independence in 1957 was 
about 50% Malay, 37% Chinese, 11% Indians and 2% others. At the time, over 
two-third of the Chinese and Indians were born in Malaya (Kasch, 1984). 
Agricultural development in Peninsular Malaysa was dominated by the 
European managed estate agriculture. After 1980, when control over the estate sec-
tor passed to Malaysian bussiness groups, the estates continued to prosper. 
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Indigenous agriculture received relatively litte attention from the colonial admin-
istration. After Independence, the Malaysian government invested heavily in 
improvement of rice cultivation for two reasons, a. to reduce the need for imports 
of rice, and, b. to improve the income of Malay farmers, equity of economic oppor-
tunity being a political issue. Another target group for government attention were 
the rubber and oil palm smallholders. Several Federal Authorities were established 
to open up new land and to organize the settlement of smallholders. The econom-
ic output of smallholder agriculture, however, remained a matter of great concern 
and many farmers migrated to towns. In consequence, the contribution of agricul-
ture to the Gross Domestic Product decreased steadily during the 1990s. Develop-
ment of other agricultural sectors, such as the production of vegetables and fruits, 
was by and large left to private initative. 
3.2. Early Malay history 
Peninsular Malaya forms a natural bridge between the Asian continent and the 
Indonesian archipelago. As Malaya and Indonsia have similar climates and envi-
ronments, their early history has much in common. Located at the convergence of 
two major sea routes and linked to the great markets of India and China, Malaya 
became integrated in the regional trading network which gradually developed from 
the third century A.D. Commerce attracted diverse groups of people from S India, 
Sri Lanka, S China and Sumatera which settled along Malaya's coasts and rivers 
(Ryan, 1976). The indigenous tribes, the 'orang asli', retreated into the jungle. 
Hardly any written or sculptural documentation exists on the early history of 
the sparsely populated peninsula (Ryan, 1976). Malaya's development was proba-
bly set in motion by the rise of the maritime kingdom Sriwijaya in S Sumatera, in 
the seventh century A.D. (ch 2.2). Sriwijaya came to exercise suzerainty over the 
Melaka Straits with its typhoon safe harbours, and it controlled piracy in the area 
(Ryan, 1976). The ensuing period of peace favoured international trade to which 
Peninsular Malaya contributed its minerals and products' from the jungle and the 
seas, which were higly valued. 
Sriwijaya's decline allowed the rise and glory of the Entrepot State Melaka as 
the heart of the trade between the East (China) and the West (India, Arabia and 
Europe) in the 15th century2. Melaka's importance as entrepot port stemmed from 
its efficient legislation and administration which guaranteed safety for traders and 
their ships, and honest and rapid handling of the cargo (Watson & Andaya, 1982). 
The foreign trading products included tea and manufacture from China, spices 
from Indonesia, cloth, pottery, copper and ironware from India, and rice from Siam 
and Indo-China. 
Traditional food supply came from hunting, fishing, gathering and swidden agri-
culture. Indigenous crops included rice, banana, coconut, root crops such as sweet 
potato (Ipomoea batatas) and cocoyam {Colocasia antiquorum), probably sugerca-
ne, leafy vegetables and fruits. Immigrants from China and India introduced planting 
materials, tools, methods of permanent land use and wet rice growing. Expanding 
sawah in fertile plains during the 11th century gave the Sultanate of Kedah the com-
mercial resources to free itself from its overlord Sriwijaya (Watson & Andaya, 1982). 
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3.3. Arrival of European contenders in Malaysia 
3.3.1. The Portuguese, the Dutch and the English. In 1511, Melaka was attacked 
and captured by the Portuguese who sought direct control over the lucrative spice 
trade, in particular cloves and nutmegs from E Indonesia. In the late 16th century, 
Dutch ships began to arrive in Malay waters. In 1602, the Dutch East India 
Company (VOC) was founded for the promotion of the East Asia trade. In an effort 
to achieve monopoly over the lucrative spice trade, the VOC captured Melaka from 
the Portuguese in 1641 after a long siege, with the help of the Malay kingdom of 
Johor. (Map on page 61). 
English influence on Malaya commenced in 1786 with the acquisition of the 
Island Penang from the Sultan of Perak by the English trader Francis Light. In 
1800, the Englishmen wrested Province Wellesley3 from the same ruler, who 
protested against the earlier deal (Ryan, 1976). At the time of the French invasion 
of Holland in 1795, all Dutch VOC possessions in Asia including Melaka were 
given in trust4 to England to keep them out of French hands. In 1815, after Napole-
on's defeat at Waterloo, the VOC settlements were returned to the Dutch. In 1819, 
the English acquired the island of Singapore from the Sultan of Johor. Several 
years later Melaka was ceeded definitely to England following the Anglo-Dutch 
treatiess of 1824 and 1826 (Watson & Andaya, 1982). 
3.3.2. Agriculture before 1815. The indigenous hunting, fishing and gathering 
societies bartered the products from jungle and sea with inhabitants of river basins, 
who in turn sold them to entrepot merchants. The increasingly busy maritime traf-
fic and the growing population demanded a steady supply of food and fruits, which 
seems not to have created serious problems. In its high days, the population of 
Melaka, swelled by foreign traders, may have numbered as many as 100,000. 
The Portuguese and the Dutch in Melaka appear to have contented themselves 
with maintaining an essential supply of food for their forces. With this objective, 
the occupying forces maintained a certain degree of suzerainty over the adjacent 
Malay territory Negeri Sembilan, and forced the inhabitants to pay them tribute in 
rice and other agricultural produce. In the territory of Melaka the successive gov-
ernors established a system of land tenure and taxation that discouraged its agri-
cultural development (Grist, 1935). 
When the settlement of Penang was established in 1786, the British East India 
Company (EIC) soon ordered the growing of vegetables and fruits for its fleets and 
garrisons. With this objective it made grants of land on the island freely available 
to agricultural entrepreneurs. In the following years the EIC encouraged cultiva-
tion of rice in the Dependencies Penang, Province Wellisley and Melaka. The EIC 
also tried to bypass the Dutch monopoly on the spice trade through the cultivation 
of spice crops on Penang and Singapore Island. Records indicate that nutmegs, 
cloves, coffee and pepper were grown in both Settlements6 since the end of the 
18th century. With the intention of stimulating agricultural development Raffles 
inaugurated the botanical gardens in Singapore in 1822. These gardens were later 
abandoned, but they may have supported the introduction of spice cultivation. 
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3.4. Agriculture in Malaya between 1815 and 1914 
3.4.1. British administration. From 1829, the four British possessions Penang, 
Province Wellisley, Singapore and Melaka constituted the Straits Settlements 
under a unified administration which, after 1832, had its seat at Singapore. The 
East India Company remained the controlling authority. In 1833, the EIC lost its 
monopoly of the China trade, which had hitherto alleviated the costs of main-
taining the Straits Settlements as ports of call. Like the VOC one century before, 
the EIC found itself in the possession of strategically valuable ports that were not 
self-supporting and that left it with the financial burden of administration. When 
the EIC ceased to exist in 1858, the administrative responsibility over the Settle-
ments was first transferred to the India Office and, in 1867, to the Colonial Office 
in London. Throughout the greater part of the 19th century, the British government 
did not expand its territorial control over Malaya. The EIC, and after its demise the 
British Government, was adamantly opposed to any involvement in Malay quar-
rels and considered vital to keep any Malay dispute a local matter under authority 
of the sultans. 
From the late 18th century, Europeans in the Straits Settlements had experi-
mented with plantation agriculture. Coffee, cotton, tea, tobacco and spices had all 
been planted but none had yielded the anticipated profits. Chinese agriculturists 
pioneered sugar planting in Province Wellisley and proved particularly successful 
in growing a combination of cassava, pepper and gambir7. They had already 
developed extensive pepper, spices and gambir estates in Singapore by the mid-
18305. A few European merchants also planted sugarcane and spices in the 
Settlements. 
3.4.2. Development of Chinese enterprise. In the 19th century the Chinese came 
to dominate commercial agriculture and tin mining industry. The displacement of 
Malays in the local economy during this period may be attributed to inherent cul-
tural attitudes. The Malay were noted as energetic traders, but seemed unwilling to 
work for wages on estates or in mines. The rigours of existence, the backbreaking 
work on the edge of the jungle and the depredations by tropical diseases caused a 
death rate of up to 50% in some rural areas. Chinese who survived demonstrated a 
competitive spirit and a determination to succeed which could not but affect the 
pace of change in the Malay world. 
The pool of Chinese manpower increased rapidly and already by 1845 the 
Chinese became predominant in the population of Singapore and some Malay 
towns (Watson & Andaya, 1982; Kasch, 1984). Their immigration was actively 
encouraged by both the Straits Settlements and the Serawak governments, for 
Chinese energy and enterprise were widely acknowledged8. Unsettled conditions 
in S China, and especially the outbreak of the Taiping rebellion in 1851, stimulated 
emigration, mainly from the SE provinces of Kwantung, Fukien and Kwangsi. 
What set the Chinese community apart from traditional Malay traders was their 
access to credit for investment in agriculture, either supplied from their own 
resources or from wealthy European merchant firms in the Straits Settlements. 
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Over the centuries the lack of liquid capital even among rich Malays was charac-
teristic as available funds were usually quickly expended on an open display of 
wealth and on the maintainance of a large retinue, the cultural indices of a great 
man. The difficulty of most Malays to call on reserves for immediate investment 
hampered their competition with local Chinese, who could purchase modern 
equipment with lent money to process products such as sago and gambir. 
The Chinese also had a concept of business organization which gave them fur-
ther advantage over Malays. Their expertise is clearly seen in the kongsi, an asso-
ciation of individuals from the same dialect group and area of China who held 
shares in a co-operative venture. An added strength of the kongsi system were the 
ties to other major centres of SE Asia, a network that was unfettered by political 
boundaries. 
With a ready pool of labour, access to capital and a business organization to 
absorb temporary losses, the Chinese position in the rapidly changing economy 
was secure (Kasch, 1984). Some perceptive Malays took advantage of the new 
opportunities presented by the Chinese and worked with them in true partnership. 
The best example of Malay co-operation with Chinese investors and labourers was 
undoubtly in Johor, where the sultan encouraged Chinese to plant pepper and gam-
bir in a shifting cultivation system (Watson & Andaya, 1982). From the mid-1840s 
the Chinese began moving to Johor because of land scarcity and exhaustion of the 
estate soils on Singapore land. Controlling the system of land grants, Johor's ruler 
was able to maintain active Malay involvement in Chinese economic enterprise. A 
Chinese headman was placed in charge of each river basin where plantations were 
developed9. By the mid-nineteenth century the results of Johor's policy were evi-
dent in the expansion of plantation agriculture. In the 1860s, there were 1,200 gam-
bir and pepper plantations in Johor, employing about 15,000 Chinese farmers. 
3.4.3. Beginning of civil turmoil. Johor's control over the Chinese was exceptio-
nal, since its Malay rulers were content to let the Chinese community exist outside 
centralized control as long as the revenue due to the local authority was paid. 
Although an estimated 100,000 Chinese lived in Johor, frictions with the Malay 
authorities remained rare for several decades. However, Chinese investors of the 
Straits soon found it more efficient simply to advance money for business opera-
tions in mining and agriculture directly, bypassing the local Malay chief. 
This trend had far-reaching effects. First, it hastened the rate at which the 
Chinese tightened their grasp on resources. Second, the independence of the 
Chinese settlements undermined the authority of the Malay chiefs and hence their 
ability to maintain order. Rivalries and hostilities between clan and dialect groups 
within the local Chinese society made the situation more complicated. The 
absorption of the Chinese by the existing Malay political and social system was 
hindered by the so-called 'secret societies' rooting in China which had a reputation 
of fomenting dissent. The potential threat of the secret societies to established 
government was evident in street fights between rival groups in Penang and 
Singapore and in the riots which often erupted when some unpopular law was 
promulgated. Strong leadership was a decisive factor in maintaining stability of the 
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society, but at least in the British view it was precisely this element which was 
lacking most in several Malay states (Watson & Andaya, 1982). 
In the second half of the 19th century, immigrants from India settled in the 
Straits Settlements. The Indians worked as labourers in road construction or as 
traders and remained outside agriculture. The migration of large groups of Tamils 
for the estate industry was organized, around 1900, by the United Planting 
Association, a society of planters (Kasch, 1984). 
3.4.4. The British take-over. In the third quarter of the 19th century civil war 
among rival sultans had become endemic. Malays and Chinese were often in con-
flict, and there were bitter faction fights among the Chinese themselves. As the 
fighting became more widespread through the early 1870s, several sultans, 
Chinese merchants who did bussiness in the native states, and merchant houses 
urged the government to intervene. Till 1872, London insisted that there was to be 
no further British involvement at an official level in the troubles of the states. 
Finally, the need to establish law and order became a major rationale for British 
involvement in the peninsula10. 
During the 1870's, on varying pretexts11 and through occasional military action 
the British quickly established control over the states Perak, Selangor, Negeri 
Sembilan and Pahang, where British residents were posted (Map page 61). Hence, 
the four above states were referred to as Protected States. Despite many initial, 
often serious mistakes the British thus consistently expanded their rule from 1875 
onwards by what came to be called the residential system12. 
To lessen economic disparity and differences in development between Pahang 
on the east coast and tin-mining states Perak and Selangor on the west coast, the 
four Protected States were grouped into a Federation in 1896. The Federated Malay 
States (FMS) were brought under a unified administration, civil service and com-
mon treasury seated at Kuala Lumpur. This move towards centralization strength-
ened British control over Malaya. 
The northern Malay States remained under Siam's suzerainty until the begin-
ning of the 20th century. In 1909, King Chulalongkorn of Siam ceeded control over 
the states of Kedah, Perlis, Kelantan and Terengganu to the British by treaty. In the 
following years the northern states were included under the unified administration 
as the Unfederated Malay States (UMS). In 1914, the British were finally able to 
extend control to the southern state of Johor, despite the strong relationship its 
rulers had maintained with Singapore. Thereby, Johor was able to preserve more 
privileges than the other states. 
3.4.5. Establishment of export oriented agriculture. When the British 
Government abandoned its policy of non-intervention in 1873, the Protected 
Malay Sates began to benefit from the systematic development of agriculture as 
initiated by the British administration in the four Strait Settlements. New Botanic 
Gardens were founded, in Singapore in 1858 and on Penang around 1887, to exper-
iment with new crops and to provide technical services. Although the Gardens 
were primarily intended to serve the Settlements and were maintained entirely 
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from colonial funds, the services of the Botanic Gardens Department of the Straits 
Settlements were later extended to the entire peninsula. Thus, the Botanic Gardens 
became the predecessor of the Department of Agriculture of the Federated Malay 
States. 
Late in the 19th century, Chinese interest in gambir, tapioca and pepper 
declined as prices fell. By then, the colonial government considered traditional 
Chinese plantings inimical to the larger interests of Malaya as their shifting 
cultivation led to soil exhaustion and to depletion of firewood, needed for the 
numerous small factories. Consequently, it moved to suppress this type of agricul-
ture and promoted permanent land-use through investments in experimental 
European plantations of coffee, tea and rubber as already established in Ceylon13 
and the Dutch East Indies. For this purpose, the colonial office supplied planting 
stock of pepper, clove, nutmeg and coffee. 
European entrepreneurs were eager to develop plantations because of the lucra-
tive market for agricultural exports. The European planters had access to much 
greater capital and better expertise than the Chinese and could employ the most 
skilled labour force. In Europe, the industrial capital sought to effectively invest its 
merchant capital in the colonies (Loganathan, 1990). Western merchant firms and 
management agencies, of which about a dozen had real importance14, linked the 
agricultural and mining activities on the peninsula with commerce in Singapore, 
and with technical expertise and finance of the UK. 
In view of the chaotic land tenure situation existing at the time, the firms want-
ed legal titles to the land to justify their long-term investments. The colonial gov-
ernment, henceforth, enacted an adequate land legislation, the Selangor Land Code 
of 1891, which was based on the Torrens15 system of registration of title (Grist, 
1935). 
3.4.5.1. Sugarcane. As earlier Chinese efforts in growing sugarcane had been 
successful, a few European merchants began planting cane in the Settlements with 
the help of experienced sugar planters from Mauritius and Ceylon. In the 1840s, 
the Malacca Sugar Co. and other enterprises had been formed which operated with 
Chinese contract growers. Malayan sugar became a higly capitalized European-
controlled industry and appeared to have a bright future. But from the beginning 
the planters were hampered by a shortage of labour, although Tamil labourers were 
brought in from India, under indentures, during the 1880s. When indentured labour 
was abolished in 1913, the last sugar factory closed (Allen & Donnithorne, 1956). 
No evidence was found that the sereh disease impeded sugarcane cultivation in 
Malaysia as it did in Indonesia. 
3.4.5.2. Coffee. The cultivation of coffee began in the 1880s with the arrival of cof-
fee planters from Ceylon, whence they had been driven by the outbreak of Coffee 
Leaf Rust Disease, caused by Hemileia vastatrix, which destroyed their Coffea 
arabica plantations (Allen & Donnithorne, 1956). The Coffee Leaf Rust Disease 
spread from Ceylon throughout SE Asia and reached Singapore Island in 1879. As 
C. arabica was the most widely grown species the search for resistant coffee was 
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commenced without delay (Sivaram, 1980). In 1875, coffee planters tried a suppo-
sedly resistant species, C. liberica, which was introduced from Africa. 
The government wholeheartedly supported the coffee planters with generous 
land terms, planting loans, technical advice and a favourable labour situation16. 
Consequently, proprietary17 estates were rapidly taken over by companies. Be-
tween 1891 and 1896, the Brazilian coffee industry slumped due to the abolition of 
slavery. This caused a price hike on the world coffee market and a boom for the 
young coffee industry in Malaya. Coffee planting was greatly expanded in Selan-
gor and extended to Negeri Sembilan, Perak and Johor. However, by 1899, when 
new supplies of Brazilian coffee came on the market, the coffee price fell to one-
third of its peak value at a time when most of the newly planted estates came into 
bearing. The situation aggravated by the outbreak of the hawk moth {Cephanodes 
hylas)18 which induced the European planters to replace or inter-plant coffee with 
rubber or to abandon their plantation. When C. liberica proved to be susceptible to 
the Leaf Rust Disease coffee growing almost disappeared. To date, the remaining 
coffee gardens in Selangor and Johor consist predominantly of a mixture of C. libe-
rica cultivars (Sivaram, 1980). 
3.4.5.3. Rubber. Towards the end of the 19th century, interest arose in the com-
mercial use of rubber. Since it was known that Hevea trees from the Amazone 
Basin provided the best source of natural rubber, the British Colonial Office in 
1876 commissioned the scientist Henry Wickham to Brazil to collect seeds of//. 
brasiliensis. Wickham succeeded in smuggling some 70.000 seeds out of Brazil, 
which were germinated in quarantine at Kew Gardens, England. Some 2,700 seed-
lings were sent to the East of which 21 were received at the Singapore Botanic Gar-
den19 in June, 1877 (Polhamus, 1962). After several years of experimentation, 
young rubber trees were given out to the coffee planters struggling with the Leaf 
Rust epidemic. Early in the 20th century interplanting coffee with rubber became 
common, and forest land was cleared for rubber planting. Rubber seemed the ideal 
crop to fulfil the government's aim of long-term land use by Europeans. In 1897, 
special land regulations were introduced in the Federated Malay States to encou-
rage rubber cultivation. As rubber gave the highest return on investment and was 
less prone to pests, other crops such as spices, cassava, sugar, and coffee disap-
peared gradually from estates. 
The expansion of the motorcar industry caused the first boom in rubber plant-
ing in 1905. By 1908 rubber was planted in every state of Malaya. Numerous small 
rubber companies obtained funding through British agencies20 established in the 
Straits Settlements. Another rubber boom, in 1909-1912, encouraged European 
companies to spent large sums to buy up Malay lands and old Chinese sugar, gam-
bir, and cassava plantations. Many Malay and Chinese smallholders began to plant 
rubber with the hope of eventually selling the land to Europeans. Thus between 
1910 and 1913 the area under estate rubber more than doubled to 322,000 ha. By 
1916 rubber passed tin as Malaya's chief export earner, a position it held till 1980. 
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3.4.5.4. Oil palm. The oil palm, Elaeis guineensis, was introduced from West 
Africa into the peninsula through the Singapore Botanic Garden in 1870. At first it 
was mainly cultivated as an ornamental plant. Only in 1917, the first plantation 
was set up as a commercial venture. Although palm oil was used in the manu-
facture of soap, candles and margarine, there was little progress in the industry 
until the slump in rubber prices after World War I forced planters to look for an 
alternative crop. 
3.4.6. The state of indigenous agriculture. Whilst the colonial government was 
actively encouraging European investment in estate agriculture, it adopted a gene-
ral laissez-faire attitude towards the economic development of Malay farmers. A 
large percentage of Malays were subsistence rice farmers in the coastal plains and 
river deltas. Many Malay and Chinese farmers planted also some pepper, gambir, 
coconut and fruits for cash income. In the early 1880's, over 90% of the coconut 
plantings were managed by Malay, Indian and Chinese smallholders (Ahmad, 
1980). Between 1910 and 1925, European and Asian estate companies planted the 
coconut to export copra21. 
As the tin mining and estate industries absorbed increasing numbers of migrant 
labourers, the authorities began to actively encourage greater Malay rice produc-
tion to feed the growing population. There was even an attempt to import Chinese 
and Indian padi farmers, but with little success. Rice growing was centered in the 
northwest and northeast22 because these areas had usually adquate supply of water, 
good drainage and some manure. Beginning in the 1880s, the Kedah aristocracy 
was in the forefront to encourage the expansion of rice growing. While the colo-
nial government constructed a big irrigation scheme for Kerian and other smaller 
projects in the 1890s, Malay initiative was mainly responsible for the increase in 
rice production23. 
Malay farmers soon regarded rubber as an ideal cash crop because it is hardy, 
little affected by pests and diseases, and it thrives almost anywhere in Malaya. The 
older rubber cultivars could be tapped from the seventh year and remained produc-
tive for about thirty years. The smallholder was, thus, assured a steady income 
from his rubber trees which require little care and minimal cost in the production 
of latex. The colonial government, minding its rice production strategy, actively 
discouraged the Malay from planting other commercial crops, especially rubber. A 
'no rubber' condition was imposed on certain land to prevent Malay farmers from 
growing this increasingly profitable and convenient crop (Grist, 1935). 
3.4.7. Establishment of a Department of Agriculture. Before 1900, the services 
of the Botanic Gardens Department of the Straits Settlements were invoked by 
planters in the Federated Malay States (FMS), particularly for advice on coffee and 
rubber cultivation. In 1903, the government of the FMS realized that the existing 
institutions could not cope with the pace of agricultural expansion. In 1904, it 
commissioned Dr J.C. Willis, then Director of the Botanic Gardens in Ceylon, to 
report on agricultural conditions in FMS and to make recommendations on future 
policy. Willis formulated an operational scheme for the organization of a 
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Department of Agriculture (DoA) and stressed the need for close collaboration 
between all departments of government concerned with agricultural questions 
(Grist, 1935; Ahmad, 1980). The recommendations were accepted and the Depart-
ment of Agriculture of the FMS was inaugurated in 1905. 
The first major task of DoA was to implement the new agricultural policy 
issued by the government to accelerate agricultural development and preservation 
of land rights. Plant protection officers prepared the first legislation24 on preven-
tion of the entry of noxious organisms and on quarantine for the Federated Malay 
States. DoA also assisted in drafting other important enactments. The passed enact-
ments included: 1. the Labour Code, 1912, securing the rights of contract labourers 
from China and Indonesia, 2. the Malay Reservations Enactment, 1913, Federated 
Malay States, empowering State Governments to declare any area within that State 
to be a Malay Reservation, in which land cannot be sold to a non-Malay. It ensured 
that a sufficiently large area of fertile land would be reserved for native smallhol-
ders, and 3. the Country Lands Enactment, 1914, granting plots of up to 4 ha to 
farmers for cultivation. 
3.5. Advancement in agriculture between 1914 and 1957 
3.5.1. Impact of World War I. The First World War, 1914-18, considerably affect-
ed agriculture in Malaya. Owing to the increased demand for rubber, the rubber 
industry claimed priority at a time when a large number of administrative and 
scientific officers were called into the services. The war impeded the import of rice 
thereby causing a precarious food situation. The FMS government issued a policy 
to increase the production of secondary food crops, such as bananas, cassava, vege-
tables, sugarcane, groundnut and maize, and to intensify ongoing research on rice, 
coconut and oil palm. The policy was supported by new legislation. In 1917, a Rice 
Lands Enactment and a Coconut Preservation Enactment were introduced to pre-
vent these crops from being replaced by rubber. In addition, the Food Production 
Enactment of 1918 set aside specific land for food crops only. Other inducements 
and subtle coercions urged the Malay farmer to remain on the land to produce food 
and, above all, rice. A regional shortage of rice occurred due to crop failure in India 
and Siam which gave these measures special urgency. 
Yet there were major shortcomings in the government's efforts to encourage 
Malay rice farming. It neglected the need for rural credit at reasonable terms. The 
farmer always faced the threat of losing his land to his creditor or of eviction by 
his landlord. Instead, the available credit facilities were channelled primarily to 
European plantations. It also let research on rice lag far behind that devoted to 
export crops. Throughout British rule the Malay farmer was viewed as a needed 
producer of rice with no real place in export crop production. 
In 1917, the government of the FMS appointed an Advisory Committee to 
increase the production of rice and other food crops. The work of the Committee 
resulted in the establishment in the Krian District of the first government rice mill 
and a Rice Research Station to stimulate rice breeding. The improvement of the 
irrigation system in Krian and other districts was speeded up (Grist, 1935). The 
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government took control over the production of all food crops and enforced plan-
ting of food crops by all employers of labour. Rapid agricultural development 
dated from this time and was, to a large extent, rendered possible by the rich rev-
enues coming in from the tin-mining industry of the FMS. 
3.5.2. Development of the Agricultural Services 
3.5.2.1. Privately funded research. DoA was responsible for the development of 
all economically viable crops, but rubber was always given most attention. In tack-
ling the technical problems of rubber cultivation, DoA was assisted by scientists 
employed by the larger rubber estates25 and by the 'Rubber Growers Association' 
(Ahmad, 1980). Shortly after World War I, however, the rubber industry demand-
ed more intensive research on rubber in the form of a scientific organization over 
which the industry would have control. The FMS government concurred with this 
desire and, in 1918, commissioned E.J. Butler26, Director of the Imperial 
Agricultural Research Institute at Pusa, India, to evaluate the agricultural services 
and conditions in the FMS. Butler recommended to separate rubber research from 
that on other crops and to strengthen the technical staff of DoA (Grist, 1935). 
Accordingly, in 1921 began the development of a large Experiment Station at Ser-
dang, Selangor, for crops other than rubber, coconut and rice. 
The year 1922 brought a serious agricultural depression due to the fall of the 
rubber price. To meet this crisis, the Colonial Office, London, introduced the 
Stevenson Scheme of Rubber Restriction throughout Malaya, Ceylon and India -the 
Dutch East Indies abstained- which remained operational until 1928. Owing to the 
economic depression, primarily, the establishment of a private rubber research 
institute was delayed for six years. Finally in 1926, the Rubber Research Institute of 
Malaya (RRIM) was founded. RRIM became a leading centre for improvement of 
rubber clones, tapping technique and latex processing throughout the 20th century. 
When DoA handed its mandate27 for research on plantation rubber to RRIM, it 
meant the first break in policy which rendered it both possible and necessary to re-
organize the Department. DoA remained responsible for all research and extension 
concerning smallholder rubber, and for the administration of all legislative measu-
res connected with the national control of rubber diseases. 
3.5.2.2. Publicly funded research. DoA's Crop Protection Branch took over cer-
tain research projets of the Botanical Gardens on pest and diseases in estate crops. 
Among these, the Branch continued data collection on the infestation and damage 
inflicted on coffee by the hawk moth caterpillar28, on its life cycle and host plants. 
Besides making recommendations on sanitary and chemical control, the govern-
ment entomologists described three natural enemies29 of the hawk moth. They also 
studied the next important pest, the coffee berry borer, Stephanoderes hampei, but 
did not detect its natural enemies. 
The DoA collected resistant planting material of all commercial crops for 
observation in the government experiment stations. In 1925, for example, 14 cof-
fee cultivars were obtained from the Experimental Coffee Plantation, Bangala, 
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East Java (Sivaram, 1980). Grist (1935) noted collaboration with the Dutch East 
Indies on the exchange of high-yielding rubber clones. The technique of bud-
grafting rubber clones was learned from researchers in Medan around 1915. Re-
search on rubber kept its priority status with DoA. The program included 
experimenting with different tapping techniques, testing of new clones under diffe-
rent soil conditions, and fertilizer trials. DoA's Field Branch, responsible for advi-
sing rubber smallholders, established clonal nurseries and supplied millions of 
clonal seedlings and large quantities of budwood for grafting. In 1952, DoA and 
RRIM jointly set up the Rubber Industry Smallholders' Planting Material Scheme 
for the supply to land development schemes (Ahmad, 1980). 
The Division of Plant Breeding began, in 1915, to make pure line selections in 
rice. In 1927, the breeders tried to cross local rice cultivars but failed to obtain new 
cultivars. Line selection yielded some high yielding strains which by 1936 had 
largely replaced local rice cultivars in Krian District (Van, 1963). The average 
small farm size of about 1 ha was a limitation to raising rice production. 
In 1927, the Experiment Station at Serdang was reorganized and its name 
changed to that of Central Experiment Station. Additionally, a considerable num-
ber of subsidiary experiment stations and demonstration plots was established 
under the supervision of the State and Circle Agricultural Officers throughout the 
FMS and the Straits Settlements. Serdang, Selangor, remained the centre of agri-
cultural research throughout the 20th century. 
3.5.2.3. Strengthening of the agricultural services. Early in the 1920s, DoA real-
ized that smallholders needed more assistance. Consequently, the Extension Servi-
ce of DoA's Field Division recruited Malay personnel to work as field staff in the 
districts. This development necessitated an adequate training of the Asian staff, for 
which purpose an Agricultural Training Centre was established at Serdang in 1923. 
In 1929, DoA was reorganized into separate branches for research, extension, and 
support services (box 3.5.2.3). In 1931, DoA and RRIM jointly put the Rural 
Lecture Caravan on the road, a van equipped with instructional films, lantern slides 
and exhibits which toured the rural areas (Ahmad, 1980). 
From 1930, the governments of the Unfederated Malay States (UMS) began to 
organize their agricultural extension services on the lines adopted in the FMS. 
Committees were established for the promotion of food crops. The Rice Commit-
tee, installed in 1930, led to the establishment of a Drainage and Irrigation 
Department in the Ministry of Agriculture. This department collaborated with DoA 
for the improvement of existing rice growing areas and the expansion of irrigation 
systems. A Tobacco Committee was installed in 1932, and a Vegetable Oil 
Committee in 1934. 
In 1931, the School of Agriculture, Malaya, was opened at Serdang, with the 
objective of training Asians for appointment in the Department and for the estates. 
Recommendations made to this effect came from officers of the Education 
Department who visited the Philippines and Java, and from the agricultural instruc-
tor who visited Ceylon. Elementary agriculture was taught at the Training College 
for Malay Teachers for primary schools. 
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By 1935, agricultural services had been made available to all states except 
Perlis, and specialist officers from the DoA headquarters could be called on by the 
UMS. The closer collaboration between all Federated and Unfederated States of 
Malaya in the agricultural sector necessitated amendment of existing legislation. 
Box 3.5.2.3 
The Department of Agriculture of Malaya 
The founding of a Department of Agriculture for the Federal Malay States 
(FMS) resembled the course of events in the Dutch East Indies. In both 
countries, around 1900, the colonial administration became hard pressed to 
maintain an effective balance between the capitalist plantation agriculture 
and the need to improve the income generating capacity of indigenous agri-
culture. The services of the Botanical Gardens Departments were over-
charged and there was no adequate extension. The institutional organization 
was in both cases conceived by a Chief Scientist, M. Treub on Java and I.C. 
Willis from Ceylon for Malaya. 
In 1905, J.B. Carruthers was appointed as the first Director of 
Agriculture of the FMS. The newly recruited staff of DoA included an ento-
mologist, a mycologist and a chemist. Agronomists of the Botanical 
Gardens, such as the Coconut Inspector and the Superintendent of 
Plantations, were also placed under the jurisdiction of DoA. Through such 
arrangements, DoA took over the research and advisory tasks on crop 
improvement in the FMS from the Botanic Gardens Department of the 
Straits Settlements. In 1919, the mandate of DoA was extended to include 
the Straits Settlements. 
In 1923, the government appointed a Malay Civil Service Officer to 
head DoA with the title of Secretary of Agriculture and changed the post of 
Director of Agriculture to that of a Scientific Advisor. In 1928, the post of 
Director of Agriculture was reinstated with the appointment of the scientist 
H.A. Tempany. The latter reorganized DoA fundamentally by establishing 
separate Branches for Research, Field (extension), Agricultural Economics 
and Publication, and Education (Tempany, 1930). The duties of officers in 
the Field Branch were clearly defined to secure close collaboration with the 
Research Branch. In the same year 1929, a Department of Statistics was 
established in the Ministry of Finance to organize Agricultural Census and 
to perform surveys on the estates and agro-industry. DoA collected most of 
the data on smallholders' agriculture. 
72 Wageningen Agricultural University Papers 99-1 (1999) 
3.5.3. The fateful decades, 1930-1950 
3.5.3.1. The great economic depression. In 1928, the Stevenson Scheme of 
Rubber Restriction was terminated. Thereafter rubber production both in Malaya 
and Dutch East Indies rapidly increased and outstripped consumption31. This 
increase, combined with the great world depression which commenced in 1929, led 
to a decline of rubber prices to an unprecedented level. Concurrently, prices of all 
other agricultural commodities declined, in many cases sinking to below cost price. 
The Malayan industries most affected were the coconut and oil palm industries. 
The situation was exacerbated by a corresponding depression in the tin mining 
industry, due to overproduction. These developments caused great financial strin-
gency both in public finance and in commerce32. Between 1931 and 1947, the gov-
ernment adhered to a restrictive policy on immigration of alien labour while encou-
raging their repatriation33. 
3.5.3.2. Second World War and the reconstruction. The Malayan economy was 
badly affected by the Japanese occupation, 1942-45. Most Europeans and many 
Malayan citizens were imprisoned or deported. Agricultural and industrial stocks 
and much infrastructural equipment were confiscated by the Japanese army. When 
a situation of acute food shortage arose, the Japanese administration sent the urban 
dwellers into the countryside to grow large quantities of food crops (Ahmad, 
1980). After the war, the pre-war agricultural policy of crop diversification was 
maintained, in particular concerning food crops. Thus, in 1946, the government 
instituted 'The Agricultural Food Crop Proclamation' which required major pro-
prietors to plant at least 2% of their total cultivated area with food crops. As a result 
of this proclamation, approximately 14,000 ha were planted in 1946. By the end of 
1955, this area had increased to about 39,000 ha. 
Research institutions and plantation industries suffered the loss of records and 
equipment during the war. Most of the pure lines and crosses of rice and other 
annual crops remaining in the experimental stations were lost too. Improved culti-
vars, which had been widely adopted, had become mixtures. It was necessary, 
therefore, to begin all selection and breeding work from scratch (Van, 1963). Work 
on food crops was resumed inmediately and self-sufficiency in rice became an 
important goal. By 1960 at least seven improved cultivars were available for large 
scale release in various states (Van, 1963). 
Utilizing the earlier testing work at the Serdang Experiment Station on 
Trinitario cacao in 1934, the DoA performed a feasibility study on establishing a 
cacao industry in 1947 and commenced nurseries with Trinitario seeds obtained 
from Ceylon. Soon, about 15,000 seedlings were given out for trials after scrutiny 
by the Plant Protection Division of the DoA (Ahmad, 1980). 
By the outbreak of the War in 1941, the rubber industry was in a strong posi-
tion due to new high yielding clones, and progress in mechanization and proces-
sing. The perennial crops on experimental stations and estates were less damaged 
than annual crops and could thus provide the backbone for a rapid agricultural 
recovery. By 1946, Malaya's rubber production was almost back to pre-war level 
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and by 1948 a record production of 708,000 tonnes was reached. The palm oil 
industry recovered rapidly too although much machinery had been removed from 
the factories. By 1950, over half of the national output and employment was again 
generated in the agricultural sector. Rubber alone contributed nearly one third of 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP). In the last years of colonial government, a First 
Five-year Malaya Plan, 1956-60, for economic development was issued and imple-
mented. 
3.6. Agriculture in independent Malaysia, 1957-present 
3.6.1. The arrival of Independence in Malaysia. On February 1st, 1948, the 
Federation of Malaya was formed by joining the Federated and Unfederated Malay 
States including Johor, Penang and Melaka. Singapore remained outside the 
Federation34. 
In 1957, the Federation of Malaya gained its independence from Britain. 
Several years later, in 1963, the Federation of Malaysia was formed by amalga-
mation of Malaya, Singapore and the northern Borneo territories of Serawak and 
Sabah. In 1964 Singapore left the Federation, but the rest of it survived the severe 
confrontation with Indonesia and the Philippines over the Borneo territories. 
When the Federation of Malaysia became independent in 1957, the primary 
objective of government changed from maintaining law and order to national 
development. The economic policies of the independent Federation were no longer 
determined by the concerns of overseas investors or foreign governments. Instead, 
the government tried to create opportunities for an equitable development of estate 
and smallholder agriculture. 
3.6.2. Agricultural policy since 1957. The government prepared a First Five-Year 
Plan for independent Malaysia, designated Second Malaya Plan, 1961-65. The 
series of five-year plans since the formation of the Federation of Malaysia in 1963, 
which cover the period 1966-2000, were named First to Seventh Malaysia Plan. 
These national plans cover all sectors of the economy including agriculture and 
form the basis for allocation of the budget (Anonymous, various). 
The main objectives of the First and Second Malaya Plan, 1956-65, were 
economic growth and the elimination of economic disparity among the ethnic 
groups. A third objective, creating more employment opportunities, would be 
achieved with greater economic growth. 
The government had only limited success in reforming rural land tenure, credit 
and marketing, which were the major factors contributing to rural poverty. In 1955 
and 1967, the Padi Cultivators (Control of Rent and Security of Tenure) Ordinan-
ces35 were passed in order to protect the farmers (Watson & Andaya, 1982). In an 
effort to give farmers access to land, the government set up the Federal Land Deve-
lopment Authority (FELDA) in 1956. Between 1956 and 1966, this body opened up 
large areas of land in Pahang and Johor, each constituting 1,600 to 2,000 ha, for 
rubber and oil palm smallholders. The DoA supplied budwood, fertilizers and her-
bicides under the Rubber Smallholders Planting Material Scheme (Ahmad, 1980). 
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The agricultural sector was a major earner of foreign exchange, averaging 
about 55% of the commodity export earnings between 1965 and 1985. This im-
pressive performance was a major reason why Malaysia did not suffer any lengthy 
or pronounced balance of payment crisis. Over the decades since 1957, the agri-
cultural sector was characterized by 1. the predominance of a small number of 
perennial crops, producing export commodities such as rubber, palm oil and cacao, 
2. an efficient, well-organized plantation-scale agriculture and a less developed 
smallholder sector, 3. dependence on export of agricultural commodities and sizea-
ble imports of food and feed and, 4. high incidence of poverty and under-employ-
ment in the Malay smallholder sector. 
When economic growth began to level off by a decrease in tin production and 
a growing competition to natural rubber by synthetic rubber, the early planning for 
diversification of the economy paid off. The palm oil industry boomed, aided by a 
large influx of capital after World War II, an adequate research program and a 
buoyant overseas market. By 1966, Malaysia had become the world's largest 
producer of palm oil. The exploitation of timber and iron ores, and an increase of 
manufacture also contributed to total export earnings. 
Ethnic disturbances in May, 1969, forced the government to reassess the entire 
question of economic growth in relation to the now vociferous Malay demand for a 
greater share in the country's wealth36 (Mahathir, 1970). The government designed 
a National Economic Policy (NEP), 1971-90, in an effort to reconcile the vexed 
question of ensuring economic growth and eliminating economic disparity37, which 
in Malaysia unfortunately tended to reflect ethnic divisions (Rehman Rashid, 1993). 
The Second Malaysia Plan, 1971-75, contained guidelines for poverty alle-
viation through facilitating the access of the poor to land, capital, training and pub-
lic services. More equity of income and opportunities should be brought about by 
reducing the dependence of Malay and other indigenous groups on subsistence 
agriculture. The Third and Fourth Malaysia Plans, 1976/85, continued the same 
policy lines by allocating 38% of the development budget to poverty eradication 
and to the development of backward rural areas by building towns and industries. 
However, the NEP's goal of poverty eradication remained elusive and large num-
bers of Malay farmers migrated to the towns. By 1981, Malay constituted one-third 
of all urban dwellers. The Malay held a privileged position over other ethnic 
groups in terms of job opportunity with the result that the rate of poverty elimina-
tion has been faster for them than for Indian and Chinese rural and urban poor 
(Yusof Hussein, pers. comm., 1996) 
3.6.3. Agricultural research since 1960. The Federal and State Departments of 
Agriculture and the universities developed jointly the first research programs for 
independent Malaysia during the Second Malaya Plan, 1961-65. Since there were 
few researchers at the time, the government set research priorities for double crop-
ping of wet rice, soil fertility, crop diversification, cultivar improvement, control 
of diseases and pests, post harvest technology and marketing (AADPC, 1984a). A 
Division of Food Technology was established in the Ministry of Agriculture in 
1966. Two years later, the Malaysia Agricultural Research and Development 
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Institute (MARDI) was founded (Yusof Hashim, 1990). Its mandate included all 
crops except rubber, livestock, poultry and fisheries. DoA established seed 
multiplication farms to supply improved rice varieties. The research budget was 
increased from 10 M US$ for the First Malasia Plan to 40 M$ for the Fourth Plan. 
Actual expenditure remained usually below the budget ceilings. 
In 1975, the Agricultural University of Malaysia (UPM) was founded which 
provides education both at degree level and diploma level. Under the Malaysia 
Plans the Ministry of Education is responsible for funding agricultural education. 
For this reason the university's agricultural teaching and research programs are 
rather theoretical (Oudejans, 1996). 
The Federal and State Departments of Agriculture were responsible for the 
extension of research findings. Since 1971, the extension service was strengthened 
through the establishment of training centres for farm mechanization and crop 
production technology. Most of DoA's extension efforts were carried out through 
Farmers' Associations. Although the budget allocations for extension were increa-
sed for each Five-Year Plan period, the extension service reached only few farm-
ers (AADPC, 1984a). 
3.6.4. Rice cultivation in Peninsular Malaysia 
3.6.4.1. Irrigation schemes and Green Revolution. In the coastal flood plain of 
the Muda river in NW Peninsular Malaya, large scale rice growing was introduced 
during the 15th century from Siam (Taylor, 1980). In the following centuries, rice 
was grown as rain-fed padi in the low-lying river basins and estuaries of Malaya 
which were irregularly flooded during the monsoon seasons. Seeds were broadcast 
when the first rains enabled tillage of the soil. Owing to the erratic rainfall patterns, 
serious weed competition always resulted in low rice yields. The method of trans-
planting, which replaced direct seeding, was probably adopted to overcome weed 
problems. Pre-germinated seeds were sown on nursery beds and the seedlings 
transplanted after 30-40 days into the fields which remained flooded until about 
two weeks before harvesting. 
The major indigenous varieties planted in Malaya before World War II were of 
the photoperiod sensitive indica type which were only suited for the main season38. 
In 1942, the Japanese introduced three early maturing, photoperiod insensitive rice 
varieties39 from Taiwan. These introductions were suitable for off-season planting 
and marked the beginning of double cropping in independent Malaysia (Ho, 1993). 
Before the Green Revolution of the 1960s, almost all rice farms were small and 
single-cropped40. Only a negligible percentage of land was double cropped. Early 
in the 1960s, the government of Malaysia commissioned the development of large 
scale irrigation facilities with loan-funding by the World Bank. The Tanjung 
Kareng Scheme, measuring 20,000 ha, in Selangor was the first one to be com-
pleted in 1961. In 1966 began the construction of the Muda River Irrigation 
Scheme in the northern states of Kedah and Perlis. The Muda and Pelu dams and 
canal system enabled a transformation from single cropped padi land to Malaysia's 
largest double cropping scheme, which encompasses an area of 97,000 ha and pro-
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Map 3.6.4.1 Malaysia, location of the major Rice Irrigation Schemes 
vides employment for 63,000 farm families (Syed & Ho, 1985). The Muda Scheme 
was completed in 1968-69, the Kemubu Scheme in Kelantan in 1972, the Besut 
Scheme in Terengganu in 1975, and the Kerian/Sungai Manik Scheme in 1976 
(map 3.6.4.1) (Taylor, 1980). Thereafter, expansion of irrigated double cropping 
area was slow because the remaining padi growing areas were small and scattered 
(Taylor, 1980). 
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During the 1960s, the Green Revolution was adopted in Malaysia, where the 
Irrigation Schemes became the main beneficiaries of its technology package of 
high yielding rice varieties, fertilisers, pesticides, and credit. Because of the pro-
found effect of the Green Revolution on total rice production (table 3.6.4.1), 
Malaysia's rate of self-sufficiency in rice increased from 56% in 1955 to about 
90% in 1990. The large scale adoption of modern varieties and technology also 
changed traditional forms of land use because they made rice farming profitable at 
last. A sizeable number of tenants were evicted between 1966 and 1975, when 
owners either took back their land or hired more land to increase the size of their 
farms. Owner-farmers could manage larger farm units because mechanization of 
ploughing, soil levelling and harvesting operations solved labour constraints. 
3.6.4.2. Rice cultivation in the Muda Irrigation Scheme. In 1967, the Kedah 
Department of Agriculture began experimenting with double cropping41 to explore 
its feasibility for the Muda Scheme. Pilot projects, using rice variety IR8, in the 
following years served to adjust traditional cultivation practices and to show the 
farmers the importance of synchronizing planting activities. When irrigation 
became available in the Muda Scheme in 1970, double cropping was ready for 
area- wide introduction (Syed & Ho, 1985). By 1974, about 92% of Muda Irriga-
tion Scheme was doubled cropped (Ho, 1993). During the 1970s, rice production 
increased steadily through a. improvement of the irrigation and drainage 
infrastructure42, b. adoption of early maturing, high yielding varieties43, c. mecha-
nization of tillage and harvesting, and d. sharply increased use of fertilisers and 
pesticides through provision of institutional rice production credit and fertiliser 
subsidies44 (table 3.6.4.2). 
A major limitation to rice production in the Muda Scheme was a chronic water 
deficit45 since irrigation demand always exceeded available supply. When water 
was let into the main channels, only the farmers (less than 10%) adjacent to secon-
dary supply canals could obtain water directly. Farmers with fields further away 
and especially those near the drainage end of the blocks had to wait up to forty days 
before water reached their fields. Poor pre-saturation of the soil hampered the syn-
chronization of planting activities, such as flooding, ploughing, transplanting, and 
weed control, to prevent pests. Due to the unevenness of the soil surface and lack 
Table 3.6.4.1. Effect of irrigation and Green Revolution technology on total off-season 
rice production in Peninsular Malaysia. Hectareage planted with improved varieties 
and imput expressed as percentage of total rice area. Source: Ho, 1994a. 
Period Total production Hectareage planted 
(x 1.0001) (x 1.000 ha) (%) 
season 1/56 443 43 1 
season 1/76 1,075 222 44 
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of water for submersion of the fields, weeds created big problems. Shortage of 
labour was another reason for delays in tillage and transplanting46 of rice seedlings. 
3.6.4.3. Transition from transplanting to direct seeding. In the seasons 1970/1 
and 2, the performance of six rice varieties was compared in transplanting, line so-
wing and broadcast experiments47. Although suitable varieties were found for 
direct seeding, farmers hesitated to adopt this practice. Uneven soils, deficient 
water management and erratic monsoon rainfall, and resulting heavy weed infesta-
tion, were high risk factors in direct seeded fields. Escalating transplanting costs 
due to lack of labour and cancellation of all irrigation in season 1978/1 due to 
severe drought prompted some fanners to try direct seeding. Studies on land prepa-
ration48, mechanization and soil characteristics in the Muda area, enabled a shift 
from wet to dry tillage (rotavation) in first-season land preparation. 
The actual change to large scale dry rotavation and direct seeding was attribut-
able to disease and pest control recommendations. The wide-spread planting of a 
few, non-resistant IR-varieties contributed to an outbreak of green leafhopper 
(Nephotettix virescens), vector of a tungro virus, between 1981 and 1984. The 
ensuing tungro virus epidemic in the Muda area was controlled through the intro-
Table 3.6.4.2. Malaysia. Rice production between 1980 and 1996. Source: Various FAO 
Production Yearbooks. Index: a. area harvested (M ha); b. production of rough rice (M t); c. 
annual production in relative values (1995 = 100%); d. yield of rough rice (t/ha). (See also 
fig. 7.3.3.b). 
Year a b e d 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
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0.72 
0.72 
0.72 
0.68 
0.66 
0.66 
0.63 
0.64 
0.67 
0.65 
0.68 
0.69 
0.67 
0.68 
0.71 
0.68 
0.66 
2.07 
2.10 
1.83 
1.81 
1.76 
1.95 
1.75 
1.70 
1.78 
1.74 
2.03 
2.14 
2.07 
2.08 
2.16 
2.22 
2.07 
93 
95 
83 
82 
79 
88 
79 
77 
80 
79 
91 
97 
93 
94 
97 
100 
93 
2.9 
2.9 
2.9 
2.7 
2.7 
3.0 
2.8 
2.7 
2.7 
2.7 
3.0 
3.1 
3.1 
3.1 
3.0 
3.1 
3.1 
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Figure 3.6.4.3. Transition from transplanting to direct seeding in rice, 
Muda Irrigation Scheme, 1981-33. Source: Ho, 1993. 
duction of variety IR4249 and sanitation (Ho, 1993). The burning and ploughing of 
the fields after harvesting to destroy the tungro virus inoculum in the stubble and 
ratoon crop, readied the field for direct seeding. Further, the Muda Agricultural 
Development Authority (MADA) terminated all first season supply of irrigation 
water in January, beginning 1984, and imposed a complete fallow during the 
month of February every year. The severe measures were necessitated by chronic 
water deficit and staggered planting problems which, among others, interfered with 
adequate pest and disease management (Ho, 1993). The result was that the direct 
seeding technique increased from 5% of the planted area in season 1984/1 to 90% 
in season 1990/1 and to almost 100% in the 1990s (fig. 3.6.4.3). 
Table 3.6.4.3. Hectareage under direct seeding in season 1993/1 in the major irrigation 
schemes of Peninsular Malaysia. Source: Ho, 1993, 1994a. 
Irrigation scheme Total planted 
(x 1,000 ha) 
Direct seeded 
(xl,000 ha) (%) 
Muda 
Kemubu 
Kerian/Sungai Manik 
PBLS 
Seberang Perau Utara 
Tanjung Karang 
92.7 
35.9 
31.0 
19.0 
13.0 
20.0 
91.8 
26.0 
3.7 
18.1 
9.1 
? 
99 
72 
12 
96 
70 
? 
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Average yield in off and main season rice crops in 
Muda, Malysia. 
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Figure 3.6.4.4. Average yield in first and second season rice crops in Muda 
Irrigation Scheme , Malaysia, 1965-1993. 
The other major irrigation schemes of Peninsular Malaysia followed the devel-
opments initiated by MADA regarding research on and extension of the direct 
seeding technique. By season 1993/1, over 70% of the total hectareage of irrigated 
rice was direct seeded (table 3.6.4.3). 
In the Muda area three types of direct seeding technique can be distinguished: 
a. wet seeding with pre-germinated seeds, b. dry seeding with non pre-germinated 
seeds, and c. utilisation of shattered seed50 with minimum or zero tillage. Each dry 
seeding technique has its own requirements concerning field preparation, supply of 
irrigation water, recommended seed rates and labour input. Each technique results 
in a typical pattern of weed growth.(Ahmed & Moody, 1980) 
In wet seeding, the field is puddled, levelled and drained before broadcasting 
pre-germinated seeds. Adequate tillage and water management before seeding can 
suppress weed emergence to a great extent. With dry direct seeding, the field is 
ploughed to incorporate the broadcast ungerminated seeds into the ground without 
any flooding. As the rice seeds germinate at the onset of rainfall in late March or 
early April in the first season, water is let into the field in stages. Meanwhile, unin-
hibited aeration of the soil (aerobic condition) stimulates the germination of grass 
weeds. In the case of self-sown seed the rice straw and stubbles are burnt and the 
fields usually dry rotavated. With minimal or no tillage, paraquat might be applied 
to dessicate left-over vegetation. 
3.6.4.4. Change in weed ecology under dry seeding practice. According to Ho 
(1991), the scenario of weed infestation and distribution changed dramatically 
since the adoption of double cropping in 1970. The MARDI station at Bumbong 
Lima, Penang, began to study weed ecology in rice in 1976. MADA conducted the 
earliest detailed weed study in the Muda area in season 2/79, when still over 99% 
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of the rice fields were transplanted. Twenty-one species were recorded with 
broadleaved weeds accounting for more than 80% of the infestation in transplan-
ted fields. Grasses and sedges were found growing sporadically along the edges of 
direct seeded fields (Ho, 1991). 
In the season 1980/1, farmers, practising wet direct seeding for three consecu-
tive seasons, reported heavy infestation of the grasses Echinochloa crus-galli and 
E. colona. In 1982, a MARDI weed survey of all major rice schemes in Peninsular 
Malaysia, reported 34 weed species in the Muda area, sedges (Cyperaceae) and 
grasses (Poaceae) being dominant. Echinochloa spp. increased in the other 
schemes too. The age similarities and morphological resemblance of grassweeds 
and rice seedlings often lead to delayed weeding (De Datta & Bernasor, 1973). In 
the season 1984/1, when 53% of the Muda area was direct seeded, of which three-
quarter by self-sown seedlings, 42 weed species were recorded by MADA. In sea-
son 1987/1, when 99% of the scheme was dry seeded due to acute water shortage, 
surveyors counted 50 species in dry seeded fields against 32 species in transplan-
ted rice. 
3.6.4.5. Chemical weed control in Muda area. Before double cropping was 
introduced, hand weeding with a sickle was the common practice. In season 
1973/1, weeding took 70 h/ha. Chemical weeding reduced labour input to 10 h/ha 
by 1981, although weed density had increased under direct seeding. In the 1970s, 
the majority of the farmers used herbicides to control broadleaves and sedges. 
They applied mainly chlorphenoxy (2,4-D) compounds51, but usually less than the 
recommended dosage rate (Ho, 1983, 1985). 
When pre-emergence herbicides52 became available in the Muda area in the 
early 1980s and post-emergence herbicides in 1986, these largely replaced 2,4-D 
to control grasses. By 1988, an estimated 11% of the Muda area were treated with 
11 commercial herbicide formulations (Ho, 1991). Chemical weeding became an 
important cost factor in rice production (table 3.6.4.5). 
Table 3.6.4.5. Comparison of expenditures (USS/ha) on production activities between 
transplanting and wet-seeding technique in the main season rice crop of 1991, Muda 
Irrigation Scheme, Malaysia. Sources: Wong, 1993; Ho, 1994a. 
Production factor 
Land preparation 
Seeding/transplanting 
Fertiliser application 
Insecticide application 
Herbicide/weeding 
Harvesting/transport 
Total production costs 364 294 
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Transplanting 
89 
111 
7 
5 
7 
145 
Wet-seeding 
94 
12 
8 
5 
22 
153 
Lack of soil moisture and improper land preparation in direct seeded rice are 
the efficiency limiting factors of pre- and post-emergence herbicides (Ho, 1994a). 
Continuous use of the same herbicides caused the problem of selective suppression 
of grass weeds. For instance, repeated application of molinate (at 3 kg a.i./ha) con-
trolled Echinochloa spp but worsened infestation by Leptochloa chinensis and 
Ischaemum rugosum. Subsequent application of pretilachlor (at 500 g a.i./ha) and 
fenoxaprop-p-ethyl (at 60 g a.i./ha) controlled L. chinensis and /. rugosum. 
Research by MARDI and MADA focussed on reduction in herbicide usage, and on 
integrated weed management (IWM) in order to solve the increased weed problems 
in direct seeded rice and in the irrigation canals system (Ho, 1994b). MADA's 
extension department developed IWM training packages on the basis of farmers' 
knowledge, attitudes and practices (KAP) studies. Since 1989, MADA organized 
several IWM extension campaigns which included training on water management, 
soil preparation and herbicide selection, spray equipment and application techni-
que (Ho, 1994b). To encourage the use of relatively more expensive herbicides for 
grassweed control, MADA negotiated with the Bank Pertanian Malaysia to include 
selective herbicides in the credit package. The herbicide credit doubled the use of 
molinate whilst reducing use of 2,4-D compound by more than two-third (Ho etal, 
1990). 
3.6.4.6. Trend in rice yields in the Muda Irrigation Scheme. Prior to 1970, padi 
yields under rainfed conditions were about 3.2 t/ha. After the introduction of dou-
ble cropping, the padi yield remained relatively stable at 4 t/ha from 1969-1977. 
The off- (first) season yields in the 1970s exceeded those of the main (second) sea-
son due to higher solar radiation and lower pest and disease incidence. With the 
introduction of a fertiliser scheme in 1978/2 yields rose above 4.5 t/ha. Between 
Table 3.6.4.6 Production trends and productivity in off-season and main-season rice 
crops in the Muda Irrigation area over the period 1982-1992. Sources: Ho, 1993, 1994a. 
Item/Seasons 
Off (first) season 
Planted area 
Transplanted 
Direct seeded 
Average yield 
Unit 
1,000 ha 
% 
% 
t/ha 
1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 
Main (second) season 
Planted area 1,000 ha 
Transplanted % 
Wet seeding % 
Average yield t/ha 
89.5 
79 
21 
3.3 
95.2 
77 
23 
4.3 
83.1 
47 
53 
3.2 
95.5 
76 
24 
4.6 
91.0 
35 
65 
3.8 
96.0 
50 
50 
4.4 
92.2 
9 
91 
3.2 
97.0 
40 
60 
4.2 
92.6 
10 
90 
4.1 
97.1 
19 
81 
5.2 
92.2 
1 
99 
3.6 
97.2 
13 
87 
5.1 
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1982 and 1984padi yields declined to 3.2 t/ha due to the tungro virus epidemic in 
the Muda area. Throughout the 1980s, overall rice yields fluctuated strongly, whilst 
off-season yields were lower than main season yields due to water stress, lodging 
and severe weed infestation (Ho, 1994a). 
Crop cutting surveys over five main-seasons (1987-91) showed that the direct 
seeding technique could raise the yield potential of irrigated rice. The average yield 
in 1979/2 was 4.8 t/ha. Since 1990, the average main season padi yields were 
above 5 t/ha when more than 80% of Muda was direct seeded (table 3.6.4.6). Pilot 
projet studies in seasons 1991/1 and 1992/1 indicated that, if farmers carefully 
followed integrated weed management recommendations, the yields of dry seeded 
crop were up to 9% higher53 than in those of the wet seeded crops (Ho, 1993). 
Direct seeding using self-sown seed with minimal or zero tillage became pop-
ular during the years 1985-88 but was then discontinued because of worsening 
weed problems and low yield. 
3.6.4.7. Insect pest control in major irrigation schemes. In Malaysia before 
1977 insect pests in rice did not cause major damage. Generally, farmers followed 
a standard recommendation for spraying at 30 and 60 days after transplanting 
(DAT) to control rice insects, in particular rice stemborers (Heong et al., 1985). In 
the Tanjung Karang Irrigation Scheme, insect pests such as the rice stemborers 
were relatively unimportant in the 1960s (Ooi, 1976; Khoo & Lee, 1978). An 
increase in preventive spraying by Tanjung Karang farmers, however, triggered a 
massive outbreak of the brown planthopper (Nilaparvata lugens, BPH) in 1977 
(Lim et al, 1978). Chemical control efforts against BPH also caused an increase 
of the white-backed planthopper (Sogatella furcifera, WBPH), striped rice stem-
borer (Chilo polychrysus), white rice stemborer (Scirpophaga incertulas), other 
rice insect pest and the tungro virus {penyakit merah) disease (Lim et al, 1978; 
Ooi & Heong, 1988). In the main season 1979/1, a major combined outbreak of 
BPH and WBPH was recorded in the Muda Scheme (Ho, 1993). 
As a response to the BPH outbreak in Tanjung Karang and the combined BPH-
WBPH outbreaks in Muda, a Pest Surveillance and Forecasting System (PSFS) 
was established for Peninsular Malaysia in 1979, with computerized data process-
ing in Muda and Tanjung Karang (Heong, 1977). The government allotted 8.1 M 
US$ to the project and entrusted DoA with its implementation in all major rice 
growing areas (Ooi, 1982). The system involved field scouting to determine the 
size of pest and predator populations and to record data on crop development, 
water management and farm practices. Catches from light traps and aerial net traps 
were collected for verification. The Malaysian Agricultural Research and De-
velopment Institute (MARDI) helped to determine the economic threshold levels 
(ETLs) for BPH and WBPH5* (Ooi, 1992; Ooi & Heong, 1988). 
At the time, pest surveillance and regular monitoring were regarded as pre-
requisites to IPM implementation among farmers (Lowe 1980; Lim et al, 1980; 
Heinrichs & Mochida, 1984). In 1979, Malaysia presented the PSFS network as the 
backbone of integrated pest control in rice (Yusof Hashim, 1992) and its function-
ing as main reason that major outbreaks stopped (Chen, pers. comm., 1996). But 
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in the 1990s, surveillance and monitoring were neglected and farmers in many 
places55 went on spraying in rice. Only in the northern part of the Muda area, a few 
teams of children scouts continued to monitor pests and diseases weekly and to 
report to the district plant protection officers (Zadoks et ai, 1986; Chen, personal 
communications, 1996). No recent survey reports on insecticide use in rice, 
intoxication and development of resistance against pesticide in rice pests were 
found Malaysia (Oudejans, 1996). 
3.6.4.8. Implementation of IPM in rice and other crops. In 1980, Malaysia 
became a member of the newly launched 'FAO Inter-Country Programme for the 
Development and Implementatio of IPM in Rice in S and SE Asia. Details on the 
FAO ICP-IPM Rice Programme and its achievements are dealt with in ch 5. IPM 
in horticulture, in particular Malaysia's great contribution to IPM research, are des-
cribed in ch 6. Information about efforts to implement IPM and IWM in dry land 
rice outside the irrigation schemes were not found. 
The history of increased incidence of insect pests, the occurrence of pesticide 
induced outbreaks of brown planthopper, leafhoppers and virus diseases resembles 
the events in Indonesia though on a smaller scale. The isolated position of the irri-
gation schemes and their central administration made integrated management of 
economic pests and diseases feasible. The effective management of chronic water 
shortages and increasing weed competition in rice in the Muda and Kumubu 
Schemes resulted to the highest yields obtained in Malaysia. 
Through training programs on integrated weed management (IWM), KADA 
and MADA techniciens skilfully guided the farmers in the transition from trans-
planting to direct seeding methodology in rice crop establishment. They also issued 
recommendations on tillage, choice of varieties, fertilisation, pest control, and 
water use on the basis of carefully conducted surveys. Such close guidance can be 
appreciated as an efficient extension approach to relatively rich farmers already 
working together in farmers' associations and irrigation bloc units. 
Studies on extension strategies and farmer participation, pertaining more to 
IWM than to IPM, were only seen for the Muda Irrigation Project (Ho, 1977; Syed, 
et ah, 1985; Ho, 1994b) and Tanjung Karang area (Heong, 1984). In a large scale 
rat control campaign in Penang, 1985, the National IPM Committee emphasized the 
importance of farmer participation (Asna, pers comm., 1986; Zadoks et al, 1986). 
In 1986, DoA's Extension Service had not adopted the FFS extension model and 
did not intend to organize Training of IPM Trainers (various, personal communica-
tions, 1996). A major concern for the near future will be the recruitment of agri-
cultural staff at all levels of the agricultural institutions and services. There are few 
students of agriculture56 and they prefer to be employed by estate agencies 
(Oudejans, 1996). 
In the scatttered dry land areas where farmers grow one crop of rice per year in 
rotation with other food and root crops, extension is less secured. The Agricultural 
Extension Service still relied on the T&V method because the Service held the 
opinion that the FFS method does not suit the Malay rice farmers, the majority of 
whom are middle-aged. It is questionable if the FFS routine, as practised in the 
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Indonesian National IPM Program (ch 5), would add to the empowerment of the 
farmers in the Irrigation Schemes. There was no project proposed for the streng-
thening of extension in plant protection outside the schemes (various personal 
communications, 1996). 
The public and private agricultural research institutions of Malaysia have good 
expertise on the economically important crops. But the findings of public research, 
e.g. MARDI's recommendations for the biological control of pests of vegetables, 
are not adequately extended to the farmers. Recommendations for integrated man-
agement of pests and diseases in vulnerable crops such as cacao and vegetables are 
hardly put into practice by the farmers. 
3.6.5. Estate and smallholder agriculture. After 1958, the government decided to 
develop more land and adequate crops for the smallholder sector and demanded the 
help from the private sector for this aim. Smallholders could obtain subsidies under 
the Agricultural Input Diversification Program for growing rice, and secondary 
food crops such as maize, fruits, coconut and coffee. The Farmers' Organization 
Authority provided fertilizers, pesticides and planting material for food crops. At 
the end of 1980 more than half-a-million fanners had benefited from the subsized 
programs. The largest amount was spent on the rice subsidy scheme which was 
introduced in 1979. The rice subsidy increased from 40 M US$/y in 1979/80 to 144 
M US$/y in 1990/91. The government spent a further amount of 160 M$ on ferti-
lizer subsidies for rice during 1991-95. 
3.6.5.1. Rubber. Since 1961, governmental subsidies to replant old estate and 
smallholder rubber has been adopted as a national policy in Malaysia, supported 
by export taxes (cess funds) on rubber. The subsidy is paid yearly as a grant and 
credit, and each year's subsidy is based on the progress made in replanting 
(Polhamus, 1962). In Peninsular Malaysia, by 1970, replanting on estate land 
amounted to 89,000 ha of rubber and 26,300 ha of oil palm, whilst on smallhold-
ing land 121,400 ha were replanted and 20,200 ha newly planted with rubber. The 
area under high yielding rubber increased thereby from 78% to 89% on estate 
lands, and from 50% to 65% on smallholdings. New plantings of rubber in Saba 
and Serawak totalled about 60,000 ha (AADPC, 1984a). 
3.6.5.2. Oil palm. Similar subsidies were extended to oil palm and coconut replanting 
programmes in Peninsular Malaysia and E Malaysia. In response to the heavy demand 
from the oil palm industry for more detailed breeding and selection57 work a special 
Oil Palm Unit was established within the Research Branch of the DoA in 1967. This 
unit also performed research on pests and diseases in oil palm. When oil palm cultiva-
tion continued to expand, the government decided to create an semi-autonomous Palm 
Oil Research Institute for Malaysia (PORIM). In 1979, PORIM commenced opera-
tion by taking over the mandate for palm oil research from the DoA (Basri, 1995). 
3.6.5.3. Cacao. Through the 1950s, selection and breeding work on cacao was car-
ried out using not only the Trinitario clones imported from all parts of the world, 
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but also the newly introduced Criollo and Amelonado clones (Ang & Shephard, 
1978). In 1953, the first commercial cacao planting was established in the State of 
Terengganu, Peninsular Malaysia. Initial enthousiasm for developing cacao as an 
estate crop was soon dampened when the 'Vascular Streak Die-back' (VSD) disea-
se, caused by the fungus Oncobasidium theobromae), became a serious problem 
(Turner & Shephard, 1978). Estate planting was reduced and breeding work was 
curtailed as a result of this disease. By the end of 1965, the hectareage under cacao 
had dwindled to only 720 ha. 
The introduction of the cacao hybrid Upper Amazone enabled a revival of the 
cacao cultivation as this hybrid proved to be more vigorous, high-yielding and less 
suseptible to VSD than the Trinitario and Criollo clones. By 1975, the hectareage 
under cacao had expanded to some 2,00 ha of which half on smallholdings under 
coconut. In Sabah DoA advised since 1961 to stop spraying contact insecticides in 
cacao plantings to enable biological control (Conway & Tay, 1967). Cultural con-
trol through pruning, removal of unripe pods outside the main season, and treat-
ment with pyrethroids was recommended. 
By 1995, total area under cacao had increased to 452,000 ha, making Malaysia 
the world's fourth cacao producer with an exported value of 180 M US$. Cacao is 
seriously emperiled by pests of which the cacao podborer (Conomorpha cramerella), 
the cacao myrid {Helopelthis theivora) and VSD cause economic damage. High 
labour costs for pest control caused a stagnation of cacao planting in Malaysia. 
3.6.6. Pesticide regulation. The growing dependency on pesticides called for reg-
ulatory oversight of pesticides. In 1974, DoA's Plant Protection Division prepared 
the first pesticide law for the Federation of Malaysia, enacted as Pesticide Act 149. 
Under the Pesticide Act of 1974, the Pesticide Board was installed and, in 1976, a 
Pesticide Registration Rule issued (ADB, 1987). DOA was equipped with a pesti-
cide quality and residue laboratory to enable inspections58 (Anonymous, 1994, 
1994a; Puteh, 1994). 
During the same period, the Plant Quarantine Branch of the DoA prepared a 
new 'Plant Quarantine Act 167', enacted in 1976. This law furthered the collabo-
ration between Peninsular Malaysia, Serawak and Sabah in restricting the entry of 
plant pests. This was no luxury in the early years of the Federation when relations 
between federal and state officers in W and E Malaysia were often strained (Mum-
ford, pers. comm., 1997). Daily air and sea trafic between the component regions 
of Malaysia make it imperative to enforce the Quarantine Act uniformely (Singh, 
1977). The Plant Quarantine Regulations were amended in 1981 and 1991 to 
enable the issuance of phytosanitairy certificates and export licenses in compliance 
with stricter international trade requirements59. 
3.6.7. Agricultural trends at the end of the 20th century.Although agriculture 
held its central place in the development of Malaysia for a long time, other sectors 
began to gradually overtake agriculture. Thus, by 1980 the relative share of 
agriculture had regressed to 22% of GDP, to about 30% of exports earnings and to 
about 40% of employment opportunity. In 1981, the Malaysian government moved 
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to gain greater control over the economy to improve Malay participation in the 
modern estate economy. In September 1981, the National Equity Corporation60 
took control of those estate agencies, which had their financial basis in London. 
Thus, the government obtained control over the estate sector and its agricultural 
export crops, and could cash the added value through expansion of local proces-
sing and marketing. 
Concurrent with the series of Five-year Malaysia Plans, since 1986, a special 
First Five-year National Agricultural Policy Plan (NAP) 1984/92 was implemen-
ted. A Second NAP, 1992/-2000 is currently being implemented. Since 1990, the 
government sought the solution for alleviating rural poverty outside the agri-
cultural sector. The Prime Minister declared that under the Second NAP the gov-
ernment would be satisfied with 65% self-sufficiency in domestic rice production 
(Business Times, February 2, 1993). An accelerated industrial development and the 
service sectors offered more hope for reducing rural unemployment. 
The effect of the changing official attitude can been seen in the rice sector. In 
the early 1990s, rice cultivation occupied about 0.5 M ha in W Malaysia and 0.2 
M ha in E Malaysia. Although the government promoted rice production through 
setting a high purchase price for rice and subsidizing inputs, the area under rice 
and the total production are decreasing. The decline in rice cultivation is largely 
because it has remained an uneconomic activity. Without subsidy schemes and 
under free market conditions, the decline would have been steeper than it is now. 
The reasons for the ongoing decline of rice growing, particularly in W Malaysia, 
are shortage of labour, high wage rates, stagnating yields, poor farm management, 
and decline in cultivated area due to the migration of young farmers. 
3.8. Discussion, Malaysia 
The following discussion and conclusions on the situation in Malaysia reflects 
the author's impressions gained from research, seven months working experience 
in and frequent visits to Malaysia and many hours of recorded interviews with 
Malaysian experts. 
A key to understanding developments in agriculture in Malaysia is the com-
plexity of its multi-ethnic population. The migration of large numbers of Chinese 
from S China to Malaya and their success in gaining the upperhand in the econo-
my stirred up much discontent. When civil unrest threatened to impair foreign 
investments, the English began to extend their administration from the Straits 
Settlements to the Malay States on the peninsula. This move brought the stability 
on which a regulatory and commercial infrastructure could be build. 
The establishment of the Department of Agriculture in Malaya happened in the 
same year (1905) as the founding of the DoA in the Dutch East Indies. The moti-
vations and preparations leading to a DoA in both countries differed considerably. 
The DoA of Malaya lacked the strong research foundation on which the DoA of the 
Dutch East Indies was built. The DoA of Malaya undertook the development of 
indigenous agriculture, but only by its reorganisation in 1928 it obtained the struc-
ture and means needed for the task. 
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Malaysia is not endowed with vast stretches of fertile soils. Only two perenni-
al crops really suit the environmental conditions, rubber and oil palm, and both 
became winners. Rubber initially and oil palm after 1960 became major export 
commodities. These are the only crops which have their own research institutes for 
production and processing. The estate industry benefited from a smooth transition 
from foreign to Malaysian ownership and was not confronted by a break in man-
agement expertise, as in Indonesia. 
Rice cultivation was given little attention in the 20th century. There was a 
scarcity of irrigated land and labour, and rice productivity was low. The huge rev-
enues from tin mining and rubber easily made up for the costs of importing rice 
from Siam, Vietnam and Cambodia. The Japanese occupation, 1941-45, deeply 
changed the attitude concerning food security. Between 1950 and 1970, eight large 
irrigation schemes were developed and the efficient production of rice became a 
national issue. There were two motives, 1. strategically, to strive for a high degree 
of self-sufficiency in rice in view of the growth of the population, and the increas-
ing need for rice imports; and 2. to improve equity of income for the Malay rice 
farmers in the multi-ethnic society of Malaysia. Since rice production became a 
political issue, the Green Revolution package of variety improvement, cultivation 
technique and pest control was readily adopted and research for rice received pri-
ority status. 
Integrated pest management in rice and in particular in vegetables received 
much attention. Malaysian scientists made great contributions to the knowledge 
base of pests and diseases, natural enemies and biological control. Malaysia joined 
the regional FAO Inter-Country IPM Programme in 1980. Implementation of IPM 
in rice and other crops by government agencies was only followed up within the 
large rice irrigation schemes. 
Contrary to Indonesia, not the outbreaks of BPH and leafhoppers led to adop-
tion of integrated pest management in rice, but rather the chronic shortages of irri-
gation water and labour which necessitated direct seeding as the leading method 
for rice crop establishment. For direct seeding and the associated Integrated Weed 
Management, Malaysia is ahead of its neighbouring countries. It could make a 
valuable contribution to regional IPM programmes. 
3.9.Conclusions, Malaysia 
1. Any discussion about developments concerning Peninsular Malaysia requires an 
basic understanding of the history of its multi-ethnic society. Ethnic diversity 
determined policy formulation in the past and present. 
2. Agricultural development in Peninsular Malaya was delayed till the establish-
ment of an English administration around 1865. Pacification of the sultanates and 
authority over the then unruly Chinese inhabitants were conditional to foreign 
investment in agriculture. 
3. Chinese farmers had since long grown crops as sugar, gambir and vine pepper 
in a shifting garden pattern of agriculture. The English administration did not 
encourage this type of swidden agriculture. 
4. Although the Straits Settlements possessed Botanical Gardens at Penang and 
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Singapore, these Gardens did not develop into the scientific core of research. Much 
knowledge of and expertise in tropical agriculture was brought in by English civil 
servants and scientists from India and Ceylon. 
5. The establishment of a Department of Agriculture in Malaya did not evolve from 
within, rather it was imposed by the Colonial Office, which commissioned the 
Director of the Botanical Gardens of Ceylon to draw up the Plan of Organisation. 
6. Agricultural research in Malaya dealt with few crops, as the topography and soil 
structure of Malaya limit the economic potential of agriculture more than in 
Indonesia and Thailand. 
7. Initally, the development of estate agriculture in Malaya was hampered by pest 
and disease problems and the lack of resistant planting material. The breakthrough 
came with the development of rubber production, which stands poor soils and is 
little affected by pests occurring in Malaya. Rubber became the leading estate 
export commodity, presently it is the leading smallholder crop. 
8. Research on indigenous food crops received little attention until the founding of 
a Central Agricultural Research Institute at Serdang, Selangor, in 1935. 
9. The Japanese occupation caused considerable damage to the agricultural 
research institutions, plantations and factories. Rehabilitation of public and private 
institutions and estates could begin immediately after World War II, because the 
British administration continued until 1957. Independence was achieved without 
struggle or disturbance of administrative and financial relations. 
10. Owing to the considerable revenues from tin mining and rubber and the rela-
tively small population, food security was not an issue for the government of inde-
pendent Malaysia. 
11. The main reason for the GoM to turn its attention to the food crop sector was 
the growing inequity in the society, in particular between the Malay and Chinese 
segments of the population. 
12. The 1969 riots led to an amendment of the Constitution, which gave consider-
able political power and privileges to the Malay constituency. The new policy had 
an obvious impact on the rice sector and an increase of rice production to improve 
farmers' income became a political objective. 
13. The main instruments for increasing rice production included the construction 
of large irrigation schemes managed by autonomous Irrigation Scheme 
Authorities, the adoption of high yielding rice varieties and improved rice tech-
nology, and the prioritizing of rice research. Socio-economic measures included 
the founding of a strategic rice purchasing agency (LPN), the construction of a 
huge rice storage capacity in the schemes, and the regulation of advantageous 
farm-gate prices for padi, a kind of hidden subsidy for Malay rice farmers. 
14. The government founded the Malaysian Agricultural Research and Devel-
opment Institute in 1968 to strengthen research on food crops and others sectors. 
15. Recommendations by Scheme Authorities included calender spraying against 
rice insect pests. Injudicious spraying induced the appearance of BPH and leafhop-
pers as major pests in the Schemes. Inputs were supplied through the farmer 
associations at whole-sale prices. 
16. The DoAand the Rice Scheme Authorities successfully relied on resistant high 
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yielding rice varieties and on a Surveillance and Early Warming System to control 
outbreaks of BPH and leafhoppers, and epidemics of virus diseases in rice. 
17. Malaysia joined the FAO Inter-Country IPC in Rice Programme for S and SE 
Asia in 1980. Even though IPM was declared agricultural policy in rice, the imple-
mentation of a National IPM Program was frustrated by lack of political will. 
18. Malaysian researchers made valuable contributions to the development of IPM, 
in particular through studies of parasitiods and other aspects of biological control. 
19. The major development in rice cultivation was the shift from transplanting to 
direct seeding as the dominant method of crop establishment in the irrigation 
schemes. Labour scarcity rather than pest problems necessitated the transforma-
tion. 
20. The shift from transplanting to direct seeding was ably guided by researchers 
of the Scheme Authorities. Despite increasing weed problems, production of rice 
rose consistently. 
21. The shift to direct seeding gave the Malaysian researchers an advantage in 
knowledge about integrated weed management (IWM). 
22. The estate sector is dominated by the cultivation of oil palm, a tree eminently 
suited to the physical and socio-economic conditions of Peninsular Malaysia. The 
growing of rubber, though the major smallholder crop, decreases due to shortage 
of labour for tapping. 
23. The exodus of young farmers from agriculture to the towns and to more 
remunerative employment opportunities as well as the lack of agricultural students 
are matters of concern for the Malaysian government and will reduce opportunities 
for IPM implementation. 
Notes 
1. Malaya contributed tin, gold and iron ore, pepper, fragrant woods, resins and herbs from the jungle, 
as well as hides, cowrie shells and coral. 
2. Melaka was probably founded by a Sriwijayan prince around 1400 A.D.. Sriwijaya's cultural herita-
ge has greatly contributed to Melaka's pattern of government and lifestyle which became the basis of 
'traditional Malay culture and statescraft'. Hence, Melaka became recognized as the origin of Malay 
identity, adat and language (Watson & Andaya, 1982). 
3. The present name of Province Wellesley is District Prai in the State of Kedah. 
4. Reference ch 2.3.4. Decline of VOC. 
5. The Anglo-Dutch treaties determined the partition of Malaya and Indonesia along the Melaka Straits, 
thereby effectively shielding the peninsula from Dutch and Siamese influence. To date, the partition is 
still regarded as a border demarcation between Indonesia and Malaysia. 
6. Nutmegs and cloves remained important export commodities of the northern Malay States until 1860 
when diseases almost destroyed these industries (Grist, 1935). The growing of coffee was reported in 
Melaka in 1779 and in Penang in 1802. 
7. Gambir is a leaf-extract of the tree Uncaria gambir Roxb. which contains catechine (an ingredient 
for sirih chewing) and catechu-tannic acid (for tanning and dying of fine leather). Gambir, with its year-
round productivity, could be combined profitably as cover crop with vine pepper (Piper nigrum L.), 
which is seasonal and slower to mature (Grist, 1935). 
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8. A Chinese community provided the European administration with a guaranteed source of revenue 
through taxes levied on pawnbroking and sales of opium, spirits and pork, the collection of which was 
rented out to Chinese individuals or syndicates (Watson & Andaya, 1982). 
9. A written authorization empowered the Chinese headman to open up plantations, supervise culti-
vation and act as revenue farmer. The last-mentioned privilege, the right to collect taxes, was more 
lucrative than agriculture itself. 
10. In 1873, London's instructions to the new governor of the Straits Settlements had a different tone. 
Any wish to intervene in the Malay States was still disclaimed; 'but looking at the long and intimate 
connection between them and the British Government...Her Majesty's government find it incubent to 
employ such influence as it possesses...to rescue, if possible, this fertile land from the ruin it must befall 
them if the present disorders continue unchecked'. The medium through which this influence should be 
exercised, it was proposed, was the person of the British agent or Resident appointed for each State 
(Winstedt, in: Allen & Donnithorne, 1956). 
11. In 1874, the Pangkor Treaty signed between the pretender Sultan of Perak and the British Governor 
in Singapore accelerated the British involvement in the affairs of the Malay states. In return for his 
recognition as a sultan, the ruler accepted a British resident whose 'advice must be asked and acted 
upon on all questions other than those touching Malay religion and custom'. It essentially became now 
a question of how and when British rule would be extended across the entire peninsula. 
12. The basic concept of the British Residential system was indirect rule, which depended on the co-
operation of the Malay ruling class. Rulers, princes and chiefs were compensated with high positions 
in the bureaucracy. They gained independence, prestige and a private income which enabled them to 
sent their sons to schools in England. Consequently, the ruling class alienated from their peasant subor-
dinates. The association between the Malay ruling class and the colonial authorities served to disguise 
the fact that real power ultimately resided with the British (Watson & Andaya, 1982). 
13. The Dutch East India Company (VOC), which occupied Ceylon from the early 16th till the late 18th 
century, began the first commercial planting of cinnamon. The English, who took over from the Dutch, 
introduced the plantation production system in the 1830s, initially for coffee and, after outbreak of the 
coffee leaf rust disease in the 1880s, under tea and rubber (Loganathan, 1990). 
14. The oldest firm is Guthrie and Company Ltd which opened a shop in 1821 and a gambir and spices 
plantation in 1823. By 1931, Guthrie was managing agent for 26 plantation companies and engaged in 
tin mining, banking and shipping. By 1952, Guthrie employed 200 Europeans and 42,000 Asians and 
controlled about 80,000 ha of rubber, oil palm, tea and coffee (Allen & Donnithorne, 1956). 
15. The Torrens system, copied from Australia, required land transactions to be registered in the 
Registry of Titles for validition. Except for short term leases, all land was alienated under a perpetual 
lease, subject to rent, liable to revision at intervals of not less than thirty years and subject to conditions 
of use. The indefeasibility of the registered title and the ease, certainty, and cheapness with which trans-
actions in land could be carried out greatly facilitated development (Grist, 1935). 
16. A most significant service provided by the colonial government was the organization of much need-
ed labour for the tin mining and booming rubber industry. Between 1911 and 1931, the government 
encouraged unrestricted immigration from India, China and the Dutch East Indies. The guaranteed 
source of cheap labour was a strong inducement to private investment in British Malaya. 
17. Estates held in private ownership by individuals. 
18. The hawk moth caterpillar caused serious injury to coffee in the Selangor and Petaling estates. It 
appears that in 1902 some crows were imported from Ceylon for biological control of the hawk moth 
(Sivaram, 1980). 
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19. H.N.Ridley, appointed director of the Botanical Gardens in November 1988, studied the new acces-
sions and promoted the planting of rubber on estates in the Federated Malay States. Ridley discovered 
the bark-saving system of reopening tapping cuts. High rubber prices and the discovery of the use of 
acetic acid to coagulate the latex were further important incentives to the rubber industry. 
20. European and Shanghai investors were willing to support rubber ventures because of the experience 
and expertise associated with such prestigious firms as Guthries, Sime & Darby, and Harrisons & 
Crosfield. 
21. Copra is dried kernels of coconut from which coconut oil is extracted. 
22. In colonial time, 60% of the total rice area was located in the N W states Perlis, Kedah, Penang, Port 
Wellesley and Perak, and some 23% in the NE states Terengganu and Kelantan. 
23. This inititive was noteworthy because, except for restricted areas in Kedah and Kelantan, rice far-
ming was not a profitable venture. Many poor tenant farmers, in need of credit, could supplement their 
income by planting export crops, but this was discouraged officially. The government preferred to see 
the Malays become a 'settled peasantry' and reliable suppliers of rice (Sivalingam, 1993). 
24. 'The Agricultural Pests Enactment, 13/1913, Federated Malay States' was published as Gazette 
Notification 3679, on 19th December 1913. Adjustments were made through Amendment Enactments 
24/1914; 5/1920; 10/1921; 9, 27/1922. 
25. All the larger plantation groups possessed their own research stations, of which most are still oper-
ating by the end of the 20th century (Chung GF, pers. coram., 1996). 
26. E.J.Butler was the original author of the famous book 'Plant Pathology' by Butler & Jones. Butler 
was director of the IARI at Pusa since 1911. 
27. Existing rubber research stations were either closed or taken over by the RRIM. The creation of 
RRIM set the precedent for many agencies to be formed from the various agricultural activities initia-
ted and nurtured by DoA. 
28. Observations on the coffee hawk moth, Cephanodes hylas L. and the coffee berry borer, Stephano-
deres hampei Ferr. were made by the government entomologists GH Corbert and M Yusoff in 1932 and 
1933. 
29. Up to 80% parasitation of hawk moths eggs by a parasite, Oencyrtus malayensis, was reported by 
a field survey in a major outbreak in Johor, 1929 (Corbett & Yusoff, 1932, 1933). 
30. The 'Plant Importation Rule, 1925' was amended by Ordinance 166 (Agricultural Pests), cited as 
'Plant Importation Rules, 1936', to include the States of Johore, Kedah, Negeri Sembilan, Melaka, 
Selangor. 
31. In 1934, after prolonged negotations, a new rubber regulation scheme was introduced which, unlike 
the Stevenson Scheme, was international in scope. Hence, the financial situation in the rubber industry 
improved considerably . 
32. Government measures included lower taxes for the agricultural industry and cost reduction includ-
ing waivers of part of the quit rents on rubber lands and at a later date on coconut lands. 
33. This policy was relaxed between 1947 and 1957 to restore production to pre-World War II levels. 
In this way and over the years, the colonial government succesfully adjusted its immigration policy to 
supply labour for the export industries. 
34. The change in constitution obliged DoA to update the Plant Protection Regulations. 'The 
Agricultural Pests and Noxious Plants Ordinance, 1953 was enacted as Ordinance 59/1953, Federation 
of Malaya. 
35. The Padi Cultivator Ordinances ruled that the maximum rental for crop sharing should be one-third 
of the crop, while fixed rentals should vary according the quality of the land (Watson & Andaya, 1982). 
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36. In 1970, nearly 50% of all households (about 800,000, of which three-quarter Malay) in Peninsular 
Malaysia received incomes below the poverty line (Watson & Andaya, 1982). 
37. The National Economic Policy, 1971/90, had two principal objectives, /. reduction and eventual 
eradication of poverty; 2. restructuring of society so that identification of race with economic function 
would be reduced and ultimately eliminated. 
38. Off-season, being in fact the first planting season of the year, begins in February/March and ends in 
July/August. The main rainy season begins in August/September and ends in January/February of the 
following year, thus being the second planting season of the calender year. 
39. Of the three early Taiwanese varieties Pyushu, Taichu 65 and Pebifun, only the latter remained pop-
ular with farmers till 1964. Pebifun and Taichu 65 were used for breeding the two high yielding and 
early maturing varieties Malinja and Mahsuri, which enabled considerable expansion of double crop-
ping after 1965 (Ho, 1993). 
40. In the 1960s, about 97 % of rice farms in Peninsular Malaysia was <4 ha and 33 % <0,8 ha. Owner-
operated farms accounted for 45% of the total, and pure tenant farms only 17%. 
41. The state's extension service supplied IR8 seeds to replace the numerous indigenous late-maturing 
rice varieties which did not fit in a double cropping schedule. Tractor service for land preparation, fer-
tilizers and pesticides were provided through interest free (subsidized) credit (Ho, 1983). 
42. Expansion of third grid irrigation and drainage facilities enabled better water management. Keeping 
the water at a constant depth of 10 cm throughout the field always gave higher yields than maintaining 
a deeper water layer but with portions of the field remaining above the water level due to poor level-
ling of the soil (Cheong, 1978). 
43. In 1975, the variety Seribu Gantang (IR8 x indigenous varieties) became popular even though it was 
not officially released due to its susceptibility to false smut, bacterial leaf streak and tungro disease. The 
variety occupied almost 80% of the planted area in 1977, 25% in 1983, and disappeared in 1984 (Ho, 
1983, 1993). 
44. The Malaysian government subsidized fertiliser for use in rice from season 1979/2 up to a maxi-
mum of 2.4 ha per farmer (Ho, 1985). It is unknown whether the subsidy is still being provided. 
45. The Muda scheme was designed for a cropping system with modest water requirements and full util-
isation of rainfall. The whole engeneering infrastructure was only a 'second grid' lay-out of irrigation, 
drainage and farm road network without proper terminal facilities for efficient supply of water to 
individual farm lots (the third grid) (Ho, 1983). 
46. Transplanting by hand is labour intensive requiring 130 manhours/ha. Escalating costs led to care-
less planting with upto 8 seedlings planted per hill at a spacing of less than 10 hills instead of 16 hills 
per m2. This slovenliness resulted in more weed growth and uneven ripening of the numerous tillers per 
hill, a disadvantage for combine harvesting (Ho, 1983). 
47. While IR5 performed better under transplanting, the varieties Jaya, IR20 and IR22 produced high-
er yields under direct seeding (Samy & Phang, 1975). Direct seeded plants matured 11 days earlier and 
broadcasting required less than 5% of the labour involved in transplanting (Yeoh, 1980). 
48. Shallow dry tillage after the harvest of the main season prevented the formation of deep cracks and 
the shrinking ofpadi soils, conserved soil moisture and minimized water requirement for pre-saturation 
of the fields (Ho, 1993). 
49. Variety IR42 was quickly adopted because of tungro virus (TV) resistance, it was planted on more 
than 40% of the area in season 1984/2. In 1985, variety IR42 was replaced by MR84 which combined 
resistance to blast and TV with high fertility and yielding quality. In 1993, MR84 still occupied more 
than 80% of the planted area (Ho, 1993). 
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50. The many seeds shattered by combine harvesting area are rotavated into the dry soil. MADA tech-
niciens called this method of crop establishment 'volunteer seedlings'. 
51. Around 1980, chlorphenoxy herbicides (2,4-D dimethyl amine, 2,4-D isobutytester, 2,4-D sodium 
salt and MCPA) were used in many transplanted and almost all direct seeded fields. The W.P. formula-
tion of 2,4-D butyl ester was most popular and broadcasted together with urea and insecticide granules. 
The recommended rate was 1 kg a.i./ha at 15-25 days after transplanting (DAT). In the Muda area by 
1990, usage of 2,4-D compounds was estimated at 400-430 t/y (Ho, 1991). 
52. The first introduced pre-emergence herbicides were trifluralin, molinate and oxadiazon. The post-
emergence herbicides included propanil, thiobencarb and metsulfaron methyl. 
53. Dry seeded rice with early rains established 3-4 weeks earlier than the wet seeded crop so that it 
escaped lodging and wet harvesting during monsoon rains. 
54. ETL levels for BPH and WBPH were 7 adults/hill and 15 respectively 25 nymphs/hill. Both plan-
thoppers are serious pests of, in particular, the off-season irrigated rice crop (May-September) (Ooi, 
1982). 
55. Medical doctors in the Tanjung Karang area reported severe incidence of intoxication from insecti-
cide use (Vos, pers. comm., 1996). 
56. Early 1996, the author lectured two months at University Pertanian Malaysia, Serdang, and inter-
viewed students and teachers about career opportunities and preferences. 
57. Prior to 1958 the majority of the oil palm plantings consisted of the 'Dura'-type. In later years, the 
hybrid 'Tenera' (cross Dura x Pisifera) was extensively cultivated because its fruits contain a thicker oil 
bearing mesocarp. 
58. In compliance with the Pesticide Act 1974, DoA carried out inspections of premises licenced for 
sale and storage of pesticides. These activities resulted in 93 confiscations and 92 summon cases in 
1982 (ADB, 1987). 
59. For example, in 1992 DoA issued a total of 2,592 import permits for various crops, 1,164 export 
licences and 12,056 phytosanitary certificates for ornamental plants, fruits, coconut and others 
(Anonymous, 1994). 
60. The National Equity Corporation was founded as a government-funded agency acquiring shares in 
trust for the 'Children of the land', bumiputra, with the objective of achieving the NEP's goal of 30% 
Malay ownership in the corporate sector. 
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Chapter 4 
Development of agriculture in Thailand 
4.1 Introduction 
Thailand (Muang Thai, Land of the Free) is an ancient Bhuddist kingdom in 
SE Asia, until 1949 known as Siam. Thailand shares borders with Myanmar on the 
W and N, Laos on the NE, Cambodia on the SE and Malaysia on the S. Owing to 
its location on the continent, Thailand played a pivotal role in the struggle between 
French and English colonial powers, but never became a colony itself. Politically, 
Thailand takes part in the alliances of the Mekong River States and the Association 
of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN). 
Thailand, with extensive areas of favourable relief, is divided into four admin-
istrative regions. The centre of the country consist of a vast, fertile1 lowland, the 
tributary of the Chao Phraya river, which is enclosed to the W, N and E by moun-
tain ridges running down from the Himalayan range. The Central Region consists 
of three sub-regions, viz. the western mountains, the eastern coast lands and the 
Central Plain located in the alluvial Chao Phraya river basin. The Central Plain is 
the granary and cultural core of Thailand. The Northern Region, with several fer-
tile valleys, consists mainly of mountainous woodlands which are the homelands 
of various hill tribes. The North-eastern Region consists of the Khorat Plateau, an 
extensive level area of moderate elevation. The North East takes up about one third 
of Thailand's total land area and harbours about one-third of the Thai people. It is 
a barren region with infertile, sandy and silty soils2. The Southern Region, located 
on the Malay Peninsula, has a mountainous backbone with relatively short river 
valleys. 
Thailand has a monsoon climate with a rainy season from May till October, a 
cool dry season between November and February and a sweltering hot period in 
March and April. Regional variation in temperature is relatively limited with mean 
maximum temperatures ranging between 31°C and 33°C and mean minimum tem-
peratures between 19°C and 23 °C. The number of rainy days averages 104 to 167 
throughout the kingdom. Variation in intensity and duration of rain is marked with 
more rainy days in the SE bordering Cambodia and on the S Peninsula. The 
Peninsula, the centre of plantation agriculture, still has an important forest reserve. 
In the NE rainfall is very irregular with alternating periods of excessive drought 
and flooding. Due to run-off and porosity of the soils, a rapid loss of water is a 
major problem. The region, called E-san, is agriculturally the most backward and 
lacks water management structures. 
The population of Thailand stood at 59 million in 1995, of which 31 M persons 
depended on agriculture. The agricultural sector contributed only 15% of the Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) to the country's economy, but 59% of the Thai labour 
force was employed in the agricultural sector (FAO Production Yearbook, 1997). 
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4.2. Early history 
The history of the Thai can be separated into three periods under three capital 
cities. The first period under the Kingdom of Sukhotai lasted from A.D. 1247 till 
1350. The second period under the Kingdom of Si Ayutthaya ran from 1350 till 
1777. The third period began at Bangkok under the first Chakri King in 1778 and 
lasts till to-day. For the four hundred and seventeen years of the second period, 
Ayutthaya, located on the border of the Chao Phraya river, remained the splendid 
capital of Siam. The European powers posted envoys at the King's court and the 
Dutch East India Company (VOC) established a trading post (factory) within its 
precincts in the 17th century. In 1777, Ayutthaya was besieged by the Burmese for 
more than one year, captured, and destroyed. The Thai abandoned the ruined city 
for strategical reasons and chose to build a new capital, Bangkok, from Thon Buri, 
a fortress-town guarding the Chao Phraya river some 40 km inwards from the Gulf 
of Siam. General Chao Phraya Chakri founded Bangkok in 1782 and was crowned 
King Rama I, the first of the Chakri Dynasty and ancestor of the present King 
Bhumibol. The wild lands surrounding Bangkok were drained and prepared for 
rice growing and, later, during the 20th century, developed into a centre of fruit and 
vegetable growing (Sternstein, 1982). 
Since the high days of Ayutthaya, foreign trade has been an important source of 
income for the Thai kings and the elite. Siam was never sealed off from foreign 
influence as China and Japan were. Since 1825, each year some 250 to 350 junks 
sailing in from China and other countries landed some 75,000 to 100,000 tonnes of 
merchandise. Siam exported mainly unprocessed forest and animal products and 
some agricultural produce. Precious wood species, resins, herbs and cardamom 
were mainly gathered from the forest by native Thais. Cash crops such as rice, 
sugar, pepper and cotton were mostly produced in small quantities by Chinese in 
seaside areas on the E coast from where it was easy to export to China. Imports 
mainly were textiles, earthenware, tea and sundries for the Thai elite and resident 
Chinese. 
Siam was not a free-trade country. Thai and Chinese merchants, patronized by 
the king, enjoyed buoyant profits whereas Western traders were discriminated 
against. The latter payed higher taxes, were forced to sell their imports at lower pri-
ces, had to purchase export wares at higher prices and were barred from exporting 
rice, sugar and pepper, the royal monopolies. In 1826, the English East India 
Company succeeded in obtaining a trade treaty, the Burney Treaty, from King 
Rama II of Bangkok. A few years later, the king granted a similar treaty to the 
United States of America (USA). The terms of both treaties remained limited as 
royal monopolies, and Chinese trade privileges, were maintained, and the esta-
blishment of consulates was refused. The terms of trade remained so skewed that, 
by 1830, Siam's imports of English goods through Singapore were firmly in 
Chinese hands. 
Dissatisfied, the foreign powers tried for new negotiations while considering to 
resort to gunboat diplomacy. In 1851, the remarkable King Mongkut3, Rama IV, 
ascended the throne. This enlightened king prepared a new policy which would 
open the country to the world whilst preserving its independence. In 1855, a British 
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mission succeeded in obtaining the king's approval of a second treaty, the Bowring 
Treaty, which established freeer diplomatic and commercial relations. Its signing 
was partly the result of King Monkut's anxiety over the outcome of the Anglo-
Burmese War of 1824-26. Within three years, similar free trade treaties were con-
cluded with the USA and eight European powers, among which the Netherlands 
(Manarungsan, 1989). 
At the beginning of Third Period, when Bangkok was founded, the government 
was in the style of the previous Ayutthaya Period with separate Ministries for the 
Interior, Defence and Finance. By a coup d'etat in 1932, the absolute monarchy 
was changed into a constitutional monarchy. In the next year, Siam's administra-
tive system was altered through the Thai Administration Act, which created a cen-
tral administration and a regional administration. The central administration con-
sisted of ministries and departments; the regional administration ruled the provin-
ces (Changwat) and districts (Amphhoe) into which the country was now divided 
(Praisont, 1982). 
4.3. Agricultural development before 1950 
4.3.1. Development of rice production in Siam before 1910. Agricultural devel-
opment in Thailand in the 19th and early in the 20th century began in the rice sec-
tor. Until the mid-19th century, foreign trade had little meaning for Thai farmers 
who were self-sufficient in the production of food and basic household goods. The 
traditional pattern of farmers cultivating rice and some indigenous field crops, veg-
etables and fruits for their own needs was broken up from the outside, for, this rea-
son, events in the rice sector until the Second World War are described as a policy 
frame. Thereafter, a more diverse agriculture policy evolved through the eight 
National Economic Development Plans since 1961. 
By 1850, domestic trade of rice4 was small and amounted probably to about 
17% of the total rice production of the Central Plain, which was estimated at 
377,000 tonnes/year (Manarungsan, 1989). After 1850, the agricultural economy 
of Siam moved gradually from self-sufficiency to an export oriented production of 
specific commodities, among which rice became the most important. Manarungsan 
(1989) distinguished two phases in the early development of rice production, the 
period between 1850 and 1910, characterized by a strong growth of exports due to 
socio-ecomomic factors, and the period from 1910 to 1950, when technological 
development provided the stimulus. 
4.3.2. Socio-economic stimuli to rice production. Before 1900, over 85% of 
Siam's population depended on agriculture and on rice farming in particular. Of the 
total rice production, two-thirds served the farmers' own needs, about 9% was 
traded in the domestic market for non-farming consumers, and the remainder 
(25%) was exported. Although the export of rice was small in comparison with 
domestic consumption, it played an important role in absorbing farmers' marketa-
ble surpluses, especially for producers of the Central Plain (Manarungsan, 1989). 
In 1855 a clause of the Burney Treaty of 1825, which excluded Western traders 
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from exporting rice, was repealed by the Bowring Treaty between Siam and Great 
Britain. The new treaty opened the market for participation by Western traders in 
export and import commodities. The free-trade policy brought relatively cheap for-
eign goods within reach of Thai farmers, who were easily induced to grow more 
rice to obtain purchasing power5. 
Between 1850 and 1910, the steadily increasing foreign demand for Thai rice 
was an external stimulus for producing a rice surplus. Demand for rice from Siam 
arose, for instance, in the Dutch East Indies, Malaya and Ceylon (Sri Lanka) in 
reaction to the rapidly expanding plantation and mining industry. The indigenous 
rice production by Indonesian, Malay and Sinhalese rice farmers was totally insuf-
ficient6 to feed the large numbers of Chinese and Indian contract labourers. Pro-
duction for the market became so attractive that Thai farmers of the C Plain left the 
stage of self-sufficiency and gathering of forest products to produce rice for export. 
Since it took time to adjust to commercial production and since the infrastructure 
for transport was lacking, the growth rate of rice exports7 remained rather low 
initially. At the end of the 1870s, about 200,000 tonnes of rice or some 15% of 
Siam's total production was exported. By 1920, exports amounted to about one 
quarter of total rice production (Manarungsan, 1989). 
Domestic causes for such growth of rice exports were the farmers' responsive-
ness to price incentives, ample availability of the production factors labour and 
land, and easily forthcoming investment in rice milling capacity, rural infra-
structure and transport (Manarungsan, 1989). Government action to encourage rice 
production consisted of monetary and physical measures. New rice lands had to be 
taken into production with the help of animal traction for land preparation. King 
Mongkut, Rama IV, introduced a new system of land taxation which resulted in a 
17% tax reduction on land property if waste lands were converted into cultivated 
rice land. For new rice land, a tax waiver was granted for the first year and reduced 
rates were charged for some more years. Land tax rates remained always much 
lower than those levied in Vietnam (Indo-China) and Burma, Siam's main com-
petitors in the rice trade. The government undertook large projects for canal 
excavation to improve transportation of rice from distant areas. During the period 
1885 and 1899, when rice export volume and value grew rapidly, nine major 
canals8 were constructed. This operation opened about 330,600 ha of new land for 
rice cultivation, which amounted to 17% of arable lands in the C Plain (Mana-
rungsan, 1989). 
In the middle of the 19th century, an estimated 25% of the Thai population 
were bonded workers or 'slaves'. An important institutional change was the aboli-
tion of slavery and corvee9 work. In 1874, the Great King1" Chulalongkorn (1868-
1910) began to dismantle the institute of slavery11. In 1899, a law was enacted to 
replace corvee by a capitation tax12. The abolition of corvee and slavery freed 
labour for new market opportunities which resulted from the opening of the coun-
try to free trade. This also benefitted the absentee land owners13, the elite and mer-
chants living in Bangkok. Scores of Thai farmers, released from rigid corvee and 
bondage, became tenants. The boom in rice production stimulated the creation of 
other employment such as rice trading, rice and lumber milling and boat building. 
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These industries mostly employed Chinese immigrant labour as Thais preferred to 
work in the rice fields. 
An external factor contributing to the growth of rice production was the lower-
ing of ocean freight rates due to the appearance of steam vessels14 towards the end 
of the 19th century. Lower shipping costs integrated the rice markets of SE and E 
Asia and increased competition15 between imported and domestically produced 
rice in many countries (Manarungsan, 1989). The opening of the Suez Canal in 
1869 for steam vessels shortened the journeys to the extent that rice could be ship-
ped as milled rice instead of as unhusked padi, thus reducing costs. Demand for 
milled rice from the side of exporters stimulated innovation in milling technology 
and a large investment in rice mills in Siam and Burma. The installation of tele-
graphic network connections in Siam, since 1883, provided one more stimulus to 
a competitive export rice trade. 
4.3.3. Technological stimuli to rice production. The rapid increase in rice export 
from Siam during the period 1850-1910 did not reflect the rate of productivity 
growth, which in fact remained low. Important reasons were the limited growth in 
domestic consumption which kept prices low, and scarcity of labour due to Siam's 
sparse population and slow population growth16 in the 19th century. In the 
commercialized C Plain, expansion of the rice hectareage, notwithstanding perma-
nent shortage of labour, was realized through a change from the traditional 
transplanting to a more labour extensive direct seeding technique. Around 1900, 
probably half of the commercial rice land in the C Plain and, by 1930, more than 
70% were direct seeded (Manarungsan, 1989). Direct seeding required less invest-
ment17 of capital and labour in land development, and enabled to grow a larger 
hectareage of rice, which compensated for the lower average yield. Productivity of 
direct seeded rice fields was one-third lower than of transplanted fields. Likely rea-
sons for low yields were low seed rates and untimely weed control, because in the 
Muda Irrigation Scheme, Malaysia, 200% higher yields are achieved with 
improved direct seeding technique (ch 3.6.4.6). 
At the end of King Chulalongkorn's reign in 1910, the growth of rice exports 
slowed down. Whereas between 1857 and 1910 average annual compound growth 
of export volume was 5.7%, it was only 1.2% in the subsequent period, 1910-50. 
Since 1914 and throughout the inter-bellum, Europe and the USA protected their 
own grain farmers by tariff walls and quota restrictions on cereal imports 
(Manarungsan, 1989). The prolonged lull of the international rice trade after 1910 
coincided with the surplus capacity of productive land and draft animals (the main 
capital stock for rice farming) relative to farm labour. The level and downward 
trend of the rice price made it less attractive for farmers to invest in technological 
innovation and to produce rice for the market beyond their own needs. 
Siam's total rice production, nevertheless, increased over the period 1910-50. 
This growth was mainly induced by an increase in domestic consumption as the 
farmer population expanded healthily. The slump in rice exports after 1910, how-
ever, halted investment in irrigation and canal-digging projects in the C Plain. 
Communication and overland transport between Bangkok and the outlying regions 
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remained difficult and time consuming. Early in the 1900s, some major railway 
extensions18 opened access to the N and NE. Hence, glutinous rice was shipped 
from the outlying provinces to city markets, although transport costs by rail and 
boat remained high (Manarungsan, 1989). 
There was little technological development in Thai agriculture before 1950. A 
survey, carried out in 1929-1930 (Zimmerman, 1931), showed that only districts in 
the C Plain, where farmers cultivated more than 4 ha per household, produced a 
marketable surplus. Zimmerman observed that 'commercialized farmers differ 
from others by working larger economic units, and less intensive agriculture, but 
too often it is nearly the same agriculture as in self-sufficiency districts'. Farmers 
did not try to improve their practices with respect to using manure or fertilizers, 
seed selection, ploughing and water management. Reasons for this negligence 
were the relative abundance of land and the structural scarcity of labour. Feeny 
(1982) remarked that it was the government's ignorance of irrigation that caused 
the long term decline19 in rice yields. The lack of institutional incentive played a 
crucial role in slowing down development of modern technologies such as 
mechanization, use of agro-chemicals and high yielding varieties. 
Around 1930, even in the most commercialized rice areas, such as Rangsit, 
farmers did not bother to obtain improved rice cultivars, issued by the Rangsit 
Experimental Station which the government had established in 1916 (Zimmerman, 
1931). Although tractors were available for ploughing and land preparation in the 
1930s, harvesting still had to be done by hand and, thus, labour availability 
remained the bottleneck. Mechanization was, furthermore, little adopted at the time 
because draft animals were still numerous and available at low cost. Moreover, 
farmers planted an assortment of early, medium and late maturing local varieties 
which could be harvested at the right time through effective neighbour assistance, 
known as 'long khaek'. 
4.4. Agricultural development since 1950 
4.4.1. The agricultural situation in Thailand. In the second half of the 20th cen-
tury, Thailand showed an impressive economic development. Despite a rapid pop-
ulation growth over the period 1950-1982, the overall real GDP growth rate was 
6.7% and the per capita GDP almost 3%. The agricultural growth rate over this 
period was 4.1% and showed a slightly increasing trend for the crops sub-sector 
(Rijk & Van der Meer, 1984). 
Expansion of the cultivated area rather than intensification was a major factor 
contributing to agricultural growth. It was estimated that, towards the end of the 
20th century, out of Thailand's total land area of 51 M ha about 23 M ha, or some 
45% of the total area, were being used for permanent cropping, swidden cultiva-
tion or grazing. Up to the 1980s, much public land was brought into cultivation by 
the growing rural population20. Encroachment and illegal logging halved the for-
est resources within 30 years time leaving current reserves below 30% of total 
land. Growth through expansion of agricultural land is no longer an option since 
fertile land and water have become scarce resources. 
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Concerning land tenure patterns, Thailand is primarily a land of owner-occu-
piers without the problem of iniquitous landlordism. Farmers of the relatively 
backward N and NE provinces, generally, were owner-occupiers whereas in the 
fertile C Plain and coastal provinces cash renting or tenancy21 was more common. 
Before 1980, 90% of the farmers owned their holding, a feature giving Thailand 
more social and economic stability than her neighbours. During the 1990s, how-
ever, tenancy appears to increase, even in the rich C Plain (Jungbluth, 1996). Table 
4.4.1. gives data concerning agricultural development in Thailand. Despite the 
rapid population growth, there was no evidence of fragmentation of holdings. 
Early in the 1990s, there were about 5.2 million farms with an average size of 4.5 
ha (Rumakom et al, 1991). 
During the 1960s, the Royal Thai Governement (RTG) invested about two-
third of its development expenditures in land development and irrigation schemes. 
The area planted with rice and major field crops expanded by 110% over the peri-
od 1960 to 1982. The Thai farmers increased productivity of agricultural labour 
through mechanization and better management which enabled them to cultivate 
larger areas. They spent, however, comparatively little on land improvement22 and 
high yielding technology. The use of improved cultivars and agro-chemicals remai-
ned limited even though informal and cheap institutional credits23 were available 
to larger farmers. Thai farmers appeared to prefer extensive farming systems since, 
in most situations, these yielded high returns to labour input. 
Therefore, the government reduced investments in land improvement, parti-
cularly in irrigation facilities, to less than 40% at the end of the 1970s. Early in the 
1980s, irrigated agriculture and flood control were still of limited scale24 and main-
ly restricted to rice cultivation in the C Plain. Multiple cropping was estimated to 
cover not more than 25% of the irrigated area (Rijk & Van der Meer, 1984). 
The most important factor for increasing land productivity (GDP per area plant-
ed), was the shift towards crops with higher added value. Traditionally, the most 
important crop was rice grown on irrigated fields, on bunded rainfed fields, or as 
'deep water' rice. Only since the Second World War, more attention was given to 
grow secondary food crops, in particular maize and cassava for export to feed the 
Table 4.4.1. Land tenure and utilization in Thailand, 1975-1990. Sources: Panayotou, 
1985; Jungbluth, 1996. 
Category\year Unit 1975 1980 1995 
Total land area 
Agricultural land 
Number of farms 
Mean farm size 
Rice land 
Field crops 
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Mha 
Mha 
M 
ha 
Mha 
Mha 
51.0 
18.2 
4.1 
4.4 
11.4 
3.2 
51.3 
18.6 
4.5 
4.1 
11.8 
4.2 
51.3 
20.4 
5.2 
4.0 
11.3 
4.6 
more than half the Ministry's budget for research and extension. From this allo-
cation, about one-third is spent on research projects and two-thirds on extension 
targets (Siamwalla, 1992). 
4.4.2.3. Plant protection research and budget allocation. Plant protection issues 
are dealt with by several divisions of DOA, by the Plant Protection Service 
Division of DOAE, and by the National Biological Control Research Centre 
(NBCRC). The DOA divisions concerned include, among others, Regulatory 
Control, Toxic Substances, Phytopathology, Zoology and Entomology. Since the 
late 1960s, the DOA divisions were mainly occupied with pesticide efficacy and 
application studies, which were largely directed at the control of grasshoppers in 
maize and sorghum, and other insect pests in rice, vegetables and fruit. DOAE 
advised the farmers on pesticide use and actual application. 
In 1969, the Pesticide Research Branch of DOA established one of the best 
analytical laboratories in SE Asia with the support of a UNDP/FAO Programme for 
Strengthening Plant Protection Services. The work program of the laboratory, and 
its two satellite stations at Khon Kaen and Sukhothai, included residue analyses in 
market samples of food crops, quality control of market samples29 of pesticides, 
studies on efficacy of pesticides and development of resistance to pesticides, and 
monitoring of environmental pollution. Because of this priority of pesticide prob-
lems before 1990, more than 95% of DOA's research budget was spent on agro-
chemical projects (Farah, 1993). 
At the end of the 1970s, UNDP/FAO initiated a project to help Thai researchers 
in developing a crop loss assessment methodology (James & Reddy, 1977b). Be-
tween 1981 and 1988, the departments DOA and DOAE worked jointly on the 
development of the national surveillance and early warning system for rice pests, 
and of crop loss assessment procedures in field crops (Jungbluth, 1996). They 
received support from the German/Thai Programme for Strengthening of the 
DOAE's Plant Protection Service Division (Hameling, pers. coram., 1981). 
4.4.2.4. Institutional constraints. Research on Thailand's agriculture is mostly 
carried out by the Research Organizations of the Ministry of Agriculture and 
Cooperatives (MOAC), the Universities and the Regional Agricultural Centres30. 
Each has its own reporting lines for finance, policies and programmes. National 
coordination is to be effected through committees for specific crops. The result is 
that researchers can propose virtually any line of research that suits their particu-
lar discipline, irrespective of its priority in achieving production growth. Research 
is therefore carried out on strictly disciplinary lines according to subjects such as 
agronomy, entomology, pathology, breeding and so on. Each has its own depart-
ment, line of reporting and budget. Cooperation between disciplines is limited to 
budget allocation (Laosuwan & Macartney, 1992). 
The disadvantage of this fragmentation of effort is that individual disciplinary 
recommendations are made to maximise yield, irrespective what factors are seen 
as major problems. The costs and benefits from the actions proposed are mostly 
theoretical. The package of practical recommendations, which exists for all crops, 
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is therefore drawn up as a conglomerate of individual discipline recommendations. 
The result is that a complex and expensive package is produced which is usually 
beyond the comprehension of the ordinary farmer and beyond his financial possi-
bilities. Government-supported research was fairly successful in irrigated agricul-
ture, but far from adequate for upland agriculture where risks are higher, par-
ticularly in areas of marginal rainfall. When packages are delivered through cred-
it, the end result is frequent farmer indebtedness (Laosuwan & Macartney, 1992). 
The DOAE is responsible for the field testing and communication to the farm-
ers of research results and new technology. To achieve this goal the extension 
workers should be mobile, well trained, briefed on the technology packages for 
promotion and respected by the farmers. Since the early 1970s, DOAE employed 
the Training and Visit system of extension. The poor acceptance by farmers of re-
commendations from extension workers and the general failure to increase produc-
tion and profit showed that DOAE operated with little efficiency. The unclear lines 
of reporting and non-accountability for personal performance are part of the prob-
lem. Administratively the extension officers usually report to the provincial 
administrative office and technically through their headquarters. There is limited 
dialogue between the central, the provincial and district officers who define and 
award priorities according to area programs. There is, therefore, no guarantee that 
operational procedures set by the headquarters will be implemented in a timely and 
effective manner. 
Thailand received considerable foreign assistance for its development efforts. 
Foreign assistance was relatively successful in the transfer of agricultural technology, 
but less successful in projects which required institutional reform and coordination 
among various government agencies (Rijk & Van der Meer, 1984). For example, 
under sponsored projects, such as the Thai/German Plant Protection Programme, 
DOAE was given training and funds to operate on-farm testing and demonstration 
programmes. But research has developed far beyond the level of performance to be 
expected from farmers whilst the linkage between research and extension is distant 
and contentious. Even the cooperative approach mostly did not prove to be effective 
(Laosuwan & Macartney, 1992). Rijk & Van der Meer (1984) remarked that 
government agencies had insufficient capacity for research, extension, deve-
lopment planning and implementation, whilst coordination between agencies was 
often deficient31. 
To remedy the problem, the Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives (MOAC) 
has set up, under an agricultural research project financed by the World Bank, a 
Farming Systems Research and Development Institute (FSRI) as the link organization 
between research, extension and the small farmer. The FSRI tests the results produced 
by research stations and universities on farms and feeds back the results. It assesses 
the farmer response to research recommendations and packages within the social and 
financial constraints of the farming system (Laosuwan & Macartney, 1992). 
4.4.2.5. DOAE's outbreak budget and emergency service. DOAE was responsi-
ble for surveillance and control of pests in the field. Since the 1960s, the DOAE 
managed a regular budget for its surveillance service and for the procurement of 
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pesticides to control serious pest outbreaks. The Plant Protection Service Division 
of DOAE, on the request of farmers representing a minimum of 80 ha of infested 
field crops or orchards, treated emergency situations free of cost. In the mid-1970s, 
the DOAE treated on average 2.7 M ha of badly infested crops per year under this 
provision, for which it purchased around 1,000 t/y of formulated products. Treat-
ments concerned insects (40%), pathogens (35%), field rats and snails (together 
25%). Between 1963 and 1976, emergency operations included aerial spraying 
against locusts and grass hoppers32 in maize and sorghum (Roffey, 1969). Disease 
control concerned rice for 90%, with preventive seed treatment as the major 
method. 
DOAE's budget for emergency treatments rose from 1,7 M US$ (40 M Baht) 
in 1974 (James & Reddy, 1977) to 3 M US$ (78 M Baht) in 1995 (Jungbluth, 
1996). DOAE calculated the budget requirement for each following year on basis 
of current infestation rates and pesticide prices, taking 10% of the cropping area as 
a benchmark figure. When outbreaks threatened to get out control, the budget 
might be substantially increased. Thus, in the 1989/1990 brown planthopper 
emergency, the budget was increased to almost 10 M US$ (250 M Baht) (Farah, 
1993). 
Of the 1995 outbreak budget 30% was spent on rice, 51% on other field crops, 
8% on vegetables and 10% on the fruit sector. Apparently, the pattern of budget 
allocations did not change significantly over the past three decades. To-date the 
budget still covers all costs of pesticide procurement33 and distribution through 
DOAE channels. The DOAE was the only major user of agro-pesticides in the pub-
lic sector, because DOAs requirements for research have always been small. 
Although portrayed as a measure of food security, critics regard the DOAE 
outbreak budget as a major subsidy instrument which contravened the pesticide 
reduction effort entailed in the IPM policy to which the RTG subscribed since 
1980. It is questionable whether the timing of the allocations and subsequent 
releases of pesticides were appropriate for efficient control of the infestations. The 
effectiveness of DOAE's outbreak measures has never been investigated (Farah, 
1993; Jungbluth, 1996). 
4.4.3. Rice production in Thailand since 1950 
4.4.3.1. Export rice production and the Green Revolution. Rice has always 
been Thailand's principal staple and major export crop and the rice sector has been 
subjected to government intervention. At the end of World War II the RTG nation-
alized the rice export trade and placed it under control of a Rice Office. Private 
exporters could sell to foreign buyers but had to pay an export premium to obtain 
a licence for actual shipment and an even larger export tax34. Export duties were 
maintained at a high level and, furthermore between 1962 and 1982, exporters 
were required to supply rice at below market price to the government to be used in 
a consumption subsidy program reserve. The Ministry of Commerce dictated quo-
tas and selling prices and even established an Rice Reserve Committee in 1960 for 
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direct government-to-government rice trading (Siamwalla & Setboonsarng, 1989). 
In 1965, a sort of rice price support program was established but due to lack of 
funding it did neither influence the actual farmgate price nor did it benefit the 
farmers. The question of the rice reserves and rice price support was a political 
issue, markedly subject to Thailand's alternating periods of parliamentary democracy 
or military regime. Siamwalla & Setboonsarng (1989) explained the dominant role 
of the Ministry of Commerce in managing the rice export from the leading position 
of Thailand in the global rice trade35. 'The Ministry feared that, if exporters were 
left free, they would undercut another's selling prices and thus loose revenue for 
the country'. The Ministry of Agriculture had little influence on rice price policies 
until 197436. 
Around 1970, the Green Revolution in S and SE Asia substantially raised cere-
al production in Asia and caused a slump in rice prices. The economic conse-
quences of the Green Revolution in Thailand led to the passage of a Farmers' Aid 
Fund Act in 1974 which provided the Ministry of Agriculture with resources and 
power to play a role in rice price policies. Unfortunately, not the poorly organized 
farmers, but the rice mill owners became the main beneficiaries. The founding, in 
1974, of the Marketing Organization of Farmers (MOF), basically an instrument of 
MOAC, has not been of much help to the farmers. 
The development of rice production and yields under Thailand's seven Natio-
nal Development Plans from 1961 till 1995 is summarized in table 4.4.3.1.a. Over 
the whole period 1961 till 1996 national rice production almost doubled. Between 
1961 and 1981, mean rice yields on farmer fields stagnated at 1.7 t/ha, whereas tri-
als at DOA's Rice Department (RD) yielded an average of 4.6 t/ha. The main con-
straints to yield improvement in irrigated rice were lack of reliable water manage-
ment, lack of technology to handle resistant HY varieties, deficiencies in direct 
seeding, pest control and fertilizer use, and adverse input costs/output value ratio 
for rice and agro-chemicals. Constraints facing rain-fed rice growing, moreover, 
included shortage of suitable land, lack of early maturing rice varieties, lack of 
knowledge and adequate extension, and lack of cash resources (World Bank, 1983; 
Rijk & van der Meer, 1984). 
Table 4.4.3.1.a. Thailand. Rice production under seven National Economic and Social 
Development Plans from 1961 till 1996. Averages of area planted (M ha), production 
of rough rice (M t) and yield (t/ha) and mean annual growth rates in the respective 
Plan periods. Sources: Panayotou, 1985; FAO Production Yearbooks. 
Category\Plan 
Area 
Production 
Yield 
Unit 
Mha 
Mt 
t/ha 
I 
6.6 
11.1 
1.7 
II 
7.3 
12.2 
1.7 
III 
8.2 
14.2 
1.7 
IV 
9.5 
16.1 
1.7 
V 
9.4 
19.1 
2.0 
VI 
9.4 
19.3 
2.1 
VII 
9.0 
20.6 
2.3 
Five-Year Plans, I = 1961-66, II = 1967-71, III = 1972-76, 
IV = 1977-81, V = 1982-86, VI = 1987-91, VII = 1992 - 1996. 
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For such reasons, the farmers of the NE provinces, while planting 45% of the totale 
rice area, obtained only 30% of the total production, whereas the C Plain farmers 
planted 26% of the total area and reaped 35% of the total production of Thailand. 
In the 1960s, Thai farmers grew at least 30 traditional rice cultivars. By 1973, 
,„ »t_ <- r» *i,„ ~Hnntion of improved RD-varieties was still below 6% on irriga-
and ^"!y about 40% of the rice area was treated with 
> ' - . , 1978). The miracle rice lines IR5, iR8, IR20 and 
. ~>.~ wonders in other Asian countries, were not so effective in 
Thailand, where water control was deficient. Farmers found them to be too short, 
easily flooded and poorly resistant to diseases and pests. 
Between 1972 and 1982, rice production increased by about 3% per annum. 
Since the population growth averaged only 2.5% per annum, Thailand could export 
more than 3 M tonnes of rice per year valued at up to 1 billion US$ (Rijk & Van 
der Meer, 1984). The growth in production stemmed mainly from improvement of 
irrigation and opening up lesser quality land for rice growing under rain-fed 
conditions in response to greater market demand (Kulick & Wilson, 1992). Annual 
rice production consisted for two-third of non-glutinous rice and one-third of gluti-
Table 4.4.3.l.b. Thailand. Rice production in the period 1980-96. Index: a. area harve-
sted (M ha); b. total production of rough rice (M t); c. annual production in relative 
values (1996 = 100%); d. yield of rough rice (t/ha). Source: Various FAO Production 
Yearbooks. (See also fig.7.4.3.a). 
Year a b e d 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
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9.1 
9.1 
8.9 
9.6 
9.6 
9.8 
9.2 
9.1 
9.9 
0.0 
8.8 
9.3 
9.1 
8.5 
9.0 
9.0 
9.2 
17.4 
17.8 
16.9 
19.6 
19.9 
20.3 
18.9 
18.0 
21.3 
20.2 
17.2 
19.8 
20.4 
18.4 
21.1 
21.1 
21.8 
80 
82 
77 
90 
91 
93 
87 
83 
98 
93 
72 
91 
94 
85 
94 
97 
100 
1.9 
2.0 
1.9 
2.0 
2.1 
2.1 
2.1 
2.0 
2.2 
2.0 
2.0 
2.1 
2.3 
2.2 
2.3 
2.3 
2.4 
nous rice. Glutinous rice was grown in particular by farmers of the NE Region 
(66%) and the N Region (33%) since its higher price compensated for its low yield. 
In the 1980s, a more suitable high-yielding rice cultivar, Suphanburi-60, was 
introduced. In the 1990s, most owner-farmers used the two government-issued 
varieties, but many tenant farmers continued the planting of indigenous rice varie-
ties which require less fertilizer and pesticide inputs (Jungbluth, 1996; Kenmore, 
1991b). 
Since the late 1970s, rice occupied over 9 M ha, or some 40% of all cropped 
land (table 4.4.3.l.b). In the period 1983-89, the largest mean hectareage under rice 
was harvested. In the 1990s, the planted area decreased by about 0.4 M ha, but 
mean annual production of rice increased by about 1 M tonnes. Many Thai farm-
ers abandoned rice growing in favour of higher priced products, such as fruits, 
vegetables and livestock. 
4.4.3.2. IPM as the leading policy for rice. In Thailand, knowledge on insect 
pests and diseases in rice and other crops was gradually built up after 1960. The 
most noxious rice insects at that time were pyralid stemborers, noctoid cutworms, 
leafhoppers {Nephotettix spp.), the rice gall midge {Pachidiplosis oryzae) and the 
rice bug {Leptocorisa acuta). Heavy grasshopper infestations in NE and C 
Thailand were attributed to extensive deforestation (Wongsiri & Kovitvadhi, 
1964). DOA researchers developed recommendations for calender-based spraying 
of insecticides, in particular against rice stemborers and rice gall midge. 
Around 1970, MO AC introduced high yielding rice varieties form IRRI to 
improve rice production in Thailand. The government encouraged double cropping 
and heavy reliance on pesticide use. Traditional infestations of stemborers, 
leafhoppers and rice gall midge became worse and a new pest, the brown plant 
hopper (Nilaparvata lugens, BPH) appeared. The concept of pest management was 
introduced in Thailand in 1973 when a graduate course in pest management was 
offered at Kasetsart University (KU). The East West Food Institute of the East West 
Centre, Hawaii, USA, conducted a series of conferences and workshops on pest 
management from 1972 to 1977, and provided support to the National Biological 
Control Research Centre. DOA intensified research on rice pest management in 
1976 and commenced with large-scale field demonstrations in which insecticide 
treatments formed an important means of control (Rumakom et al, 1989, 1991). 
In 1980, the FAO launched an Inter-Country Programme for the Development 
and Application of Integrated Pest Control in Rice in S and SE Asia (ICP-IPC 
Rice) (ch 5). ICP phase I concentrated on research and later phases of the program 
on extension. In 1981, the Thai government subscribed to the FAO ICP-IPC Rice 
Programme and declared IPM, based on the regulation of pesticides use, to be the 
national policy for plant protection (Rumakom et al, 1989, 1991). A Steering 
Committee was installed to manage the National IPM in Rice Program. The DOA 
and DOEA both established a sub-division for biological control of insects. The 
research divisions of DOA worked on IPM projects in cotton since 1981, rice since 
1983, and sugarcane since 1985. During 1982-84 and 1985-87, DOA conducted 
'IPM in rice' demonstration trials on a scale of 84 ha only, in which the planting 
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of resistant rice cultivars and need-based pesticide use were the main tactics 
(Rumakom et al, 1986, 1991). No further reports on IPM field research by DO A 
were found. 
The IPM program on DOAE began with the development of a Surveillance and 
Early Warning System (SEWS) in 1981, with the assistance of the Thai-German 
Plant Protection Program. This program, executed by the German Technical Aid 
Agency (GTZ) since 1975, helped to develop IPM technology by establishing eco-
nomic threshold (ETL) values for pests and diseases37, and procedures for moni-
toring, treatment and demonstration. The plant protection service units of DOAE 
were strengthened and a nationwide scouting network was installed. There is no 
evidence of a lasting impact of the Thai-German Program on current methods of 
agricultural extension. The German program included surveys of field rats and 
improved methods of rat control in food crops. 
Around the same time, an Agricultural Spraying Machinery Evaluation Centre 
(ASMEC) was set up at DOA in Bangkok, by the Centre of Overseas Pest Research 
(COPR) under a British bilateral program (Sutherland, pers. comm., 1979). The 
ASMEC was taken over by DOA's Pesticide Research Branch in the 1980s. In 
1979, the Agricultural Requisite Scheme for Asia and the Pacific (ARSAP), a 
Dutch funded project of the Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the 
Pacific (ESCAP) at Bangkok, began in Thailand with a series of planning work-
shops for trainers from the public and private sector on safe and efficient pesticide 
use. The ARSAP project covered ten countries between 1979 and 1983. The 
ARSAP-training module was the first of its kind installed in DOAE in 1980 
(Oudejans,1992). 
In the 1980s, IPM demonstration projects on cotton, sugarcane and vegetables 
(crucifers and onions) were carried out with the support of FAO/UNDP. In 
response to the government policy to promote the export of fruits, DOA and DOAE 
requested long-term assistance from the German Technical Aid Agency (GTZ) to 
undertake a Thai-German IPM project for improvement of fruit trees. The project 
began in 1989 on mango, tangerine, pomelo, durian and longan (GTZ project 
office, pers. comm., 1993). 
The pest problems in rice aggravated around 1989, when BPH outbreaks 
became increasingly severe in 25 provinces. BPH and Ragged Stunt Virus (of 
which BPH is the vector) damaged, in 1990, an estimated 0.6 M ha of rice fields, 
causing yield losses of about 0,3 M US$ (8 M bahts). The widely adopted rice vari-
ety Suphanburi-60 proved to be disastrously vulnerable to BPH. The use of 
organophosphate and pyrethroid insecticides against rice thrips (Thrips oryzae) 
and leaffolders (Cnapholocrocis medinalis) were named as a further cause of the 
BPH outbreak (Rumakom et al, 1991). 
In the 1990s, DOA and DOAE intensified their work on the development of 
IPM and bio-control technology. Of the 1993 budget of DOA's Entomology 
Division (2.5 M US$ or 63 M Baht), 36% was allocated to control (7% to IPM-
related research, 10% to biological control, 19% to chemical control) and 20% to 
crop related projects such as crop loss assessment and plant resistance (Jungbluth, 
1996). 
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The government strengthened the capacity of DOEA for IPM development and 
promotion by doubling the department's annual budget between 1991 and 1995. 
This was in line with the Seventh Five-year Plan (1992-1996) which emphasized 
IPM, biological control, pest surveillance and forecasting, and education in effi-
cient and safe use of pesticides. The allocation to DOAE's Plant Protection Service 
Division for IPM extension was raised four-fold to about 0.8 M $/y. Its allocation 
for development and extension of biological control38 increased eight-fold. In 
comparison with DOAE's outbreak expenditure, however, allocations for IPM and 
bio-control related activities remained relatively small (Jungbluth, 1996). 
Recognizing the importance of healthy improved seeds, the RTG established a 
first seed multiplication project with USAID assistance in 1976. Within MOAC, 
the departments DOA and DOAE were made responsible for the improvement and 
distribution of quality seed. DOA's Agricultural Technology Division (ATD) and 
Kasetsart University produced breeder and foundation seeds at the agricultural 
experiment stations. The Seed Division of DOAE produced registered and certified 
seeds at its Seed Multiplication Centres and through contract farmers. MOAC de-
partments could only produce39 about 1% of the estimated demand. DOAE sold 
annually about 12,000 tonnes of seed which was mainly procured from the private 
sector. The private seed companies concentrated on multiplication, through con-
tract farmers, of maize and sorhghum seed, since the profit margin for rice seed and 
oilseeds was unattractive (Rijk & Van der Meer, 1984). 
4.4.4. Other field crops and estate agriculture. Before 1950, no other crop could 
compete with rice in value, although sugarcane and rubber also had a long history 
in Thailand. Since World War II, considerable diversification took place with major 
crops such as maize, cassava, soybean, tobacco and a whole range of other food 
and cash crops gaining interesting market shares. In several instances, the introduc-
tion of new crops resulted from international developments which endangered 
Thailand's political stability. Two examples are given. 
In 1957, a neglected area on the NE Khorat plateau with a strong Laotian cul-
ture, called E-san, was struck by a combination of extreme drought and locust out-
breaks. Its inhabitants fled in large numbers to Bangkok where they were housed 
in refugee camps. The crisis and fear of insurgences in Thailand's border 
provinces, inspired by the communist regimes of neighbouring countries, ne-
cessitated the Thai government to undertake the development of the NE region. A 
massive aid effort40 freed the E-san from its isolation, gave it access to the market 
economy and brought rapid agricultural development. For E-san farmers, who 
produced mainly glutinous rice and sorghum for self-sufficiency, improved maize, 
kenaf, cassava {Manihot esculenta) and mung bean (Phaseolus aureus) became 
major cash crops. 
In the N Region, the homeland of the Meo, Karen, Lisu and other hill tribes, 
shifting cultivation was the common pattern. The range of subsistence crops 
included upland rice, maize, millet, yam, sweet potatoes, fruits and vegetables. 
However, the traditional mainstay of the hill tribes' economy was opium poppy 
(Papaver somniferum), a crop with a peculiarly high value per unit weight and not 
Wageningen Agricultural University Papers 99-1 (1999) 113 
readily perishable. A United Nations Survey in 1967 found that some 1800 ha of 
opium poppy were grown (O'Reilly & McDonald, 1983). In 1980, the Thai gov-
ernment and the United Nations launched, under the patronage of King Bhumibol, 
a joint Highland Agricultural Marketing and Production (HAMP) Project aimed at 
developing crops which would be economic to grow in remote uplands. Arabica 
coffee seemed a good choice and a Highland Coffee Research and Development 
Centre was set up with Dutch funding at Chiang Mai (Rijk & Van der Meer, 1984). 
Under the successive Five-Year Development Plans intensification and diversi-
fication were promoted, but often rather by private sector initiatives seizing the 
opportunities of a free market than by the government. Intervention by the RTG in 
the development of individual crops usually concerned policies of price stabilisa-
tion, levies, exports taxes and cess funds rather than investing in improvement of 
seed and planting material and technology (Siamwalla & Setboonsarng, 1989). For 
example, the use of fertilizer and pesticides by Thai farmers was for many years 
much lower than the average level in SE Asia because of high agro-chemical 
prices"' (Waibel, 1990a,b; Panayotou, 1985). 
Other field and tree crops included a whole range of plants such as sugarcane, 
sorghum, the oil crops soybean and groundnut, the fibre crops kenaf and cotton, 
mung bean, tobacco, coconut and kapok. Although these crops occupied a smaller 
hectareage, they were profitable because they suited local conditions or were the 
farmers' response to temporary developments in market prices. Sugarcane growing 
expanded considerably since the 1970s and amounted to 1 M ha with a production 
of 6.3 M t raw sugar by 1996. Tobacco was a crop of similar value as cassava and 
maize, but its cultivation, including the supply of seed and chemical imputs, was 
largely controlled by the private sector. Generally, the government did little to pro-
mote the cultivation of plantation crops42 (Rijk & van der Meer, 1984) but, in 
recent years, interest in growing rubber and oil palm was increasing. The culti-
vation of higher priced horticultural crops and fruits increased rapidly (ch 6.4). 
4.5. Discussion, Thailand 
The following discussion and conclusions reflects the authors' interpretation of 
the agricultural situation in Thailand. During my stay at UN ESCAP, Bangkok, 
1979-83, and in later visits I worked with and interviewed a fair number of Thai 
experts in Kasetsart University, DOA and DOAE. My contact with provincial offi-
cers and farmers was very limited because of the language barrier. 
Thailand, known as Siam till 1949, remained an independent kingdom by liais-
ing with the English colonial administration in Burma and Malaya and with the 
French in Cambodia and Laos. This fact determined the course and pace of agri-
cultural development in Thailand till present times. During the 19th century, for-
eign planters and agronomists introduced exotic crops into Indonesia and 
Peninsular Malaya and invested in the production of commodity crops for export, 
which created a need for scientific research. Siam kept the foreign (farang) influ-
ences at bay and began agricultural development autonomously. 
Remarkably, agricultural development in Siam too began with export com-
modity production. But Siam exported rice and mainly to Asian markets. The fac-
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tors which allowed Siam to become a major rice exporter included ample availabil-
ity of fertile land in the C Plain, low domestic consumption due to its small popu-
lation, and under-utilization of labour. The demand in the Asian markets grew with 
the expansion of the mining and plantation industry in Malaya and the Dutch East 
Indies. The government of Siam furthered rice export through measures which kept 
the price of Thai rice competitive with prices offered by Indo-China and Burma. It 
maintained low land tax rates, invested in road and canal construction to improve 
transportation, opened 0.3 M ha of uncultivated land for rice production and 
expanded the rice milling capacity. By dissolving servitude constructions in the 
rural society, the King freed labour for tenant farming and employment in positions 
which supported agricultural development. 
Around 1900, Siam could not meet the Asian demand for rice because labour 
became the limiting factor in the C Plain. Higher prices induced the farmers to shift 
from labour intensive transplanting of rice seedlings to less labour demanding 
direct seeding. By 1930, about 70% of the rice area was direct seeded 
(Manarungsan, 1989). Thus, direct seeding of rice was practised in Thailand about 
50 years earlier than in the Irrigation Schemes of Malaysia, but for the same rea-
son of shortage of labour for transplanting. 
The Malay researchers accompanied the shift in method of crop establishment 
by weed studies and development of integrated weed management. No reference 
was seen to Thai research projects for weed control in rice. It is likely that the weed 
problem was a major cause for low productivity in rice in Thailand (table 
4.4.3. l.b). 
After World War II, the Royal Thai Government (RTG) allowed the opening of 
new land and promoted production of other food crops. The Cold War and the fear 
for an increase of communist insurgencies in the backward provinces in the N, E 
and S of Thailand were a major incentive to extend the road system to the border 
provinces and to begin construction of irrigation dams in the N and NE regions. 
Owing to the massive presence of the United States Forces in NE Thailand, during 
the 1950s in connection with the Vietnam War, agricultural technical aid began to 
arrive. New opportunities were the growing of maize and cassava in the outlying 
provinces for export as feed stock to European markets. Much of the expansion 
was realized by the private sector, which provided the seeds, agro-chemicals and 
credit facilities. Since the export revenues from agricultural commodities con-
tributed substantially to the national economy, the Ministers of Finance and of 
Trade and Commerce had more power in directing agriculture than the Minister for 
Agriculture. 
The fact that Thailand never experienced nation-wide shortage of food nor a 
structural lack of food security might have delayed agricultural development. 
National revenues from commodity trade (rice and rubber) received more attention 
than the need to increase productivity. The policy concerning export taxes and 
floor prices for rice discouraged Thai rice farmers to spend more on inputs. For 
example, the RTG imposed high tariff rates on agro-chemical imports to protect 
Thai investment in the fledgling fertilizer and pesticide industry (Waibel, 1990b). 
In Thailand, institutional development in agriculture began at least hundred years 
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later than in Indonesia and Malaysia. The RTG founded a Rice Department in the 
1950s only but lacked experienced researchers. Therefore, the RTG invited interna-
tional technical assistance in the 1960s to strengthen research and education. Plant 
production and plant protection are still weak in terms of experts and expertise. 
The gap between the government institutions and the farmer is wide in 
Thailand, largely due to Thai culture and attitudes (Heim, 1990). The Agricultural 
Extension Service (DOEA) has collaborated with international agencies such as 
the German Ageny for Technical Cooperation (GTZ) to improve extension. Still, it 
is not sufficiently equipped to meet the needs of the 20 million farmers (Laosuwan 
& Macartney, 1992). 
4.6. Conclusions, Thailand 
1. Agricultural development in Siam (since 1949, Thailand) differed essentially 
from that in Indonesia and Thailand. In Thailand development began in indigenous 
agriculture, in the rice sector, as an autonomous process. 
2. Increasing opportunities to export rice induced farmers of the C plain to produce 
a surplus, elsewhere farming for self-sufficiency persisted. 
3. Rice production for export became possibly because, in the 19th century, Siam's 
C Plain offered the right conditions and the government provided the adequate 
incentives. The King dissolved traditions of labour bondage and servitude and thus 
freed labour for agricultural development. 
4. Export rice production was valued for its contribution to the national economy, 
but no attention was given to improving productivity. 
5. Foreign investment in Thai agriculture was delayed till after World War II owing 
to restrictive terms for land lease and high export taxes. The cultivation of coffee, 
rubber and oil palm remained restricted to smallholders in S Thailand. Thus, there 
was little need for research on pests and disease control in estate crops. 
6. Siam was less damaged by the Japanese presence during World War II than 
Indonesia and Thailand. Commodity export from Siam was, however, interrupted 
and no investments were made during the 1940s. 
7. Only the farmers in C Thailand could avail of the higher prices for export rice 
and participate in export production. Farmers in most of the other provinces lived 
in self-sufficient communities. 
8. Thai agriculture contributed substantially to the Gross Domestic Product and 
mainly through export of rice and rubber. As an inportant source for taxes, agri-
culture was dominated by the Ministers of Finance and Commerce. The Minister 
of Agriculture had little influence. 
9. The fear for political instability in backward rural areas after the Second World 
War provided a greater impulse for agricultural development than the low political 
interest for advancement in agriculture. 
10. Adoption of improved rice varieties, fertiliser use and mechanisation remained 
low. The government used the floor prices for rice to regulate export rather than to 
stimulate the development of rice technology. 
11. In the past and the presence, farmers, in general, missed the incentive to spend 
more on inputs to improve rice production 
116 Wageningen Agricultural University Papers 99-1 (1999) 
12. The commercial attitude of Thai Ministers and civil administrators towards 
agriculture gave plenty of opportunity to the private sector to operate on a virtual-
ly free market. 
13. The Thai government joined the FAO ICP-IPC Rice Programme in S and SE 
Asia in 1980 . The RTG established a National IPM Program, but did not official-
ly declare IPM as national policy in rice. There is no evidence of IPM programs in 
the field other than a few IPM demonstrations in rice, cotton, sugarcane and veg-
etables in the 1980s. 
14. The National Biological Control Research Centre acquired a considerable 
expertice in biological control, the rearing of natural enemies and quarantine. 
However, no information was found to what extent biological control is de facto 
applied in field crops and orchards. 
15. Well-executed technical aid projets on rat control and pesticide application 
equipment maintenance from the late 1970s were not continued. 
16. Major obstacles for international development assistance programs to Thailand 
appear to be the difficulty for foreigners to understand the intricacy of Thai cus-
toms and language, and to deal with its bureaucratic system. 
17. The RTG executed a joint Thai-German IPM Programme for Selected Fruits 
(ch 6) which aimed at the improvement of rootstock and reduction of pesticide use. 
The effort looked promising, but no evaluation results were available yet. 
18. The markets for agrochemical inputs, seeds and agricultural machinery were 
managed by the private sector with little regulation and control by the government. 
The fact that the RTG joined FAO's regional IPM initiatives had no visible effect 
on the pesticide market in Thailand (ch 7). 
19. In the 1990s, the RTG appeared to have little interest in agriculture due to a 
general expectation in the society about accelerated development in other economic 
sectors such as industry and services. 
Notes 
1. The soils of the Central Plain and northern valleys have a generally similar illitic clay-mineral 
composition and high humus content (O'Reilly & McDonnald, 1983). 
2. The soils of the North East have low carbon content, are almost deficient in phophorous, exchange-
able potassium, calcium and magnesium, and some are rather kaolinitic. Lack of water retention and 
salinity are general problems (O'Reilly & McDonnald, 1983). 
3. King Mongkut (1851-1868) had lived as a Buddhist monk for 27 years, mastered several foreign lan-
guages and he was well informed. The opening of China after the Nanking Treaty, 1842, and the annex-
ation of Lower Burma by the English army, convinced King Mongkut that also for Thailand the days 
of isolation were over. Thus, in 1855, he entered into negotiations with the English mission under Sir 
John Bowring in a constructive mood (Manarungsan, 1989). 
4. In 1850, the capital Bangkok, by far the largest town at that time, required not more than 39,000 
tonnes of rice per year for its 160,000 inhabitants. Since export of rice amounted to 15,200 tonnes in 
the same year, the marketable surplus of 1850 was less than 60,000 tonnes. Data series on rice produc-
tion during the 19th century are not available and those for the 20th century are ambiguous (Mana-
rungsan, 1989). 
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5. Farmers' lack of material incentives led to the relatively low development of a money economy in 
rural areas. Siam's first bank, the Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation, was established in 
Bangkok in 1888. Bank notes were issued but their circulation remained mostly limited to Bangkok. In 
village markets transactions was chiefly done by barter (Manarungsan, 1989). 
6. Rice production in the Indonesian and Malay Archipelago was limited by low productivity, almost 
exclusive attention for plantation agriculture, and the numerous insurgences against the colonial admi-
nistration. 
7. Average annual exports increased fifteen-fold from 62,370 t/y volume of 1857-1860 to 929,457 t/y 
in 1906-1910 (Manarungsan, 1989). 
8. Nowadays, some of these early canals have become indispensable arteries of drinking water supply 
to the metropolis Bangkok. 
9. Corvee was an ancient obligation of every free man to perform services for the king and the local 
overlords during three months of the year. Since the free Thai was uncertain when he would be called 
for corvee services, the system hindered the expansion of rice production. Free people sold themselves 
into bondage for reasons of financial problems, such as insolvency, or for economic security provided 
in the form of food, shelter, clothing, and protection by their masters. Since slaves were automatically 
exempted from corvee, the lot of the debt slave was not too unpleasant in comparison with that of the 
free man (Manarungsan, 1989). 
10. The Great King Chulalongkorn, reigning as Rama V from 1868-1910, was an enlightened monarch 
who reformed Thai society despite its deeply ingrained and pervasive traditionalism. His many reforms, 
which constituted a 'revolution from the throne' brought the kingdom well into the modern world 
(Stemstein, 1982). 
11. King Chulalongkorn decreed that children born after a certain date could not be enslaved, and that 
debt slaves were to be credited with 4 baht per month until their debts were paid off and they became 
free. 
12. The per caput tax rate replacing corvee duties varied from 1.50 to 6 baht per year depending on the 
status of the individual and the prosperity of the region. 
13. With the abolition of slavery landowners got the chance to rent their abundant, unfilled rice lands 
out to tenants. In Rangsit area, 95 per cent of the farmers were tenants (Manarungsan, 1989). 
14. By 1891, steamships accounted for 90% of all shipping tonnage at Bangkok port already 
(Manarungsan, 1989). 
15. The large imports of relatively cheap Thai rice upset in particular the Chinese rice trade. Between 1893 
and 1930, integration of the Thai and Chinese rice markets in Thailand and China, respectively, became 
so intense that the correlation coefficient between Chinese and Thai rice prices was calculated at 0.86. 
16. The mean annual growth rate of Thailand's population increased from 0.95% around 1850 to 3.0% 
between 1880 and 1900, and peaked at 3.8% between 1960 and 1970 (Stemstein, 1982). 
17. Investment in seed differed as seed rate for broadcast sowing amounted to 21 kg against 7 kg for 
for transplanting. 
18. The Thai government invested in rail construction rather than irrigation in view of a treatening colo-
nial expansion from Indo-China. The ecomonic effect of the railways was limited because the expan-
sion was modest and freight rates prohibitive for bulky commodities (Rijk & Van der Meer, 1984). 
19. According to the Statistical Year Book, the padi yields in the C Plain, particularly in the Chao Phraya 
basin, were relatively stable at about 1.5 t/ha during the period 1921-1950. Average yields in the N and 
NE provinces and on marginal land of the C Plain declined considerably from 1.5 t/ha to 1.1 t/ha 
(Manarungsan, 1989). 
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20. Thai statistics on land use are contradictory because swidden cultivation is not recorded as agricul-
ture and minority groups, e.g. the hill tribes, are not recognized as Thai citizens and, thus, cannot own 
land officially. Further, unstoppable encroachment on public land is an offence and not recorded since 
registration would signal acceptance and legitimation of the actual land occupation (Rijk & van der 
Meer, 1984). 
21. Around 1980, the lowest tenancy rate (<0.1%) was found in the N province of Nan, whereas Thon 
Buri N province, adjacent to Bangkok, showed the highest tenancy rate (23% only). Tenancy points to 
the phenomenon that in a commercial, fertile environment the value of land increases rapidly (O'Reilly 
& McDonald, 1983). 
22. Rijk & Van der Meer (1984) noted that statistics on land use and registration were lagging behind 
actual occupation. Since land use rights were secured for only 50% of total agricultural land, unclear 
rights formed an obstacle for cultivating newly expanded agricultural land and intensification of pro-
duction. 
23. The credit needs of Thai farmers were for at least 50% catered for by private parties, such as mid-
dlemen, money-lenders, and relatives. Farmers had access to cheap institutional short term loans, such 
as from the Agricultural Credit Bank. Many small farmers, however, lack the collateral or shun the cum-
bersome procedures involved (Rijk & van der Meer, 1984). 
24. The low utilization of dry season irrigation facilities was attributed to an unfavourable benefit/cost 
relation, to deficiencies in design, maintenance and government services, and to low pressure on the 
land. The Thai government focussed more on small scale irrigation schemes than on large ones and on 
rehabilitation of older schemes. The return on investment in irrigation was little studied (Rijk & van der 
Meer, 1984). 
25. The massive road construction programme since the early 1960s was principally inspired by polit-
ical rather than by developmental arguments. The Indo-China and Vietnam wars and growing 
Communist insurgency urged the Thai government to undertake extensive road programmes with for-
eign assistance in order to establish more direct control by the armed forces over its outlying rural areas. 
26. Kenaf (Hibiscus sabdariffa L. and H. cannabinus L.) is a fibre crop and a substitute for jute. 
27. Rice exports valued 2 billion US$/y and other commodities, such as rubber, maize, tapioca, prawns 
and sugar earned another 3 B US$/y. Reduction in tapioca trade caused a decline in the value of 
agricultural exports to roughly 4 B US$/y. 
28. In 1960, the U.S. Operation Mission (USOM) provided funds for research on rice insects, but 
Thailand lacked experienced researchers. Therefore, the government asked UNDP/FAO to organize 
training (Wongsiri & Kovitvadhi, 1964). 
29. Between 1974-76, quality testing of pesticides taken from shop shelves showed that 26% out of 753 
samples analysed were sub-standard (James & Reddy, 1977b). 
30. There are over 100 research stations and experimental farms widely distributed over the major agro-
economic regions of the country. 
31. In the intricate fabric of Thai administration, the delicate division of competency between the two 
departments might constitute a major obstacle for program implementation. An importent concept in 
Thai communication is 'kriengchai' which might be translated as indulgence. 
32. Large scale locust and grasshopper outbreaks occurred in 1963, 1969, 1970 and 1973. In the latter 
year, locusts were controlled on 312,650 ha by the Agricultural Aviation Unit, flying 4 Pilatus Porter-
aircraft, at the cost of around 0.5 M US$ (James & Reddy, 1977b; Roffey, 1969). 
33. The outbreak budget features a post for the purchase of biological pesticides such as Bacillus thurin-
giensis, neem and bio-agents produced by the Bio-Control Centre (Jungbluth, 1996). 
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34. The combined proceeds from the premium (a quota rent collected by the Ministry of Commerce) 
and additional tax (imposed by the Ministry of Finance) made up a quarter of total government revenue 
between 1949 and 1955 (Siamwalla & Setboonsarng, 1989). 
35. Thailand emerged as the world premier exporter of rice in 1964-66, 1971-72, 1977, and 1981-86. It 
obtained a 37% share of the global rice market in 1985 (Siamwalla & Setboonsarng, 1989). 
36. Since 1977, all of Thailand governments have consisted of shifting coalitions among the military, 
the technocrats and the elected politicians. The Commerce and Agriculture portfolio became the pre-
serve of elected politicians. This opened the position for ministers with an agricultural training back-
ground, who backed programs to improve producers' prices (Siamwalla & Setboonsarng, 1989). 
37. Economic treshold values were determined for the fungal rice diseases Rice Blast, Sheath Blight, 
Sheath Rot, and the viral diseases Ragged Stunt, Leaf Curl, and Yellow-Orange Leaf (Rumakom et ah, 
1991). 
38. Within DOAE the research on non-chemical control technology was prioritized and the bio-control 
section in its Plant Protection Service Division up-graded to the status of division. Of the Plant 
Protection Service budget for 1995/96, amounting to about 1,6 M $ (40 M Baht), 30% was allocated to 
bio-control development (Jungbluth, 1996). 
39. During the years 1975 to 1979, the average annual production of non-glutinous rice seed was 645 
tonnes (15 t breeder, 362 t foundation and 2671 registered seed). Additionally, about 1101 glutinous rice 
seed and 137 t maize seed were produced by ATD and DOAE (Panayotou, 1985). 
40. In its struggle against communism, the Thai government found an ally with the USA, which were 
engaged in the Vietnam War. Since the US airforce operated from five large military bases in E-san, the 
US government invested largely in road building, irrigation and the economic situation of the region. 
41. In Thailand, a combination of tariff policies on the production and import of fertilizer, intended to 
protect domestic fertilizer industry during its infancy, led to very high fertilizer prices and unfavourable 
rice/fertilizer price ratios (Panayatou, 1985; Waibel, 1990b). 
42. By restrictions on the size of concession (maximum 800 ha) and heavy taxes on production and 
export, the RTG, in fact, discouraged foreign investment in rubber planting (Manarungsan, 1989). 
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Chapter 5 
Development of Integrated Pest Management 
in SE Asia 
5.1. Episodes in the history of plant protection 
The knowledge of and skill in protecting crops against pests and diseases have 
improved greatly over the centuries. The advance in science and technology, 
particularly during the 20th century, changed men's approach to pest and disease 
management. Crop protection has developed into a new branch of science in which 
Zadoks (1991) recognized four distinct periods: a. pre-scientific period before 
1890; b. pathogenistic period from 1890 until 1940; c. chemistic period from 1940 
until 1990; and d. ecologistic period after 1990. 
From ancient times till late 19th century many important discoveries were 
made with regard to plant and animal life and their interrelationships. Chinese lit-
erature of 2,500 years old shows that the Chinese understood and employed the 
process of predation to control orchard pests. The Dutch scientist A. van Leeu-
wenhoek, in 1700, observed and correctly interpreted the behaviour of parasitoid 
insects (van Lenteren, 1993a). Reaumur (1683-1756) proposed the introduction of 
natural enemies for the control of pests, in casu the release of lacewings in green-
houses for the control of aphids (Flint & van den Bosch, 1981). 
In Europe, the period between 1750 and 1880 was regarded as a time of agri-
cultural revolution in which farming left the stage of subsistance enterprise. In the 
second half of the nineteenth century, European countries and some of their colonies 
were stricken by agricultural disasters, such as the Potato Blight in Ireland, grape 
phylloxera in France and Coffee Leaf Rust disease in Sri lanka. These epidemics 
sparked off a chain of research activities in the field of pest control. Biological con-
trol through predators and parasites was put to practice in France and Germany 
since 1840 (Van Lenteren, 1993a). In 1841, Harris published the first American text-
book on the control of insects under the title 'Treatise on some of the insects injuri-
ous to vegetation'. The first (modern) textbook on plant pathology by Kuhn 
appeared in 1858. It listed climatic and soil conditions, insects, parasitic higher 
plants and microorganisms as causes of plant diseases. At that time there were still 
few useful control methods for plant diseases (Flint & van den Bosch, 1981). 
In 1890, Koch stated his 'postulates' which determine the conditions to identi-
fy a certain micro-organism as the causal agent of a particular disease. Zadoks 
(1993a, c) takes this year as the turning point from the pre-scientific to the pathoge-
nistic1 period. In the latter period, great progress in diagnostics brought an under-
standing about infectiousness, transmission by vector insects, and the properties of 
sub-microscopic pathogens. Such understanding offered possibilities to avoid 
contamination and thus led to a wide range of preventive measures in pest control. 
The chemistic period from 1940 till 1990 began with the discovery, in 1939, of 
the insecticidal properties of DDT by the chemist RH. Miiller of the J.R. Geigy 
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Company, Switzerland (BCPC, 1979; 150). During World War II, the Western 
Allied Forces developed pesticides of the chlorinated hydrocarbon group, whereas 
the German side came up with insecticidal compounds, such as parathion and 
schradan, in the organophosphate group (Flint & Van den Bosch, 1981). When 
DDT and other chemicals were released by the War Production Boards, they imme-
diately became commercial successes in agriculture. Chemical companies conti-
nued the synthesis and screening of numerous new compounds on biocidal prop-
erties and invested heavily in marketing. The highly effective organochlorine and 
organophosphate insecticides replaced the old pre-war assortment of anorganic 
materials (such as calcium arsenate, lead arsenate), and botanicals. 
Whilst chemical control technologies acquired a greater prominence, technolo-
gies based on biological control, habitat sanitation and cultural practices were dis-
rupted or abandoned. Moreover, research emphasis in entomology shifted from 
biological studies towards studies of insecticides (Perkins, 1980). The arrival of 
synthetic herbicides contributed to increase labour productivity and farm size. The 
development of systemic fungicides, around 1960, opened a new road to curative 
control of plant diseases as the new chemotheropeutic products offered a possibil-
ity to treat already infected plants from within (Zadoks, 1991, 1993a). 
During the 1950s, evidence emerged on insecticide-induced resurgences of 
pests and the appearance of secondary pests caused by pesticides. Ever more cases 
of pest resistance2 to pesticides, a phenomenon already known since 1946, were 
reported. The common reaction to such nuisances was an increase in pesticide use 
through increased dosage, use of another pesticide, or use of a combination of sev-
eral pesticides. When the application resulted in target pest resurge, the pesticide 
would be applied more and more frequently. The result was more pesticide resist-
ance, more pest resurgence, and more secondary pest outbreaks. The syndrome 
was called 'the pesticide treadmill'. Once caught, the farmer could not get off 
(Flint & Van den Bosch, 1981). A major reason for the failure of insecticides was 
their destructive effect on the natural enemy complex which in an non-contamina-
ted environment often suffices to keep potential pests in check. 
As a reaction, entomologists and ecologists developed new approaches such as 
'supervised', 'harmonious' and 'integrated' control, guided by research on population 
dynamics. They perfected several new control tools which were compatible with the 
Integrated Pest Management concept and minimally disruptive to ecosystems. 
Concomitant with these entomological results, an awareness of the hazards to men 
and environment from pesticide usage sprang up. In 1962, Rachel Carson published 
'Silent Spring', a book that not only documented crop-centered problems with 
chemical pest control, but also exposed the broader implications of their unrestrained 
use for human health and non-target organisms. Rachel Carson's warning had a tre-
mendous impact on the scientific world. It set off a chain of consumer oriented actions3. 
Public scrutiny brought new research in the field of hazard avoidance, such as 
reduction of the number of applications, of dosage and spray volume, improvement 
of formulations and application technology and equipment, development of less 
toxic, more selective pesticides, and usage of insect pathogens, pheromones and 
growth inhibitors. The excessive use of pesticides and fertilizers caused envi-
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ronmental pollution, particularly with respect to drinking water quality (Gezond-
heidsraad, 1992; Vijftigschild et al, 1995). Introduction by various governments 
of policies for pesticide reduction and sustainable agriculture marked a gradual 
transgression to the fourth periode. 
The ecologistic episode was ushered by the Brundtland report 'Our Common 
Future' published in 1987 (WCED, 1987). The Brundtland Commission outlined a 
political route to sustainable food security which was internationally acclaimed. 
Zadoks (1993) placed the beginning of the ecologistic episode in the Netherlands 
in the year 1990, when the Dutch government issued its Multi-Year Crop Pro-
tection Plan (MYCPP) (Anonymous, 1990, 1991). This Plan outlined a pesticide 
reduction policy, as was also being implemented in several other European coun-
tries such as Sweden, Danmark and the United Kingdom (Oudejans, 1993). 
5.2. Development of Integrated Pest Management in SE Asia 
5.2.1. Political choices regarding pest control in SE Asia. In 1985-86, integrated 
pest management was proclaimed the overriding agricultural policy in several 
countries of S and SE Asia. Within a period of fourteen months, the Presidents of 
Indonesia and the Philippines, and the Federal Ministers of Agriculture of India 
and Malaysia officially declared4 Integrated Pest Management (IPM) a priority 
objective for agricultural research and extension in rice. 
The prioritizing of IPM, which in Indonesia was accompanied by a ban on 57 
brands of insecticides for use in rice, had great consequences, not in the least for 
the chemical industry and private investors (ch 7.2). It involved a massive reallo-
cation of manpower, public resources and private investment. A policy change of 
such impact must have been supported by convincing arguments of proven validi-
ty. Moreover, these arguments must have been familiar to the thinking of agricul-
tural experts because response at the executive level was rapid. The motivation for 
installing IPM as a regular policy in SE Asia in the late 1980s is to be found in two 
streams of events, concurring at the international and national levels, which 
brought motives, occasions and parties together at the right time. 
The first stream consisted of developments in the national economy of several 
SE Asian countries in general and their food production sector in particular. These 
developments included the consecutive intensification programs through which the 
governments, in particular Indonesia, invested large amounts of money in irriga-
tion, introduction of Green Revolution technology and strengthening of agricultur-
al services with the objective of attaining self-sufficiency in rice production. 
Agricultural intensification with its emphasis on higher yields through resistant, 
short straw cultivars, chemical imputs and improved water supply greatly exacer-
bated crop pest problems in the tropics. Pest populations could build-up because 
host plant resistance had often been traded for yield potential in breeding pro-
grams, fertilizers made plants more nutritious for pests, and irrigation permitted 
continuity of host plant exposure. Higher pest incidence led to increased dependan-
ce on synthetic pesticides which in turn aggravated problems through destruction 
of natural enemies (Way, 1987). During the 1970s, ever larger and more frequent 
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outbreaks of insect pests in particular of the brown planthopper {Nilaparvata 
lugens, BPH) threatened to jeopardize the very goal of self-sufficiency in rice in 
Indonesia. The alerted governments strengthened agricultural extension, established 
Surveillance and Early Warning Systems and Emergency Control Services, and 
encouraged frequent use of insecticides. 
The second stream pertained to developments at the international level. The 
experience gained in a.o. California, USA, Canada and Europe with Supervised 
and Integrated Pest Control (IPC), had brought an understanding of the relationship 
between higher frequency of pest outbreaks and indiscriminate use of broad-spectrum 
insecticides, and an awareness of inherent environmental hazards. Serious pest out-
breaks in cotton in S America and maize in C America had instigated the establish-
ment of Integrated Pest Management (IPM) programs by national and international 
institutions (Brader, 1987). These involvements were precursors to the FAO Inter-
Country Programme for the Development and Application of Integrated Pest 
Control in Rice in SE Asia (ch 5.7.3). 
Other political developments of great consequence included the 'oil crisis' of 
the early 1980s when, following the release of the OPEC price agreements, Middle 
East producer countries over-supplied the global markets. The resulting oil glut 
drove prices down. Indonesia in particular, its Gross Domestic Product existing for 
some 90% of income from oil and natural gas, was hard hit (World Bank, 1986). 
Facing rapid increases of yield losses in rice due to insect pests and the high 
expenditure on agicultural credit and input subsidies, certain quarters of the 
Indonesian government grew very sceptical about the failing domestic agricultural 
policies (Oka, pers, comm, 1995). In Malaysia, the calamitous civil disturbances of 
1969 resulted in the proclamation by the government of the New Economic Policy 
which was largely focussed on improving the well-being of the Malay section of 
population, the Bumiputra (Mahathir, 1970; Rehman Rashid, 1993). Serious loss-
es in rice yields due to pests went against the government's political need to secure 
a fair income for Malay rice farmers. Finally, in Thailand, rice contributed up to 
60% to the national export earnings in the 1970s. Thus, when pests induced losses 
in rice production soared in the late 1970s and early 1980s, the governments of 
Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand each had a clear reason to accept the proposed 
FAO/UNEPICP-IPC in Rice Programme which appeared to offer a solution to the 
disquieting BPH and Tungro outbreaks. 
5.2.2. The FAO Integrated Pest Control Programmes. Recognizing that pesticide 
misuse can potentially create serious problems in tropical climatic conditions, FAO 
called a meeting of experts in 1959 to review pesticide use practices, the inherent haz-
ards and the need for relevant legislation. The meeting recommended that goverments 
should support research leading to harmonization5 of chemical and biological control, 
and that FAO should intensify its activities concerning registration and control of pes-
ticide usage. Thus, the meeting marked the beginning of the official support given by 
the FAO to the development of IPM (Brader, 1987) and, later, to safe use programs. 
In 1963, the 12th Session of the FAO Conference recommended that FAO should give 
greater emphasis in its crop protection program to integrated control. 
124 Wageningen Agricultural University Papers 99-1 (1999) 
As a first step, FAO organized a Symposium on the subject in Rome, October, 
1965. During this event the term 'Integrated Pest Management' was accepted for 
common use (Waterhouse, cited in Shangi, 1998), and the establishment of an 
Expert Group on Integrated Pest Management was proposed. The Director General 
of FAO installed, in 1966, a Panel of Experts6 on Integrated Pest Control with the 
task of helping to define and effectuate relevant methods of pest management in 
developing countries. During the first ten years, the Panel of Experts focussed on 
the development and evaluation of IPM research, thereafter its function as an advi-
sory body to FAO programs in execution became more prominent. In these early 
years, FAO launched two field programs7, the control of the rhinoceros beetle 
(Oryctes rhinoceros) in coconut in the S Pacific (1964-75), and the control of 
insect pests in cotton (1970), with an extension into maize in 1974 (van Huis, 
1981), in Nicaragua. Encouraged by the results achieved in these field programs, 
but recognizing the need for a more systematic approach, the Panel, in a jointly 
sponsored meeting in 1974, prepared a FAO/UNEP Cooperative Global Program-
me for the Development and Application of Integrated Pest Control in Agriculture 
(FAO/UNEP, 1975). Since the United Nations Environmental Protection Agency 
(UNEP) had already shown interest as a sponsor, the Panel of Experts on IPC 
became a joint FAO/UNEP advisory body in 1979. The Global Programme began 
officially in 1975 with the appointment of a program coordinator by FAO on 
UNEP funds. The aims of the Global Programme included the preparation of Inter-
Country Programmes (ICP) for cotton in E Africa and C America, rice in S and SE 
Asia, and sorghum and millet in Sahelian Africa. 
The proposals for the ICPs were completed early, but the search for funds from 
donors proved to be difficult. D.F. Waterhouse, the initiator of IPM programs for 
rice in Asia, raised the funds for an 'FAO Inter-Country Programme for the Deve-
lopment and Adoption of Integrated Pest Control in Rice in S and SE Asia' with 
the government of Australia (Sanghi, 1998). On Waterhouse's warnings for an 
imminent food crisis in S and SE Asia the Australian Freedom from Hunger 
Campaign provided the initial funding of about US$ 120,000 (Way, pers. comm., 
1997; Sanghi, 1998). In 1978-79, consultations with seven countries resulted in an 
agreement about the project proposal. The FAO Intercountry Programme for IPC 
in Rice became operational in April 1980 (ch 5.7.3). 
At the time when the Panel of Experts on IPM was set up, the term 'Integrated 
Pest Control' had been firmly adopted by entomologists as a rational approach to 
pest control instead of over-reliance, sometimes total reliance, on synthetic pesti-
cides. In a key paper titled 'The integrated control concept' (Stern et al., 1959), a 
group of Californian workers -V.M. Stern, R.F. Smith, R. Van den Bosch, and K.S. 
Hagen- proposed a set of formal definitions, statements of principles and neces-
sary techniques8 (Perkins, 1980). It was the same R.F. Smith who chaired the first 
meeting of the FAO/UNEP Panel of Experts in September, 1967, (Brader, 1987) at 
which the FAO definition of IPM was proposed (ch 5.2.3). Apparently, American 
entomologists had considerable influence on policy development in FAO and on 
the conceptual development of crop protection, and one may wonder about the 
development of IPM in North America during the 1950s. 
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5.2.3. Various definitions of Integrated Pest Management 
A simple representation of the ideas of Stern, Smith and van den Bosch is the fol-
lowing definition (Flint & van den Bosch, 1981): 
In integrated pest management, various combinations of methods are utilized in 
a compatible manner to obtain the best control with the least disruption of the 
environment'. 
According to Perkins (1980), this first formal articulation of the integrated control 
paradigm in 1959 referred to the integration of only two techniques, biological and 
chemical control. The term 'Integrated Pest Management' is synonymous with the 
term integrated control (Stern et al, 1959). At an FAO Symposium on Integrated 
Control in Rome in September 1965, R.F. Smith and H.T. Reynolds offered a more 
inclusive concept which called for the integration of all feasible techniques guided 
by an understanding of the ecology of the agricultural system (Smith & Reynolds, 
1966). This concept was the basis for the formal FAO definition of IPM, issued by 
the FAO/UNEP Panel of Experts in 1968 (FAO, 1968; Brader,1979): 
'A pest management system that, in the context of the associated environment 
and the population dynamics of the pest species, utilizes all suitable techniques 
and methods in as compatible a manner as possible and maintains the pest 
population at levels below those causing economic injury'. 
The President of the United States of America in his 1979 Environmental Message 
stated: 
'IPM uses a system approach to reduce pest damage to tolerable levels through 
a variety of techniques, including natural predators and parasites, genetically 
resistant hosts, environmental modifications and, when necessary and appro-
priate, chemical pesticides. IPM strategies generally rely first upon biological 
defenses against pests before chemically altering the environment'. 
Thus, Integrated Pest Control -the term is synonymous with Integrated Pest 
Management- is a broad ecological approach to pest control using a variety of con-
trol technologies. The principle is that whilst synthetic pesticides may be essenti-
al, they should be used to compliment rather than to jeopardise controls based on 
host plant resistance, cultural practices and use of natural enemies. Kenmore et al. 
(1985) summarized the above in a most practical definition of Integrated Pest 
Control: 
'The best mix of available tactics for a given pest problem in comparison with 
the yield, profit and safety of alternative mixes'. 
The agro-chemical manufacturer Novartis (Kaufmann, 1995) gives the following 
definition of IPM: 
'Integrated Pest Management (IPM) is the farmer's best combination of cultur-
al, biological and chemical measures that yield the most cost-effective, envi-
ronmentally sound, and socially acceptable insect, disease and weed mana-
gement for crops in a given situation'. 
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5.3. IPM, made in Canada 
In the 1940s, the earliest IPM program in deciduous fruit tree crops opened the 
road to IPM (Flint & van den Bosch, 1981). The spraying of apple orchards with 
pesticides was common practice across the North American continent since the 
early 1900s because of the high product value. In Nova Scotia orchards, in the 
1920s and 1930s, frequent and heavy dosages of insecticides were required to sup-
press key pest such as codling moth (Laspeyresia pomonelld) and eye-spotted bud 
moth (Spilonota ocellana). Target pest resurgence and secondary pest outbreaks 
aggravated the problem. The latter included outbreaks of the oystershell scale 
(Lepidosaphes ulmi) in the 1930s, and of the European red mite (Panonychus ulmi) 
and the grey banded leafroller {Argyrotaenia mariana) in the early 1940s (Pickett, 
1949). 
The Nova Scotia program was empirically9 developed by Pickett and co-work-
ers, one step at the time. The oystershell scale problem appeared to be caused by 
applications of sulfur-based fungicides which killed the scale's natural enemies. By 
substituting Cu-based (Bordeaux mixture) and ferbam fungicides for the sulfur-
based fungicides, the parasites and predators were sufficiently spared to achieve 
effective biological control of the oystershell scale. The second target was the red 
mite whose predators were eliminated by insecticide sprays against codling moth 
and other key pests. In the early 1950s, introduction of selective botanicals, such 
as ryania, and a need-based application regime allowed predator populations to 
recover which in turn effectively controlled the European red mite population. In 
a simular way, a third secondary pest of the late 1950s, the Lecanine Scale 
{Lecanium coryli) was overcome. Shortcomings in the biological control of the 
apple maggot {Rhagoletis pomonelld) and codling moth were resolved through 
sanitary measures (removal of wild hosts and infested drop-fruit), monitoring of 
population build-up and need-based spraying of selective insecticides. The princi-
ple of the Nova Scotia IPM program in apple orchards was adopted throughout 
North America since the 1950s (Flint & van den Bosch, 1981). 
5.4. IPM, made in the United States of America 
5.4.1. American entomology and its influence abroad. The Department of 
Agriculture of the United States and its Division for Crop Protection always had 
strong influence on the development of agriculture both at home and across the 
borders. In 1892, for instance, the Dutch zoologist J. Ritzema Bos was commis-
sioned to the United States to report on the potential threat of the San Jose Scale to 
the fruit tree sector in the Netherlands. His findings (Ritzema Bos, 1898,1899) led 
to the establishment of a national phytopathological service in the Netherland in 
1899 and to amendments to the Dutch legislation according to the American model 
(box 5.4.1). 
At about the same time in the Netherlands East Indies, M. Treub (box 2.5.3) 
proposed the establishment of a Department of Agriculture, for which the United 
States Department of Agriculture (USDA) served as the model. In the field of pest 
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rise again. Growers then generally applied an insecticide, decimating the recover-
ing predator populations and setting off an ever more rapid resurgence of the aphid. 
Secondary pest outbreaks of insects, such as alfalfa caterpillar, required additional 
sprays which contributed to the development of insecticide resistant strains of the 
spotted alfalfa aphid. To break the vicious cycle three hymenopterous parasites 
were imported of which Praon palitans gave the best aphid control (van den Bosch 
et al, 1959). As a cultural control, the alfalfa was harvested strip-wise whereby the 
remaining strips provided refuge for natural enemies. Another cultural control 
measure, timely irrigation, enhanced virus infection in the aphid population. 
Further, an economic threshold for the spotted alfalfa aphid was established, and a 
sweep-net sampling method for predators standardized. In field tests for selective 
insecticides, which would least disrupt natural enemy activity, demeton (SystoxR) 
was found to control the aphid effectivily when biological control was insufficient 
(Smith & Hagen, 1959). In 1960, an alfalfa cultivar resistant to the spotted alfalfa 
aphid was sown. Research on economic thresholds for all major pests further 
reduced the need for spraying insecticides in alfalfa. Early mowing was effective 
to keep the alfalfa weevil under control without spraying. In the 1970s, use of 
microbial insecticides, e.g. Bacillus thuringiensis and Verticillium lecanii, for the 
control of loopers and the alfalfa caterpillar were included in the program (Flint & 
van den Bosch, 1981). 
5.4.3. Environmental concern and legislation in the USA. In the United States, 
Perkins (1980) distinguished three overlapping phases since 1945, particularly 
marked by changes in entomology. The phases were approximated as: Euphoria 
and Crisis of Residues, 1945-55; Confusion and Crisis of the Environment, 1955-
60; and Changing Paradigms, 1960-present. Euphoria refers to the conviction of 
many agriculturists that insect pest problems were finally overcome by the superi-
or control provided by the synthetic insecticides. Researches and farmers were 
compelled to jump the bandwagon of insecticide promoters least they would loose 
out in their professional carreer or in competation with more progressive farmers. 
When the negative sides of intensive insecticide usage -target pest resurgence, 
emergence of secondary pests, resistence in pests, and residue problems- became 
visible, professionals got confused. The multitude of factors shaping commercial 
agriculture made the situation fairly complex. Ever more capital was invested in 
farm mechanisation and inputs whilst the number of people working in agriculture 
decreased rapidly. The scaling up in farm size and productivity per hectare and per 
person-hour made a return to more labour intensive production impossible. The 
changing agricultural practice and the production stimulating price policies had 
made farmers dependent on pesticides. For example, insecticides with nematicidal 
activity made less profitable crop rotation schedules redundant in potato and corn 
growing and herbicides became indispensible for grain production. 
Right from the beginning in 1945, some ecologists expressed their concern 
about the safety of the new insecticides for environment and human health. The 
first hearings on residues of insecticides were held by he U.S.Food and Drugs 
Administration in 1949. A Committee of the U.S. Congress concluded that the 
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insecticides then in use frequently had insufficient toxicological or pharmacologi-
cal information to establish their safety and that new laws were needed. An amend-
ment to the Food, Drugs and Cosmetics Act was introduced that required pesticide 
manufacturers to test their products for human safety and to obtain a tolerance or 
exemption before marketing them (Perkins, 1980). 
In 1962, Rachel Carson protested against the widespread use of insecticides by 
the publication of 'Silent Spring'. This book made the American Congress and the 
public realize the dangers inherent to an unrestrained release of deadly chemicals 
into the environment. Perkins (1980) called the shift from unrestrained pesticide 
promotion to the search for alternatives the phase of the Changing Paradigms13 
(1968-present). In the early 1970s, both the USDA and the National Science 
Foundation (the latter joined later by the Environmental Protection Agency) 
approached insect pest control in a more holistic way, that is to concentrate on a 
given crop or cropping system in a limited farming area. They sought a thorough 
understanding of the ecosystem, especially in regard to crop growth and pest 
impact, and of cost-benefit relationships of pesticide use. This was in essence put-
ting into practice what Stern and his fellow entomologists had been saying since 
1959 (Huffaker & Messinger, 1964). 
As a consequence of convincing evidence from research and pilot schemes in 
various crops, the President14 and the Congress of the United States urged adop-
tion of IPM in one way or another. The State of California legislature was the first 
to decree by law that IPM must be employed 'wherever feasible' (Smith, 1980). 
Alfalfa and apple belonged to the first crops in which a holistic approach to pest 
management was instigated. The key to IPM programs is to recognize the impor-
tance of assessing population numbers of both pests and natural enemies to predict 
future population trends and to decide if pest control action is actually needed 
(Flint & Van den Bosch, 1981). As farmers are interested mainly in financial loss-
es and the ways to decrease them, economic considerations are crucial in taking 
decisions for or against action (Zadoks, 1986). Way (1987) considers the definition 
and utilisation of economic injury thresholds15 for insect pests, combined with the 
selective use of insecticides, fundamental to integrated control of such pests. The 
results in alfalfa and apple clearly illustrated that heavy reliance on insecticides 
resulted in destruction of natural enemies, rapid target pest resurgence, and inno-
cuous insects becoming secondary pests. Political interest was aroused to the 
extent that the government of the United States of America directed its agencies to 
modify programs to support and adopt IPM startegies whenever practicable 
(Perkins, 1980). This directive sanctioned American efforts to employ IPM pro-
motion as an instrument to further international agricultural development whilst 
obtaining political good-will in developing countries. Consequently, IPM oriented 
projects became important components in the technical aid programs of USDA, 
USAID and the internationally operating Foundations. 
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5.5. IPM, made in the Netherlands 
5.5.1. The Dutch approach to harmonic control. Immediately after World War II, 
which caused much destruction and a major famine in the Netherlands in 1944-45, 
the Dutch government gave priority to reconstruct agriculture. The Department of 
Agriculture, established in 1897 within the Ministry of the Interior (Vermeulen, 
1966), was upgraded to an autonomous ministry in 1947. New technologies, inclu-
ding seeds and pesticides were imported and tried. Chemical control soon eclipsed 
older cultural and biological technologies and per hectare usage of pesticides rose 
faster in the Netherlands than in neighbouring countries. It did not take long before 
resistance in key insect pests16 developed (Briejer, 1949). In 1955, when resistance 
was found to be building up against organophosphate insecticides in European red 
mite {Panonychus ulmi) on fruit trees, a 'Committee de Wilde' was formed17. This 
committee initiated research leading to a more limited use of pesticides. In 1958, the 
committee was transformed into a 'Working group for Harmonic Control of Insect 
Pests18' (Werkgroep voor harmonische bestrijding van plageri) operating under the 
aegis of the Dutch National Council for Agricultural Research (Nationale Raad 
voor Landbouwkundig Onderzoek NRLO/TNO) (de Fluiter, 1969a). The objective 
of the working group was to attain an economically remunerative and sustainable 
control of diseases and pests in agriculture through combining, in a harmonic way, 
ecological (i.e. through biological and cultural measures) and technical (i.e. through 
mechanical, physical and chemical means) control. Chemical control should only 
by applied when the natural resistance factors fail to keep the population of noxious 
organisms below the economic threshold19 level (de Fluiter, 1969a). 
The Dutch scientists D.J. Kuenen and J. de Wilde found that factors, which 
influence the physiological condition of the crop, also exert an effect on the popu-
lation dynamics of the noxious and beneficial organisms living on the crop and vice 
versa (de Wilde, 1969). Therefore, they emphasized preventive measures, which 
included the raising of natural resistance against pests within individual plants as 
well as in the crop and its environment (de Fluiter, 1969b). Kuenen allegedly was 
the first to describe, independent from Stern cum suis, the concept 'economic dam-
age level' (de Wilde, 1969). The threshold concept was applied in the Dutch East 
Indies in the 1920s already. S. Leefmans, Chief Entomologist of Department of 
Agriculture at Bogor, argued that chemical control of insects should be based on 
population counts and related to expected damage, an approach later known as 
'supervised control' (Leefmans, 1928). Leefmans put his ideas into practice by 
organizing an effective coconut leaf moth (Artona catoxantha) monitoring and 
control service on Java and Sumatera, which employed biological, chemical and 
sanitary measures (ch 5.6.6). 
Around 1960, the Dutch Working Group for Integrated Pest Control began an 
orchard pests program, modelled after the Nova Scotia example set by Pickett cum 
suis (1958). However, Pickett's scheme and the pesticides used (such as Bordeaux 
mixture and ryania) did not suit the conditions in the Netherlands. The problem 
was addressed through basic research of its individual components, i.e. the entire 
orchard environment, the population dynamics of injurious and beneficial organ-
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isms, their sensivity to prevalent pesticides, and the tolerance of apple cultivars. 
Only after effective measures were elaborated, in laboratory and orchard experi-
ments, an intensive control schedule was composed for release to professional 
growers through the extension service (Gruys, 1980). The schedule included con-
trol of key pests, such as spider mite, apple aphid, codling moth, and wintermoth. 
It took about three years to re-establish balanced natural fauna in a formerly inten-
sively sprayed orchard. At the time, the use of insecticides and fungicides on fruit 
trees had increased to 25-30 sprays per season. Hence, the transition from routine 
spraying to integrated control needed to be pursued through a gradual substitution 
of broad spectrum insecticides by selective ingredients (de Fluiter, 1969b, Gruys, 
1980). IPM for orchard pests was rapidly adopted as the result of a special, govern-
ment funded, extension drive. The number of Dutch apple growers applying super-
vised control increased from 8 in 1973 to 700 in 1978 on a total of 4,000 holdings. 
Control of fungal diseases such as apple mildew (Podosphaera leucotricha) and 
apple scab (Venturia inaequalis) remained a problem for a long time (Zadoks, pers. 
coram, 1998). 
5.5.2. IPM in protected crops. In the Netherlands, the development of biological 
control has been has been unexpectedly rapid in greenhouse crops. Greenhouses 
are relatively isolated units in which high-quality products are grown in large 
quantity on a small area. Glasshouse crops require well-trained, intelligent growers 
who cannot afford to risk any damage. Because consumers demand unblemished 
and residue-free fruits, vegetables and flowers, growers use pesticides only if the 
result of biological control is not assured (van Lenteren, 1993b). In relation to the 
very high capital investment, the cost of pest control is minimal, in tomatoes less 
than 2% of overall cost of production (Oskam et ai, 1992). 
The number of pests in isolated greenhouses is limited but they reproduce rap-
idly due to climate optimization and virtually year-round cultivation of crops. 
Some field pests, such as spider mites, have acclimatized to the glasshouse 
environment to the extent that they no longer respond to diapause-inducing factors 
(van Lenteren, 1995). Preventive control measures in protected crops include 
cleansing of greenhouses before new crops come in, standard use of pest-free 
growing media instead of soil, monoculture, and use of resistant cultivars. 
Advantages are that isolation prevents massive immigration of pest organisms and 
that pest management programs can be tailored to each separate greenhouse unit, 
thus providing optimum protection for the crop and introduced natural enemies. In 
wanner climates, greenhouses are often temporary structures made of wooden 
frames and plastic, which can hardly be kept clean and climatized. There, pests and 
pathogens can easily penetrate from surrounding fields all the time. 
Biological control of insects in greenhouses was already practiced in the United 
Kingdom since 1926, when an English research station reared 1.5 million pupae of 
a parasite {Encarsia formosa) per year to control of the greenhouse whitefly (Tri-
aleurodes vaporariorwri) in nurseries and for export to Commonwealth and 
European countries (van Lenteren, 1995). In the Netherlands, in 1950, resistance 
against parathion was demonstrated in the two-spotted spider mite (Tetranychus 
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urticae) on glasshouse crops. In 1959, a predatory mite (Phytoseiulus persimilis) 
was imported from S Africa which controlled spider mites so well that it was taken 
into commercial production. Since 1968, P. persimilis is reared commercially for 
spider mite (T. urticae) control in greenhouse crops. In the early 1970s, outbreaks 
of the tobacco whitefly (Bemisia tabaci) created serious damage throughout 
Europa. The parasite E. formosa appeared to be also effective against B. tabaci. 
Hence, production of E. formosa was resumed without delay and biological con-
trol in greenhouses had come to stay. In the 1990s, biological control of the two 
key pests in greenhouses, whitefly {J. vaporariorum) and spider mite (T. urticae) 
was adopted by about 25 countries (van Lenteren, 1993a, 1995). 
The successful implementation of IPM in the Dutch greenhouse industry was 
the result of collaborative public and private research. Private firms produced vi-
rus and fungus resistant cultivars and some 30 natural enemies of 18 pests in com-
mercial vegetables crops (Malais & Ravensberg, 1992). For instance, plant breed-
ers developed partial resistance in tomato and cucumber against whitefly and 
spidermite (de Ponti & Mollema, 1992; van Lenteren 1995). To-date, more than 35 
commercial companies, mostly located in W Europe, mass-produce and dis-
tribute20 world-wide biological agents, such as predators, parasitoids and microbial 
pesticides. In general, registration of predatory or parasitic insects, mites and nema-
todes, is not required. Microbial pesticides based on entomopathogenic micro-orga-
nisms, such as bacteria, fungi, viruses and protozoa, need to be registered through 
identical procedures as those used for chemical pesticides. The relatively high cost 
of registration impeded the development of biological pesticides in most European 
countries (Ravensberg, 1994). Since biological control sometimes needs to be backed 
up by use of compatible pesticides, a Working group 'Pesticides and Beneficial Ar-
thropods' of the IOBC/WPRS, continued testing of selective pesticides and of 
selective application techniques. A sophisticated development was the use of insec-
ticide-resistant strains or natural enemies, in casu the release of an organop-
hosphorous-resistant strain of P. persimilis. Integrated control of diseases in green-
house crops, such as tomatoes, cucumbers and flowers, became a priority since 
1990. By lack of biological control agents of pathogens, fungicides are still the 
major option, although problems of resistance are increasing. 
In glasshouse crops as in orchards, IPM posed the problem, how to combine two 
or more control technologies into programs in which each individual method rein-
forces the effectiveness of the others and thus create a level of suppression greater 
than that provided by a single technique. An essential question to be answered in the 
intensive, high investment greenhouse industry is: Can a complete IPM program be 
developed in which chemical pesticides do not interfere negatively with non-chemi-
cal means of control? Only if the answer to this question is positive, the organisation 
of such IPM program can be undertaken (van Lenteren, 1995). A decisive element in 
the adoption of IPM by the greenhouse industry has been the intensive support by 
regional research and extension instititutions during the first years. The voluntary 
IPM study groups of growers played a vital role in directing research to the many 
problems in practice. 
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5.5.3. Phytopathology, epidemiology and Farming Systems Research. 
Phytopathologists seemed less prominently involved in developing the principles 
of IPM than entomologists (Box 5.5.3). In the Netherlands, a computerized adviso-
ry system, called EPIPRE (EPIdemology, PREdiction and PREvention) was intro-
duced in 1977 for the supervised control of certain diseases and pests in winter 
wheat2' (Blokker, 1982; Zadoks, 1989). EPIPRE was developed by phytopa-
thologists of the Wageningen Agricultural University as a forecasting and inter-
vention model to optimize treatment frequency. Farmers participating in EPIPRE 
were trained to recognise and monitor the injurious organisms in the wheat fields. 
Calculations22 on the basis of disease progress models were made for each field 
separately with the aid of a computer. The EPIPRE system predicted when the 
action threshold would be reached. 
The use of various thresholds was described by Stern et al. (1959) and applied 
as an instrument of disease management by Zadoks (1986, 1989). Zadoks and 
Schein (1979) suggested to employ the economic-injury level as a funtion of time 
to be represented on a sliding scale, which must be determined emperically23. 
In the 1970s, some researchers realized that IPM and crop protection in gener-
al appeared to be marginalized to rationalization of pesticide inputs in the preva-
lent cropping systems. Other causes, such as insufficient crop rotation, susceptible 
cultivars and high nitrogen applications were also responsible for losses. The 
obsession with maximum production goals with the help of technologies overly 
dependent on agro-chemicals was perceived as a major cause for the complex 
problems in agriculture. In a reaction, the International Organisation for Biological 
Control introduced, in 1979, the concept of Integrated Farming Systems (IFS) for 
Arable Agriculture, which includes crop protection. The crux of the farming sys-
tems approach is the substitution of expensive and potentially polluting inputs, par-
ticularly fertilizers and pesticides, by agricultural and ecological knowledge, 
labour and non-chemical cultivation techniques (Teng & Savary, 1992). The flora 
and fauna in and around the field are conserved and encouraged in order to stabilise 
the agro-ecosystem as a major preventive measure against outbreaks of pests, dis-
eases and weeds (Vereyken, 1989). The two oldest projects are the Lautenbach-
farm near Stuttgart, Germany, and the experimental farm at Nagele, the Ne-
therlands. In IFS trials at three locations in 1986-90, a reduction was achieved of 
50-65% per ha and year in the use of active ingredient, excluding nematicides, and 
of 85-90% per ha and year, including nematicides, in comparison to the convential 
reference system (Wijnands et al, 1993). Herbicide spraying could be largely 
reduced through mechanical control and band-spraying. Fungicide use was redu-
ced through resistant cultivars and supervised control. Insecticide use could almost 
be avoided through control thresholds, low dose technique and band spraying. In 
all IFS systems the convential use of huge amounts of soil fumigants against pota-
to cyst nematodes (Globodora rostochensis and G. pallida) is substituted through 
a combination of resistant cultivars and detailed soil monitoring (Been & 
Schomaker, 1998). The financial results showed that in the integrated farming sys-
tems the average gross margin equalled that of the convential systems (Wijnands 
etal, 1993). 
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Box 5.5.3 
Phytopathology and IPM development 
Traditionally, phytopathologists perceived pest management more in terms 
of plant health, whereas entomologists thought in terms of reduction of pest 
numbers and populations. It was often difficult to determine the cause of an 
injury, particularly when the pathogen was little known, such as viruses, or 
if abiotic factors were involved, such as nutrient-deficiency, toxic elements 
or water stress. Phytopathologists were obliged to consider all biotic agents 
and abiotic factors in the plant's environment for clues and learned that way 
to think in terms of systems approach earlier than entomologists. 
When entomologists already had effective synthetic insecticides to kill 
insects and mites, phytopathologists still had few means for curing disea-
sed plants. They had to rely on preventive measures, such as protective cop-
per-based sprays (Bordeaux mixture), to prevent fungi from entering the 
plant. Curing plants from diseases caused by fungi inside the plant became 
possible only when systemic fungicides became available which kill fungi 
growing inside the plant. Prevention required a thorough knowledge of 
sources of inoculum and of pathogen transmission. Prevention, moreover, 
included measures aimed at increasing the resistance of the plants against 
abiotic or biotic injurious factors. Breeding for resistance and techniques 
such as grafting, frame pruning, balanced plant nutrition, weeding, flood-
ing and drying off, and shading were routinely advocated by phytopatholo-
gists long before entomologists elaborated the concept of Integrated Pest 
Management. Finally, the repercussions of indelicate pesticide usage 
showed up first and most prominently in the form of insect pest resurgence, 
and secondary insect pest emergence. 
Where in the course of the 20th century, the entomologists deviated 
more from the systems approach than phytopathologists they had to be 
more vociferous to return to that approach by way of IPM, against the inter-
ests of a naiscant pesticide industry (Zadoks, 1991). In contrast to the 
entomologists, plant pathologists had few natural enemies available to 
satisfactorily control diseases. 
Since about 1970, the phytopathologists in the USA opted for 'plant 
health' rather than for 'IPM' (Cook & Veseth, 1991), thus phrasing a dif-
ference of means rather than a difference in objectives. 
IPM programs in greenhouse crops and orchards are commonly adopted in the 
Netherlands and other W European countries. These programs could succeed 
because their use was promoted only when a complete IPM program had been 
developed covering all aspects of pest and disease control for a crop. The total cost 
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of the crop protection in the IPM program were not higher than in the chemical 
control program. Non-chemical control agents (natural enemies and resistant cul-
tivars were easily available, and as reliable and as constant in quality as chemical 
pesticides (van Lenteren, 1993b). 
The Netherlands gave considerable financial and technical support to interna-
tional IPM programs. The fact that the Netherlands' contribution to FAO was less 
institutional and more program-oriented, provided a certain leverage on program 
execution in fields in which the Netherlands held a comparative advantage. This 
included ample expertise in tropical and temperate agriculture and and progressive 
schools in relevant disciplines of crop protection. Prominent scientists such as J. 
Dekker (phytopathology), J.C. Zadoks (epidemiology) and J.C. van Lenteren 
(entomology), and their co-workers, succeeded in translating the high political 
commitment in the Dutch society into effective crop and pest management projects 
in developing countries. 
5.6. IPM in estate crops, made in Indonesia and Malaysia 
5.6.1. The treasure box of colonial agriculture. Research literature and annual 
reports of the Directorates of Agriculture of the Dutch East Indies and Malaya con-
tain many data concerning the control of pests, diseases and weeds at a time that 
no synthetic pesticides were yet available. Selection for resistence and yield, soil 
cultivation, weeding, handpicking of insects, removal of diseased plants and use of 
sulphur fumes were practized since early times. By combining preventive and 
curative measures in the regulatory sphere and in the field and by a continuous 
search for more resistant varieties threats to specific cultures could often be over-
come. 
A number of control methods, which were successfully applied, went out of 
sight. Some are rediscovered or evaluated for use in a different field. For example, 
isolations of the fungus Metarrhizium anisopliae were cultured in the 
Phytopathological Institute of the Plantentuin, Bogor, and applied in the Dutch 
East Indies against larvae of the cassava borer in the 1910s (Rutgers, 1916) and lar-
vae of the rhinoceros beetle (Oryctes rhinoceros) in coconut palms during the 
1920s (Franssen & Mo, 1952). Today, in the 1990s, an international program stud-
ies the formulation and application of M. anisopliae against grasshoppers with 
funds of the European Commission. 
Examples are given below of research on and practical application of non-
chemical ways of pest and disease control in plantation and smallholder crops dur-
ing colonial days. The examples pertain to three estate crops (sugar, cacao, and 
tobacco) and two smallholder crops (coconut and coffee). Each section begins with 
a note on the major pest problems and relevant research capacity for the specific 
crop. Table 5.6.1 gives an modern overview of the means of control applicable in 
IPM. It is remarkable to note, how many of the elements listed were already 
applied in colonial agriculture. The sections conclude with some information on 
recent IPM applications in that particular crop. 
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Table 5.6.1. Listing of elements of integrated pest management. Most of the elements 
were practised in estate agriculture in SE Asia before or after World War II. Author's 
list after Zadoks (1993b) and van Lenteren (1993b). 
1. Prevention 
1.1. Regulatory program 
1.1.1 Quarantine (prevent introduction of new pest, containment) 
1.1.2 Inspection, certification, fumigation 
1.2 Selection and breeding program (plant resistance) 
1.3. Grafting program (resistance, vigour, productivity) 
1.4. Pest-free propagation material 
1.4.1. Healthy and clean seed (basic seed, farmer seed) 
1.4.2. Healthy propagation material (tissue culture, disinfection 
1.5. Pest-free soil or culture medium 
1.5.1. Soil sterilization (steam, fumigation, solarization) 
1.5.2 Crop rotation, green manure, cover crop 
1.5.3 Prevention (disinfection of equipment, seclusion) 
1.6. Sanitation 
1.6.1. Removal of crop debris (sources of infestation and infection) 
1.6.2. Removal of unwanted vegetation (alternate host plants) 
1.7. Environmental protection 
1.7.1 Shade, wind breaks, mulch, controlled humidity 
1.7.2 Protected cultivation (netting, seclusion, avoidance) 
1.7.3. Establishment and protection of natural enemies 
1.8. Cultural measures before planting 
1.8.1. Soil tillage (no-till, low-till, normal tillage) 
1.8.2. Crop species level (monoculture, mixed cropping) 
1.8.3. Crop cultivar level (resistance, cultivar mixtures) 
1.8.4. Seed and plant material (seed treatment and pelleting) 
1.8.5. Planting dates 
1.8.6. Spatial arrangement (plant spacing, seed rate) 
1.9. Cultural measures after planting (crop care) 
1.9.1. Fertilization, manuring, minor elements 
1.9.2. Water management (irrigation, drainage) 
1.9.3. Tillage (soil breaking, harrowing, hoeing, ridging) 
5.6.2. Sugarcane 
5.6.2.1. Major problems and research. Around 1880, the emerging private sugar 
industry in Indonesia was hit by the devastating sereh disease at a time it was 
already in a state of crisis due to competition from European beet sugar. The plan-
ters' associations decided to search for scientific advice for the control of sereh and 
improvement of the sugar manufacturing process. They founded three regional 
138 Wageningen Agricultural University Papers 99-1 (1999) 
Continuation of table 5.6.1. Listing of elements of integrated pest management 
2. Intervention 
2.1. Control of diseases 
2.1.1. Diagnosis 
2.1.2. Surveillance, monitoring 
2.1.3. Sanitary measures (removal of diseased plants or plant parts) 
2.1.4. Biological control (antagonistic organisms) 
2.1.5. Incidental chemical control (method, means, frequency) 
2.1.6. Supervised chemical control (threshold, combination) 
2.2. Control of non-vertebrate pests (insects, mites, snails, nematodes) 
2.2.1. Identification, study of life cycle and physiology 
2.2.2. Surveillance, monitoring (pests, natural enemies) 
2.2.3. Cultural control (trap crops, repellant crops) 
2.2.4. Mechanical control (hand picking, roguing, light trap, 
excision, burning, flooding, drainage) 
2.2.5. Incidental chemical control (methods, means, frequency) 
2.2.6. Calender chemical control (methods, means, frequency) 
2.2.7. Supervised chemical control (threshold, combination) 
2.2.8. Semiochemical control (pheromones, growth regulators) 
2.2.9. Biological control (antagonistic organisms/viruses) 
2.3. Control of weeds and volunteer plants 
2.3.1. Cultural measures (inundation, mulching, planting time, cover crop) 
2.3.2. Mechanical measures (soil tillage, weeding, flaming) 
2.3.3. Biological measures (herbivores, antagonists) 
2.4. Control of vertebrates (rodents, birds, wildlife) 
2.4.1. Rodents (mechanical; catching, hunting, sanitary measures) 
2.4.2. Rodents (chemical: baiting, fumigation) 
2.4.3. Birds (poisoning, chasing) 
experiment stations, i.e. Station W Java near Tegal in 1885, Station C Java at 
Semarang in 1886 and Station E Java at Pasuruan in 1887. Soon regional congres-
ses were organized with the sereh disease as major topic. The Sugar Research 
Station C Java was closed after several years. In 1907, the remaining stations W 
Java and E Java merged into the 'Association of Research Stations for the Java 
Sugar Industry' (Vereeniging het Proefstation voor de Java-Suikerindustrie). The 
station at Pasuruan, E Java, housed the cultivation department and the station at 
Pekalongan, W Java, the chemical-technical department. Subdivisions of the culti-
vation department were established at Jokyakarta, Ceribon and Banjumas to work 
on location specific problems. A General Syndicate of Sugar Manufacturers (Alge-
meen Syndicaat van Suikerfabrikanten in Nederlandsch-Indie) was founded to 
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represent the interests of the industry. The Syndicate collected the cess funds24 for 
research to which member companies contributed pro rata of area planted. 
During World War II, the Pasuruan Institute, which had become the centre of 
the Java sugar research, was taken over by the Japanese. In 1943, Dutch scientists 
were interned, Indonesian staff was dismissed, scientific equipment and records 
were confiscated and breeding material got lost. In July 1948, the laboratories and 
library of the Pasuruan Institute were destroyed by fire during the political strug-
gle for Independence. In 1957, the former Dutch private 'Research Institute for the 
Java Sugar Industry' at Pasuruan was nationalized. It was renamed the 'Indonesian 
Sugar Research Institute' (Balai Penelithian (Penyelidikan) Perusahaan Gula, 
BP3G). From that year the Department of Agriculture (DoA), and after 1970 in 
particular the Agency for Agricultural Reserach and Development (AARD), beca-
me responsible for sugarcane cultivation and pest management research (Pawirose-
madi & Wirioatmodjo, 1986). 
5.6.2.2. Selected pests and diseases 
a. Sereh. Around 1882, a new disease, called sereh25, was detected in factory fields 
near Ceribon. By 1896, the disease had spread to Bali, Kalimantan, the Straits 
Settlements of Malaysia and probably to Queensland, Australia (Went, 1898). As 
the disease caused great crop losses, the sugarcane planters soon financed research 
on the causal agent26 of sereh. F. Soltwedel27 contributed greatly to solving the 
sereh problem. Soltwedel presumed that nematodes caused sereh, and therefore 
recommended planting bibit2* gardens on uninfested soils, which he found in 
mountainous areas (Went, 1898). Mountain bibit, cut from 8 months old cane, 
could be multiplied once in the lowland to provide sufficiently healthy bibit for 
planting the factory fields. Planting second generation lowland bibit resulted in 
seriously infected fields and third generation bibit in crop failure. As even moun-
tain gardens could not be kept disease free, special mother gardens were laid out 
in isolated places (Went, 1898). Growing mountain bibit became a profitable 
undertaking29 which factories left to specialist entrepreneurs. Because the Priangan 
Regency was particularly suited for growing mountain bibit, the government 
declared the area off-limits for planting factory cane (Koningsberger, 1948). 
In the early 1890s, some planters and researchers decreased sereh incidence in 
their fields considerably through perpetually selecting top parts of symptom-free 
cane for bibit. F. Went (1898), Director of Station W Java, held the opinion that 
such selection for resistance, if consequently maintained, would ultimately make 
mountain bibit superfluous. The idea appeared to be realistic in the unique situa-
tion of the highly disciplined private Java sugar industry applying a legally impo-
sed annual crop rotation schedule. However, elimination of the infectious sereh in 
this way would require ample funds for temporary purchases of mountain bibit and 
rigid selection of healthy cane sets. It could never work with smallholders' and ra-
toon-cropped sugarcane. 
Soltwedel recommended crossing with resistant sugarcane types as the most 
effective way to solve the sereh problem. After overcoming problems of sugarcane 
fertility30, Soltwedel initiated a breeding program with sugarcane types that diffe-
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red greatly in susceptibility to sereh. Wild sugarcane types, such as Glagah, and the 
variety Kassoer (see below) were not susceptible and some imported varieties 
'Canne morte' or 'red Fidji' and 'Manila cane' remained free of infection (Went, 
1898). The most commonly grown variety Black Cirebon was so sensitive to sereh 
that it was used for standard symptom description. To improve the chances for 
obtaining resistance, many sugarcane accessions were imported from the Outer 
Islands and from abroad. Soltwedel recognized the risk of introducing alien dis-
eases and pests and established, around 1890, a quarantine station for imported 
cane on the Karimun-Djawa islands, 190 km N of Semarang (Koningsberger, 
1948). In later years, sugarcane quarantine gardens were also laid out on Banka 
(Sumatera) and, in 1928, on the South slope of the Smeru volcano at 1,200 m ele-
vation, E Java. 
The Pasuruan Station31 became the centre for cultivar improvement through 
breeding and selection, known as 'nobilisation' (Koningsberger 1948). Several 
successful planter-breeders selected for higher sugar content only because, by 
using mountain bibit, they could manage the sereh problem. Breeders at the 
Research Station insisted on resistance against sereh, but made little progress32. 
Sugarcane varieties imported from India33 brought the desired sereh resistence, but 
hybridization with Java varieties did not yield commercially interesting progenies. 
Finally, hybridization of a botanical bastard variety Kassoer34, found in the wild on 
Java, 1880, with the cultivar 100 POJ brought the break-through and led to the 
development of the sereh resistant high-yielding 2878 POJ and 2883 POJ cultivars 
(Koningsberger, 1948). Within 5 years 2878 POJ had replaced practically all older 
cultivars. The development of resistant hybrid varieties, around 1930, ended the 
mountain bibit industry and saved the sugar industry millions of guilders per year. 
b. Top Rot. Large scale acceptance of the new hybrid POJ-cultivars brought anoth-
er disease, Top Rot or pokkah bung35, to the fore. Top Rot, caused by the fungus 
Fusarium moniliforme, was a disease of little importance until the 1930s. How-
ever, the popular sereh resistant cultivar 2878 POJ appeared to be very susceptible 
to Top Rot. In autumn 1934, high percentages of Top Rot infestation were report-
ed from E Cirebon, C Java (Mededeelingen IPZ 87). In the 1950s, Top Rot of sug-
arcane appeared still to be a prevalent disease, because the Pasuaruan Sugar Insti-
tute placed it on the priority list for research (AARD, 1986). 
c. Pineapple Disease. The general practice of vegetatively propagating sugarcane 
through cane sets {bibit) made the crop vulnerable to soil-borne fungal diseases. 
For example, the soil-borne Black Rot or Pineapple Disease often caused serious 
losses in the field. Went (1898) described the fungus Thielaviopsis aethaceticus as 
the causal agent. To protect bibit against Black Rot, the set ends were dipped in tar 
diluted with arak or in a copper sulphate solution (Went, 1898). In later years, solu-
tions containing (highly toxic) mercury compounds, and after 1970, benomyl or 
other fungicides were used for disinfection of bibit. 
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d. Yellow Stripe Disease. Virus diseases, such as Yellow Stripe, could inflict great 
damage to non-tolerant varieties. Yellow Stripe Disease, caused by a Sugarcane 
Mosaic Virus, was first described by Van Musschenbroek36 in 1892 (Went, 1898), 
but its causal agent could not be detected at that time. Wilbrink proved that Yellow 
Stripe was transmitted by the aphid Aphis maidis from maize, a common rotation 
crop of sugarcane, at the end of the dry season (Koningsberger, 1948). As a preven-
tion young bibit gardens were inspected one month after the onset of the rains and 
infected plants destroyed. Various predatory insects, such as a ladybird beetle 
(Chilomenes sexmaculata), were identified as effective and ubiquitous enemies of 
the vector aphids and white fly {Bemisia tabaci). After 1950, selection work was 
continued at Pasuruan for resistance against Yellow Stripe Disease of which seven 
strains were identified. The research program also included Ratoon Stunting Disea-
se, a virus disease first reported by Steindl in Australia in 1950, that had spread to 
Java. It was found that Ratoon Stunting Disease can be controlled by hot water 
treatment of bibit at 50°C for 2 hours. 
e. White top borer. The white top borer (Tryporyza nivella) was the most de-
structive insect pest of sugarcane and wild Saccharum. It was observed in Java in 
1890 and described by J.C. Koningsberger in 1898. Because of its economic 
importance, the borer was the main research target of the entomologists Hazelhof 
and Hart of the Pasuruan Institute, 1927-39. Borer infestation appeared to be corre-
lated with amount of rainfall and tissue hardness of the cane top (pupus), the latter 
a factor hindering penetration by young larvae. The sereh resistent varieties 2878 
POJ and 2883 POJ, with softer tissue, were heavily infested. During monsoon, 
white top borer, in W and M Java, infested more than 20% of the tillers of these 
varieties (Kalshoven, 1951). Koningsberger (1948) estimated the average loss of 
sugar due to this pest at 5-7%. 
A mechanical method of controlling white top borer, introduced by estate man-
ager J. Poll in 1925, existed of carefully cutting out (excision) the borer infested 
tissues by specially trained labourers at frequent intervals37. Poll's method of sur-
veillance and control decreased infestation of cane stems by 50% and increased 
sugar production by 1-3 t/ha (Kalshoven, 1951). Burning or inundation of cane 
stubs, catching moths with lamps, and removal of egg masses, proved less effec-
tive. 
Good results were obtained with biological control of the white top borer 
through egg parasites among which the parasitic wasps Phanurus beneficiens var. 
elongates and Trichogramma spp. were the most employed. Parasitized borer egg 
masses were laid out in the sugercane fields in specially constructed 'Phanurus 
boxes' in which the borer larvae remained trapped while the emerging parasitic 
wasps could disperse (Koningsberger, 1948). The Sugar Research Station and the 
estates kept statistical records on parasitation of sugarcane white top borer38. 
/ Stemborer. The striped stem borer (Diatraea venosata) and the shiny stem borer 
(Chilotraea auricilid) were the most harmful sugarcane stemborers. The striped 
stem borer occurred over entire Java and caused on average 5-7% loss of sugar 
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(Koningsberger, 1948). As the striped stem borer was also parasitized by P. benefi-
ciens, 'Phanurus boxes' served two purposes. Chemical control of sugercane stem-
borers was studied by Ruinard (1958) who found the botanicals ryania and derris, 
and the mineral cryolite39 to be effective for that purpose. 
In the 1970s, AARD carried on with research on biological control of the white 
topshoot borer (T. nivella) and the shiny stemborer (C. auricilaea), in particular on 
a parasite Allorghas spp. (AARD, 1986). AARD claimed over 80% control of 
white top borer in trials in which excising borer larvae from cane tops was com-
bined with application of carbofuran granules. Pawirosemadi & Wiriodmojo 
(1986) reported that the AARD program included efficacy studies on pheromone-
traps for borer control and synthesis of the sex-hormone of the shiny stemborer (C. 
auricilia). 
g. White woolly aphid. The white woolly aphid (Ceratovaruna (Oregma) lanige-
ra) was another serious pest of sugar cane. In 1926, a ladybird beetle species, 
Coelophora biplagiata, was imported from Formosa and reared in the Pasuruan 
station and Bogor Phytopathological Institute for release in the sugar estates. 
Outdoors in the cane fields, C. biplagiata larvae controlled the aphids well, but the 
beetle did not establish itself. When release of reared beetles was stopped, C. bipla-
giata was no longer found (Kalshoven, 1951). The most effective enemy of the 
white woolly aphid was the parasitic wasp Encarsia flavoscutellum. Since on Java 
sugarcane was planted as an annual rotation crop, biological control had to be fur-
thered by inundating newly planted fields with woolly aphid colonies, highly par-
asitized by Encarsia larvae, which had been taken from older cane fields. 
Microscopical inspection of seven months old aphid colonies revealed 60-80% 
parasitization by Encarsia (Koningsberger, 1948; Kalshoven, 1951). 
h. Weeds. Where sugarcane was grown in rotation with rice and secondary crops, 
weeds in young plantings could be controlled by handweeding. Frequent ridging 
and cleaning of irrigation gullies helped to suppress weeds. On factory land with 
fallow rotation, cover crops were sown to prevent weed growth and soil erosion. 
Cover crops included Crotalaria anagyroides and Colopogonum mucunoides. 
When fields were neglected, the perennial alang-alang or lalang grass (Imperata 
cylindrical) often became troublesome. Chemical weeding with sodiumtrichloro-
acetate (TCA), 2,4-D or 3% formulation of lalang oil was tested by Duyverman in 
1957, but results are not reported (Oei-Dharma, 1969). When soil tillage was 
mechanized Cyperus rotundus and other sedges, and Ipomoea spp. became major 
weeds because power tillers divided their root system in to small, germinative parts 
which were readily dispersed. 
5.6.3. Tobacco 
5.6.3.1. Major problems and research. In Indonesia, the centres of tobacco pro-
duction were situated in the Principalities (C Java), in Besuki (E Java) and in Deli 
(E coast of Sumatera). The Principalities produced the so-called ' Vorstenlandsche 
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tabak' (Java or 'Principalities' tobacco) and the Sumateran sultanates the 'Deli 
tobacco'. In 1898, several tobacco companies in Java established the first Tobacco 
Experiment Station at Klaten, E Java, under technical supervision of the Planten-
tuin laboratories at Bogor. In 1907, other companies established a second station 
for tobacco which resorted under the Central Experimental Station at Salatiga, C 
Java. In 1912, the two stations merged into the Experiment Station for 'Principali-
ties' Tobacco (Proefstation voor Vorstenlandsche Tabak) at Klaten, E Java. The 
most serious disease of Java tobacco was 'tanas', a wilting disease of seedlings and 
older plants caused by Phytophthoraparasitica var. nicotianae. Sanitary control of 
lanas through removal of all sources of infection and selection for resistance were 
practised (Beets, 1949). Other diseases of Java tobacco included Leaf Spot 
(Cercospora nicotianae) and Tobacco Mosaic Virus. 
On the E coast of Sumatera, pest and disease pressure in tobacco was heavier than 
on Java, because there is no pronounced dry season in Deli and tobacco was grown 
on long, narrow fields situated between large stretches of fallow land which were 
continuous sources of infestation. In the 1890s, the tobacco growers of E Sumatera 
sought the help of the Plantentuin laboratories40 to find a solution to a serious tobac-
co nursery disease. In 1906, the Deli Planters' Association (DPV) founded the Tobac-
co Research Station at Medan. The most important disease of Deli tobacco was Slime 
Disease caused by the soil-borne bacterium Pseudomonas solanacearum. Damage 
from caterpillars -in particular, inflicted by four Noctuid species Heliothis assulta, H. 
obsoleta, Plusia signata and Prodenia litura- to the famous Deli wrapper leaf caused 
losses of 20% to 30% of harvested leaves annually. 
5.6.3.2. Selected pests and diseases 
a. Lanas in Java-tobacco. As other Phytophthora diseases, lanas was very infec-
tious and caused great damage over a wide area. D'Angremond (1920) found that 
lanas was spread by contaminated manure from the villages. When disinfecting 
manure before application -with carbondisulphide or through self-heating on 
heaps- had been generally adopted, this source of infestation was excluded. Thung 
(1938) noted that lanas disease occurred regularly on plantations at higher altitudes 
with much water and inclining soils where contaminated mud was deposited on the 
land. Thung demonstrated that muddy water, carrying fungal spores, was the main 
vehicle to spread lanas. Runn-off of infested water from plots with diseased plants 
or debris, from floors of tobacco barns, and from village gardens with native tobac-
co, infested pathogen-free soils immediately. Strict implementation of sanitary in-
structions issued by the Tobacco Research Station41 helped to greatly reduce lanas 
incidence on the estates. In Java, tobacco was ususally planted after two or three 
crops of rice, depending on water availibility during the east monsoon. Rotation of 
tobacco with sawah rice was effective in suppressing lanas, because the P. nico-
tianae fungus was killed by microbial degradation and temperature changes in 
flooded and dry sawah soils (Thung, 1938). 
At Klaten, d'Angremond (1920) began to cross tabacco varieties for resistance 
against lanas. Several hybrids with improved resistance were obtained, but their 
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quality remained poor. In the 1930s, C. Coolhaas (1936) succeeded in producing 
Timor x Vorstenlanden hybrid tobacco lines of good /awos-resistance and high 
quality. 
b. Slime disease of Deli tobacco. Of the numerous pests and diseases of Deli 
tobacco, slime disease was the most damaging and difficult to control. J. Honing 
showed that it is a soil-borne bacterial disease42, caused by the extremely infec-
tious Pseudomonas solanacearum. Tobacco seedlings could only be taken from 
seed beds in which no single plantlet was infested, least this could increase infes-
tation in transplanted tobacco by more than 30% (Honing, 1910). Sanitation was 
so strictly adhered to that each year about 50,000 seed beds were destroyed. Some 
estates with badly infested soils even had to procure all seedlings from outside. 
Steam sterilisation of seedbeds made the soil disease-free for 3-4 years. By 1940, 
several estates had invested in steam equipment for large scale use on semi-perma-
nent seed bed compounds (van der Laan, 1949). Van der Poel (1933) found that a 
green cover crop, Mimosa invisa, beside enriching the nitrogen content, suppressed 
the bacterial infestation of the soil 
c. Tobacco Mosaic Virus. Mosaic Virus caused considerable damage to estate 
tobacco during the 1920s and early 1930s. Large scale removal of diseased plants 
was the recommended way of control. When it was recognized that contaminated 
hands of labourers working in nurseries and fields and of children picking cater-
pillars were the main reason of the virus epidemic, decontamination was recom-
mended. Thung (1934) found that disinfecting the hands of labourers with a 4% 
cent formaline solution sufficed if it was done carefully before any handling of 
plant material. When, in 1934, the estates adopted Thungs' advise Mosaic Virus 
incidence decreased rapidly. Since the smoking or chewing by labourers of native 
tobacco, which was usually heavily infected, was another major source of contami-
nation, tobacco consumption during work was forbidden. 
d. Tobacco Curl Virus. The control of Curl or Crinkle (Krupuk) Virus disease of 
tobacco was deemed important, because they reduced the growth, weight and qual-
ity of the tobacco product. Symptoms of Curl Virus disease were already described 
by Keuchenius (1915) in Besuki tobacco. Krupuk-disease was transmitted by one 
species of whitefly (probably Bemisia tabaci), mainly from sources around villages 
which were still largely unknown in 1931. Thus, Thung (1934) judged control of 
Curl-Virus diseases impossible at the time. Aphids {e.g. Myzus persicae ssp.), vec-
tor of a less important Pox Virus disease (pokziekte) in nurseries, were controlled by 
brushing a 0.5% nicotine solution onto infested plants. Aphids had to be controlled 
before the infestation could spread over too many nursery beds. Thung (1932) found 
that the practice of brushing was by itself the main route of transmitting Mozaic 
Virus between seedlings. When the estates began to apply nicotine solutions by 
using sprayers instead of brushes, Mosaic Virus ceased to be a problem. 
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e. Thrips. Thrips infestation in the nurseries and plant beds was controlled because 
thrips frequently caused white veins on the upper and lower tobacco leaves, which 
deminished the value of the product. Thrips are the only vector insects of Tobacco 
Mosaic Virus, although of minor importance. A thrips infestation in tobacco was 
sprayed immediately with a derris powder suspension or an emulsion of petroleum 
soap. Fumigation of thrips-infested beds was tried with cyanide and sulphurdioxide 
formulations but equipment was too primitive for large scale applications. 
5.6.4. Cacao 
5.6.4.1. Major problems and research. From its beginning cacao in Indonesia 
and Malaysia had two major insect pests, the cacao mirid (Helopeltis spp.) and the 
cocoa pod borer {Conopomorpha cramerella, CPB). The first record of symptoms 
due to Helopeltis in Indonesia dates from 1841 (Giesberger, 1983). Zehntner 
(1903) and Leefmans (1916) described two species of Helopeltis (Fam. Miridae) 
in Java, H. antonii and H. theivora (tea mosquito bug), the former predominantly 
on cacao and the latter mainly on tea. Helopeltis mirids puncture pods and young 
shoots resulting in severe die-back and reduction of leaf canopy. None of the cacao 
varieties was resistant to Helopeltis although some were more heavily attacked 
than others43. The recent expansion of cacao cultivation throughout Indonesia 
since 1985 -with the largest area planted in Sulawesi- was soon followed by nume-
rous outbreaks of the CPB. In early 1997, the severity of CPB infestation reached 
about 10% in twelve provinces (Mumford, 1997). 
To find solutions to the Helopeltis and CPB problems, the Cacao Planters 
Association founded, in 1901, a private Cacao Research Station44 at Salatiga, C 
Java. By 1905, the Salatiga Station for Coacao was enlarged and renamed 'Gene-
ral Experiment Station (Algemeen Proefstatiori) at Salatiga'. Its mandate was 
extended to include all highland cops (bergcultures). In 1934, after 33 years of 
continuous operation, cacao research was transferred from Salatiga to nearby 
Semarang, C Java, for reasons of convenience. At Semarang, the work was conti-
nued until 1950. In view of the current expansion of the crop, AARD carries out 
research on cacao at the Jember Research Institute for Estate Crops, E Java45. 
5.6.4.2. Selected pests and diseases 
a. Helopeltis. Around 1900, cacao mirids were generally controlled by handpick-
ing throughout the year, especially at the time of low population density. Hand 
picking was done by gangs of women and children who used bamboo sticks with 
cotton wool drenched in resinous exudates. Because hand collecting was labour 
and cost intensive, scorching of the bugs resting on pods with flares was recom-
mended (Zehntner, 1903). Roepke (1916) combined scorching for periods of high 
density and handpicking for low density. Scorching was discarded in the 1920s, but 
handpicking was continued on some smaller estates well into the 1930s. When 
Betrem (1940) established that only one third of the mirid population present in 
cacao plantations was eliminated by hand collecting, this practice came to an end. 
Studies on the biology of Helopeltis spp. and their relationships to over 30 host 
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species and to other insects provided the basis for an effective biological control 
system. More than 50 publications from 1901 till 1995 bear testimony to the conti-
nuous attention paid to the Helopeltis problem (Giesberger, 1983; Lee & Sidhu, 
1984). Predators and parasites of Helopeltis are numerous. The braconid wasp 
Euphorus helopeltidis was given much attention because it was the first parasite of 
Helopeltis detected (Kalshoven, 1951). 
In 1908, two planters had observed that the cacao black ant (Dolichoderus bitu-
berculatus (thoracitus)) protected cacao trees against Helopeltis to a large extent. 
By experimentation planters discovered that white cacao mealybugs (Cateno-
coccus (Pseudococcus) hispidus (lilacinus)) were tended by the cacao black ants 
and that the two species, ant and mealybug, appeared to have a reciprocal rela-
tionship with Helopeltis. In the years 1915-17, W.K. Roepke and P. van der Goot 
(Toxopeus & Wessel, 1983) studied this complex relationship between Helopeltis, 
two ant species and two species of mealybugs. The result was a practical method 
of cacao mirid control based on the antagonistic action of the association of the 
cacao black ant and the white cacao mealybug on Helopeltis feeding. The black 
ants protected the mealybugs which could reproduce undisturbedly. Together, the 
black ants and mealybugs disturb Helopeltis adults to such an extent that their 
feeding and reproduction on cacao are considerably impeded so that almost no 
mirids occur. If the black ant-mealybug populations declined due to an invasion of 
predatory gramang ants (Anoplolepis longipes), the situation could be easily cor-
rected by exterminating the latter46 and re-introducing the black ants and mealy-
bugs whilst the Helopeltis pest was temporarily controlled with botanical insecti-
cides. 
By 1920, artificial black ant nests and pod husks with numerous mealybugs 
were routinely placed on leading estates (Giesberger, 1983). The effectiviness of 
the ant-mealybug association was reconfirmed in the 1930s by Ph. Levert47 (1940) 
and G. Giesberger. The latter stated (1983) that for over forty years the mirids were 
controlled effectively on the large cacao plantation Siloewok Sawangan in C Java 
by introducing mealybugs and black ants when needed and by controlling the gra-
mang ant. During the Japanese occupation 1942-1945 and the early postwar years 
the mealybug-black ant complex was greatly disturbed, but when the cacao plan-
tation came again under Dutch management, the former population balance of 
these insects was restored within 2 years time. But for incidental 'knock-down' 
treatment of gramang ants and Helopeltis in heavily infested fields, no insecticidal 
control was practised. 
Giesberger (1983) wrote that the mealybug-black ant association was no longer 
used in the cacao estates of E Java and N Sumatera to control Helopeltis, and that 
knowledge of this biological control system seemed to be lost. In Malaysia, 
research on the effectiveness of the black cacao ant (D. thoracicus) for suppress-
ing the cacao mirid were resumed around 1988. Artificial nests of the black ant and 
cacao chips with the mealybug (C. hispidus) were introduced in a cacao garden that 
had been sprayed with the pyrethroid deltamethrin to reduce the population of 
antagonistic ants. After 30 months, the black ant had become well established and 
the benefit-cost ratio was positive in comparison to chemical control of the mirid. 
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(Ho & Khoo, 1994; Liew, Khoo & Leong, 1994). Malaysian scientists are also 
investigating the introduction of black ants in cacao plantings in Sulawesi, 
Indonesia. 
Regarding chemical control of cacao mirids, J.G. Bertrem (1940) demonstrated 
on the estates Djati Roenggo and Getas that Helopeltis could be controlled effec-
tively by dusting derris powder (rotenon content 0.7%, talc as carrier). He recom-
mended a threshold of 80 mirids per 100 trees and 4-6 dust applications at fort-
nightly intervals. Giesberger (1983) reported in 1940 that spraying of plots with 2% 
lead-arsenate effectively controlled nypmhal stages of Helopeltis but not the adults. 
b. Cacao pod borer. The cacao pod borer (C. cramerella, CPB) attacks the cacao 
pods on the tree and may cause total loss of yield. Since 1900, the CPB was con-
trolled by stripping the cacao trees of all fruits (a practice called rampasari) once a 
year (usually in November/December) (Wessel-Riemens, 1983). 
Since 1995, an IPM program is implemented for CPB control in smallholding 
cacao in Sulawesi. Since 1996, the Chocolate Manufacturers' Associations of the 
United States and the United Kingdom are funding the establishment of an extension 
network to this effect. Rampasan is still recommended but to-date it includes comple-
te, frequent, regular harvesting throughout the year of the ripe pods (Mumford, 1997). 
At Pesantren, placing polythene bags over the pods (sleeving) as a protection 
against borer attack yielded 82% uninfested cacao pods (Wessel-Riems, 1983). The 
fruits of rambutan, Nephelium lappaceum and of namnam, Cynometra cauliflora, 
were recognized as host plants of the CPB moth. Therefore, the removal of these 
host plants is recommended as a prevention. 
Selection for resistance against CPB appeared possible. The Djati Roenggo 
hybrids48 and Forestero cacao were less attacked by the CPB than Criollo types. 
Control of the CPB on a large scale by insecticides proved to be too costly49 and 
too risky. At the Siloewok Sawangan estate, after 1958, about 1.200 ha of cacao had 
to be uprooted as a result of a disastrous outbreak of the stem and branch boring 
beetle Glenea novemguttata50. Giesberger (1983) suggested that indiscriminate 
spraying of endrin and other insecticides against CPB on this estate since 1957 
could have destroyed the natural enemies of this initially minor pest and, thus, have 
caused the collapse of cacao production. Wardojo (1980) stated that over-use of 
organochlorine insecticides resulted in an excessive damage to cacao trees by the 
red branch borer (Zeuzera coffed) and ultimately in abandonment of several estates 
in C Java. 
In Malaysia, heavy CPB infestations were recorded in Sabah, Serawak and 
Malaka. Throughout the 1950s, the control of CPB in E Malaysia existed mainly 
of frequent sprays with contact insecticides. Since 1961, the provincial DoA of 
Sabah recommended the cessation of spraying contact insecticides on young cacao 
plantings because such sprays disrupted natural control of borers by indigenous 
parasites and predators (Conway & Tay, 1967). DoA's instructions included regu-
lar pruning to give the cacao trees a light open frame, removal of fruits {rampa-
sari), and application of pyrethroids. Since that time, pyrethroids have been unaba-
tedly used by Malaysian cacao growers against the CPB. Although no resistence 
against deltamethrine was reported yet, the Malaysian Cocoa Board, in collabora-
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tion with Golden Hope Plantations, began to use insect growth regulators, such 
triflumeron and flufenuron, for CPB control (Lee & Sidhu, 1984). 
c. Vascular Streak Die-back. In Malaysia, prior to 1956, the mostly planted cacao 
type was Amelonado. Amelonado clones and hybrids proved susceptible to the dis-
ease Vascular Streak Die-back (Oncobasidium theobromae), especially on loca-
tions where growth vigour is weak and rainfall is high. The pathogen first infects 
the flush leaves and causes a die-back of branches and stems. Vascular Streak Die-
back was a major limiting factor to cacao cultivation on estates in Peninsular 
Malaysia and a cause of catastrophic die-back in the large replanting programs 
using Amelenado material (Turner & Shepherd, 1978). The introduction, in 1965, 
of hybrid 'Upper Amazone' cacao allowed a revival of the cacao culture as this 
hybrid material proved to be, in general, more vigorous, high-yielding and less sus-
ceptible to Vascular Streak Die-back than the Trinitario and Criollo clones 
(Jayawardena ef al, 1978; Mardi, 1992). 
The recommended treatment of Vascular Streak Die-back is removal by prun-
ing of infected branches and stem parts at a three months interval. Bending infected 
stems to encourage chupon forming before pruning saves valuable rootstock for 
budding. Within-canopy pruning to improve aeration reduces the disease because 
high moisture is required for sporulation and spore germination (Turner & 
Shepherd, 1978). Prior to 1969, young cacao was planted (often under coconut) at 
a very high density of 2,000 saplings/ha, with the main objective of reducing weed-
ing cost before thinning. Vascular Streak Die-back incidence was found to be much 
higher at such high density planting. Therefore, planting density was gradually 
reduced to 1,200 plants/ha in the years 1969-75, and later to 900 plants/ha 
(Jayawardena et al., 1978). 
5.6.5. Coffee 
5.6.5.1. Major problems and research. In the 1870s, the government and estate 
coffee plantations in Indonesia and Malaysia were devastated by the Coffee Leaf 
Rust fungus51 (Hemileia vastatrix). Research on the Leaf Rust disease was 
commenced by the Phytopathological Laboratory of the Bogor Botanical Gardens 
at Bogor. In 1901, an experimental garden for coffee was openend at Bangelan near 
Malang, E Java. In 1905, the new DoA became responsible for developing small-
holder coffee. Research for estate coffee was later included in the mandate of the 
private Research Station for C and E Java at Malang and of the Busuki Research 
Station at Jember, E Java. The stations also studied various insect pests of which 
the coffee berry borer (Hypothenemus (Stephanoderes) hampei) caused the most 
damage. 
5.6.5.2. Selected pests and diseases 
a. Coffee Leaf Rust. When, in 1885-88, Coffee Leaf Rust attacked the Arabica 
coffee gardens, the average production of the ill-maintained government planta-
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tions decreased to one fourth within two decades (van Hall & van de Koppel, 1949 
lib). Only Arabica coffee in the highlands escaped from infection for reason of 
temperature. In 1875, a coffee species originating from Liberia {Coffea liberica) 
was imported into Indonesia via the Netherlands and test-seeded in the Cultuur-
tuin. Since Liberica coffee showed resistance to H. vastatrix, private estates and 
smallholders replanted with this species. In the 1990s, several spontaneous hybrids 
of C. arabica x C. liberica) were detected on estates which were very insensitive 
to Coffee Leaf Rust and produced better quality than Liberica plants. The hybrids 
were vegetatively propagated by grafting on Liberica rootstock. Large scale plan-
ting of hybrid coffee became superfluous when in 1900, C. canephora or Robusta 
coffee was successfully introduced52 into Java. Robusta coffee was much more 
productive than hybrid Liberica and highly resistant to Coffee Leaf Rust, only its 
taste was less refined. Selection on quality and resistance in Robusta coffee was 
undertaken since 1914, but proved to be difficult due to almost complete self-steril-
ity of this species. As propagation through seed gave a very heterogeneous proge-
ny, long-term selection programs were executed to obtain superior clonal seed and 
grafting wood from Robusta mother trees. Vegetative propagation through grafting 
became the common practice in coffee (van Hall & van de Koppel, 1949, IIB). 
b. Coffee berry borer. The beetle H. hampei {bubuk), which was first observed in 
1909 in W Java, caused up to 20% yield loss during its major outbreaks of 1920-
24, because it was not controlled by indigenous parasites. The estates opened a 
bubuk research fund, employed an entomologist and sent a mission to Uganda in 
1923 to search for parasites. A parasitic wasp, Prorops nasuta, was imported and 
reared by the stations. Despite its release in large numbers on estates, the wasp did 
not establish (Kalshoven, 1951). Better control of the coffee berry borer appeared 
possible by removal of the coffee fruits. Adult female borers deposit the eggs on 
coffee berries, because larval development can only take place in berries with ripe-
ning seed. In particular, pre-mature berries on the tree, shedded berries and har-
vested dried berries offer favourable conditions for breeding. Control of the coffee 
berry borer requires complete picking of all mature and ripening berries on the tree 
(rampasan), and removal of all berries on the ground (Jelesan = fallen berry) in 
successive picking rounds. In regions with a harvest-free period, clean-picking of 
all berries remaining after the last picking round interrupted the population build-
up for at least 3.5 months. Smallholders were advised to weed 6-12 times per year 
and to burry all dropped berries and pruning waste in deep pits after disinfection 
with e.g. carbonsulphur or cyanodust. (Leefmans, 1924). Harvested coffee was 
commonly sun-dried on drying floors adjacent to the gardens. As the process could 
take several weeks, the layers of drying, infested beans constituted a major source 
of reinfestation. Therefore, harvested berries were soaked in hot water of fumigat-
ed before drying to kill the borer larvae within. 
5.6.6. Coconut. The coconut palm (Cocos nucifera) is a native crop of SE Asia 
which was always planted as a food and cash crop around the house or in small-
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holdings. The most destructive pests of the coconut palm included the coconut 
moth, rhinoceros beetle and various hispid beetle species. 
a. Coconut moth. The coconut moth (Artona (Brachartona) catoxantha, Mapper mot, 
wangwung klapd) is capable of massive reproduction and can ravage palm crowns 
completely, causing fruit fall and interrupt fruit bearing for several years. The coconut 
moth was detected on Java in 1864 and described for Java and Melaka in 1904-08 
(Franssen & Mo, 1952). Between 1914 and 1924, outbreaks occurred repeatedly on 
Java53 and Sumatera, and various ways of control were tested by DoA54. In 1911 DoA 
recommended smallholders to cut (bekapperi) all fronds from heavily infested trees, 
leaving 3-4 emerging leaves. An empirical action threshold for cutting was determined 
at five coconut moth caterpillars per leaf per tree. Palm owners protested the low ETL 
value because almost complete defoliation interrupted fruit bearing for several years. 
They refused to report the beginning of outbreaks (Kalshoven, 1951). 
Chemical control was introduced but caused difficulties since only highly toxic 
arsenic compounds were available and equipment for spraying of tall trees was 
insufficiently developed. In 1933, field trials were carried out with dust formu-
lation of botanical pyrethrum powder (DusturanR) applied by adjusted motor-
blowers. The dusting trials were successful but pyrethrum had a too short storage 
life. DusturanR was replaced by derris powder (10% rotenon) from 1935 onwards. 
Application was improved by spraying derris-talcum suspensions with the help of 
pressure pumps through long rubberhoses which were carried up into the palm 
crowns by the spraymen (Kalshoven, 1951). 
Around 1925, the chief entomologist of DoA, S. Leefmans, developed a 
surveillance and monitoring system for the coconut moth (Brachartona surveil-
lance)(Leefmans, 1928). From 1925 onward, trained surveillors performed regular 
counts of coconut moth caterpillars in known outbreak areas. When the ETL level 
was approached, DoA, in collaboration with the Phytopathological Institute at 
Bogor, monitored the coconut moth population taking into regard larval stages and 
presence of parasites and hyperparasites. When an need-based supervised spraying 
by the Agricultural Extension Service55 did not give adequate control of the 
coconut moth, the treatment was supplemented by cutting of fronds in the most 
heavily infested plantings. 
The complex of parasites and hyperparasites of the coconut moth comprised 
over 30 species. The most effective parasite of the coconut moth was the Braconid 
wasp Apanteles artonae which parasitized the second instar larvae. Ichneumonid 
and chalcidid wasps, and tachinid flies also caused a high degree of biological con-
trol (Kalshoven, 1951). The results of the studies on parasites were not put to prac-
tice because the parasites were neither reared nor released for the purpose of con-
trolling the coconut moth pest. 
b. Coconut hispids. The hispid beetle, Brontispa longissima. caused serious out-
breaks in S and N Sulawesi between 1918 and 1934. The larvae (grubs) damaged 
the apical leaf of young coconut palms and caused up to 15% tree mortality. 
Around 1930, the pest spread to the Moluku and Sunda islands, Bali and E Java. 
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the Philippines, were introduced in many countries. IRRI recommended high use 
of nitrogen fertilizer and application of pesticides since the early IR-cultivars had 
low resistance to pests and diseases. 
Indonesia was under pressure to act decisively because it had to import ever 
greater quantities of rice due to a shortfall in food production and a rapid popula-
tion growth. Indonesia began its first large scale Bimas {Bimbingan masal, Mass 
guidance) intensification program in 1966 (ch 2.6.3.2). Indonesia's approach was 
conventional. The scale of the operation was, however, so impressive that the state 
organisations charged with the distribution of inputs and administration of the 
credit failed to meet the targets. Therefore, in 1968, the Gol reorganized the Bimas 
program to Bimas Gotong Royong (= Mutual cooperation) program. The Gol con-
tracted60 several multinational companies to assist DoA with the distribution of 
rice seed, fertilizers and pesticides to the villages and with application and exten-
sion. The problems of an acute shortage of application equipment and meddled lo-
gistics were partly solved through aerial ULV spraying of organophosphate insec-
ticides on more than a hundred thousand hectares of rice in W, C and E Java dur-
ing two years (ch 2.6.3.4). 
In the 1960s, the major rice pests in the rice fields of SE Asia allegedly requir-
ing control were various rice stemborers -striped borer (Chilo suppressalis), yel-
low borer (Scirpophaga incertulas), white borer (S. innotatd), leafhoppers as vec-
tors of Tungro Virus Disease -green leafhopper (Nephotettix spp.), whitebacked 
leafhopper {Sogatella furcifera) and zig-zag leafhopper (Recilia dorsalis)- , rice 
gall midge (Orseolia oryzae), and the rice seed bug {Leptocorisa spp.) (De Datta, 
1981; Oudejans, 1994). In most years field rats (Rattus argentiventer, R. brevicau-
dd) caused serious damage in rice too (van de Fliert et ah, 1994). Extension agents 
instructed farmers to apply insecticides at fixed intervals without reference to actu-
al infestation rates in their fields. The brown planthopper (BPH, Nilaparvata 
lugens), indigenous to SE Asia and a vector of Grassy Stunt and Ragged Stunt 
Virus Diseases, was never reported to be a major pest before 1970. In 1970 and 
1971, however, outbreaks of BPH61 were reported in sub-districts of W Java where 
farmers sprayed intensively against white stemborers. The introduction of the 
Bimas input package with its corollary of insecticides appeared to be accompanied 
by BPH outbreaks (Kenmore, 1991a). In the Bimas program areas Tungro Virus, 
transmitted by several leafhopper species, became epidemical (van Emden & 
Peakall, 1996). Alarming BPH and leafhopper outbreaks and virus epidemics on 
Java in 1975-77 -after the government first subsidized insecticides directly- caused 
losses that necessitated a 44% increase of Indonesia's annual rice imports. The Gol 
tried to control this upsurge in 1976 and 1977 with aerial applications on W, C and 
E Java and N Sumatera. The blanket spraying by air of large rice areas was follo-
wed in 1977 by the greatest yield loss from BPH so far recorded in any country in 
history: over a million tons of rice, worth hundreds of millions of dollars, or enough 
to feed more than 2.5 million people (Kenmore, 1991a). 
The Gol countered the crisis of 1977 in two ways. First, the Gol, unaware of 
the cause of the outbreaks, increased the supply of insecticides and spray equip-
ment to program farmers at subsidized prices and instructed the extension service 
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to step up farmer training. Second, it replaced the sensitive cultivars in the Bimas 
package, IR5, IR8, and C4-63, with cultivar IR26 and other cultivars from the 
series IR20 to IR34. These varieties contained genetic material that gave rice a 
repellant taste for BPH biotypes in Indonesia. Through a process of natural selec-
tion, BPH populations in E and C Java were, within three seasons, able to feed on 
IR 26. With the help of increased insecticide subsidies62 and of a domestic 
insecticide formulation industry since 1976 completely protected from imported 
competition, 1979 became the second worst year for losses on record (Kenmore, 
1991a). 
The 1979 BPH crisis was temporarily resolved by the planting of IR36 from the 
wet season 1976/77 onwards. This was a short duration hybrid containing the 
BPH2 gene for resistance to BPH biotype 2, which had evolved in N Sumetera and 
on parts of Java. IR 36 became the most widely planted rice cultivar in history, 
world-wide, up to the mid-1980s. Indonesian breeders incorporated the same 
BPH2 gene in Indonesian hybrids of which Cisadane and Krueng Aceh, released 
in 1981, outyielded IR36 on Java. Since Cisadane and Krueng Aceh fetched consi-
derably higher prices owing to their superior milling quality and taste, these cultivars 
covered half the rice area in C Java by 1984 (Kenmore, 1991b; Jatileksono, 1993). 
Whilst the wide acceptance of the resistant cultivars IR36, Cisadane, and 
Krueng Aceh relieved the BPH problem for a period of four years, chemical con-
trol of rice pests was not yet questioned. Thus, during an outbreak of Tungro Virus 
on Bali in 1981/82, some 12,000 ha were immediately sprayed by air to control its 
vector, the green leafhopper (Van Emden & Peakall, 1996). 
The continuous expansion of irrigated areas planted to high yielding varieties 
with an increase of fertilizer use to about 90 kg/ha of urea and TSP (Jatileksono, 
1993), and low crop losses made Indonesia self-sufficient in rice in 1983 (imports 
equalled exports) (Kenmore, 1991b). According to FAO statistics, Indonesia's 
growth in per capita rice production, especially contributed by Javanese rice far-
mers, between 1975/76 and 1984/85 was the second highest in Asia, after 
Myanmar (FAO, 1986). Meanwhile, the Gol increased insecticide subsidies63 ever 
more, thereby stimulating a strong growth of the insecticide formulation output in 
Indonesia from about 5,100t f.p./y in 1978/79 to 25,000 t f.p/y in 1983/84, a five-
fold increase (Staring, 1984). 
By 1984, rice fields planted with Krueng Aceh, Cisadane and IR36 in C Java 
and Yogjakarta were seriously 'hopperburned', which raised the suspicion that a 
new biotype of BPH had evolved against which the cultivars had no resistance. By 
1986, the areas infested by BPH and the corresponding damage were approaching 
the levels of the mid-1970s (ch 2, fig.2.6.3.4.d). Other rice pests, such as rice leaf-
folder {Cnaphalocrosis medinalis), stemborer and gall midge became more damag-
ing too (van de Fliert, 1993). 
5.7.2. Brown planthoppers, insecticides and natural enemies. From 1977 till 
1979, Kenmore and co-workers (Kenmore, 1980) studied the population dynamics 
of the BPH in relation to its natural enemies in rice fields at IRRI, Los Banos, the 
Philippines. Since the results from this study became a key argument for the 
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change from pesticide driven to IPM oriented plant protection policy in Asia, its 
main findings are recapitulated below. Kenmore cum suis sampled the cultivars 
IR20 and IR1917, both susceptible to Philippine phenotypes of BPH, for eggs, 
nymphal stages and adults, and for prevalent natural enemies. The surveys 
revealed that in untreated fields less than 4% of the planthoppers reached the adult 
stage, with over 65% mortality before the first nymphal stage. Factors contributing 
to this mortality included parasitation and predation of eggs, and failure of 10-30% 
of the eggs to hatch. Spiders64 were the most prominent predators on the nymphs 
and adults of BPH and whitebacked planthopper (WBPH). Veliid predators (rip-
plebugs) attacked the many newly emerged nymphs, which were seen falling in the 
water, and the adult planthoppers on or near the water surface. No untreated BPH 
populations ever increased steadily throughout the crop season and no hopperbum 
level was ever reached in untreated rice fields. The entire community of spiders 
and, to a lesser extent, the community of generalist predators at the water surface 
(veliids) responded numerically to prey density. BPH populations appeared to be 
controlled in all rice fields without insecticides (Kenmore et al, 1984). 
To see the effect of insecticides, a normal crop of IR20 was sprayed65. In about 
one third of the treated fields severe hopperburn symptoms appeared and yield of 
rice was reduced by one third. Egg production per female adult in the insecticide 
treated field was about double that expected for the observed density66 of BPH 
females. The BPH outbreak, which caused hopperburn, could thus be explained by 
the disruption of population regulating factors due to insecticides. Disruption occur-
red first because BPH survival was much higher when predators were not allowed 
to respond numerically to BPH densities and second because egg production may 
have been higher in the treated than in non-treated females (Kenmore et al, 1984). 
The most significant result of Kenmore's study was that over a range of high 
immigration rates67 of up to 80 brown planthoppers per plant, densities were kept 
below hopperburn levels without insecticides or varietal resistance68. In contrast, 
even when immigration was apparently minimal, the use of insecticides caused an 
outbreak by blocking the numerical response of predators (Kenmore et al, 1984). 
Further, if no insecticides were applied, neither higher fertilizer levels nor the use 
of non-resistant modern or older cultivars could cause the 100- to 1000-fold 
increases in BPH densities observed in hopperburned fields. 
The study showed that the mainstay of any BPH control technique is varietal 
resistance. When a cultivar exhibits resistance to the local BPH phenotypes, is oth-
erwise acceptable to farmers and is economically rewarding to grow, it eliminates 
the need for insecticides in BPH control. Resistance can amplify the effectiveness 
of individual predators, by weakening planthoppers through inadequate feeding so 
that they fall more easily prey. Varietal resistance and natural enemies thus seem 
complementary (Kenmore et al, 1984). 
The observations of Kenmore cum suis were confirmed by studies carried out by 
IRRI economists in farmers' fields in 1969. Farmers' profits decreased the more fre-
quently they applied insecticides. Farmers applied pesticides as an insurance against 
crop loss, not to improve profits. It was argued that their motivation was fuelled by 
ignorance about agro-ecosystems. Another Philippine study, concerning production 
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costs incurred by rice farmers during 1970-73, showed a 4-fold increase in spending 
on insecticide use. When the farmers surveyed had reached their peak of spending, 
BPH outbreak seriously damaged (hopperburned) the majority of their fields, and 
over 20% of the farmers lost their crop (Kenmore et al , 1987). 
5.7.3. FAO's Programme for Integrated Pest Control in Rice. In view of the 
unexpected pest outbreaks resulting from the Green Revolution technology in rice 
in Asia, the FAO/UNEP Panel of Experts on Integrated Control and Host Plant 
Resistance advised FAO repeatedly since 1967 to initiate a cooperative Regional 
Programme on the integrated control of rice pests in Asia. FAO investigated, in 
1977, the status of integrated pest control (IPC) in rice in S and SE Asia and test-
ed the interest of the governments in the region to develop of a cooperative inter-
country program. Subsequently, at a technical consultation, held at Bangkok in 
March, 1978, a proposal was drafted for an Inter-Country Programme for the 
Development and Application of Integrated Pest Control in Rice in S and SE Asia 
(acronym: ICP-IPC Rice). Late 1978 and early 1979, a FAO mission finalized the 
Plan of Operation with the governments of the seven prospective countries: 
Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Thailand (Water-
house et al, 1983). The Australian government, through the Australian Develop-
ment Assistance Bureau (ADAB), began funding the FAO ICP-IPC Rice Pro-
gramme (ICP for short) in 1979 on an annual basis. Phase I began on 1 April 1980 
when the Regional Programme Leader, Dr John A. Lowe from USAID, assumed 
duty. The activities of ICP were expanded in June 1982, when the Netherlands 
government signed a FAO/Netherlands Government Cooperative Programme 
Agreement contributing its support for a period of five years. In 1986, an addi-
tional grant became available from the Arab Gulf Fund. The objectives of Phase I, 
which covered seven countries, focused on applied research69 in farmers' fields, 
traditional approaches to extension, national IPM policies and capacity building. In 
each participating country a corresponding National Integrated Pest Control in 
Rice Program was initiated under a National Program Leader. Close working 
relationships were established with relevant research and extension agencies in an 
effort to link up with and strengthen ongoing national rice programs. Effective 
collaboration developed with the plant breeders and pest control specialists70 of the 
International Rice Research Institute (IRRI) and other major rice institutes in Asia, 
who helped to adapt the objectives of ICP to the reality of Asian rice cultivation. 
Since by that time the pesticide induced nature of BPH outbreaks was proven, the 
vital first step was to limit insecticide usage on the basis of an economic injury 
threshold (Kenmore, 1987). The research findings at IRRI allowed to formulate 
and implement appropriate strategies for an integrated control of BPH which were 
instrumental in bringing about major changes at the national policy-making level, 
particularly in Indonesia (Eveleens, 1992). 
In 1978-80, basic training principles were developed and a pilot ICP-IPC in 
Rice training program was conducted in the Philippines (Matteson et al, 1992). 
Farmers were trained in groups in weekly two-hours sessions throughout the grow-
ing season. Demonstrations, exercises and discussions in the field, using real plants 
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and insects, replaced traditional class room lecturing and hand-outs. Farmers 
learned to recognize pest insects and natural enemies and to take their own deci-
sions. Pesticide use, and thus pest control costs, by trained farmers decreased 
(Kenmore et ai, 1987). The rice yields of some participating farmers allegedly 
increased, probably as a result of increased use of fertilizer that could be purchased 
from the money saved on pesticides (van de Fliert, 1993). Some Philippine farm-
ers in Leyte increased their income by investing, for instance, in additional coconut 
trees with the saved insecticide expenditure (Oudejans & Mumford, 1988). In the 
Philippines training intensity and quality, however, detoriated as the program was 
scaled up. The same enthusiasm that had inspired the pilot group of IPM trainers 
could not be achieved at a larger scale (van de Fliert & Matteson, 1990). 
Farmer group training were supplemented by multimedia strategic extension 
campaigns71 after farmers' training needs and information channels had been iden-
tified. Training efforts through NGOs complemented national IPM extension acti-
vities in the Philippines, but their scale of operation remained limited. Throughout 
Phase I and II of ICP (1981-92) similar IPM training was extended to the other par-
ticipating countries72 through the national extension services which employed the 
T&V extension approach (Whitten et ai, 1990). 
ICP phase II, which started in 1987 with two additional countries (China and 
Vietnam), was funded by the same donors, Australia and the Netherlands. The 
donor contributions73 to Phase I and II amounted to almost 13 M US$ (Eveleens et 
ai, 1986a). Once ICP had worked out effective economic injury thresholds (ETLs) 
and had identified suitable insecticides, its priority shifted to the adoption of the 
IPM message by farmers (Kenmore, 1987). Hence the objectives of Phase II 
emphasized the empowerment of farmers74 through participatory forms of training. 
The 1990 review of Phase II found the IPM 'technology package' and the train-
ing process, which had been developed by ICP for transferring IPM skills to far-
mers, highly adequate. From then on the ICP could concentrate more on support-
ing the implementation of IPM technology and the training process by national 
programs. Actually, this meant overcoming bureaucratic hurdles which often were 
in the way of translating political acceptance of IPM into effective action at the 
field level (Eveleens, 1992). The review further showed that by October 1990 over 
380,000 farmers and over 13,000 extension agents had been trained in the nine par-
ticipating countries. By the end of 1992, the total of farmers trained amounted to 
530,000. 
In April 1993, ICP was extended into Phase III for five years with donor 
grants75 totalling about 13.9 M US$ from the Netherlands, Australia and 
Switzerland. Due to a political controversy76 between Indonesia and the Nether-
lands in 1991, Dutch donor contributions were not longer acceptable to Indonesia. 
The breach led to an immediate departure of Dutch experts and a much regretted 
diminishment of a century-old scientific collaboration. The FAO used Dutch grants 
in particular for ICP's expansion in Vietnam and other participating countries. 
Their number had expanded to thirteen when Cambodia, Republic of Korea, Laos 
and Nepal joined the program. 
Throughout the 1990s, ICP continued to play a pivotal role in implementing the 
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IPM strategy in the region. It facilitated transfer of information and expertise in all 
directions, between and within countries and between and among researchers and 
practitioners. It continued its efforts to bring together all expertise, engaged in rela-
ted donor-funded activities in individual countries, into the IPM rice network. An 
example was the EC-funded IPM Program in rice in Bhutan which country had not 
yet developed a national IPM program. ICP also facilitated the establishment of the 
'FAO Inter-Country Programme for the Development and Application of IPM in 
Vegetables in S and SE Asia' since 1996. A particular critical function of IPC was 
the securing of continued external funding of existing national programs. 
5.7.4. The National IPM Program of Indonesia 
5.7.4.1. The declaration of Indonesia's IPM policy. Indonesia is the ICP mem-
ber country in which the concept of Integrated Pest Management became deeply 
entrenched and in which ICP achieved its greatest impact. The history of ICP's 
implementation in Indonesia illustrates well the manyfold opportunities and diffi-
culties encountered even under politically favourable conditions. ICP's progress in 
other member countries is well documented in various review reports (Waterhouse 
etal, 1983; Zadoks et al, 1986; Whitten etal, 1990; Eveleens etal., 1996a; van 
Huis & Buurma, 1998) and documents (Martin, 1988; Kenmore, 1991b; Eveleens, 
1992; FAO, 1994, Sanghi, 1998; Wynn, 1997). 
Efforts to introduce IPC for rice farmers in Indonesia had started as early as 
1975 when the Directorate of Food Crops Protection, Pasarminggu, Jakarta, adopt-
ed the concept in its policy and became responsible for its implementation (Oka, 
1978, 1990; Partoadmodjo, 1981). National IPM pilot projects were already exe-
cuted on Java, Sumatera and S Sulawesi. Between 1980 and 1983, the National IPM 
Program received technical support from an IRRI outreach group and a Japanese 
research project77 (FAO, 1989). ICP began to strengthen the indonesian National 
Program in 1980 by upgrading the training packages and technology with the expe-
rience gained from the scaling-up of the Philippine National Programs. DITLIN 
organized IPM demonstrations with the same T&V extension approach as was used 
in the Bimas programs. Meanwhile, DITLINS Surveillance and Forecasting Service 
(ch 2.6.3.5) frequently alarmed DoA's emergency control units to spray rice areas 
with high pest incidence78. In 1984, ICP and DITLIN surveyed the IPM demon-
stration fields and found that pest populations in some of these areas were increas-
ing alarmingly (van de Fliert, 1993). In 1985-86, BPH populations exploded and 
destroyed an estimated 275,000 ha of rice (fig. 2.6.4.4). Similar outbreaks occurred 
in Malaysia and Thailand between 1977 and 1990 (figs. 7.3.3.a and 7.4.3.b) 
(Whitten et al, 1990) 
At this crisis point in 1985-86, when the second nation-wide BPH outbreak had 
seriously affected the recently achieved self-sufficiency in rice production, the Gol 
chose an IPM approach. It announced the Indonesian National IPM Policy on 
November 5, 1986, as Presidential Instruction No. 3 of 1986 (INPRES 3/86). 
'As written it (the Gol) did three major things: 1. On explicit ecological 
grounds (BPH multiplication by destruction of natural enemies) banned 57 trade 
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formulations (brands) of insecticides from use on rice, and ordered that resistant 
varieties be grown in affected areas; 2. Increased from less than 1300 to over 2900 
the numbers of pests observers assigned to rural extension centres; and 3. Ordered 
that observers, extension staff and farmers be trained in IPM as national pest con-
trol strategy' (Kenmore, 1991b; Thomas & Waage, 1996). 
As a reaction to INPRES 3/1986 declaring IPC the national pest control strate-
gy, an inter-sectoral group of ministers was assigned to implement the IPM policy. 
The responsibility for implementing the IPM policy was transferred from the 
Ministry of Agriculture to the State Planning Bureau (BAPPENAS). Top priority 
was given to changing the behaviour of farmers, administrators and agricultural 
staff through improvement of knowledge and skills. A first activity was the recruit-
ment and crash course IPC training of master trainers, pest observers79, village 
extension workers and farmers. The World Bank approved the reallocation of the 
remainder of its loan to the National Extension Project (4.2 M US$ destined for 
NAEP-phase II) to fund IPM training (table 5.7.4.1). FAO's ICP helped DITLIN 
to obtain IPM field data and to extend training to specialist staff. BPH resistant 
varieties (IR36 and IR 64) were more actively promoted, and the Surveillance and 
Early Warning network expanded for immediate control of BPH infestations (van 
de Fliert, 1993). 
The pesticide market of Indonesia was confronted with two measures at the 
same time, the ban on 57 brands of insecticides80 and a rapid reduction of the sub-
sidy on pesticides for rice. Their impact on the pesticide market and industry was 
deep and lasting (ch 7.2). The subsidy was reduced step-wise from 85% to zero 
over three years and was terminated in January, 1989. At the time of INPRES 3/86, 
the subsidies consumed 130-160 M US $ from the country's annual foreign cur-
rency expenditures. 
The Indonesian crash program achieved that trained farmers reduced insec-
Table 5.7.4.1. Indonesia, World Bank's funding of research and extension programs. 
Source: World Bank Staff Appraisal Report, Indonesia Integrated Training Project, March 5, 
1993. 
Period Project Original Loan 
MUSS 
Research 
1975-80 
1980-90 
1989-95 
Agricultural Research and extension 
National agricultural research 
Agricultural research management 
21.5 
65.0 
35.3 
Extension 
1976-82 
1980-88 
1987-92 
National Food Crops Extension 
National Extension II 
National Agricultural Extension III 
22.0 
42.0 
70.0 
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ticide applications from over 4 to less than 2.5 per season on average. 'Contrary to 
the popular belief fanned by the pesticide industry, rice production in Indonesia 
could be massively uncoupled from insecticides. BPH infestation declined quick-
ly and steadily since 1986' (Kenmore, 1991b). 
An evaluation of the 1987-89 training showed a less satisfactory picture. In this 
crash program, conducted through the T&V system, great efforts81 were made to 
train trainers and farmers and to develop effective training aids. Though the acti-
vities had Presidential priority and special facilitation by the Finance, Planning and 
Economics Ministries, training funds and materials arrived late. The goal of the 
crash project was to train 125,000 farmers, but only 10,300 actually received train-
ing. Where the farmers were reached, trainers used top-down approaches82 and did 
not utilize the farmers' own experience so that the desired changes in behaviour did 
not occur (van de Fliert, 1993; Untung, 1995). 
5.7.4.2. Breakthrough in Indonesia's National IPM Program. In order to 
achieve the desired change in farmers' behaviour in Indonesia, BAPPENAS con-
tracted in March, 1989, FAO's ICP to strengthen the training effort of the National 
IPM Program83. Phase I of this large scale training program, 1989-92, was 
financed by reallocating money84 from abolished pesticide subsidies which had 
previously been granted by USAID. The greatest innovation was the change from 
the T&V form of extension to the Farmers' Field School (FFS) form (Box 5.7.4.2.a 
and b). By mid-1990, at least 60.000 fanners were trained and savings were esti-
mated at 20 US$ per ha and season. For the year 1990 alone an amount of 2.4 M 
USS was saved by IPM trained farmers in Indonesia (Whitten et al, 1990). The 
distribution among farmers of financial benefits85 from IPM practices was inde-
pendent of farm size and land tenure status (World Bank, 1993a). 
In season 1990/91, the Indonesian National Program was challenged by an unex-
pected outbreak of white stemborer (T. innotata) on Java. This traditional but spo-
radic pest damaged 13,000 ha of rice in the Jalur Pantura, a NE coastal region of W 
Java. National media attention drew forth frequent calls from various sources to relax 
the Presidential IPM Policy and allow the use of banned organophosphates. The pres-
sure was resisted by the sustained action of a number of Cabinet Ministers and 
provincial government officials. National funds were used for an additional training 
program on how to recognize egg masses of white stemborer in seedbeds and fields. 
Farmers then could remove egg masses by hand instead of applying insecticides 
against larvae of which the majority had entered the rice stems already. Over 75,000 
farmers in the affected district were trained in FFSs (Dilts, 1990). Over 300,000 peo-
ple were mobilized to destroy egg masses during the critical late 1990 immigration 
period of stemborer moths, and less than 1,000 ha were damaged in 1991 during the 
wet season. Ex post analysis of the white stemborer outbreak showed that sub-dis-
tricts with highest damage were those that, for at least three prior seasons, had been 
exposed to the highest dosages of carbofuran86. Farmers who had continued to plant 
the more profitable Cisadane had a much lower damage from stemborers than those 
who followed central government recommendations to plant IR.64. Although in W 
Java Cisadane was never as badly damaged by BPH as it had been in C Java and 
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Box 5.7.4.2.a 
The Training & Visit System of Agricultural Extension 
Management of agricultural extension appeared to have great influence on 
agricultural development in Asia. In the 1960s and 1970s, the Training & 
Visit (T&V) form of extension was commonly adopted to spread the Green 
Revolution technology and the messages of the intensification campaigns 
in rice production down to farmers' level. 
The T&V system applies a 'transfer of technology' model, which relies 
on a two-way diffusion process. It emphasizes regular training of extension 
field workers and 'contact farmers' and improvement of linkages between 
extension and research. Briefly described, a single line of administrative 
control and technical support is established from the Directorate of 
Agriculture to the extension field worker. 
Ideally, under this system the work schedules, duties, and responsibil-
ities are clearly specified and closely supervised at all levels. A specific 
schedule of visits to a manageable number of farm families is rigidly fol-
lowed. In weekly one-day training sessions the extension workers are 
instructed in the most important recommendations for the forthcoming one 
or two weeks of the crop season. This preparative training helps the exten-
sion workers to understand and to more convincingly transmit the message 
to the farmers. The extension workers should extend the extension mes-
sages to selected contact farmers, who are supposed to spread the new prac-
tices to their neighbour farmers and friends. The system relies on the com-
municative abilities of contact farmers and on the curiosity of non-contact 
farmers to watch and ask (Benor & Harrison, 1977). 
The information is expected to flow from research via Subject Matter 
Specialists and (village) extension workers to contact farmers and, finally, to 
follower farmers. In Indonesia, each village extension worker cared for 1000-
3000 farm families, divided into 16 farmer groups. A farmer group (kelompok 
tani) consisted of all farmers operating in a certain tract of rice fields. The con-
tact farmers {kontak tani) were to be visited once in two weeks to receive 
recommendations. Frequently, this did not happen, or the information convey-
ed did not correspond with the field conditions (van de Fliert, 1993). A low 
social status and payment affected the motivation of the extension workers and 
made them looking for additional income opportunities (van de Fliert, 1993). 
Generally, the T&V system fitted well in the hierarchical, top-down struc-
ture of the Ministries of Agriculture and the Extension Services of S and SE 
Asia. A fundamental shortcoming of T&V is that it failed to build the farmers' 
capacity to access external information when they need it, to develop farmers' 
ability to experiment and draw conclusions, and to enhance farmers' individual 
and collective ability to take sound decisions (RQling & van de Fliert, 1994). 
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Box 5.7.4.2.b 
The Farmer Field School System of Agricultural Extension 
Since the late 1980s, the Farmer Field School (FFS) has become the form 
of extension preferred by FAO and NGOs for implementing IPM programs 
for rice, vegetables and cotton in Asia and Africa. 
The Farmer Field School system aims at empowering farmers to make 
their own decisions based on knowledge, field monitoring, pest identifica-
tion and experimentation. Highly motivated pest observers and village 
extension workers select active farmer groups or villages for training. In 
Indonesia, the FFSs followed the original model of season-long training, a 
study plot, agro-ecosystem analysis, presentation and discussion, and plan-
ning farmer experiments. A field school is run one morning per week dur-
ing 10 to 12 weeks. Farmers appreciate to be trained in the field by way of 
facilitation rather than by frontal instruction in a school room and to be 
regarded as competent farm managers. Through attending IPM field school 
training farmers increase their skill as observer in the field and gain more 
self confidence (van de Fliert, 1993). 
The FFS helped to preserve and utilize indigenous knowledge. Innova-
tions usually do not only require external supply of new technology, but 
also the development of internal capacity to innovate (van de Fliert, 1993). 
While IPM for rice is still the entry point in the FFS and in the follow-up 
activities, the farmers increasingly want to discuss a widening range of crop 
management topics. These include diseases, variety testing, manuring, fertilis-
er application, planting distance, irrigation management, time of planting rice 
and rotational crops such as soybean, and IPM in vegetables (ch 6.2.3). During 
1996, FFS graduates in 800 localities planned and conducted their own season 
long-experiments (Eveleens, 1996b). By 1998, the number of Indonesian 
farmers who graduated from a season-long FFS approached one million, of 
which about 17,000 volunteered as farmer-trainer (FAO ICPV, 1998). 
Horizontal spread of the IPM message from trained to non-trained farm-
ers remained a matter of concern. Continued political interest at the central 
and provincial levels of administration is essential for the future allocation of 
extension personnel and funds to IPM implementation through FFS training. 
Van de Fliert (1993) observed that IPM rice farmers in C Java, after 
being exposed to production intensification programs for more than twenty 
years, have become modern, high external-input farmers who tend to rely 
more on their own experience than on recommendations of the state exten-
sion service. It is expected that empowerment of farmers will finally result 
in demand driven extension and in an improvement of their socio-economic 
position vis-a-vis other groups. In this way the FFS approach may escape the 
institutionalisation which made T&V ineffective (Eveleens et al, 1996b). 
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Yogjakarta, the major reason for pushing IR6487 had been insecticide-induced BPH 
outbreaks. IPM thus staged a comeback for Cisadane. 
With such results to show, the National IPM Programme in Indonesia was 
extended with a second phase (1993-98). Its core activity, the 'IPM Training 
Project', was funded by a loan of 32 M US$ from the World Bank, a grant of 7 M 
US$ from the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and 
a contribution of 1 M US$ from the Gol (World Bank, 1993a). The technical assis-
tance contract with FAO through ICP and with international and national experts 
was continued. The program's objectives included training of trainers (ToT) and 
farmers following the FFS model, to support field studies88, and to strengthen the 
regulatory and environmental management of pesticides. The National IPM 
Program operated in 12 of 26 provinces of Indonesia, including the eight provin-
ces, where three quarters of the nation's rice is produced. In 1994, the administra-
tion of the National IPM Programme was transferred from the National Develop-
ment Planning Agency (BAPPENAS) to the Ministry of Agriculture. By 1996, 
DITLIN staff, consisting of 350 field leaders guiding about 2000 pest observers89, 
as well as field extension workers of the provincial agricultural services and a-
round 8000 farmer trainers were holding FFSs at village level. Through this com-
bined effort about 650,000 farmers90 had been trained in FFSs in 1996. The pace 
of IPM training went up when farmers, who had graduated from season-long IPM 
classes, were involved in farmer-to-farmer training (Oka, 1995). The FFS training 
approach in Indonesia became the model for the other Asian countries participating 
FAO's ICP, phase III (van de Fliert, 1993). Only 14% of the Indonesian par-
ticipants in FFS were women (Eveleens et al, 1996b). 
In June, 1996, a major breakthrough with regards to pesticide policies hap-
pened. The original ban of INPRES 3/1986 on the use of 57 brands of pesticides 
in rice, was extended to include all food crops. Further, the United States 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) began to strengthen the regulatory and 
environmental management of pesticides in Indonesia (Eveleens et al, 1996b). 
In the mid-1990s the National IPM Program in Indonesia appeared to be con-
fronted by competing paradigms, namely the nationwide forecasting system result-
ing in spray/no spray recommendations on the one hand and on the other hand the 
IPM approach in which farmers make a decision after conducting an agro-ecosys-
tem analysis in their rice fields. Field workers of the DoA Division of Crop 
Protection were facing the dilemma that they had to conduct pest surveillance91 
and FFS extension training. The rapid expansion of the National IPM Program 
threatened the quality92 standards of IPM training and the enthusiasm among the 
Indonesian officials at the mid-level of the central bureaucracy. In spite of various 
efforts the link between research and extension was still considered to be weak 
(Eveleens et al, 1996b). IPM activities of the Indonesian National Program are 
reviewed in Wynn et al, 1997. 
In Indonesia, several NGO's are engaged in IPM training a.o. on Java and N 
Sumatera (ch 6.2.5). NGO activities are basically directed at empowerment of the 
farmers through community organizing, consciousness raising and education, pub-
lic advocacy, capacity building, and support services for income generating activ-
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ities. In general, national governments have well defined structures and employ 
staff up to vilage level who have technical skills and basic knowledge on agrono-
my, ecology and farming. NGOs, on the contrary, do not have well developed agri-
cultural policies, and most of their workers miss a technical background. However, 
they usually work for groups which are not reached by government agency pro-
grams. The extension approach of governments is generally top down, with limit-
ed participation of farmers in defining their own needs and in developing the prod-
uct or model. NGOs on the other hand are process oriented. Participation and 
analysis by farmers, and group dynamic processes are the key components The 
involvement of NGOs in national IPM programs, usually, improves their quality 
through the combination of the strengths of both approaches (FAO, 1992b). 
5.7.5. The National IPM Program of Malaysia. Following the Green Revolution, 
Malaysia saw a rapid expansion of rice production through intensification and cen-
tralisation in large, efficiently managed irrigation schemes. Since 1970, the rice 
industry passed from a stage of traditional, mostly manual cultivation into large, 
highly mechanized rice production cooperatives. Lack of water in the off-season 
and a combination of labour shortage and skewed age distribution of farmers led 
to shift from transplanted to direct seeded and ratoon rice crops, and these to very 
serious weed problems (ch 3.6.4.4). 
As happened in Indonesia, the Malaysian researchers and farmers followed 
IRRI's recommendations regarding fertilizer and pesticide use in the early IR-vari-
eties which lacked resistance against major rice pests and diseases. Generally, 
fanners made two applications per season, at 30 and 60 days after transplanting. 
An increase of stemborer infestation drove the frequency of preventive spraying 
up, in Sekinchang and Tanjung Karang even to 8 applications per season (Lim et 
al, 1978). In the late 1970s, Malaysia experienced serious outbreaks of the brown 
planthopper (BPH) and green leafhopper which in turn caused epidemics of Grassy 
Stunt and Tungro Virus Diseases (Ooi & Heong, 1988; Ho, 1993). As a first meas-
ure the GoM distributed high yielding rice varieties with resistance against BPH 
and Tungro. In 1977, a Pest Surveillance and Forecasting Service was set up for all 
major rice growing states of Peninsular Malaysia to monitor the population deve-
lopment of rice pests and their natural enemies (Ooi, 1982, 1992). From that time 
the spraying of insecticides was encouraged through free supply of insecticides 
when economic threshold values were approached (supervised control). The con-
certed effect of growing resistant rice cultivars and spraying on the basis of moni-
toring data brought BPH and virus diseases under control (ch 3.6.4.7) (Heong et 
al, 1985, 1992b). 
Malaysia signed the agreement with FAO on the Inter-Country Programme for 
IPM in Rice in S and SE Asia in March, 1978. DoA was made responsible for IPM 
demonstrations in rice and MARDI for IPM research and development. A National 
IPM (Steering) Committee93 was established for liaison with FAO's ICP and for 
the coordination of six working groups94. By mid 1980, the National IPM Program 
began its activities95 in the Rice Schemes, but only a small number of farmers par-
ticipated and achievement was low (Lim et al, 1980). In March 1984, a national 
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Box 5.7.5 
Children brigades scouting for rice pests in Malaysia. 
In 1986, an FAO/donor mission observed the performance of children as 
pest scouts (age about 12 years) in a village koran school in the State of 
Perlis. The children appeared to be efficient monitors, who made an impor-
tant, weekly contribution to the district surveillance network. The kids, 
boys and girls, enjoyed the experience. They monitored a total of 15 pest 
and 5 beneficial insect species, especialy BPH and whitebacked planthop-
per, and used economic threshold values to make control recommendations 
for the farmers. The children's brigade, an idea and initiative of the koran 
school teacher, kept the nicely uniformed children busy on Saterday morn-
ing, making observations and completing observation forms. Together, 
they arrived at a no spray/spray recommendation and closed the excercise 
with singing. This activity was appraised as having long-term significance 
in terms of raising the rural population's awareness of pest mangement. It 
was also usefull general education of the children (Zadoks et al, 1986). 
Ten years later, in 1996, the number of children scouting brigades, 
engaged in monitoring rice fields of the states of Perlis and adjacent Kedah 
throughout the season, was said to have increased. Farmers encouraged the 
children scouts by contributing to their fund, from which school books and 
recreational activities were payed (Chen Yew Moi, pers. comm., 1996). 
The Director General of the Department of Agriculture, acknow-
ledging the importance of participatory training at farm level, sought to 
export the model of children brigades to the other rice growing states. In 
his opinion, the Pest Surveillance and Forecasting System would remain 
the mainstay of pest management in Malaysia. It was used as a back-up to 
farmer training because adult farmers appeared to lack training in surveil-
lance and IPM-skill. DoA allegedly hoped to involve farmers in monitor-
ing of pests and to use their data with the help of computer systems for 
identification of pest trends and forecasting (Datuk Abdul Jamil, DG 
DoA, pers. comm., 1996). 
IPM workshop reconfirmed the T&V system as the main form of extension. The 
T&V system was slightly modified to accomodate training and extension to farm-
ers' groups. The National Agricultural Policy dictated a farmers' group96 approach 
in order to instill an awarenes of the opportunity for lowering costs of production 
if farmers would form commercial farmers' groups. The Agricultural Extension 
Service collaborated with the Pest Surveillance and Forecasting Service to back up 
farmer training. The only significant participation of the farmer community in field 
monitoring of pests took place in the northern section of the Muda Irrigation 
Scheme, State of Perlis, where children were trained as pest scouts (Box 5.7.5). In 
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1986, the Malaysian National Program organized a large scale rat control cam-
paign in Penang State. The campaign was designed on sound technological and 
sociological principles and its communication strategies were well documented 
and pre-tested (Zadoks et al, 1986; Asna, pers. comm., 1996). The field-oriented 
Malaysian scientists achieved a break-through in rice-virus diagnostics on the 
farm. They used an Elisa technique to detect the presence of virus infestations in 
order to issue early warning for spraying against leafhoppers. In this way the risk 
for Tungro Virus epidemics was reduced (Zadoks et al, 1986). 
In 1986, IPM implementation appeared to have full political support from 
national and state governments. DoA seemed to adopt a more participatory appro-
ach to farmers, the latter making their own decisions. By 1990, the National IPM 
Committee claimed that 38,000 farmers had been trained in IPM but the FAO 
review found that farmers were weak on details related to skills (Whitten et al. 
1990). The Rice Scheme Authorities, such as the Muda and Kemubu Agricultural 
Development Authorities (MUDA and KADA) organized training and campaigns 
on weed and rat control (Hoe/ al, 1990; ch 3.6.4.5). and on crop and human health 
in the Tanjung Karang Scheme). DoA claimed an annual saving of 30-27 M US$ 
through IPM implementation during the 1980s. There were 9 pest surveillance cen-
tres serving 131,000 ha, 36 farmer IPM clinics and 7 emergency control brigades. 
Although Malaysia had a declared policy on IPM as part of the overall rice 
intensification policy, the Director General of Agriculture in charge97 did not lent 
it active support (Whitten et al, 1990). The DoA and MADA authorities had no 
confidence in farmers' abilities to make good decisions on pest control but, rather, 
relied on top-down instruction to farmers in order not to jeopardise production tar-
gets. Malaysia had no pesticide subsidies, but government agencies continued to 
release sprayers and pesticides during declared outbreaks. In irrigation schemes 
there was a conflict of interests since the authorities responsible for IPM also han-
dled pesticide advertising and subsidized incentives to increase sales through farm-
ers' associations. If the National IPM program lacked political support, the Plant 
Protection Branch and members of the National IPM Committee remained staunch 
promoters and, in a discrete way, continued with some IPM activities. Thus the 
spending of the annual budget of 3.3 M US$ for plant protection depended in fact 
more on the interest of individuals than on government policy98 (Whitten et al, 
1990). Over the years disappointed IPM scientists99 left government service or 
were transferred to a position outside the IPM program. Since 1996, under a new 
Director General of Agriculture, more attention was directed at reviving IPM 
implementation but there seems to be a lack of orientation and a los of grip on the 
rapidly changing conditions in Malaysia agriculture (Oudejans, 1996). 
Malaysia acquired a leading position in integrated weed management (IWM) in 
rice (ch 3.6.4.5). Direct seeding, which has become general practice in the Rice 
Schemes, caused an increase in weed densities and herbicide use, and raised the costs 
of land preparation and water management (Whitten et al, 1990). During the 1990s, 
the Irrigation Department, in collaboration with DoA, carried out large scale soil lev-
elling (planing) operations to improve weed control by submersion of rice fields with 
water (Oudejans, 1996). Since 1996, MARDI tries to complete its IPM research with 
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an ecologically based synthesis (Eveleens et ah, 1996b; Oudejans, 1996). Malaysia 
continued with IPM in vegetables, fruits (ch 6.3) and other crops such a cacao. 
5.7.6. The National IPM Program of Thailand. Thailand was one of the seven 
initial members of the FAO ICP. Allegedly, IPM in rice received attention since 
1976. ICP strengthened the work on IPM since 1981 when the Plant Protection 
Division of DOA was designated as counterpart to the ICP. This division, which 
was also responsible for the Surveillance and Forecasting Service, issued the 
national IPM policy guidelines. However, the responsibility for developing and 
applying IPC in rice fell on two departments, DOA being responsible for IPM re-
search and demonstration, DOAE for IPM extension. In the first years, ICP's acti-
vities were limited to the training of researchers and DOAE staff, providing expert-
ise and holding workshops and meetings. In the years 1982-84, the Plant Protection 
Division of DOAE performed three trials100 in farmers' rice fields but failed to 
involve the farmers' neighbourhood. In 1988, ICP supported a Strategic Extension 
Campaign on Surveillance and Early Warning System Technology which was 
targeted at 12,000 farmers and 5,000 school children in Chai Nat province. 
FAO's ICP kept good relations with two other plant protection programs direct-
ed at the strengthening of Thailand's plant protection infrastructure. These were the 
Thai-German Plant Protection Program101, fielded by the German Technical Assis-
tance Agency (GTZ) from 1975-83, and the Thai-Japan Program funded by Japan 
International Cooperation Agency's (JICA) program from 1978-86. The presence 
of these two strong programs reduced the need for inputs from ICP. 
Thailand was hit by a huge BPH outbreak in season 1989/90. ICP provided 
funding for a survey to determine the extent of the BPH infestations in the C Plain. 
The study indicated that, in 1989 about 150,500 ha, and in 1990 over 300,000 ha 
of rice fields were damaged. The cause of the BPH outbreak was attributed to the 
high export price of rice during 1987-88, which incited Thai farmers to go for max-
imum yields and to take risky decisions. They began cultivating susceptible high-
yielding cultivars, such as Suphanburi 60, at planting densities twice as high as 
normal, while using high doses of fertilizers. They liberally sprayed organophos-
phate and pyrethroid insecticides during the successive seasons (Kenmore, 1991b). 
The outbreaks occurring between 1976 and 1984 and the 1989/90 outbreak were 
preceded by upswings in insecticide use. Predictably, the treatments triggered 
extensive BPH outbreaks, and many farmers experienced total crop failure. 
The RTG countered the 1989/90 outbreak by accelerating the multiplication 
and distribution of cultivar RD23, which had the same resistance gene (BPH2) as 
IR36. By November 1990, most farmers grew the new varieties RD23 and Suphan-
buri 90 as well as traditional varieties for which the government supplied the seed 
at a subsidized rate. Farmers in the outbreak areas reduced fertilizer use to com-
pensate losses with lower production costs. 
A national IPM conference was held at Bangkok in October 1990. Indonesian 
policy makers and scientists explained to Thai Members of Parliament, central and 
provincial administrators and policy analysts the causality of pesticides and brown 
planthopper outbreaks and IPM adoption in Indonesia. Follow-up was insufficient 
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to secure understanding of the message amongst senior government officials and 
to generate a public commitment to the philosophy of IPM. 
The Thai-German Plant Protection Program (TGPPP) had experienced a com-
parable lack of sustainable impact in Thailand. The TGPPP could not obtain last-
ing support from relevant policy makers nor could it establish a solid foundation 
in Thailand's administrative structures. The ICP and the TGPPP both depended 
upon the Plant Protection Division of DOAE for passing IPM knowledge and skills 
to extension field workers and rice farmers. The IPM knowledge base was divided 
between -DOA and DOAE, which did not seem to have close liaison. The necessa-
ry collaboration with the Research Branch of DOA, and with other departments 
also having in-country expertise and overlapping responsibilities, could not be suf-
ficiently effectuated (Zadoks et al, 1986). DOAE persisted in its rigid top-down 
approach along the T&V extension system. Typical features of Thai social culture 
and hierarchical attitudes (acharn-ship) within the civil administration seemed to 
constitute obstacles for technical dialogue between administrators and scientists. 
An ICP-review mission concluded 'The lack of clear commitment in Malaysia and 
Thailand was considered a significant factor in the Inter-Country Programme fal-
ling short of its potential in these countries' (Eveleens, 1992). 
The RTG had not yet arrived at a policy on IPM or on pesticide restriction by 
1998. Thailand enjoyed a relatively free economy, and an ample supply of over a 
thousand legally registered rice insecticide formulations and of hundreds unregis-
tered ones (ESCAP/CIRAD, Pesticide Index, 19 . Pesticide import was charged a 
very low excise duty, the tarriff and tax total being less than 7% as compared to 
25% for other agricultural inputs such as fertilizers and machinery (Waibel, 
1990a,b; Jungbluth, 1996). More distorting than this significant hidden subsidy 
were indirect subsidies enjoyed when the government declared an outbreak and, 
usually with a compliant bilateral donor, released insecticides102 for free in arbi-
trarily defined areas. 
5.7.7. Integrated rat management in rice. In most years field rats {Rattus rattus 
brevicaudatus), white stemborers (Scirpophaga inotata) and root rot (omo 
mentek), a physiological disease) were the major causes of crop loss in wet (padi 
sawah) and dry (padi gogo) rice in Indonesia (van der Goot, 1948a). The annual 
reports of the Central Research Station, Bogor (Mededeelingen IPZ, 34-39, 1933-
36), mention the exemption of landtax because of excessive crop damage103. The 
high amount of exemption granted in outbreak years and local food shortages 
induced the Inland Administration to call for large scale rat control. Following 
widespread outbreaks of field rats in W Java during the season 1932/33, DoA 
organized large campaigns existing of surveillance and monitoring and actual con-
trol by poisoning and clubbing (battue, 'blanket' killing). The Division of Agri-
cultural Extension and the Inland Administration jointly supervised the distribution 
of rat poison and placement of tenth of millions of baits by the peasants. The 
costs104 of supervision and poison material was borne by the government agencies, 
the battue was incidentally encouraged by a premium for killed rats. The campaign 
was continued till 1938 and involved per year between 25,000 to 86,000 ha of 
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sawah during the west monsoon (November-April) and up to 15,000 ha sawah dur-
ing the east monsoon (June-October) in each of the Residencies Bantam, Batavia 
(W Karawang), and Priangan. In the Residency of Cirebon, where sugarcane was 
grown in rotation with rice, the sugar factories joined in the organization of the 
campaign at their own costs as an effective rat control in rice meant a smaller pop-
ulation in the following sugarcane crop. A major effect of rat control during the 
rainy west monsoon was that it enabled the cultivation of dry season rice (padi 
gadoe) in irrigated areas during the east monsoon105. 
In the 1930s, rats in sugarcane fields were killed in their burrows with thallium 
sulphate or arsenic trioxide tablets or dusting with cyanic or sulphur-dioxide 
formulations (van der Goot, 1942). Rats created an acute problem in sugarcane 
during the 1960's. Effective control was achieved by placing baits containing 1 per 
cent zinc-phosphate or 5 per cent warfarin. In later years less acute toxic ingre-
dients such as tomarin and cumarin were used. Rats in rice were controlled by bait-
ing with phosphor paste106, arsenic compounds or less toxic barium carbonate on 
sliced batatas (ubi) was practised (Kalshoven, 1951). In the Regencies of Jogyakar-
ta and Bali introduction of the above control methods required extra convincing 
because of superstitious ideas about rats among the population (Mededeelingen 
van het IPZ, 1933-36). In 1935, trials with rodent killing viruses were undertaken, 
but soon abandoned. 
In Malaysia and Thailand, during the 1970s and 1980s, large training programs on 
rat control were organized by the German Agency for Technical Cooperation (GTZ). 
Large scale extension and implementation of rat control by the national DoA took place 
in several countries of SE Asia with support of GTZ. In 1985, a rat control extension 
program was implemented in Province Penang, Malaysia (Asna, pers. comm., 1986). 
The methods were said to be effective but the results were not published. 
During three rice seasons in 1989-90, the FAO IPC-IPM in Rice Programme 
organized a pilot Integrated Rat Management project in C and W Java. In some dis-
tricts of C Java, rats had almost completely destroyed the rice crop for six consec-
utive seasons. DoA estimated crop loss by rats (mainly Rattus argiventer) in rice 
over the decade 1985-95 at 1.5 M US$, several times higher than the total loss by 
other rice pests (van de Fliert et al, 1994) The integrated approach emphasized the 
need for action by a whole farming community, as was a premise of the former 
regional GTZ programs. The pilot project reaffirmed that the proven methods of 
monitoring of population build-up, destruction of burrows, rat drives {battue) and 
systematic baiting with anti-coagulants were as effective as before once the com-
munity was organized and action coordinated. If left to their own, farmers hardly 
adopt bait stations and anti-coagulant rodenticides (van de Fliert et al, 1994). 
5.7.8. Integrated Weed Management. Weed control is essential in the humid 
tropics because of the lush plant growth. Early forms of weed control included 
handweeding, grazing, slashing and burning of unwanted vegetation. Inundation of 
land for the purpose of controlling weeds was closely connected with the develop-
ment of the wet rice (padi sawah) cultivation method, probably because of 
immense weed problems in dry rice. 
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Weed control on sawah is a combination of tillage and water management 
(Grist, 1935). First, the field is inundated to enable ploughing and puddling of the 
soil, and then drained to allow germination of available weed seeds. Second, the 
field is inundated again to suffocate emerging weeds and draft animals are driven 
around to trample the weeds into the mud. Third, the mud is leveled (planing) and 
the field covered with a 10 cm layer of water (sawah) into which the rice seedling 
are transplanted from the nursery beds. Skilful sawah preparation provides an 
effectice control of weeds and gives the transplanted rice an advantage of several 
weeks over competetive weeds. Today, sawah preparation is largely mechanized 
but for narrow rice terasses. The requirement of a larger plot size for tractors and 
power tillers has frequently spoiled the capacity of traditional sawah lay-outs to 
hold water. Uneven sawah soils and higher work speed allow more weeds to 
escape and to become a problem. In Malaysia during the 1990s, agricultural poli-
cy included the levelling of vast stretches of sawah land with the help of laser-
guided tractor/planer units in irrigation schemes. The purpose was an improvement 
of water management on sawahs for beter crop growth and weed control. The pro-
gram was implemented by the Public Works Department in collaboration with 
DoA (Director DoA, pers. comm., 1996). 
In Malaysia, the direct seeding of wet rice (padi sawah) became the standard 
practice in the rice schemes (ch 3.6.4). Greater weed densities, which accompanied 
the shift to direct seeding, necessitated many experiments on seed rates, seedling 
density and herbicide usage (Ho, 1991,1993). This work has given Malaysia a lead 
in Integrated Weed Management (IWM) in rice. An increasing problem in wet rice 
stems from the grassy weeds, such as Echinochloa crusgalli, because these grass-
es are indistinguishable from rice in the early stages and their seeds are difficult to 
separate from rice seed (ch 3.6.4.5). 
The extensive planting of rubber and oil palm in SE Asia by the estate indus-
try, the Land Development Schemes and smallholders requires intensive control of 
weed during the first years of tree establishment. Weeding is almost completely 
done by use of herbicides (ch 7.3). There is ample literature on the use of herbi-
cides in estates crops, but little reference is made to Integrated Weed Management. 
5.8. Discussion 
Agricultural research in the three countries of SE Asia, in particular in 
Indonesia, during the 19th and 20th century yielded a huge amount of information 
on the control of pests in native and introduced crops. The incentives for such re-
search followed a curious Mobius-type of loop. The absence of synthetic pesticides 
before World War II necessitated a search for methods of cultural, biological and 
regulatory control which could offer sufficient protection to make certain cultures 
financially attractive. The mainstay of plantation agriculture was selection and 
breeding for characteristics of high yield, suitable habitus and a fair resistance 
against pests and diseases. In the process, ingenious techniques of breeding, graft-
ing, pruning and avoidance of contamination were developed, which remained 
valid till today. Colonial research on mechanisms, properties and application of 
biological control through natural enemies was fundamental and well documented. 
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After World War II, the fast killing synthetic pesticides appeared to offer a more 
efficient solution to the management of pests in crops. Public and private invest-
ments in research were soon almost entirely directed at the development of chem-
ical pest control. Old practices of non-chemical control became redundant if an 
easier or cheaper method of chemical control was feasible. The chemical euphoria 
lasted until the 1970s when symptoms of pest resurgence, increasing pesticide 
resistance in noxious organisms, and externalities, such as human intoxication and 
environmental contamination, were recognized and understood. 
The conclusion that synthetic pesticides provide at best only a partial solution 
to pest problems has re-opened the search for alternatives and a renewed appreci-
ation of biological control. An essential difference between past and presence in 
biological control is the availability of synthetic pesticides. Researchers showed 
that pesticides, when used in a judicious way -i.e. the need-based use of a suitable 
pesticide applied with an adequate technique at the right time and place- can make 
a decisive contribution to integrated control. The controversy, usually, lays in the 
interpretation of'need-based'. 
SE Asia learned the necessity for restraint in pesticide use the hard way. 
Extensive outbreaks of insect pests and virus epidemics in rice followed intensive 
calender based application of insecticides in the national rice intensification pro-
grams. Coincidence of various events established the IPM programs in SE Asia. 
The events included a. the recognition that the brown planthopper and Tungro 
Virus outbreaks in the new high-yielding rice varieties, which endangered the gains 
in rice production, were pesticide-induced; b. a concern about the deteriorating 
food security situation in Asia persuaded international organizations and donors to 
finance a regional Programme for the Development and Application of Integrated 
Pest Control in Rice in S and SE Asia as proposed by FAO; c. in Indonesia, the 
recession on the world-oil market in the early 1970s opened the country's door for 
IPM. The concurrence of low revenues from oil and gas, on which Indonesia's 
economy depended for over 85% at that time, with the heavy drain of its foreign 
currency reserves by increasing imports of rice and inputs, made the Indonesian 
Minister of Trade question the appropriateness of pesticide subsidies for rice. The 
FAO Inter-Country and Indonesian National IPM Programmes, in collaboration 
with Indonesian scientists, pursued with success Indonesia's commitment to IPM 
in rice as a national policy. 
Since 1987, high-level policy makers in Indonesia, persuaded by the effec-
tiveness of the Presidential Ban on insecticide use in rice in abating pest outbreaks, 
funded national development of IPM. Indonesia arrived at a classic example of a 
win-win situation: farmers (less hazards, less expenses), government (rationale 
was provided for abolishing costly pesticide subsidies) and public at large (envi-
ronmental gains) (Eveleens et al., 1996a). The National IPM Program in Indonesia 
showed in the 1990s a continuing development towards consolidation, expansion 
and institutionalisation. With technical assistance from the FAO Inter-Country 
Programme, the Indonesian National IPM Project trained about 800,000 farmers 
on IPM in Rice Based Cropping Systems which, increasingly, included elements 
of IPM for vegetables and soybean. Numerous farmer groups had emerged from 
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the FFSs and farmer trainers had organised themselves in associations. These asso-
ciations organized local IPM programs in almost all districts under the program 
(FAO, 1998). 
In Indonesia, the occurrence of several localized pest outbreaks revealed the 
existence of an active IPM network, that organized an effective integrated control 
before the authorities resorted to pesticide applications. Examples were the white 
stemborer outbreak in Indramayu, E Java, in 1991; outbreaks of BPH, Tungro and 
rice stemborers in C Java in 1996; and, in 1998, outbreaks of BPH in N Sumatera 
following strong advertisement by the industry for use of endosulfan against the 
golden apple snail. The growing capability for rapid action by an IPM Farmer Net-
work before the national Surveillance and Early Warning Systems (SEWS) 
engages DoAs Emergency Spraying Units or before the extension service advises 
to use insecticides, needs to be treasured as an indispensable component of nation-
al IPM implementation. The organized pressure of empowered, critical farmers is 
needed to impress the authorities and the agricultural services and to enforce poli-
cy changes at district level. 
In 1988, after the currency devaluation, the costs of an FFS averaged 200 US $ 
per season or 8 US$ per farmer when attended by 25 participants. The National 
Program commissioned health impact and gender studies and produced maps 
showing the agro-ecosystems of Java's major rice bowls (12 sheets), the pest pat-
terns and the cultivars planted. The continuation of IPM implementation on a scale 
as in Indonesia will depend on the availability of strong management capacity and 
considerable funding from international and national resources. 
To safeguard IPM as a plant protection and FFS as an extension approach a 
critical mass of supporters is needed among the Indonesian officials in the mid-
level of the central bureaucracy. The class of field-oriented Indonesian adminis-
trators and scientists, who participated in the national rice intensification schemes 
of the 1970s and 1980s and who saw the hopperburned fields, will retire early in 
the 21st century. Donors should realize that an internationally supported regional 
program will be needed to keep, with fresh arguments and data on results, the 
attention of policy-makers focused on the issue of national IPM implementation. 
The strategy of the FAO-backed IPM programs in Rice in S and SE Asia is 
based on preservation of the natural biodiversity of the rice field. Tropical rice is a 
complex and stable agricultural system because of the high species richness, abun-
dance and dispersion of natural enemy populations. The abundance of alternate 
food sources (non-herbivores) for parasitoids and predators at the various trophic 
levels of a rice ecosystem early in the growing season boost natural enemy popu-
lations well in advance of a rise in pest population numbers. If, nevertheless, pest 
populations would approach economic threshold levels, insecticides would almost 
always be counter-productive. 
The application of herbicides in direct seeded rice is increasing rapidly 
throughout SE Asia. The relationship between the technique of direct seeding, 
development of weed populations and herbicide efficacy is best studied in the large 
Rice Irrigation Schemes of Malaysia. The effect of herbicide use on natural enemy 
populations and their food sources in rice is, however, not known nor is any 
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research program of the kind announced. 
The control of rats and snails as also undertaken by the Inter-Country and 
National IPM Programmes in S and SE Asia. Control of these pest is, usually, suc-
cessful, but only for the short period that the cooperation of all farmers is obtained 
5.9. Conclusions 
1. The development of colonial agriculture without synthetic pesticides yielded 
ingenious combinations of regulatory, cultural and biological control measures. 
2. Research on mechanisms, properties and applications of biological control 
through natural enemies was fundamental, particularly in the Dutch East Indies, 
and well documented. 
3. The need to preserve and utilize the colonial records is evident. 
4. Considerable private investment in agriculture appeared to be a premise for the 
establishment of an initial agricultural research capacity and its proper mana-
gement and funding. 
5. The absence of such incentive delayed the development of agricultural research 
in Thailand. 
6. Development of IPM, before 1930, stemmed from a need to devise effective 
control mechanisms in the absence of synthetic pesticides. After 1945, the need to 
avoid the negative effects of pesticide use re-opened the search for alternative 
approaches to pest management. 
7. The findings of research on IPM in apples (Canada and the Netherlands), alfal-
fa (California) and protected crops (the Netherlands) had shown the causal rela-
tionship between pest outbreaks and pesticide use and led to an effective integrat-
ed control strategy. 
8. The large scale rice production intensification programs in SE Asia in the 1960s 
on the basis of Green Revolution technology and inherent over-use of insecticides 
caused outbreaks of planthoppers and leafhoppers in rice followed by virus epi-
demics and great losses mpadi yield. 
9. The insecticide-induced character of BPH, leafhopper and virus outbreaks 
(Tungro, Ragged Stunt and Grassy Stunt) was proven by IRRI scientists in the 
early 1970s. 
10. Trials demonstrated that indigenous natural enemies in untreated rice efficient-
ly prevented the build-up of insect populations. 
11. Contrary to the stance taken by the industry, the IPC and national programs 
maintain that insecticides are not an indispensable production factor in rice. 
12. The use of insecticides in rice tends to be counter-productive since it affects the 
stable composition of its natural enemy fauna. 
13. The effects of herbicide use in direct seeded rice are poorly understood. 
14. In view of the rapid increase of direct seeded rice and the corrolary use of her-
bicides, the effect of herbicides on the rice ecosystem and its natural enemy popu-
lations needs to be studied intensively. 
15. Numerous experiments in rice by IRRI and by the regional and national pro-
grams, yielded conclusive evidence that not using insecticides coupled to using 
adequate agronomic practice increases the likelihood of higher yields and, gener-
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ally, results in lower production costs by savings on pesticide application. 
16. The lack of resistance against BPH, leafhopper and viruses, in particular 
Tungro Virus, in early released IR-cultivars and in local improved selections was 
a major reason that insecticides were included in the Green Revolution technology 
package. 
17. Lack of resistence in early high yielding varieties and calender based spraying, 
jointly and in a synergistic fashion, unleashed the outbreaks of secondary pests 
such as BPH. 
18. The establishment of Surveillance and Early Warning Systems (SEWS) in SE 
Asia initially led to an increase in insecticide application in rice, a.o. by engaging 
the Emergency Control Units of DoA in the three countries, and thus contributed 
to a worsening of the situation. 
19. Aerial spraying operations on large tracts of rice in W, C and E Java, NW 
Sumatera and Bali triggered the large outbreaks of the 1970s by almost eliminat-
ing pest control by natural enemies during two years in sequence. 
20. Severe outbreaks of BPH in rice in Thailand occurred in the late 1980s only, 
when insecticide use in rice was stepped up due to an increase of the rice price. 
21. The implementation of IPM in rice based cropping systems was most success-
ful in Indonesia. 
22. In Malaysia, IPM related activities were incorperated in the technological guid-
ance for rice production extended to rice farmers in the large Rice Irrigation 
Schemes of Peninsular Malaysia. 
23. The lack commitment to the cause of IPM in Malaysia has much to do with the 
delegation of the management and education of rice farmers to the Scheme 
Authorities and with the countries Bumiputra politics. 
24. In Thailand, the IPM implementation in rice hardly reached the farmers due to 
a lack of political commitment and funding. 
25. In Thailand, inadequate communication between departments prevented the 
unity of mind needed for IPM implementation. 
26. The T&V method of extension, which is still the preferred approach in agri-
cultural extension in Malaysia and Thailand, demotivated the extension field offi-
cers and farmers. It could not compete with the sales efforts of pesticide suppliers 
in the country side. 
27. The FFS method of extension jolted farmers out of their traditional role as pas-
sive recipients of ill-understood and poorly appreciated instructions from above 
and into an active engagement in informed decision making on their own crop. 
28. The establishment of the FAO Inter-Country Programme for Integrated Pest 
Control in Rice in SE Asia, although born from need in view of increasing pest out-
breaks, was an audacious undertaking in view of the high interests of the chemical 
industry and of certain policy makers in an undisturbed pesticide market. 
29. Indonesia gave a strong boost to the credibility of IPM as a superior alternative 
to current practices and prompted re-adjustments in prevailing national crop 
protection policies in other ICP member countries (drive towards policy changes). 
30. The most injurious pest in rice on record are the field rats. 
31. The techniques and means for an Integrated Rat Management (IRM) are well-
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known and proven. Large-scale campaigns in the Dutch East Indies (1930s), 
Malaysia (1985-87), and Indonesia (1988-90) invariably stranded on lack of con-
certed, sustained action by the village community. 
32. The plague of the golden apple snail in rice provokes increased use of insecti-
cides (endosulfan) and, thus, creates a new danger for BPH resurgence. 
Notes 
1. Pathogenitism claims that one well-defined pathogen is the exclusive causal agent of one well-
defined disease (Zadoks, 1993). 
2. In 1946, the first case of tolerance to DDT in the house fly (Musca domestica) was reported in 
Sweden. Within 20 years, 127 agricultural pests were recorded as resistant to one or more groups of 
insecticides (Flint & Van den Bosch, 1891). 
3. In a reaction to 'Silent Spring' the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) reviewed pesticide reg-
istration procedures. The USDA banned most uses of DDT in 1972, and subsequently banned or severe-
ly restricted use of aldrin, dieldrin, endrin, heptachlor, DBCP, and chlordane (Flint & Van den Bosch, 
1981). 
4. Indonesia, Presidential Instruction 3/1986, November 5, 1986; Philippines, President Corazon 
Aquino on Policy Directions in Agriculture, point 5, Speech at Awarding ceremonies for 'Outstanding 
farmers of the year', May 30, 1986; Manila Bulletin, May 31, 1986; Malaysia, Minister of Agriculture, 
Anwar Ibrahim, declared at the Opening of the 2nd International Conference on Plant Protection in the 
Tropics that 'the current 1PM program in rice, jointly implemented with FAO, will be expanded to 
include crops such as cacao and vegetables'; India, the Federal Minister of Agriculture declared 1PM 
national policy in a speech, September, 1985 (Zadoks et al, 1986). 
5. Voute & Fluiter (1961) introduced the term ' harmonious control' in the Netherlands for the concept 
that internationally became known as llntegrated Pest Management'. The term 'harmonious' was used 
by Pickett and consorts (1958). 
6. Initially, 37 entomologists from various countries were invited on personal title to join the Panel for 
a term of four years. The Panel convened every one or two years at FAO, Rome. The American R.F. 
Smith was appointed as chairman. The Netherlands was represented by J.J. de Fluiter and J. de Wilde, 
and England by M.J. Way. After 1974, phytopathologists and herbologists were also invited as Panel 
member (Brader, 1987). 
7. In January 1980, FAO and UNDP launched an Action Programme for Improved Plant Protection 
with the objective of strengthening national plant protection services in various developing countries. 
This program was advised bij another Expert Committee on Pest Control (members included N. van 
Tiel (PD-NL), R. Kaske (GTZ-D), P. Haskell (COPR-UK), F,W. Whittemore (USAID). 
8. Among these American scientists, V. Stern is said to have masterminded the Integrated Control 
Concept. R.F. Smith was the politician who, although being a poor speaker, achieved great results 
through sheer tenacity (Way, pers, coram., 1997). 
9. De Fluiter (1969b) noted that the effective, integrated control of diseases and pests in Novia Scotia 
apple orchards was developed by trial and error before the mechanism of the system was understood. 
Pickett's system appeared to be rather location specific and the study of its principles followed later. 
10. E.W. Knipling worked with USDA on screwworm fly control in Texas since 1931. During World 
War II, he directed the testing of DDT for the army. In 1953. he shifted federal entomological research 
into non-chemical control projects. In 1959, Knipling introduced the paradigm of Total Population 
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Management which led to the eradication of the screwworm fly through sterile- male technique in Texas 
(Perkins, 1980). The Texas sterilization facilities were used for the elimination of the scewworm fly 
infestation in N Africa (FAO/Lybia Screwworm eradication project) during the 1980s. 
11. Supervised insect control. Control of insects and related organisms supervised by qualified ento-
mologists and based on conclusion reached from periodically measured population densities of pests 
and beneficial species (Stern et al, 1959). 
12. Smith recognized the need for pest management-consultants, trained to identify pests and their state 
of health, to carry out monitoring programs and to assist growers. The first supervised control expert, 
K.S. Hagen, was hired in 1946 to implement the integrated control program against alfalfa caterpillar 
(Flint & Van den Bosch, 1981). 
13. Paradigms consist of the results or exemplars of past work that are accepted by a community of sci-
entists and that supply the foundation for their further work. The two essential characteristics of para-
digms are a. their abilty to attract an enduring group of adherents away from competing modes of activ-
ity, and b. the presence of a sufficient number of problems for the adherents to resolve (Kuhn, 1970). 
14. In his 1979 Environmental Message, President Carter instructed the Council on Environmental 
Quality "to recommend actions which the Federal Government can take to encourage the development 
and application of techniques to be used for sound IPM programmes" (Smith, 1980). 
15. Stern et al. (1959) defined the economic-injury level as: 'The lowest population density that will 
cause economic damage. Economic damage is the amount of injury which will justify the cost of arti-
ficial control measures; consequently, the economic injury level may vary from area to area, season to 
season, or with man's changing scale of economic values'. 
16. In 1949, the Director of the Plant Protectio Service of the Netherlands, C.J. Briejer, warned for 
resistance in insects and residues as the inevitable outcome from the excessive reliance on chemical 
control (Briejer, 1949). In 1956, Briejer wrote'Zilveren sluiers'('Silverveiles'), a Dutch pendant of R. 
Carson's 'Silent Spring', with his advice 'Spray as little as you dare' (de Fluiter, 1969) (1969a). 
17. J. de Wilde, professor of entomology, was among the Dutch pioneers who saw the need to reduce 
pesticide use and to take the initiative in searching for alternative ways of pest control. Others were H.J. 
de Fluiter, D.J.Kuenen and E.D.Voute. 
18. In 1967, the name of the Dutch Working Group was changed into 'Working Group Integrated 
Control of Pests TNO', to adjust it to the internationally accepted terminology. 
19. Economic threshold is 'The density at which control measures should be determined to prevent an 
increasing population from reaching the economic-injury level' (Stern, 1973). 
20. Distribution has vastly expanded due to great improvement in formulation and packing technology 
for the living biological agents (Malais & Ravensberg, 1992). 
21. The diseases in winter wheat monitored by EPIPRE include Yellow Rust, Brown Rust, Mildew, 
Septoria Leaf Spot and Septoria Glume Blotch. Three species of aphids were taken together (Blokker, 
1982;Zadoks, 1989). 
22. In EPIPRE the farmers mailed data on soil type, cultivar, sowing date, developmental statge, nitro-
gen application dates and rates, pesticide applications, and the observations from successive inspections 
per individual plot to a central computer unit. Within 2 to 3 days, EPIPRE advises the farmers about the 
need (yes/no) of pesticide application for each registered plot. Sometimes a warning threshold is applied 
which is lower and earlier than the economic threshold to allow the farmer time to react (Zadoks, 1986). 
23. As field trials are costly , Zadoks (1986) recommended to employ the the new instrument of dynam-
ic simulation to substitute for field trials to a certain degree. 
24. The cess paid by the estates over 200,000 ha sugarcane planted in 1930 provided a research budg-
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et of approximately 1.5 M NGL (Koningsberger, 1948). 
25. The symptoms of sereh included diseased roots, red coloured gummed phloem vessels, shortened 
internodes and telescoping leafsheaths which made the sugarcane plant resemble Sere/j-grass 
(Cymbopogon nardus Rendle). 
26. Research on sereh and its causal agent was undertaken at the Plantentuin in Bogor, and at the three 
research stations. M. Treub (Bogor) and F. Soltwedel (Semarang) attributed sereh to nematodes, H.J. 
Wakker (Pasuruan) to physiological disorder, and F.A. Went (Tegal) suspected bacterial infection. Its 
contagious character was confirmed in 1923 by Ms. G Wilbrink who detected that warm water treat-
ment cured sereh-infested bibit (Koningsberger, 1948). Now-a-days, sereh is attributed to a virus infec-
tion (Eveleens, 1976). 
27. The German F. Soltwedel, Director of the Research Station of C Java, made contributions which 
included overcoming low sugarcane fertility, disease-free propagation through mountain bibit and 
establishment of a quarantine station. He died in 1892 at the age of 30 years. 
28. Sugarcane was commonly propagated through bibit, short sets of 3-5 internodes cut from the top 
part of factory cane (maalriet) at harvest. Cane from mountain gardens was entirely used for bibit pro-
duction, one hectare producing sets for planting 24 ha of factory fields. 
29. Mountain bibit was expensive due to the frequent field inspections and transport over great distan-
ces. In the 1890s, the costs of import bibit often exceeded NGL 15,000 per year for individual estates 
(Went, 1898). 
30. Before it had been assumed that sugarcane did not produce seed which could germinate 
(Koningsberger, 1948). Soltwedel obtained germination of sugarcane seed in 1886, the year in which 
Bovell and Harrison achieved the same feat in Barbados (Went, 1898). 
31. The Sugar Research Station at Pasuruan, E Java (Proefstation voor Suiker Oost Java, hence its 
acronym POJ) is one of the few places where sugarcane flowers easily. Many commercial cultivars have 
a parentage including one or more POJ-cultivars. 
32. Sugarcane, usually vegetatively propagated and highly heterozygous (compare potatoes), produces 
a heterogeneous F1 -progeny. At Pasuruan, hundreds of crosses were made wich required planting of 
hundreds of thousands plants for line selection. Selected lines were thereafter vegetatively propagated 
as factory cane (maalriet) (Koningsberger, 1948). 
33. In 1890, the colonial government commissioned the plant breeder J.C. Kobus to India to search for 
resistant sugarcane varieties. Hybridization of Indian cane accessions Chunnee and Ruckree with Java 
cultivars, such as Black Cirebon, provided many new POJ-lines with high sereh resistance but general-
ly uneconomic habitus (Koningsberger, 1948). 
34. Jeswiet decided in 1915 that Kassoer was a spontaneous bastard of the botanical species S. sponta-
neum (Glagah) and S. officinarum (Black Cirebon). In 1911, J. Wilbrink obtained from the cross (100 
POJ X Kassoer) the resistant line POJ 2364. Crossing of the latter with EK-28 (the best cultivar devel-
oped by planters) yielded the resistant POJ 27 and 28 series, rich in sugar. Further crosses with these 
lines yielded, in 1921, the sereh resistant, high yielding 2878 POJ and 2883 POJ cultivars (Konings-
berger, 1948). 
35. As indicated by its name (pokkah = malformed), bung = shoot) the disease causes breakage of the 
young leaves still enclosed in the leafsheath and rot of the top shoot. It occurs at the onset of the rains 
which stimulate sudden, strong cane growth. 
36. Description of Yellow Stripe Disease by Van Musschenbroek (Circulaire No .42, Surabaya 
Vereeniging, 16 Oct. 1892: 327). Nitrogen application remitted the mosaic symptoms in the sugarcane 
leaves temporarily. 
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37. The effectiveness of controlling white top borer by excising borer infested tissue in three-weeks 
intervals was analysed from estate data collected over the period 1930-34 (Kalshoven, 1951). 
38. Analysis of the statistical records of the Sugar Research Institute over 1931-32 showed that, for 
instance, the ubiquitus wasp Elasmus zehntneri parasitized on average only 3-4 per cent of the white 
top borer larvae in W and E Java (Kalshoven, 1951). 
39. Cryolite (aluminium trisodium fluoride) is an about 98% pure, naturally occurring mineral with a 
stomach and contact insecticidal action (BCPC, 1979: 132). 
40. The phytopatholgist J. Van Breda de Haan was sent by Treub from Bogor to Deli on 6 month mis-
sions. Van Breda de Haan identified Phytophthera nicotianae as the causal agent of the nursery disease. 
In 1906, van Breda de Haan, was appointed as the Director of the Deli Tobacco Research Station at 
Medan. 
41. The Research Station for Java-tobacco, Klaten, issued detailed instructions for removal and burn-
ing of all diseased plant in field furnesses, for cleaning of harvested fields before tillage, for disinfect-
ing soil around infested plants before their removal, for common use of plant debris by the people and 
composting of debris of healthy plants (Thung, 1938). 
42. Slime disease causes wilting of the leaves at one side of the plant and rotting of tops and roots. 
Whitish slime oozing from cut stems contains great quantity of bacteria and is very infectious. 
43. Differences in resistance against Helopeltis are also reported for cacao varieties in Ivory Coast, 
Africa (Zadoks, pers. comm., 1997). 
44. The Cacao Proefstation at Salatiga was instituted in March 1901 and L. Zehntner was appointed 
Director. It was built amidst cacao estates and financed by the cacao cess fund to which members con-
tributed on basis of area planted. The Station's Bulletins (Mededeelingeri) reported on results (Toxopeus 
& Wessel, 1983). 
45. Jember Research Institute for Highland Crops, E Java, is the new name given, in 1980, to the for-
mer Besuki Research Station, E Java, which had been the centre for coffee research since 1911. 
Research at Jember includes improvement of coffee, cacao, rubber and Besuki tobacco, as well as the 
management of pests and diseases in these highland crops. 
46. To whipe out the gramang ants pits were dug in the soil under the trees which were filled with dead 
leaves. Within days the restless gramang ants build their nests in these pits, which there upon are fumi-
gated with HCN or carbonbisulphide under a layer of earth (Giesberger 1983). 
47. Ph. Levert was agronomist of the 1500 ha Siloewok Sawangan cocoa plantation - by far the largest 
cacao estate in E Java at the time - and G Giesberger microbiologist of the Experiment Station at 
Malang. These scientists and Betrem re-activated the research on Helopeltis control in the late 1930s 
(Levert, 1940). 
48. Djati Roenggo hybrid cacao was the result of crossing Venezuela X Criollo varieties; the basterd 
was named after the plantation in E Java (Wessel-Riemens, 1983). 
49. Laoh (1955) showed that application of endrin at a frequency of 16 sprays per year gave effective 
control of CPB and Helopeltis in field trials. But costs were prohibitive. 
50. The stemboring beetle Glenea novemguttata Cast, was formerly a minor cacoa pest in C Java. 
Control took place by catching beetles at certain times of the year and by excising its larvae from infest-
ed stem tissue (Kalshoven, 1951). 
51. Coffee Leaf Rust, an African fungal disease, was first detected on Ceylon in 1869, where it 
destroyed the thriving coffee cultivation. The disease reached via Padang Highlands, Sumatera, the 
Botanical Garden (Cultuurtuin) at Bogor and the adjacent estates in 1876. 
52. In 1900, a Dutch plantation company bought 150 robusta seedlings from a Belgian company, which 
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copies were distributed. 
82. A FAO mission reviewing the Indonesian National IPM Programme commented: "A rigid system 
equipped to move simplistic messages to a large number of passive farmers could not absorb the ener-
gy of IPM's field skills training. A transformation from within was needed to meet the new challenges 
from outside" (Whitten et al, 1990). 
83. The National IPM Program was managed by a National Steering Committee, chaired by BAPPE-
NAS, and a Working Group with members from various ministries and national universities. It establish-
ed field training centres and organized courses for extension and plant protection officers and farmers. 
84. The Gol received a grant from USAID to the value of about 4.2 M US$ to finance the services of 
FAO for a duration of 24 months. The counterpart commitment included costs of staff, administrative 
services and facilities, local supplies, transport and communications (FAO, 1989). 
85. A survey of 2,000 Indonesian rice farmers before and after IPM training carried out by the nation-
al program in 1991 showed that IPM farmers reduced pesticide use by an average of 58% per season. 
86. Carbofuran was still permitted on rice under the IPM policy and was included in the intensification 
package (SUPRA INSUS). A major carbofuran formulation plant had been built in Jalur Pantur. 
87. The variety IR64 has yet another gene for BPH resistance (BPH3) but appeared to be more suscep-
tible to white stemborer attack. Kenmore (1991b) called it a precise example of the limits of applying 
that specific form of biodiversity called genetic diversity. 
88. Field studies included white stemborer problems in W Java, a health impact study in C Java (Kishi 
et al, 1993 ), training evaluation studies, and integrated disease and weed management and integrated 
rat control in rice and palawija crops. An IPM database was set up too (van de Fliert, 1993; Eveleens 
etal, 1996b). 
89. DITLIN's field leaders at sub-provincial and district level supervised about 10-15 pest observers per 
district with an average population of 1 to 2 million people (Eveleens et al., 1996b). 
90. The 600,000 farmers correspond to 3% of the 20 million farmers living in the 12 provinces covered 
by the Indonesian IPM project (Eveleens et al. 1996b). 
91. Pest Observers and Extension Workers, acting as trainers in FFSs, were at the same time often 
involved in the supply of intensification 'packages', which at times still contain pesticides, which they 
were often compelled to promote (Eveleens et al, 1996b). 
92. Quality of FFSs was of particular concern due to shortage of funding and low attendance rates (on 
average 16 participants instead of 25 targeted per FFS). The 1996 budget for a FFS amounted to 550 
US$. A locally funded FFS of similar quality conducted by a Farmer Trainer costed around 50 US$ (E-
veleens etal., 1996b). 
93. The National IPM Committee, chaired by the Director of Crop Protection, consisted of a Secreta-
riate within the Section Plant Diseases of the Crop Protection Branch of DoA; a Technical Committee 
for Rice IPM chaired by the MARDI Research Director for Rice; and Operational Units in the Rice 
Irrigation Schemes of Peninsular Malaysia. 
94. Working groups included DoA-MARDI groups for biological control, development of ETL-values 
for rice pests, and for screening and improved application of insecticides. 
95. In Tanjung Kareng Irrigation Scheme at Selangor two IPC pilot areas were selected. The most 
advanced farmer IPM training in Tanjung Kareng, Sawah Sempadan, in 1981 involved 39 groups of 5 
persons meeting 2 times per week during the season. 
96. Group farming entails that the farmers of an irrigation block join together to manage larger tracts 
of land thus bringing economies of scale in labour, mechanisation, harvesting, credit, information activ-
ities and IPC effectiveness. In the MADA scheme during the 1980s, harbouring 63,000 farm families, 
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there were 238 farmers' groups. 
97. The DG DoA held the view that the origin of IPM was to be sought in residue problems from pes-
ticide over-use in 1983 rather than in pesticide-induced outbreaks. He argued that IPM in rice effec-
tively reduced only insecticide use, whereas the use of herbicide and rodenticide increased all the time 
(Whittenefa/., 1990). 
98. The FAO review mission remarked in 1990 that "lip service is given to a national IPM policy and 
program but implementation is truncated and dependent on individuals" (Whitten et a!., 1990). 
99. Prominent Malaysian IPM scientists and administrators, after leaving MARDI or the Plant 
Protection Branch, took up positions with the FAO Inter-Country Programme, the International Institu-
te for Biological Control, IRRI or FAO. The enthousiastic and effective Secretary of the National 
Committee was transferred to Alor Setar as head of extension training. 
100. Three trials were conducted in Pathumthani Province on 82 ha of rice fields of 22 farmer families. 
Although called 'Demonstration IPM Paddies' the DOAE did not try to involve neighbouring farmers. 
The finding that reducing treatments from 7 to less than 3 per season did not decrease rice yields was 
not exploited. Kenmore (1991b) observed that DOAE's staff seemed not to be appreciative of the social 
technology that had proven necessary in other countries to make IPM projects work with farmers. 
101. Under the Thai German Plant Protection Program, the GTZ built 31 well-equipped Plant Protecti-
on Centres in the regions of Thailand in the neighbourhood of DOAE extension officies. GTZ further 
organized training in IPM and rat control, and provided overseas fellowships. 
102. The Extension Service (DOAE) had a policy of providing free pesticides if a local infestation 
affected more than 85 ha (500 rai). Free samples were given to farmers for smaller areas so that the 
farmers knew what they could purchase through private outlets (Kenmore, 1991b). 
103. The landtax office (landrentekantoor) reported the follow-ing amounts of tax exemption granted 
because of rat damage in sawah in the Residency Chirebon, NW Java: NGL 76,691 in 1931, NGL 
18,084 in 1932, and NFL 31,181 in 1933. The amount of exemption for 1933 in the Residency Bantam 
amounted to 24% of the total tax on sawah (Mededeelingen van het IPZ, 84, 1933: 7-15). 
104. Mededeelingen van het IPZ, 84,1933; 85, 1934; 86, 1935; 89, 1936, reported various cost items 
but not in a systematical way. The cost of rat control appeared to vary from 5 to 20 cents/ha in west 
(October-Februari) and east monsoon (May-Augiust) respectively. 
105. Before 1934, farmers of W Karawang considered growing padi gadoe in the dry monsoon as too 
risky in view of the high rat density. Around-the year rat control increased the planting of padi gadoe 
in W Karawang from 1,750 ha in 1934 to 14,891 ha in 1936. Therefore, in a cost/benefit analysis the 
padi gadoe yield of 37,500 tonnes valued at NGL 660,000 was considered as return on investment W 
Karawang over whole 1936. (Mededeelingen an het IPZ, 89, 1936: 14-15). 
106. Phosporpaste was a concoction of white phosphor, palm oil, rice flour and sugar. The paste is dilut-
ed with water and the bait ingredients are is dipped in the slur. 
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Chapter 6 
Horticulture and IPM in SE Asia 
6.1. Horticultural production and Integrated Pest Management 
6.1.1. Introductory remarks to horticulture in SE Asia. Horticulture is a collec-
tive noun for a range of cultivation practices pertaining to the production of veg-
etables, herbs, fruits, ornamental plants and flowers. For a discussion of plant pro-
tection issues, pesticide use and pest and disease management in horticulture, three 
main types of horticulture are distinguished, each with considerable diversity in 
crop protection practices. 
1. Mixed home (kitchen) garden, planted with a great variety of fruit bearing trees 
and plants, herbs, and annual and perennial vegetables1. The production of the gar-
den is often supplemented by the leaves, fruits and tubers of crops the farmer 
grows in rotation with rice, such as groundnut, soybean, cassava, jute, sweet pota-
to, taro and cowpea. Production is partly for household needs but surplus is traded 
in the local market. 
2. Intensive market gardening which accounts for a large part of the local market 
supplies in SE Asia. This type arose in response to the development of roads and 
transportation, and to the rapid urbanisation (Oomen & Grubben, 1978). 
3. Large scale commercial horticulture, which includes fruit orchards, vegetables 
and fruit plants grown as field crops, and flower or ornamental plant nurseries. 
Commercial enterprises, demanding a considerable investment, came into exist-
ence where and when structured market organizations garanteed a regular and reli-
able demand. It includes the production by contract growers for nucleus process-
ing industries such as fruit canning and sap extraction. 
Horticultural production for the market usually entails farmers using intensive 
cultivation practices to obtain high quality produce. The production systems are 
characterized by relatively high inputs of knowledge, cash, labour and materials 
(seed, planting stock, fertilizers and pesticides). For vegetables and flowers the 
production cycle is usually short, two or three months. Generally, several crops are 
grown in monoculture or rotation on the same plot in one year, which may lead to 
an increase in infestation rates by injurious organisms. Some 80 species of vegeta-
bles are sufficiently profitable for today's labour-intensive market garden produc-
tion. Some 20 species are exploited in highly commercialized protected cultivation 
systems (Terra, 1966; Oomen & Grubben, 1978). 
Commercial vegetable growing is concentrated in the highlands for temperate 
type vegetables (e.g. head cabbage, potato), and in the lowlands for annual hot-sea-
son type vegetables (e.g. hot pepper, pumpkin, amaranth) or in swamp soils and 
ponds for waterplant-type vegetables (lotus lily, kangkong, watercress) (table 
6.1.1.a). Nurseries for flowers and ornamentals are recent developments although 
flowers, such as lotus, hibiscus and jasmine are traditionally grown in quantity for 
use in religious and civil ceremony. 
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Commercial lowland orchards grow fruits such as citrus, mango, papaya, 
rambutan, litchi and durian. Banana, pineapple and water melon are major fruit 
bearing plants grown as field crops (table 6.1.1.b). Highland production of grapes 
is important in Thailand. The production of apples, restricted to few high plateaus 
of Java and Malaysia, is not very successful. 
The vegetable and fruit sector created an important processing industry and 
Table 6.1.l.a. Estimated production of major vegetables in a. planted area (x 1,000 ha) 
and b. produce (x 1,000 tonnes) in Indonesia and Thailand in 1988. Sources: Lembang 
Horticultural Institute, Indonesia; Department of Agricultural Extension, Thailand. 
Vegetable crop Indonesia Thailand 
a b a b 
Lowland 
Allium cepa (shallot) 
Amaranthus spp. (amaranth) 
Capsicum spp. (hot/bird pepper, chili) 
Cucumis sativus (cucumber) 
Cucurbita spp. (pumpkin, gourds, okra) 
Ipomoea aquatica (kangkong) 
Phaseolus vulgaris (kidney bean) 
Solarium melongena (eggplant) 
Vigna unguiculata (yard-long bean) 
Zea mays (maize, young cobs) 
sub-total lowland vegetables 459 2024 196 1028 
Highland 
Allium fistulosum (Welsh onion) 
Allium sativum (garlic) 
Brassica oleracea (cabbage, Chinese kale) 
Brassica juncea (leaf mustard) 
Brassica rapa (Chinese cabbage, caisin) 
Daucus carota (carrot, wortel) 
Lycopersicon esculentum (tomato) 
Phaseolus vulgaris (French bean) 
Raphanus sativus (Chinese radish) 
Solarium tuberosum (potato) 
Sub-total highland vegetables 218 2145 67 741 
Total 677 4169 263 1769 
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66 
22 
137 
40 
4 
10 
51 
32 
97 
? 
391 
84 
441 
291 
173 
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63 
168 
280 
? 
21 
? 
121 
16 
10 
5 
? 
? 
10 
13 
269 
? 
328 
143 
108 
23 
9 
? 
75 
82 
25 
16 
44 
? 
27 
11 
32 
23 
4 
36 
163 
90 
809 
? 
220 
124 
195 
105 
28 
411 
2 
31 
15 
5 
5 
? 
6 
? 
3 
? 
41 
330 
186 
43 
46 
? 
70 
? 
32 
? 
therewith new earning capacity and employment opportunity. Statistics on veg-
etable and fruit production are not very reliable because they record, at best, only 
the planted area and the production of major crops which enter the trade. The many 
minor crops and the large home garden production cannot be properly estimated. 
Practices such as mixed cropping, relay cropping, repeated harvesting ('ratoon-
ing'), and alternating bearing of fruit trees blurr any estimation of production 
(Grubben & Siemonsma, 1993). Therefore, the tables 6.1.1.a, b and 6.3.1, showing 
production data for vegetables and fruits, serve as an indication only for the dimen-
sion of plant protection problems. 
6.1.2. Factors influencing vegetable and fruit growing. The population develop-
ment of noxious organisms and the chance that crops become infested is i.a. influ-
enced by temperature, humidity, origin of crops, cultivation system, water manage-
ment, and quality of the planting material. 
Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand have a monsoon-type climate with a high 
mean temperature and high relative humidity during most of the year. The high-
lands, which are the traditional areas of commercial vegetable production, are 
characterized by markedly distinct wet and dry seasons. Many insect pests, such as 
lepidopterous larvae, cause more damage during the dry months July/August than 
in the rainy months March/April. In the rainy season, larval mortality is high due 
to fungal parasites (Eveleens & Vermeulen, 1976; Buurma & Nurmalinda, 
Table 6.1. l.b. Mean production (x 1,000 t) of fruits in Indonesia and Thailand in 1986 
and 1987, and production in Peninsular Malaysia in the year 1989. Sources: Various, 
Indonesia; Ministry of Agriculture, Malaysia; Department of Agricultural Extension, 
Thailand. 
Fruits 
Banana, Musa spp 
Cashew nut, Anacardium occidentale 
Chempedak, Artocarpus integra 
Citrus, Citrus spp 
Durian, Durio zibethinus 
Guava, Psidium guajava 
Jackfruit, Artocarpus heterophyllus 
Langsat, Lansium domesticwn 
Mango, Mangifera indica 
Mangosteen, Garcinia mangostana 
Papaya, Carica papaya 
Pineapple, Ananas comosus 
Rambutan, Nephelium lappaceum 
Watermelon, Citrullus lanatus 
Indonesia 
1994 
68 
? 
530 
175 
? 
? 
64 
416 
? 
285 
559 
146 
9 
Malaysia 
200 
? 
81 
10 
299 
54 
23 
72 
25 
33 
12 
129 
59 
82 
Thailand 
572 
35 
23 
559 
414 
55 
392 
101 
380 
67 
? 
? 
477 
? 
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1992a,b). Serious fungus diseases such as Phytophthora infestans (late blight on 
potato), Colletotrichum capsici (anthracnose fruit rot), Plasmopara and Perono-
spora spp (downy mildews), and Pythium debaryanum (damping-off) are more 
prominent in wet periods (Yang, 1989). 
Pest and disease pressure is, generally, high in vegetable and fruit crops. This 
is not only due to the fast reproduction rate of noxious organisms in humid warm 
weather, but also because most commercially planted highland vegetables were 
introduced from temperate climate zones in the 20th century. The following factors 
are involved, a. these temperate-type vegetables possess resistance or escape 
mechanisms well adapted to countering noxious organisms in their area of origin, 
which generally fail in the new tropical environment (Lim, 1990a). In commercial 
vegetable farming such failing defence mechanisms were routinely substituted by 
pesticide applications (Eveleens & Vermeulen, 1976); b. if water supply is suffi-
cient, vegetable crops are grown on a year-round basis. This enables a continuous 
reproduction of pest insects and pathogens. Without adequate rotation, multiple 
cropping causes a rapid build-up of soil-borne diseases and nematodes; c. com-
mercial vegetables are often planted in mono-cultural or simple inter-cropping pat-
terns with poor ecological balance, largely devoid of effective natural enemies. 
Examples are the large area monocultures of shallot in Brebes, N Java, and Chieng 
Rai, N Thailand, and of leek in Brastagi, N Sumatera; d. several exotic pests have 
been introduced which may remain uncontrolled for lack of matching parasitoids 
(Lim, 1990a). An example is the beet army worm (Spodoptera exigua); e. damag-
ing organisms are easily spread throughout the region because of the lively trade 
in fresh produce, and in non-disinfected seed and planting material. Implementation 
of quarantine regulations and fumigation at points of entry is often failing. 
The pest and disease pressure in a traditional home garden is relatively low 
though fruit flies and viruses are ubiquitous. Its mixture of fruit trees, herbs and 
vegetables provides a more balanced ecosystem conducive to natural enemies. 
Family members protect valuable fruit by bagging, control pests by hand picking 
and repellent herbs and weeds by handweeding rather than resorting to chemical 
control. AVRDC proved in garden experiments in Taiwan, that a non-sprayed 
kitchen garden of 16 m2 yields a year-round supply of fresh vegetables for a fam-
ily of six persons. In Vietnam, kitchen gardens are routinely planted with Tagetes 
spp, which suppress nematodes (Lim & Oudejans, 1991). It is common practice to 
plant vegetables in open spaces within field crops, on field borders and on bunds 
along flooded rice fields. Vegetables planted in greater quantity in an extensive 
rain-dependent production with low use of fertilizer, pesticides and labour, yield a 
considerable part of the low priced, poor quality produce found in any tropical 
market (Grubben & Siemonsma, 1993). Little is known about pesticide use in such 
extensive vegetables production systems. When vegetables are grown close to or 
amidst heavily sprayed cash crops, the produce may be heavily contaminated 
(Oudejans & Mumford, 1988). 
In commercial farms vegetables are grown under rainfed or irrigated conditions 
either in permanent production or in rotation with other upland food crops such as 
maize and soybean. In wet field {sawah and deep water rice) systems, vegetables 
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are grown on residual soil moisture during the dry season following wet season 
rice. The flooding during the rice season largely eliminates soil-borne pests and 
diseases and suppresses in particular the growth of broadleaf weeds (Grubben & 
Siemonsma, 1993). But easily dehiscing grassweeds {Echinochloa crus-galli, and 
wild rices), which mimic rice plants, may become very troublesome in crops 
grown after rice. The sedges (Cyperus rotundus, C. irea) have become a real prob-
lem already since ever more rice fields are turned into permanent vegetable plots 
(Grubben, pers. comm., 1998). 
Many vegetables are grown in inter-cropping systems, often taking the form of 
relay cropping, in which the growing period of earlier and later planted crops, or 
of crops with long and short production periods concur. Advantages of relay crop-
ping are, 1. spreading the risk of crop failure, 2. more intensive use of scarce land, 
3. protection of crops against some pests and diseases, 4. higher economic returns 
from expensive chemical inputs and, 5. more regular income. 
From the view point of plant protection, mixed cropping contains important 
elements of IPM. Certain combinations of crops lower the risk of insect, fungus or 
virus infections. For example, tomato repels diamondback moth in cabbage where-
as rape (Brassica campestris ssp. oleifera) is a trap crop for DBM (Sudarwohadi, 
1987). An older crop shields a younger crop against sunburn and shades out weed 
growth. The mixed and relay cropping systems have, however, certain disadvan-
tages, such as hindering crop specific measures as e.g. rotation and solarization for 
nematode control, and the application of selective pesticides and selective chemi-
cal weeding. Generally, intercropping augments the number of factors involved in 
decision making in an integrated approach. It requires considerable knowledge and 
skill of the vegetable growers and a high input of (family) labour. 
A major obstacle to commercial horticulture is the lack of healthy seed and suf-
ficiently resistant varieties (van der Riet, 1988). Many resistant varieties developed 
for the temperate climate are not adapted to humid tropical conditions with high 
night temperatures2 and do not produce seed. Selection and breeding of resistant 
vegetable types adapted to the climatic conditions prevailing in SE Asia has yet 
yielded only few commercially interesting cultivars. But the number of public 
institutions and private seed companies working on tropical vegetables is rising3 in 
response to growing demand (Asian Seed Vol. 1/1:6-7, Vol. 1/6:10, 1994; Groot, 
1990). Unfortunately, maintenance of good germinative power of seed and plant-
ing material in storage and trade, and protection against infestation are often poor 
(Groot, 1990; author's observations). Pelleting of seed with fungicides and insecti-
cides offers good prospects but pelleting equipment is hardly available locally. 
Seed certification and quality control are receiving too little attention (Zadoks, 
pers. comm., 1998). In the case of vegetatively propagated crops, the lack of dis-
ease-free planting material posed a serious limitation to productivity. Seed potatoes 
obtained through selection in local potato lines, multiplied during many genera-
tions, are often infested by viruses or soil-borne pathogens. The main methods 
used to control virus diseases are basically those intended to prevent infection 
(Beukema & Van der Zaag, 1990). Under tropical conditions, the production of 
virus-free seed potatoes could formerly only be achieved by rigorous roguing and 
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control of vectors (a.o. aphids). Today, laboratory facilities for meristem culture 
and micropropagation are available in Thailand, Indonesia and Vietnam for the 
production of virus-free seed stock (Commandeur & Pistorius, 1992; Oudejans, 
1996). Tissue culture is also used for virus-free vegetative propagation of onion, 
leek and garlic (Centerpoint Vol. 13/1, 1995: 6-7) and ornamentals (orchid, 
Chrysanthemum, rose) (MARDI, 1975). 
6.1.3. General situation regarding pests, diseases and weeds. Vegetables in 
general are succulent, nutritious plants which attract all kinds of pests and pathogens. 
The total assortment of vegetables and field legumes (Grubben & Siemonsma, 1993; 
Terra, 1966; Saturaya & Grubben, 1995) and their associated key pests and diseases 
is wide (Lim, 1989, 1990b; Yang, 1989, 1990; Jangi et al, 1991). 
The economically most important botanical families of vegetables, such as 
Cruciferae and Solanaceae, are attacked by a wide variety of pests and diseases. 
Among the most destructive pests of crucifers (Chinese cabbage, Chinese kale, 
head cabbage, cauliflower, leaf mustard, and edible rape) are the diamondback 
moth (DBM) {Plutella xylostella) (Lim, 1988) in highland and lowland areas, and 
the cabbage webworm (Hellula undalis), which causes the forming of multiple 
heads in cabbage, in the lowlands (Syed & Loke, 1995). Other serious cabbage 
pests are the beet army worm {Spodoptera exigua), flea beetles (Phyllotreta vitta-
ta), cabbage semiloopers {Trichoplusia chalcites) and the cabbage head worm 
(Crocidolomia binotalis) (Sutarya & Grubben, 1995; Ooi et al, 1992). Common 
diseases of crucifers are Bacterial Soft Rot (Erwinia carotovora), Black Rot (Xan-
thomonas campestris), Club Root (Plasmodiophora brassicae), Black Leg (Phoma 
lingam), Downy Mildew {Peronosporaparasitica), Cabbage Mosaic (turnip mosa-
ic virus TuMV) (Yang, 1989; Praasterink, 1996 a). 
Solanaceous crops (potato, tomato, hot pepper, eggplant) are threatened by a 
range of polyphagous borers, such as the tomato fruit worm {Helicoverpa 
armigera) and beetles {Epilachna spp.) Serious diseases are Late Blight (Phytoph-
thora infestans) on potato, P. solani on tomato, Bacterial Wilt (Pseudomonas sol-
anacearum) and viruses such Tomato Mosaic Virus (TMV) (Beukema & Van der 
Zaag, 1990; Praasterink 1996 b; FAO, 1998b). The worst diseases of hot pepper 
include anthracnose (Colletotrichum capsici) and various viruses (Vos, 1994). 
As happened with brown planthopper in rice, certain minor pests of vegetables 
have become major problems. Thrips, a complex of species with a wide host range 
affecting a.o. tobaco, are difficult to control due to resurgence following devel-
opment of pesticide resistance and lack of effective parasites and predators. For 
DBM, cabbage webworm and certain fruit boring caterpillars, effective parasitoids 
are available (Lim & Di, 1990; Jangi et al, 1991; Talekar, 1991; Jusoh etal, 1992; 
MARDI, 1992) but their activity is often impaired by wanton application of pesti-
cides. The situation might be aggravated when serious pest and disease problems 
occur for which no adequate control is available yet. For instance, citrus cultivation 
on Java suffered heavily from Citrus Vein Phloem Degeneration disease (CVPD) 
caused by a mycoplasma and transmitted by a psyllid (Eveleens & Vermeulen, 1976). 
Weeds constitute a major cost-increasing factor for vegetable and fruit growers. 
190 Wageningen Agricultural University Papers 99-1 (1999) 
The major weeds in horticulture are well described4 for Asia in general and for 
Indonesia in particular. Although the plots of commercial farms and nurseries are 
intensively tilled and planted with crops over the greater part of the year, pressure 
of weed growth is usuallly high. Weeds are controlled by flooding, handweeding, 
hoeing, or with the help of a powertiller. The placing of vegetative mulch on veg-
etable beds and around individual plants or trees is a common method of sup-
pressing weed growth, preserving soil moisture and controlling soil erosion by rain 
and wind. Where labour is scarce and costly, chemical weeding with herbicides is 
on the increase. An integrated approach to weed control aimed at stabilization of 
weed populations, depletion of weed seed reserves (seed bank) in the soil, and 
maintenance of control efficacy has not yet received much attention. Integrated 
weed management (IWM) striving for sustainable forms of control at low costs 
(Post & Wijnands, 1993) is still a largely unexplored field for farmers of SE Asia. 
Presently, IWM practices for tropical horticulture appear to receive most attention 
from biological farmers practising low-external input sustainable agriculture 
(LEISA) (Reyntjes et al, 1992). Since IWM and IPM have a number of overlap-
ping strategies (e.g. fermenting of compost to kill pathogens and weed seeds, rogu-
ing of weeds which host pest insects, timely burning of debris on the field), mes-
sages on integrated weed control could be incorporated in IPM field school train-
ing (Lim & Oudejans, 1991). 
6.1.4. Pesticide issues in vegetable and fruit farming. From the 1960s on, grow-
ers have sprayed heavily with insecticides and fungicides against pests and dis-
eases. Generally, they either preferred inexpensive pesticides with broad-spectrum 
activity or applied mixtures of several insecticides and fungicides as a safeguard to 
injury (Eveleens & Vermeulen, 1976; Buurma & Nurmalinda, undated). In com-
mercial vegetable, fruit and flower growing, where any injury or blemish lowers 
the market value of the produce, preventive application of pesticides is the rule 
(van derNoll & Savitri, 1989; Jourdain & Rattanasatien, 1995). Insecticides gave 
good control for reasonable prices. Research is mostly concentrated on pesticide 
efficacy tests and since researchers were often payed by the industry for registra-
tion trials alternative control methods were not sought. In fact, most vegetable 
farmers believe that it is impossible to grow vegetables without frequent and high 
dosage applications of pesticides (van Keulen & SchQnherr, 1992). 
Because the market share of pesticides for vegetables, ornamentals and fruits 
has been growing rapidly (ch 7), the industry continues to invest heavily in new 
product development and promotion. Consequently, vegetable farmers are exposed 
to a stream of information about product performance from commercial sales 
agents and extension agents, without having the knowledge and means to verify the 
claims. It was, however, observed in Indonesia and Thailand that farmers rely on a 
limited number of favoured chemicals5 applied repeatedly rather than taking risks 
with new products (Buurma & Nurmalinda, 1992b; Jourdain & Rattanasatien, 
1995). 
In SE Asia, as elsewhere, researchers in the public and private sector performed 
innumerable trials since World War II to test and demonstrate the use of pesticides. 
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Generally, the quality of research is high and recommendations correctly based on 
findings in well controlled experiments. However, the translation of research find-
ings to the practice of a complicated pest and disease situation in exotic vegetables 
growing in the humid tropics requires expert extension. Since the latter is lacking 
and the average grower has a poor understanding of causal agents and of the ways 
to manage pests and pesticides judiciously, ineffective schedule spraying and prod-
uct misuse are common practice. Buurma & Nurmalinda (1992a) concluded from 
a survey of farmers' practices on shallots in Brebes, N Java, that growers do not 
follow a clear-cut strategy for chemical control. A high pesticide use, involving 
mixtures of varying composition, was found to increase incidence of armyworm 
(Spodoptera spp) larvae and to lower shallot yields, thus tempting the farmers to 
spray more often. 
Through overreliance on chemical control, genetic resistance against pesticides 
began to build up in many pests and, in the 1990s, no single chemical gives ade-
quate control of the whole pest complex in vegetables (Soekarna & Kilin, 1988). 
Farmers respond by increasing dosages and frequency, and by applying mixtures 
or 'cocktails' of insecticides and fungicides (Talekar,1995; Jourdain & Rattana-
satien, 1995; Vos, 1994). The resistance of DBM on cabbage to all major classes 
of synthetic and biological insecticides is notorious and the direct result of exces-
sive use and poor understanding of pesticide activity (Sudderuddin & Kok, 1978; 
Lim, 1989; Sinchaisri et ah, 1990; Verkerk et ah, 1996). Exceptional misuse of 
insecticides for the control of four Spodoptera species6 occurring simultaneously 
on shallot and onions in Brebes, C Java, was reported by Talekar (1995). 
Throughout the region the trend in insecticide use for vegetables and the result-
ing resistance pattern has been essentially the same, a shift from early botanicals 
in the 1930s to organochlorines in the 1940s, then to organophosphates and carba-
mates, and in the 1970s to pyrethroids (Soekarna & Kilin, 1988). In the 1980s, acyl-
urea insect growth regulators (IGRs), which induce inhibition of chitin synthesis, 
and insecticides with anti-feeding or repellant effect at sub-lethal dosages were 
applied against DBM (Tan, 1988). Pheromones, biorational insecticides based on 
Bacillus thuringiensis Berliner (Bt) and abamectin proved to be effective against 
DBM and certain army worms in Malaysia (Syed, 1992) and elsewhere, ^-resist-
ance in DBM was, however, reported in Taiwan (AVRDC,1996). 
IGRs, Bt-based products and abamectin were extensively used by farmers in 
the Cameron Highlands, Malaysia, for their compatibility with parasitoids as con-
trol agents (Ooi & Lim, 1989; Loke et ah, 1992, 1996). Alarmingly, even against 
these IGRs and biorational insecticides resistance7 appeared rapidly after their 
introduction (Verkerk et ah, 1996). As a result, farmers decreased the use of 
abamectin and Bt. kurstaki (Btk) leading to increased reliance on Bt. aizawai (Bta). 
In order to prevent a complete loss of environmentally-compatible insecticides 
such as Bta due to insecticide resistance an Insecticide Resistance Management 
(IRM) program in Malaysia was proposed in 1996 (Verkerk et ah, 1997). Such 
IRM program for DBM entailed a tentative pesticide alternation scheme8 on a 'one 
mode of action per generation' basis. Resistance developed also against fungicides 
in certain pathogens. For example, in Malaysia resistance against benomyl and car-
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bendazim was demonstrated in an isolate of Colletotrichum capsici (Lim, 1989). 
Vegetable farmers know little about selectivity of individual pesticides and, 
generally, do not keep records of production costs and pesticide usage. Few data 
on actual use patterns are available to identify key features of pest management 
problems faced by farmers (Heong et al., 1994; Jourdain & Rattanasatien, 1995; 
Talekar, 1995). Highland cabbage growers sprayed at least two to three times per 
week against DBM (Lim, 1990b). In E Java, hot pepper and potatoes were sprayed 
every four to five days, tomatoes were treated weekly and carrots every 20 days. 
Javanese farmers also tended to overdose in 37%- 64% of the cases examined in 
surveys in order to achieve a quick knock-down of the pests (van der Noll & Savi-
tri, 1989). Onion and shallot growers in Brebes, N Java, sprayed upto five times a 
week (Talekar, 1995). A detailed analysis of the socio-economic parameters, plant-
ing methods, and fertilizer and pesticide use involved in shallot and hot pepper 
production in Brebes was made by Buurma & Nurmalinda (1992 a, b; Buurma, 
undated). In the dry season (9 weeks in May/June 1990), farmers sprayed on aver-
age 17 times/season with 2.4 active ingredients per treatment at an expenditure of 
250 US$/ha. In the wet season (Jan./Feb. 1991) on average 15 treatments with 1.1 
a.i. per spray were made at an expenditure of 50 US$/ha. The survey showed that 
the farmers of some villages preferred to control army worms (Spodoptera spp) by 
handpicking whereas those in other villages rather sprayed insecticides. But there 
were also considerable differences in army worm incidence and labour availabili-
ty between the villages. 
The escalating use of pesticides has an ever greater impact on the farmers 
health (Mustamin, 1988; Kritalugsana, 1988; Cheah & Suratman, 1992; Kishi et 
al, 1993), on the environment (air and water) (Untung, pers. comm., 1996), and 
causes an increasing residue problem in produce (Cheah & Suratman, 1992; Rosli 
& Dzolkhifli, 1996). Growers tend to ignore pesticide residue hazards for consu-
mers, but often do not spray their home garden and family supplies planted on 
separate plots (Oudejans & Mumford, 1988; various personal communications). 
Understanding farmers' pest management practices, their perceptions, their con-
straints to certain options and their objectives is vital to improve poor pest mange-
ment practices (Norton & Mumford, 1993; Whitten, 1996). The examination of the 
trade-offs between environmental and economic impacts of agricultural policies is 
crucial in defining an acceptable pesticide policy. 
6.1.5. Development of IPM policy in vegetables. Following the 15th session of 
the Asian and Pacific Plant Protection Convention (APPPC) in 1987, three region-
al working groups were set up to assist APPPC for 1. IPM in Vegetables, 2. Fruit 
fly, and 3. Post-entry plant quarantine. In November, 1988, the FAO Regional 
Office for Asia and the Pacific (RAPA), Bangkok, held an Expert Consultation9 on 
IPM in major vegetable crops (FAO/RAPA, 1988). The Consultation concluded 
that the indiscriminate use of pesticides in vegetables had created the following 
major problems. Pest resistance against pesticides was increasing. Residue 
contamination of marketable produce had already led to rejection by importing 
countries (e.g. Singapore). Intoxication of farmers was serious10 although little 
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realized by the applicators themselves and not publicly admitted. Costs of veg-
etable production continued to escalate due to higher losses and more work 
notwithstanding increasing use of pesticides11 (Lim, 1988;FAO/RAPA, 1988). Wi-
de gaps existed in yields obtained by farmers and experiment stations. Singh 
(1990) pointed at the acute shortage of extension staff12 specifically trained in veg-
etable production. To break the pesticide deadlock, the development and applica-
tion of an adequate IPM approach was deemed necessary for the sector as a whole 
and for individual vegetable crops. In particular were needed suitable IPM compo-
nents, adequate local research and expertise, effective extension infrastructures, 
public commitment and funding support from governments and donors. In all SE 
Asian countries some IPM activities in vegetable and fruit were on-going, but 
implementation of IPM technology differed greatly (FAO/RAPA, 1988, Lim & Di, 
1990). Available information was scattered over different organizations, col-
laboration was lacking and efforts were sometimes duplicated. The necessary 
collaboration between separate government institutions responsible for research 
and extension could only be enforced by National IPM Steering Committees. 
Information on many aspects of social economics of vegetable IPM was seriously 
lacking and public awareness of pesticide residues hazards had received scant 
attention (Lim & Oudejans, 1991). 
Hence, the Expert Consultation on IPM strongly recommended that FAO 
should formulate a regional project for IPM in vegetables similar to the model of 
the FAO Intercountry IPM in Rice Programme in S and SE Asia. An analogous 
FAO Intercountry IPM in Vegetables Programme should stimulate and support 
national and regional institutions to develop national IPM projects in selected veg-
etable production systems on the basis of available expertise. 
The need for a regional programme on IPM for vegetables in SE Asia was 
expressed again at the Fourteenth Session of the FAO/UNEP Panel of Experts on 
Integrated Pest Control in Rome, October, 1989, at the Regional Workshop on Pest 
Management in Vegetables, October 1990, Cameron Highlands, and at the Con-
ference on IPM in the Asia-Pacific Region, 23-27 September, 1991, Kuala Lumpur. 
In November, 1990, a joint FAO/Netherlands identification mission was fielded to 
five countries13 of SE Asia with the objective to design a Plan of Operation for a 
FAO Inter-country Programme for the Development and Application of Integrated 
Pest Management in Vegetables in SE Asia (Lim & Oudejans, 1991). The FAO 
ICP-IPM in Vegetables Programme began in January, 1995, in four countries: 
Bangladesh, Laos, the Philippines, and Vietnam. The Netherlands, as the major 
donor, contributed 4.14 M US$ for a period of four years (FAO, 1995). Indonesia 
joined the FAO ICP-IPM Vegetables programme in 1998, when Australia provid-
ed funding. 
The FAO has not yet launched a separate Inter-Country initiative for IPM in 
fruits or flowers in S and SE Asia. Thailand executed, however, a joint Thai-
German IPM Program for fruit trees since 1992 (ch 6.4.2). 
6.1.6. Regional institutional capacity for IPM development. Several interna-
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tional research agencies have acquired a long time expertise in the field of tropical 
agronomy, entomology, phytopathology and other subjects of relevance for the 
development of IPM programs in food and fiber crops. The following agencies are 
currently involved in IPM development in SE Asia. 
a. Asian Vegetable Research and Development Center (AVRDC). AVRDC 
operates from its headquarters in Taiwan, from an outreach program at Kasetsart 
University, Bangkok, and from a research station at Chiang Mai, Thailand. Since 
1971, AVRDC has contributed to the improvement of tropical vegetable pro-
duction. Its program includes preservation of genetic resources, selection and 
breeding for productivity, heat tolerance and resistance to a broad spectrum of 
pests and diseases, screening of viruses, tissue culture technique and biological 
control studies (AVRDC, 1996; Talekar, 1995). AVRDC participated in biotech-
nological research on the production of disease-free seed, insertion of Bt genes for 
DBM resistance in crucifers, methodology for detection and genetic mapping of 
viruses of tomato and hot pepper, and the breeding for resistance against tomato 
fruit worm and nematodes. Relevant achievements were i.a. the breeding of heat-
resistant tomato cultivars, which were widely adopted in sub-tropical China, and 
the development of IPM recommendations for DBM and other cabbage pests, for 
the use of parasitoids, predators, sex pheromones, NPV virus and biologicals on 
the basis of Bt. By 1990, AVRDC established AVNET-I, an IPM research network 
for DBM, which included Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines. 
AVRDC assisted the countries in SE Asia with IPM training, funding of parasite 
mass rearing facilities, and the undertaking of pilot projects. In 1993, AVRDC initi-
ated AVNET-II, a collaborative Vegetable Research Program for SE Asia, with 
financial support from the Asian Development Bank (ADB). Besides AVRDC's 
annual reports, no evaluation reports were found showing the rate of adoption of 
improved vegetable cultivars issued by AVRDC and its impact with farmers in SE 
Asia. 
b. CABI Bioscience (CB). The institution was formerly called International 
Institute of Biological Control (IIBC). CB promotes the biological means of pest 
control and their integration into sustainable pest management systems through 
cooperative research, training and information. CB is an institute of CAB 
International, UK, which is an intergovernmental organization providing services 
on behalf of more than 30 member countries to agriculture, forestry, human health 
and the conservation of national resources. The roots of the Commmenwealth 
Agricultural Bureaux (CAB) are the Imperial Bureau of Entomology (since 1911) 
and Imperial Bureau of Mycology (since 1920), the clearing houses for research 
and information on pests and diseases of tropical agriculture in Asia and Africa 
(Scrivenor, undated). 
The FAO ICP-IPM for Vegetables Programme subcontracted research on IPM 
components for vegetables to CB. The regional office of CB in SE Asia, located at 
the Malaysian Agricultural Research and Development Institute (MARDI), Serdang, 
in Malaysia, developed and tested training exercises for vegetable IPM (for cabbage, 
hot pepper, tomato and other vegetables) for use in farmer field schools organized by 
the FAO Inter-Country ICP-IPM Rice (Vos, pers. comm, 1998). 
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c. International Potato Centre (CIP). The International Potato Research Centre 
(CIP, Peru) assisted the Biotechnology Centre (BC) at the National Centre of Scien-
tific Research, Hanoi, in the development of techniques for tissue culture and regener-
ation of disease-free potato seeds. Under a joint project BC-CIP tested over 7,000 
genetically different potato plants from some 100 varieties (Commandeur & Pistorius, 
1992). Through micropropagation and in vitro techniques good results were achieved 
in particular for resistance against late blight (P. infestans) and for increase of yield. 
The expertise was made available to national IPM programmes in SE Asia. 
In a joint undertaking with Indonesian partners14, CIP and UPWARD jointly 
initiated, in 1994, a participatory project to develop Integrated Crop Management 
(ICM) technologies for sweet potato. During phase I, 1994-1997, CIP developed 
the ICM technology and extension approaches dealing largely with cultivar selec-
tion, fertilisation and pest management. In project phase II, the Indonesian Nation-
al IPM Program and local NGOs extend the ICM message through Training of 
Trainers (TOT) and Farmer Field School (FFS) sessions (van de Fliert et ah, 1995, 
1996; van de Fliert, 1997). 
d. Asian Institute for Technology (AIT). In the 1980s, the Asian Institute for 
Technology, Bangkok, through its Department of Agricultural Economics, con-
tributed to the understanding of the influence of pesticide subsidies and exter-
nalities of pesticide use in SE Asia (Waibel, 1990a,b). Field trials were performed 
at AIT concerning the repellent effect on DBM and other pests of certain herbs 
such as sweet basil (Ocimum basilicum), citronella (Cymbopogon nardus) planted 
as border crops around cabbage plots (Bender, pers. comm., 1990). The trials had 
no follow up and no impact. 
e. International Crop Research Institute for the Semi-Arid Tropics (ICRISAT), 
India. The institute has a mandate for the improvement of pulses (grain legumes). 
Pulses are often grown in rotation with rice together with lowland vegetables for 
domestic consumption. Thus, IPM recommendations for popular grain legumes, 
such as groundnut, deserve attention. 
/ National Biological Control Research Center (NBCRC), Thailand. Although 
a national institution, the NCCRC has a regional significance as a Natural Enemies 
Reference Depository (NERD) and because of its expertise in identification, rear-
ing and management of biological control agents (Napompeth, 1998). The NBCRC 
was established in 1975 by Thai government departments, universities and agen-
cies dealing with agriculture, livestock, fisheries and forestry as a joint network 
organization. The Kasetsart University (KU) at Bangkhen, Bangkok, manages the 
NBCRC, in collaboration with the National Research Council of Thailand, on a 
yearly budget of about 850,000 US$. The NBCRC operates a headquarter with lab-
oratories, quarantine facilities, and depository at Bangkhen Campus of Kasetsart 
University, four regional centers and several stations. Important achievements 
included the introduction of predacious snails to control the giant African snail, 
various specious of predatory and herbivorous insects to control insect pests and 
(water)weeds in Thailand, and assistance to biological control programs in Asia, S 
America and S Africa (NBCRC, 1997). 
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6.1.7. Development of IPM components. Any IPM program approach requires an 
early survey of the state of the art concerning knowledge of and expertise with the 
crops concerned, the problems needing attention, the availability of healthy and 
resistant seed and planting material, and an appraisal of possible options 
(Napompeth, 1998). Major problems in vegetable cultivation, in need of IPM sol-
utions, are caused by fruit borers in tomato and eggplant, Late Blight and Bacterial 
Wilt in potato and tomato, DBM and Club Root in cole crops, viruses in potato and 
hot pepper, anthracnose in hot pepper, armyworms in Allium spp, and alternaria in 
lowland tomato and Allium (Lim, 1987; Yang, 1989; Loke & Abdul Aziz, 1992; 
Grubben, pers. comm., 1998). 
Numerous bits and pieces of information are already available and are being 
brought together by ongoing national (in Indonesia and Vietnam) and international 
IPM-programs (e.g. by CABI Bioscience, AVRDC and FAO ICP-IPM in vegeta-
bles). To facilitate practical extension, research findings and expertise are bundled 
into training excercises and pre-tested to suit the general conditions of a Farmer Field 
School (Praasterink, 1996a,b). Farmers are encouraged to develop their own field 
experiments to clarify ecological processes in the field (Vos, pers. comm., 1998). 
6.1.8. Seed and planting material, and quarantine. The use of improved com-
mercial seed and rootstock is rapidly increasing in SE Asia, particularly by com-
mercial vegetable and flower growers. Nevertheless, a large part of the marketed 
vegetables is grown from seeds or planting materials of local cultivars, landraces 
or farmers' selections. This is particularly the case for self-pollinated crops (toma-
to) which propagate true to type, and of vegetatively propagated crops (shallot, 
garlic, leek, potato). It is more difficult for farmers to select good seed from cross-
pollinating plants (cucumber, hot pepper) with segregating characteristics. Farmer 
selected seeds often carry seed-borne diseases (anthracnose, Alternaria, bacterial 
diseases, viruses) (Vos & Duriat, 1995). The supply of improved disease-free cul-
tivars is still limited and a well organized local seed industry is only just emerging 
(Groot, 1988; Asian Seed, 1994; Grubben, pers. comm., 1998). Ever more pro-
fessional growers recognize the advantages of using high-priced quality seed. 
Demand for quality seed, in a reciprocal cause and effect relationship, stimulates 
further investment in public and private seed industry and official regulation. 
Regulation and implementation of strict quarantine as a prevention of entry or 
spread of noxious pests and diseases is economically a most effective measure. 
Clubroot {Plasmodiophora brassicae), the worst disease15 of cruciferous crops, 
entered SE Asia probably by the mid-1970s (Suhardi et al, 1976; Yang, 1989). 
Liriomyza huidobrensis, a serious leafminer pest of egg plant (Solanum melongena) 
in Bangladesh and Vietnam, has recently entered Indonesia (Whitten, 1998) and 
threatens potato, tomato, yardlong bean, and cucurbit vegetables, and 
Chrysanthemum. Cabbage fly {Delia brassicae) and carrot root fly (Psila rosae) 
have not yet been detected in SE Asia (Grubben, pers. comm., 1998). Demanding 
political attention for the strengthening of regional and national quarantine services 
is obviously an important task of National IPM Steering Committees. At the 
producer level, seed disinfection, isolation of the crop, and keeping diseased or 
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infested propagation material out of the farming area, are useful cultural methods. 
6.1.9. Cultural, biological and chemical control. In general, farmers have great 
skills in cultural methods which help to prevent or remedy pest situations, even if 
they do not understand the causal relations. Crop rotation has a strong potential for 
the prevention of population build-up of pests and soil-borne diseases in temperate 
climates. A similar effect might be expected from rotating wet rice with tomato or 
hot pepper in the tropics as inundation kills soil-borne organisms, but no docu-
mented proof was found. The slime disease (Pseudomonas solanacearum) of Deli 
tobacco was managed by destruction of infected seed beds and a rotation of one 
season Deli tobacco, two seasons of wet rice and a five years fallow (Honing, 
1910). The beneficial effect of crop rotation on upland fields is claimed for cruci-
fers, cucurbits and beans (Grubben & Siemonsma, 1993). Inter-cropping and 
mixed cropping of vegetables and other crops resulted for hot pepper-maize in a 
reduction of aphids and virus infestation on hot pepper, for tomato and garlic-cab-
bage in a lower DBM infestation, and for Chinese cabbage-garlic or allium inter-
crop in a lower infestation of soft rot (Erwinia spp.). Mulching with rice straw or 
plastic improves crop performance in general, and suppresses weed growth (Ding 
et al., 1981). White and silvery plastic mulches reduce thrips injury (Thrips 
parvispinus Karny) and delays virus epidemics in hot pepper (Vos & Sumarui, 
1997). 
Use of plastic cover to shield seedlings from rain is common in highland nurs-
eries. Few farmers practice removal (roguing) of host plants, or plant repellent 
herbs or catch crops. They are ignorant about or cannot afford to use blue light 
traps for detecting and monitoring moths, nor yellow sticky traps for aphids and 
thrips. Fine-mesh nylon netting as a physical barrier for aphids and aphid-trans-
mitted viruses and other insects is rarely seen, with the exception of high invest-
ment flower nurseries (Vos & Nurtika, 1995). Protected vegetable growing was 
tried by several farmers near Bangkok in the early 1990s with a subsidy of DOAE. 
However, farmers found the unsubsidized costs prohibitive, whilst the polyphenyl 
material was not resistant to UV-light and degraded within one year (personal 
communications with growers, 1991). Intensive use of plastic in agriculture for 
sheltering protected crops, mulching, and protective sleeving of fruits (banana, 
durian) creates an environmental problem. 
Much experience exists with the pesticide industry and with public and private 
research institutions on the efficacy of pesticides in horticulture. Major companies 
operate research stations in SE Asia, particularly in highland vegetable areas, to 
experiment with narrow spectrum products in situ. The means and knowledge for 
proper application of pesticides against several important pests and diseases in 
horticulture are available at the institutional level. For practical and commercial 
reasons, however, the growers receive at best only part of the available infor-
mation. Horticultural education and extension on pest control and pesticide use are 
generally deficient. All the parties involved, producers and users of pesticides, 
regulatory institutions and consumers, are confronted with the problem of pesticide 
resistance, residues, intoxication and other externalities. Since pesticide use is par-
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ticularly high in horticulture, the search for alternatives of chemical control has 
been ongoing since the 1960s. 
In SE Asia, the knowledge base for biological control through parasitoids16 is 
available for a few pests of crucifers such as DBM and of solanaceous crops 
through the AVRDC/AVNET network, for potato and sweetpotato through the CIP-
network. Considerable expertise on potential IPM components in hot pepper was 
obtained through joint research of Dutch, Indonesian (LEHRI) and Malaysian 
(MARDI) researchers (Vos, 1994; Vos & Nurtika, 1995; Sivapragasam & Lee, 
1996). A number of predators of vegetable pests, such as spiders, coccinellid bee-
tles, pentatomid bugs, mites, and dragonflies, were identified (Shephard et al., 
1987; van Vreden & Ahmadzabidi, 1986; Lim, 1989). Neering (1988) studied the 
pests and diseases and their natural enemies of palawija crops, in particular of soy-
bean and groundnut. But in general, knowledge concerning use of parasitoids, 
predators, micro-organisms, sources of natural resistance, and cultural methods is 
still limited (Lim et al., 1990; Napompeth, 1998). Moreover, the effectiveness of 
indigenous as well as of some introduced parasitoids, which became established, 
is often jeopardized by farmers who continue to apply pesticides indiscriminately 
(Oudejans, 1996; Neering, 1997). 
Microbial agents or biopesticides have been used since the late 1970s to con-
trol larval stages of moths, beetles and flies. Vegetable farmers spray spore suspen-
sions of Bacillus thuringiensis Berliner (Bt)17 to control DBM and army worms 
(Jangi et al., 1991). S?-products selectively kill larval pests through endotoxin 
activity, but not the beneficial parasitoids and predators. Bt-based products, such as 
DiPelR and XenTariR, are used in conjunction with selective synthetics such as 
imidacloprid, or with insect growth regulators (IGRs) to avoid pesticide resistance 
problems (Quick et al., 1996). In experiments in Thailand, nucleopolyhydrosis 
viruses (NPV) gave effective control of beet army worm on onion and tomato fruit 
borer on tomato, whereas the fungal agent Verticillium lecanii was used for the 
control of white fly (a.o. Bemisia tabaci) and aphids. In Vietnam and Malaysia, the 
parasitic fungi Entomophthora sphaerosperma and Beauveria bassiana were used 
to control DBM. Natural insecticides, such as neem {Azadirachta indica) extracts 
were employed against DBM on Chinese kale and cabbage (Lim, 1990a). Besides 
Bt products and abamectin, no other biopesticides are used by farmers on a large 
scale. 
6.1.10. Discussion. The preparation of 'technological IPM packages' for vegeta-
bles is essentially a contradictio in terminis. The current idea about IPM is that it 
is not a matter of packaging and delivering a set of cultivation and control guide-
lines adapted to particular crops. The modern point of view is to develop the 
farmer's capacity to recognise symptoms of disturbed crop growth in the context 
of his specific field situation, the cultivation practices he uses, and the stage of crop 
development (Eveleens, pers. comm., 1998; Whitten, 1998), and to let the farmer 
integrate new information with his own traditional knowledge and experience of 
growing vegetables on his own plot. Training handbooks, exercises, posters, all are 
useful instruments to improve the farmer's awareness and knowledge of pest 
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characteristics and control possibilities. The Farmer Field School (FFS) is an ade-
quate approach to motivate and enable farmers to discover the ecological intri-
cacies of the triangle 'crop, pests and treatment' (Matteson, 1992; van de Fliert et 
ah, 1995, 1996). Experience has shown that, particularly in demanding crops such 
as vegetables, the combination of good instruction material and extension appro-
ach (FFS) does not suffice. The IPM-trained farmer still needs to be guided in the 
control of major pests (Teunissen, pers. comm., 1998). In the Netherlands during 
the 1980's, 'guided' or 'supervised control' of caterpillars in cabbage was deve-
loped on the basis of relating the percentage of injury inflicted to the stage of crop 
growth as indicator for the appropriate control method and timing (Theunissen & 
Sins, 1984; Theunissen & den Ouden, 1985, 1987). European researchers develo-
ped modules for monitoring, action threshold levels for acceptable injury at 
recognizable growth stages, and taking of decisions on biological and chemical 
control measures in field vegetables, wheat (EPIPRE system, Zadoks, 1989), pota-
toes, sugarbeet. Supervised control is particularly advanced in protected horticultu-
re in the Netherlands, where over 50%-99% of the production of tomatoes, bell 
peppers {Capsicum spp) and cucurbits is obtained with biological control and host-
plant resistance against pests and diseases (van Lenteren, 1986, 1995). Recogniti-
on of the growth stages in a vegetable crop is more difficult than in rice, where 
FAO-ICP's advice of no-spraying during 40 days after transplanting creates no 
misunderstanding. The development of a guided control technology, with levels of 
acceptable injury as criterion, is necessary for critical problem areas, such as army 
worm in Allium, DBM in cabbage, and Phytophthora and bacterial wilt in potatoes 
and tomatoes. Transformation of monitoring data of injury observations and pest 
densities into simplified control recommendations is beyond the capacity of the 
farmers. Rather, it would be a task for the FAO ICP-IPM for Vegetables Program-
me in collaboration with National IPM program and regional institutions. 
Since vegetables are often a rotational crop for rice farmers and since vegetable 
farmers grow a variety of crops, a vegetable IPM training and FFS exercise should 
be of flexible design and the trainers be knowledgeable about a considerable range 
of possible problems and control options. 
In the field situation, where farmers do not accept risks of crop failure, the use 
of synthetic pesticides, in particular fungicides, may be required. The key of the 
IPM extension in rice in SE Asia was to make farmers knowledgeable about the 
pest controlling power of natural enemies through keen observation of insect 
behaviour in the vegetable crop (ecosystem analysis exercises). Thus, in rice the 
message was to refrain from using insecticides. While in rice the approach is on 
'informed non-intervention', the strategy in vegetables is one of 'informed inter-
vention' (Whitten, 1996). 
If biological control, involving release of natural enemies, plays an important 
role, a community-wise undertaking of the IPM activities need to be stressed, least 
contaminating control methods -such as use of pesticides in a densily occupied 
area- may undo the efforts of the IPM farmers (van Huis & Buurma, 1998). In bio-
logical control studies, the starting point should be a no-spray situation and not a 
reduction in pesticide use, in order to detect the potential of the natural enemy of 
200 Wageningen Agricultural University Papers 99-1 (1999) 
biochemical agent (van Huis & Buurma, 1998). In protected horticulture, this 
approach has paid off well. 
As spraying of IGRs, biological and IPM compatible synthetic pesticides may 
be needed in the unprotected field, it is sensible to include judicious instruction on 
application equipment and IPM compatible, selective pesticide use in vegetable 
crops. The Indonesian-Dutch LEHRI project (ch 6.2.2), 1987-92, included 
research on the use of T-jet spray nozzles for popular types of knapsack sprayer in 
vegetables in Indonesia (Stallen & Lumkes, 1990). The LEHRI recommendations 
for IPM in a.o. shallot, tomato and yardlong bean, include advice on systemic 
fungicides, biological insecticides and IGRs (Sutiadi et al, 1994). To-date, the T-
jet nozzle, having suitable droplet distribution characteristics for vegetable spray-
ing, is for sale in retail stores on Java (Grubben, pers. comm., 1998). 
6.2. Vegetables and fruits in Indonesia after 1950 
6.2.1 Introduction. In Indonesia around 1975, the horticultural sector provided al-
most the same share (13%) to the GDP as rice and a larger share than estate agri-
culture (Eveleens & Vermeulen, 1976). Table 6.1.1 gives indicative production 
data on the major lowland and highland vegetables in Indonesia in the late 1980s. 
Records on hectareage planted and quantity produced nationally and by province 
are kept by the Central Bureau of Statistics, Jakarta, for some 20 major vegetables 
and 18 fruit species. Detailed data i.a. on yield levels for vegetables and fruits, 
number of fruit trees amd marketing channels for 1982-85 were reported by van 
derRiet(1988). 
The highlands of Java and Sumatera are the traditional centers of commercial 
vegetable production in Indonesia. Highland vegetables are, in particular, planted 
in the areas of Puncak, Sukabumi, Priangan and Pekalongan for the urban centres 
of Jakarta and Bandung (W Java), at Diem for Yogyakarta and Semarang (C Java), 
and at Tretes and Batu for Malang and Surabaya (E Java). The highlands of 
Brastagi18 and Seribudolog, Karo, supply the markets of Medan (N Sumatera), 
Penang and Kuala Lumpur (Malaysia), and Singapore. Large concentrated areas of 
commercial vegetable production have developed in the lowlands, usually in the 
vicinity of big cities. Cultivation of hot pepper and shallot is concentrated in Tegal-
Brebes, C Java. Farmers in the lowlands plant palawija crops and vegetables in 
rotation with rice. 
The production of fruits in Indonesia is shown in table 6.1 .l.b. The production 
of banana is almost four times bigger than in Thailand and of citrus about equal. 
However, no data were found on IPM initiatives for fruits. 
6.2.2. Development of horticultural research. In Indonesia after 1950, horticul-
tural research was the responsibility of the Horticultural Research Institute (HRI) 
at Pasarminggu, Jakarta. Since the mid-1960s, several joint Indonesian-Nether-
lands programs were undertaken to strengthen horticultural research and to 
upgrade of staff19 and facilities. The first joint project (ACP-4), 1968-74, entailed 
a broad approach for rehabilitation and capacity development of the Horticultural 
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Research Institute at Pasarminggu. The second project (ATA 111), 1974-77, prior-
itized research on the highland vegetables cabbage, potato and tomato. Attention 
was given to pest management and improvement of seed stock through selection 
and introductions, seed multiplication and upgrading of seed technology (Wessel, 
1977). The facilities were expanded with a virology and nematology laboratory at 
Segunung Experimental Garden, W Java. The seed improvement program20 was 
based at Margahayu, a HRI branch station for W Java, where a laboratory for seed 
testing and storage was set up. In 1975, surveys of 35 major weeds in highland veg-
etables and weed control experiments were included in the project (Wessel, 1977; 
Everaarts, 1981). 
In the 1970s, the development in horticulture was guided from the Central 
Research Institute for Horticulture (CRIH) at Lembang, W Java, and at its branch 
station Segunung, W Java. In 1984, a Horticultural Research Institute for Fruits 
was established at Solok, near Padang, W Sumatera. Research at Solok is directed 
at seed production, vegetative propagation techniques and disease control in tree 
crops. Research on non-rice food crops (palawija) was the responsibility of the 
Malang Research Centre for Food Crops (MARJF), renamed as Research Institute 
for Legumes and Tuber Crops (RILET), E Java. The latter institute is also engaged 
in rice research for E Java, Bali and Nusa Tenggara. RILET's priorities include 
variety improvement and IPM for the major grain legumes soy bean, groundnut 
and mungbean (Neering, 1988). 
A third Indonesia-Netherlands program (ATA-395), implemented at the 
Lembang Horticultural Research Institute (LEHRI), W Java from 1987-92, had as 
main objective to strengthen research on lowland vegetables in Indonesia. Its fur-
ther objectives included the upgrading of LEHRI's research management and 
laboratory services. Achievements included the establishment of data banks on 
vegetable production, the pest and disease complex of lowland vegetables and on 
agro-chemicals use, collection of local germplasm for major lowland vegetables of 
Indonesia, breeding of shallot and cucumber, development of an experimental gar-
den for lowland vegetables at Kramat, near Tegal, N Java, improved management 
of LEHRI's experimental gardens, and improved communication with Agricultural 
Research and Extension Services (LEHRI, 1991). Cooperation with the extension 
service was essential for the execution of an additional 'On-farm Client-oriented 
Research' (OFCOR) project in shallots in the Brebes district, N Java, in 1990. 
(Buurma & Nurmalinda, 1992a, b). 
The three joint projects achieved worthwhile results in the form of scientific 
publications by Indonesian and Dutch staff on pests and diseases of vegetables, on 
efficient natural enemies and on recommendations for use of fertilizer and pesti-
cides in integrated crop production. The lasting effect of the projects in terms of 
improved research management and expertise of the Indonesian staff cannot be 
judged by the author. There is no evidence of a wide adoption of the project's rec-
ommendations by the Indonesian vegetable growers in the surroundings of 
Lembang, W Java. The OFCOR project activities in Tegal-Brebes, C Java, were 
continued. In 1997, LEHRI researchers performed trials on 50 ha of shallot and hot 
pepper with the participation of 200 farmers. The problems had, however, wors-
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ened since 1992. Rice disappeared more and more from the rotation cycle while 
monoculture of shallot and hot pepper increased on an ever larger hectareage 
(Grubben, pers. comm., 1998). Meanwhile, the pest situation, pesticide resistance 
and pesticide misuse in shallot was described as alarming (Talekar, 1995). 
In 1994, Indonesia and the Netherlands signed an agreement on a Joint Cooper-
ative Research Programme on Biotechnology, Plant Breeding and Seed technology 
for Horticulture (BIOBREES). The collaboration between the Central Research 
Institute for Horticulture (CRIH-AARD) and the Dutch Centre for Plant Breeding 
and Reproduction Research (CPRO-DLV) began on July 1, 1994 (Grubben, 1997). 
The objectives included 1. transfer of knowledge to AARD on biotechnology for 
improvement of practical plant breeding and quality research of planting material, 
2. production of plant breeding material with resistance against diseases and pests, 
3. training of young Indonesian and Dutch researchers in biotechnological research 
and advanced plant breeding, 4. stimulation of active participation by private com-
panies in the Netherlands and Indonesia. 
The research projects on vegetables and ornamentals under BIOBREES phase 
I (1994-98) included several crops, a. Hot pepper, improvement of resistance 
against Anthracnose (Colletotrichum spp), b. Shallot, breeding for resistance to 
Purple Blotch {Alternaria porri), Anthracnose and beet armyworm (Spodoptera 
exigua). 3. Flower plants, breeding of resistant outdoor cut rose cultivars for the 
highlands in Indonesia, and breeding chrysanthemum and gladiolus for disease 
resistance and daylength adaptation. 
A first result was the introduction of improved BIOBREES cultivars of rose and 
chrysanthemum on the market in 1998 by the Indonesian Institute for Ornamental 
Plant Research in cooperation with CPRO-DLO and Indonesian companies 
(Grubben, 1997). The BIOBREES program is funded by the Dutch Ministry of 
Agriculture with a contribution of 1,8 M $ (3.6 M DFL) for four years (phase 1) and 
a matching counterpart funding by Indonesia. The program was extended in 1998 
for four more years (phase 2, 1998-2002) with equal conditions for funding. 
6.2.3. Institutionalization of IPM for vegetables. In the late 1980s, when the 
effect of INPRES 3/86 became visible and IPM training in rice accelerated (ch 
5.7.4), Indonesian agricultural administrators began to express their interest for 
including vegetables in the IPM Rice training curriculum. The FAO-ICP 
Programme's designation was widened correspondingly to 'IPM for Rice-based 
Cropping Systems'. The project proposal for 'FAO ICP IPM in Rice for S and SE 
Asia, phase III', explicitly mentioned inclusion of vegetables (FAO, 1992a). In 
1996, the Indonesian National IPM Program conducted 649 FFS training events in 
non-rice commodities (soybean, potatoes, cabbage, hot pepper and shallots) with 
some 16,225 IPM graduates from these vegetable FFSs. In the same year, the 
National Program conducted 5,122 FFSs in rice by IPM Field Trainers and 2,617 
FFSs by Farmer IPM trainers (FAO ICPV, 1998). By 1998, the number of 
Indonesian farmers who graduated from a season-long FFS was estimated at 
around one million, of which about 17,000 became farmer-trainer (FAO ICPV, 
1998). The expansion of the IPM movement from rice to vegetables in Indonesia 
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ran parallel to similar developments of the ICP Programme in Vietnam and the 
Philippines. (FAO, 1995a,b) 
Indonesia joined the FAO ICP-IPM for Vegetables Programme in 1998, when 
Australia accepted to provide the funds. The action plan identified three activities 
for initial support. /. Action research facility in W Sumatera. The project com-
prised field studies in Solok district, W Sumatera, designed to isolate, produce and 
apply suitable biological pathogens (viruses, bacteria, fungi and nematodes) that 
can be used by vegetable farmers to reduce dependency on imported pesticides. 
Farmer training in the production, testing and distribution of bio-pesticides takes 
place through 27 village biocontrol posts. 2. Vegetable IPM activites in Brebes, 
which aim to strengthen action regarding conservation of natural enemies and 
development and production on biopesticides for use on, in particular, shallot, hot 
pepper and rice. 3. Operation of a Biotechnology Research Center at Bogor. The 
facility, comprising a laboratory and quarantine rooms, upgraded by the Clemson 
University Palawija IPM Program, is used to receive, rear and release imported 
natural enemies of the recently introduced leafminer Liriomyza huidobrensis. The 
Bogor facility will also function as expertise and support centre for activities 1 and 
2 (Whitten, 1998). 
6.2.4. Achievements of IPM for vegetables in Indonesia. The most consistent 
research efforts were directed at the control of diamondback moth (DBM) in cab-
bage and at the Integrated Crop Management (ICM) of hot pepper. 
6.2.4.1. Integrated control of diamondback moth. Since DBM is the worst pest 
of Indonesia's 70,000 ha of head cabbage and Chinese cabbage (caisin) crops the 
search for its natural enemies began early. Surveys held in the centres of cabbage 
growing in Java, Bali, Sumatera and Sulawesi during 1971-76 and 1981-83, 
showed that Diadegma eucerophaga, a parasitoid of DBM introduced into Indo-
nesia by H.C.A. Vos from New Zealand in 1953, had established itself in highland 
areas of W Java, C Java, Bali and W Sumatera, but not in N Sumatera and Sulawesi 
(Sudarwohadi & Eveleens, 1977; Lim, 1990a). In the late 1970s, D. eucerophaga 
could be established in N Sumatera too when the selective microbial B. thuringien-
sis was used to control DBM instead of synthetic insecticides (Sastrosiswojo & 
Sastrohardjo, 1986). The parasitoid Cotesia plutella was introduced in cabbage 
grown at mid-level altitudes where D. eucerophaga does not survive (Talekar, 
1991). The feasibility of IPM was studied at Margahayu Experiment Station, 
LEHRI, Lembang, from 1983 till 1986. The increasing insecticide resistance in 
DBM strains, resurgence of DBM and high pesticide residue levels in harvested 
cabbages prompted this study. It was found that a. chlorfluazaron and Bt ssp 
kurstaki (DipelR, BactospeineR and ThuricideR) selectively killed DBM larvae, but 
not D. eucerophaga; b. the economic threshold level for DBM was 0.3 larva/plant; 
c. female DBM moths prefered rape (Brassica campestris ssp. oleifera) for ovipo-
sition which made rape a suitable trap crop in DBM management; d. male DBM 
moths could be controlled by the pheromone PXR (Sudarwohadi, 1987). 
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6.2.4.2. Integrated crop management (ICM) in hot pepper. Pest control 
Capsicum annuum (hot pepper) and C. frutescens (bird pepper), the most impor-
tant lowland crops in Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand in terms of hectareage and 
production, received much attention under the project ATA-395. The study of hot 
pepper21 covered several aspects of integrated crop management, such as a survey 
of farmers practices and problems, field trials on plant raising techniques, mulch-
ing and fertilisation to investigate their effects on crop health (Vos, 1993; Vos & 
Nurtika, 1995; Vos & Duriat, 1995). Plastic and alumina foil mulching repelled 
thrips (T. parvispinus), aphids and whiteflies and thereby reduced virus transmiss-
ion and infection (Vos & Sumarni, 1997). Anthracnose, caused by the pathogens 
Colletotrichum capsici and C. gloeosporioides, on ripening hot pepper fruits could 
be best controlled by sanitary measures which minimize the source of inoculum. 
6.2.5. IPM efforts of international and local NGOs. In Indonesia, some institu-
tions and NGOs, among other objectives, also address the issue of IPM. For 
instance, the International Potato Institute (CIP) assists local NGOs (e.g. Mitra Tani) 
on IPM in sweet potatoes (ch 6.1.6) (Van de Fliert et al., 1996,1995). Several inter-
national institutions, such as 'Care' and 'Save the Children', and local NGOs have 
adopted the Farmer Field School method of agricultural extension developed by the 
FAO ICP-IPM in Rice Programme. The US-based NGO 'World Education' assists 
local NGOs with the organisation and implementation of IPM Farmer Field Schools 
in N Sumatera (Oudejans, 1996). DOA research institutes reportedly collaborate 
with local and international NGOs in the collection of information on research 
needs at farmer level and in extension of research findings. In N Sumatera, NGOs 
are recognized by provincial and district level administrators and agronomists as 
useful initiators and stimulators of activities, though no subsidies are provided. 
'World Education' and CIP received full collaboration from the Lembang Research 
Institute for Vegetables (LEHRI) for the organization of training on monitoring and 
diagnosing potato viruses22 in Brastagi, N Sumatera, 1995 (Chujoy, 1995). No 
independent evaluation data were found on the impact of NGO activities. 
NGOs which try to raise public concern about lax pesticide policy, residue lev-
els in market produce and the environment have difficulty to conform with gov-
ernment control. The Pesticide Action Network (PAN) Branch in Indonesia rather 
limited its attention concerning pesticide issues in order to be allowed to address 
less controversial environmental issues (PAN-office, Jakarta, pers. comm., 1996). 
6.3. Vegetables, fruits and flowers in Malaysia after 1950 
6.3.1. Introduction. In Malaysia, some 50 types of vegetables are grown commer-
cially for domestic consumption and export (Ding et al, 1981). The Cameron 
Highlands, Pahang State, is the main production centre for temperate vegetables. 
Selangor and Johor Baru are supply centres of lowland vegetables for Kuala 
Lumpur and Singapore. Further production of lowland vegetables is scattered over 
the coastal plains. Table 6.3.1 shows the production of vegetables of Peninsular 
Malaysia for 1990. The production of Saba was estimated at 50,000 t, whereas no 
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data were available for Sarawak (Malaysia Agricultural Index 1993/94:108). The 
figures for 1990 on the trade in vegetable produce showed an import of 304,282 t 
valued at 99 M US$ against an export of 240,064 t valued at 27 M US$. Expens-
ive (highland) vegetables are exported to Singapore mainly, whilst shortages are 
increasingly compensated through imports of cheaper vegetables from N Sumate-
ra and Thailand. 
The production of fruits in Peninsular Malaysia is shown in table 6.1.1 .b In 
1989, Malaysia exported 378,756 t of fresh fruits, valued at 47 US$, mainly to 
Singapore and Hong Kong. Temperate fruits such as grapes and apples, are import-
ed from Thailand, Taiwan and Australia. The fact that Malaysia remained a net 
importer of vegetables to the tune of 72 M US$ and had a sizable shortage of fruits 
inspired the government to pursue expansion of vegetable and fruit production 
even at the expense of the rice hectareage. No information was found about IPM 
initiatives in the fruit sector. 
Floriculture started in Malaysia in the 1960s with the production of orchids for 
cut flowers. In 1991, there were 1,286 ha under floriculture. Centres are in 
Cameron Highlands for temperate flowers such as roses and chrysanthemum, and 
in Johor Baru and Selangor for lowland flowers, mainly orchids and ornamental 
potted and garden plants. Flower production increased rapidly in value from 3.2 M 
US$ in 1986 to 28.4 M US$ in 1991. Production of cut flowers has high priority 
in research. 
Cameron Highlands is the oldest vegetable production centre23 in Peninsular 
Malaysia. Since the late 1980s, the planting of cabbage in Cameron Highlands 
declined from 1,500 ha to less than 100 ha in 1995/96, the former main crop being 
largely replaced by other vegetables and cut-flowers for export24 (Syed, pers. 
comm., 1996). Pests and diseases, pesticide resistance and poor crop management 
were named as reasons why farmers shifted from cabbage to more profitable crops, 
especially flowers (Reerink, 1996). By 1991, some 350 ha of temperate flowers 
were grown annually producing about 14 US$ worth of cut flowers, mainly for 
Table 6.3.1. Peninsular Malaysia. Production of vegetables in planted area (x 1,000 ha), 
and production (x 1,000 tonnes) in 1990, and value (M USS) in 1989. Source: Ministry 
of Agriculture, Malaysia. 
Category Area Production Value 
Leafy vegetables 
Fruit vegetables 
Root vegetables 
Spice vegetables 
Other vegetables 
Total 31.0 570 180 
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8.8 
17.1 
0.8 
4.2 
0.1 
148 
328 
22 
71 
1 
38 
74 
2 
63 
3 
export. In view of the many complaints from overseas importers of cut-flowers, the 
flower nurseries requested MARDI to initiate priority research on pre- and post-
harvest prevention of quality problems. The MARDI administration hired a Dutch 
horticultural expert in 1985 and ordered a redeployement of its experts and facili-
ties from the highland vegetables to the flowers sector. (Syed, pers. comm., 1996) 
6.3.2. Achievements of IPM for vegetables in Malaysia. MARDI had separate 
divisions responsible for, respectively, production improvement of and pest control 
in vegetables, flowers and fruits. Vegetable research was concentrated in the 
MARDI stations at Cameron Highland, Klang in Selangor and Johor. In the late 
1970s, two task forces were especially set up for the development of IPM in veg-
etables with the focus on DBM, which caused serious loss almost every year 
(Sudderuddin & Kok, 1978). Four Malaysian universities and several pesticide 
companies became involved in IPM research for vegetables. 
A national survey, conducted in Malaysia in 1981, showed that over 85% of the 
vegetable farmers saw pests and diseases as their main problem, and that 65% of 
them relied completely on chemical control (Ding et al, 1981). Two indigenous 
parasitoids, Cotesia plutellae and Tetrastichus ayyari, occurring in the Cameron 
Highlands, gave insufficient control of DBM. Ooi & Lim (1989) successfully 
introduced the parasitoids Diadegma eucerophaga, D. semiclausum and 
Diadromus collaris. Together, the parasitoids formed the basis of an initially suc-
cessful biological control program in cruciferous crops in Cameron Highlands. 
(Lim & Yusof, 1992; Chin et al, 1991; Jangi et al, 1991). IPM extension on veg-
etables, soon narrowed down to integrated management of DBM, was jointly car-
ried out by DoA's extension service and MARDI through the method of T&V. In 
spite of years of extension on biological control in crucifers, most vegetable farm-
ers continued to employ synthetic pesticides liberally to control pests and diseases 
(Reerink, pers. comm., 1996; Praasterink, 1996a; author's observations, 1996). In 
1996, the MARDI station at Tanah Rata, Cameron Highlands, stopped its 30 years-
old research on highland vegetable cultivation except for urgent practical pest and 
disease problems25 (Syed, pers. comm., 1996). In 1996, MARDI was reorganized 
to give priority to sustainable agriculture and the environment. The divisions of 
entomology and phytopathology appeared to be weakened by this decision. 
The study on ICM in hot pepper {Capsicum annuurri) by Vos (1994) was com-
pleted in Malaysia. MARDI focussed on selection and breeding in hot pepper. In 
Malaysia by 1990, more than 350 accessions of tropical and temperate cultivars 
and types of peppers had been collected and evaluated. From this collection, 34 
sources of resistance or tolerance against CVMV and CMV were identified and 
certain types of virus resistance were crossed into new cultivars (Lim, 1990a). A 
local hot pepper strain, showing resistance against anthracnose (C. capsici), was 
used as a parent in the breeding program (Lim, 1990a). No written evidence was 
found that MARDI's recommendations on ICM in hot pepper are adopted by farm-
ers on any sizeable scale. 
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6.3.3. IPM efforts of international and local NGOs. The bigger NGOs in 
Malaysia are the Consumer Association of Penang (CAP), the Environmental 
Society of Malaysia and the Pesticide Action Network (PAN-Malaysia). PAN-
Asia, an umbrella organization representing 20 NGOs, has its regional headquar-
ters at Penang, Malaysia. PAN-Asia addresses unspecific issues concerning pesti-
cide externalities on a regional level rather than raising questions concerning prob-
lematic situations in Malaysia (author's impression from a visit to PAN's 
headquarter in Penang, 1995). The three larger NGOs, well organized, ran several 
campaigns through newsletters and publications pertaining to externalities of inju-
dicious pesticide use. Another NGO group undertook organic farming as the core 
activity of community development. In 1991, NGOs organized a Regional 
Workshop on Organic Farming in Kuala Lumpur, which led to collaboration 
between NGOs and agencies of the Ministry of Agriculture to evaluate and pro-
mote organic farming (Lim & Oudejans, 1991). No report was found on the 
achievements of the organic farming movement in Malaysia. 
6.4. Vegetables, fruits and flowers in Thailand after 1950 
6.4.1. Introduction. Compared to other SE Asian countries, the production of veg-
etables in Thailand is relatively high (table 6.1.1.a). The vegetable production is 
concentrated in four main areas in NW, NE, SW Thailand and around Bangkok. 
Crucifers constitute the main group26 with head cabbage and Chinese cabbage 
dominating in the highlands and kales in the lowlands. Hot pepper and shallot lead 
the lowland vegetables. When irrigation became available in some provinces, 
farmers began to cultivate water melons as dry season crop after rice. In the 1970s, 
several fruit canning industries27 established nucleus estate type processing plants 
which received their supplies of fruits from farmers and large own plantations. 
More than 14,500 tonnes of canned pineapple were exported in 1973 already. 
(O'Reilly & McDonald, 1983). 
Thailand's production of tree fruits is entailed in table 6.1.1.b. Thai fruit grow-
ers produce the best quality fruits of the region but nevertheless face serious dis-
ease problems. In citrus orchards, for example, the productive life of the trees is 
usually less than seven years since they are grown from non-resistant seedlings. 
Only around 1995 grafting on rootstock, with resistance against Phytophthora par-
asitica root and stem disease spp., was introduced (ch 6.4.4.2) (GTZ-program offi-
cer, pers. comm., Kasetsart, 1993). 
Thailand is a major exporter of vegetables, of fresh and canned fruit and of cut 
flowers. Recent data on export of vegetables, fruit and flowers are not readily available. 
Thailand has emerged as a major exporter of vegetable seed in the region. In 
1992, Thailand exported 2,861 t of vegetable seeds to the value of 23 M US$ to 
thirty countries28, of which water melon accounted for 45% and tomato for 36% of 
the exported value (Asian Seed 1/6, 1994:10). The Seed Division of DOAE pro-
duced 118 t of vegetable seed in 1984 (Asian Seed 2/3, 1995:4). Imports of seeds 
in 1992 amounted to 7 M $ of which 23% head cabbage, 7% Chinese cabbage and 
15% watermelon seed. Almost 60 companies in Thailand exported or imported 
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vegetable seed among which Know You Seed Co took almost 30% of the export 
value and Chia Tai 20% of the import value (Asian Seed 1/1, 1994:6-7). 
6.4.2. Insecticide use pattern in Thai horticulture. A survey of treatment patterns 
in Pathum Thani Province, a major supply area for the capital of Bangkok, found 
that on the most intensively treated vegetable, Chinese kale, farmers made on aver-
age 6.5 applications at intervals of 8 days. On average 15.3 pesticides were includ-
ed in the mixtures29 of which 74% insecticides, 22% fungicides and 3 % herbicides 
(Jourdain & Rattanasatien, 1995). The favoured insecticides for use on crucifers 
and lettuce were profenefos, chlorfenapyr30, mevinphos, and tebufenazide. 
Farmers rarely used biorational insecticides such as B. thuringiensis (Bt) and aba-
mectin, and if used, they did so in conjunction with synthetic insecticides. They 
preferred a rapid knock-down effect to keep the vegetables undamaged and fresh-
looking. On lettuce and Chinese kale up to 32% of the insecticides fell under WHO 
Class IA (extremely hazardous) and Class IB (highly hazardous) chemicals. By 
1990, the use of organochlorines was prohibited in Thailand. They were replaced 
by insect growth regulators (IGRs) and pyrethroids. Farmers based their decisions 
for treatment on visual impressions without a clear understanding of pest monitor-
ing and control thresholds. 
All farmers reported heavy infestations and resistance of DBM and beet army-
worm (S. exigua) to pesticides. The rapid appearance of resistance against, for 
instance, chlorfluazuron (registered in 1984) was accepted as a normal fact. 
Without any idea about insect resistance management (IRM) farmers responded by 
increasing dosages, and more frequent applications with higher costs and more 
phytotoxicity. They continued using Bt and abamectin even when the products had 
lost their impact. In the case of chlorfenapyr farmers relied on only one chemical, 
which they thought to be reliable at the time (Nanta, 1996). Public investment in 
IRM could be justified by reduction of pesticide externalities. No documentation 
was found that such types of investments were realized. 
Excessive pesticide use is reported for fruit orchards (GTZ, 1993) and flower 
nurseries. Jasmine shrubs, the flower being a national symbol, and fruit trees are 
often planted on raised beds separated by water filled trenches. The trees are treat-
ed frequently with motorsprayers placed on small boats. Heavy contamination of 
the women and children picking the flowers (pickers' disease) is common 
(Baumann, pers. comm., 1993). 
A 1993 survey covering 157 fruit growers in C, SW and S Thailand, showed 
that fruit growers had been using paraquat for weed control for almost two 
decades. Most smallholders applied paraquat as a blanket spray, while a minority 
carried out strip spraying along the rows or circle weed control around the fruit 
trees. Some 95% of the owners of the holdings mixed and sprayed paraquate them-
selves. A combination of stationary pumps, hoses and hand-lances was the pre-
ferred equipment, the use of protective apparel was inadequate (Whitaker et al., 
1993). 
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6.4.3. Institutionalization of IPM in Thai horticulture. In 1984, a joint 
UNDP/FAO-Government of Thailand Programme was started aimed at the devel-
opment of integrated pest control for secondary crops (cotton, sugarcane, ve-
getables). The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) allocated in total 
0,5 M US$ for execution during four years. Collaboration was established with the 
US Consortium for International Crop Protection (CIPC), and international 
universities and institutes31. Working groups were set up for the target commod-
ities, cotton, sugarcane, non-rice food crops and vegetables. The Working Group 
for Vegetables, consisting of 38 experts of DOA and DOAE, organized workshops, 
trainings and demonstrations in cabbage and onion crops in particular. The IPM 
strategy was recommended in policy guidelines of DOA since 1985 (FAO/RAPA, 
1988; Nanta, 1996). 
During the 1980s, the German Agency for Technical Cooperation (GTZ) sup-
ported, in the frame work of the 'Thai-German Programme for Strengthening of 
the Plant Protection Service', the construction of training centres in Thailand. 
Many of the training programs contained elements on IPM for vegetables. 
Thailand is a member of the FAO ICP IPM in Rice Programme since 1980 (ch 
5.2.4). Because of failing interest of the Thai government in implementation of the 
National IPM Program, Thailand was not included in the FAO Inter-Country IPM 
in Vegetables in S and SE Asia Programme which comprised Vietnam, Laos, 
Philippines and Bangladesh. At a later date, however, inclusion of Thailand in the 
Programme was reconsidered because of its ties with Laos. It was deemed difficult 
to develop an IPM vegetable program in Laos without acknowledging the inten-
sive political and trade links between the bordering countries32. After an initial 
contact in 1986, through the NGO 'Save the Children"s Regional Initiative for 
Sustainable Agriculture (RISA), administrators of the Thai Plant Protection 
Service at a Rice Program Advisory Committee Meeting in Bankok, February 
1997, requested Thailand's joining the FAO ICP IPM in Vegetables Programme. 
The project would assist Thailand in the organization of TOT and FFS training and 
in facilitating field studies. FAO ICP would provide backstopping and funds, Thai-
land would provide counterpart contribution (FAO-ICPV, 1998). 
6.4.4. Achievements of IPM for horticulture in Thailand. Research on veg-
etables, fruits and ornamentals was the task of DOA's Institute of Horticulture 
Science, of the Kasetsart University at Bangkok, and the universities of Khon Kaen 
and Chiang Mai. All these institutions contributed to the development of IPM tech-
nologies. Two examples are given. 
6.4.4.1. Integrated control of diamondback moth. The control of DBM in cab-
bage with synthetic insecticides since the 1960s, had caused serious resistance of 
this pest. In 1984, DOA and DOAE began an UNDP/FAO supported IPM program 
against DBM which envisaged application B. thuhngiensis (Bt) when ETL values 
were surpasssed. In the same year, DOA launched a joint project with Kasetsart 
University, Bangkok, and the Nagoya University, Japan, called 'Insect toxico-
logical studies and integrated control of diamondback moth'. Research topics were 
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the monitoring of resistance development, egg parasite studies, rotation of insecti-
cides, protection by netting structures and insect trapping. The changes in insecti-
cide use, the increasing application rate of Bt, and the introduction of the biocide 
biomectin were recorded. 
The mass rearing and release of the egg parasitoid Trichogramma spp. became 
the most important instrument in DBM control programs33. DOA's Division of 
Entomology received support from AVRDC under the AVNET program for under-
taking mass rearing and DBM control trials with egg and larval-pupal parasitoids34 
(Vattanatangum, 1990a). By 1998, Thailand had a massive and commercial pro-
duction in public and private rearing laboratories of biological control agents such 
as Bt, nucleus polyhydrosis virus (NPV) and the nematode Steinernema carpoca-
pensae. Exchange of expertise and organisms takes place with rearing stations set 
up under the FAO ICP in Vegetable Programme in Vientiane, Laos, in Hanoi, 
Vietnam, and in Pnohm Penh, Cambodia (FAO-ICPV, 1998; Napompeth, pers. 
comm., 1998). Expertise on commercial mass rearing of the parasitoid Cotesia 
plutella is provided by the University of the Philippines, Los Banos, which sup-
plies stock cultures under the FAO ICP programme as well as specimens of Bt and 
CuelureR, a pheromone trap for fruit flies (FAO-ICPV, 1998). In 1989 and 1990, 
DOAE organized field days in 80 provinces to demonstrate35 how well screen net-
ting can prevent infestation of vegetables by lepidopterous and dipterous pests 
(Nanta, 1996). 
6.4.4.2. IPM for fruit trees. The Thai DO A and DOEA addressed in 1989, with 
the assistance of the German Technical Assistance Agency (GTZ), the huge pest 
problems in orchard fruit production. Thai fruit growers had a high level of knowl-
edge, but sprayed 20-40 times a year to reach relatively high yields. The first phase 
of the joint Thai-German Project began with interdisciplinary research on mango, 
tangerine, pummelo and durian, and with developing pest monitoring systems and 
IPM technology packages. In Thailand, pummelo and tangerine were for almost 
100% affected by one of the three diseases: Citrus Tristeza Virus, Citrus Greening 
Disease, and Phytophthora spp. root and stem disease. The diseases resulted in low 
yields, frequent replacement of diseased trees and a commercial lifespan of the 
orchards of less than 5-7 years. 
In the second phase, 1993-96, orchard trials were carried out in nine provinces 
in C, SW and N Thailand. To combat the Phytophthora disease, import and nurs-
ery production of disease-resistant root stock for citrus cultivars and of disease-free 
trees under a certification scheme was adopted. A national citrus seed garden was 
established at Rayong province, SE Thailand, to grow resistant root-stock for graft-
ing. In a second nursery program, thermotherapy and shoot tip grafting techniques 
were employed for the production of trees free from Tristeza Virus and Citrus 
Greening Disease. Disease and virus-free tree material was propagated at a nation-
al citrus budwood foundation block and further multiplied in regional nurseries 
under public or private sector management. A model nursery training centre was 
set up in Rayong, SE Thailand, for education in new propagation techniques and 
nursery management (GTZ, 1993). 
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Since balanced orchard systems offer suitable ecological conditions for biolog-
ical control great attention was given to the identification of natural enemies. The 
project established mass rearing facilities for predatory mites (Amblyseius spp) for 
control of the red mite (Eutetranychus africanus). Research for biological control 
of two other key pests, the citrus leaf miner (Phyllocnistis citrella) and citrus psyl-
lid (Diaphorina citri) was continued (GTZ, 1993). 
The project aimed, furthermore, to improve knowledge about pesticide selec-
tivity and pesticide application techniques. Selective pesticides, improved formu-
lations, modern (orchard) spray equipment and nozzles, and effective spraying 
techniques were introduced. Management systems were strengthened through 
continuous monitoring of the orchard ecosystems, and through technology transfer 
and extension methodology. During the third phase, 1996-99, emphasis was on 
IPM extension and strengthening of infrastructure. Project funding up to 1996 
amounted to 6 M US$ (9 M DM) from the German side and 8 M US$ from the 
Thai side. No evidence was found whether the project has made a lasting impact. 
6.4.5. IPM efforts of international and national NGOs. In Thailand, intensifica-
tion of agriculture since the late 1960s and a booming agricultural industry since 
the mid-1980s caused a considerable growth of agricultural income. However, the 
benefits of sectoral growth have mainly fallen to the wealthier part of the popula-
tion. Farmers' income in general has deteroriated due to rising costs and increas-
ing amounts of inputs, unpredictable market prices, and lack of control concerning 
choice of suitable markets. These developments created conditions for the emer-
gence of strong Thai agricultural cartels36 as well as the existence of a growing 
percentage of impoverished, often landless Thai farmers (Levin & Panyakul, 
1993). 
Under the pressure of industrialisation of Thai agriculture and deterioration of 
social conditions of Thai farmers, some Thai farmers and NGOs returned to tradi-
tional farming for self-sufficiency. Interest arose for organic farming as a possibil-
ity to escape the need for costly chemicals. From early initiatives a movement for 
alternative or sustainable agriculture emerged in the mid-1980s. In 1984, a loose 
network of NGOs was formed which evolved into the Alternative Agriculture 
Group (AAG). Its main points are 1. trust in farmers' contributions towards eco-
logical balance, and 2. economic autonomy of the farmers is a means to overcome 
exploitation by a dominating market. A 1992 survey, revealed that over 50 NGOs 
and numerous fanner organisations worked on sustainable agriculture in Thailand. 
However only 20,000 households, or 0.4% of Thai farming families, had switched 
to sustainable agriculture. The production technique for sustainable agriculture 
was found to be more complicated and more labour intensive than chemical in-
tensive farming (Levin & Panyakul, 1993). 
6.4.6. Adoption of biotechnology in Thailand. In 1989, The Thailand Develop-
ment Research Institute (TDRI) surveyed the technological capabilities of 42 
biotechnology-based Thai companies in La. feed, seed, aquaculture and health 
related industries. The survey revealed a ubiquitous lack of expertise and financial 
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interest in the private sector and poor public-private sector linkages. The Thai gov-
ernment, however, wanted to developed biotechnology in order to improve value-
added production for export. Hence the government founded, in 1991, the National 
Science and Technology Development Agency (NSTDA) as an umbrella organiz-
ation of, among others, the National Centre for Genetic Engineering and Biotech-
nology (NCGEB) and the Science and Technology Development Board. The 
government also established a Bioservice Unit as a core facility to provide 
researchers from both governmental and private organizations with appropriate in-
struments for biotechnical research (Commandeur & Pistorius, 1992). With the 
objective to attract foreign investment and technology transfer by Japanese and US 
companies a US-Thailand Commercialization of Science and Technology Program 
was set up in 1990, in which prominent US agencies37 were represented. Thai 
demands for biotechnology products and processes (production of tomatoes and 
potatoes) were available at US companies, but needed climatological and scale 
adaptions. The agreements have hardly led to an actual exchange of technology 
(Commandeur & Pistorius, 1992). 
6.5. Conclusions 
1. Market-oriented production of vegetables and fruits is characterized by intensive 
cultivation practices which require a high input of knowledge, materials, cash and 
labour. This is equally true in the tropics as in temperate zones. 
2. Pesticide advertisement for use in horticulture by the chemical industry is 
strong. Several companies operate research stations in major vegetable production 
areas on Java under the banner of IPM. In Thailand, the vast supply of brands of 
pesticides for horticulture is highly confusing for the farmers. 
3. The two main sectors of horticulture, growing of temperate vegetable species in 
highland areas and of (mainly) native species in the lowlands, differ greatly in cul-
tural practices and problems of pest and disease management. 
4. Temperate vegetables have always been in high demand and are, therefore, sub-
ject to sustained research efforts since colonial times. Still, availability of healthy 
seed and resistant (against pests and diseases, heat, humidity) cultivars is limited. 
5. In vegetable crops, the pressure of pests and diseases is, generally, high, in par-
ticular in temperate vegetables due to a.o. the absence of specific parasitoids, pred-
ators, or antagonists. 
6. Vegetables are usually grown year-round on relatively small plots in short and 
overlapping production cycles. Hence, the build-up of pests and diseases is con-
tinuous and fast. 
7. Lowland vegetables grown in rotation with wet rice benefit from the suppressive 
effect of inundation on soil-borne pests, diseases and weeds. 
8. Weeds are a costly nuisance in vegetable growing. Tillage often aggrevates weed 
problems through fragmentation of the root system of certain weeds, such as 
sedges. Herbicide use in vegetables is, however, complicated and little practised. 
9. Indonesia has a huge production of temperate and native vegetable species on 
1.3 M ha of the highlands and lowlands. Fruit production is a more limited affair. 
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10. Pesticide use is high in the major production areas of cabbage and potato (the 
highlands of Java and NW Sumatera), and hot pepper and shallot (lowlands on the 
N coast of C Java). 
11. The various Indonesian-Dutch technical assistance programs for the strength-
ening of horticulture achieved their objectives and contributed to an improvement 
of knowledge on both sides. 
12. Indonesian scientists are catching up on biological control, particularly in cab-
bage, tomato and potato, and Allium crops. Work on disease control is less 
advanced. Horticultural research still has a shortage of expert horticulturists and 
specialists. 
13. In Indonesia, the National IPM Program for Rice Based Cropping Systems has 
succeeded in including vegetables (and soybean) in its planning of IPM Farmer 
Field School Training. Indonesia also organized over 400 special vegetable FFSs 
since 1996. 
14. Malaysia had a relatively small production centre for temperate vegetables (in 
particular cabbages), the Cameron Highlands. In the 1990s, cabbage growers shift-
ed en masse to cut flower production for export owing to high losses from pests in 
vegetables and to attractive prices for flowers. 
15. Control of insect pests of cabbage crops, especially the diamondback moth, 
was intensively studied and well published by Malaysian scientists. Adequate 
methods of biological control of the major insect pests were worked out in the 
field. Application of biological control in highland areas failed due to inadequate 
extension. 
16. Research on highland vegetable production has currently low priority with 
MARDI. Little information is available on IPM for lowland vegetables except for 
hot pepper. 
17. Thailand has sizeable production of fruits and vegetables for export and domes-
tic markets. The fruit sector leads the market. 
18. Thai growers are very professional, the quality of fruits and vegetables is rela-
tively high. For pest control, however, these growers strongly depend on pesti-
cides. 
19. Thai researchers mastered biological control of diamondback moth and the cul-
turing of natural enemies. The National Biological Control Research Center has 
much expertise. Application of IPM in the field appears to be limited. 
20. Thailand faced very serious disease problems in fruit trees. Since 1992, the 
Thai German IPM Program for Selected Fruits developed integrated control meth-
ods including the introduction of resistant rootstock, grafting techniques, biologi-
cal control and training injudicious pesticide application. Published data on pene-
tration and success rates could not be found. 
21. The agricultural extension service in the three countries lacked the capacity to 
implement IPM in horticulture in terms of shortage of staff, expertise, budget and 
motivation. 
22. The general and often excessive use of pesticides in the centres of vegetable 
production hampers the implementation of IPM due to the decimation of natural 
enemy populations. 
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23. Commercial vegetables farmers, usually, purchase high quality seed. Several 
private seed companies and public institutions, such as AVRDC, are developing 
resistant cultivars of favourite vegetables. The supply of healthy, vigorous and re-
sistant seeds and plant material still falls short of demand. 
24. Seed dressing with fungicides is practised bij many growers. The industrial pel-
leting of seeds with various kinds of pesticides is underdeveloped in SE Asia. 
25. Application of IPM technology in horticulture is a complicated issue since the 
use of pesticides can not be excluded if non-chemical methods of control are insuf-
ficiently worked out. 
26. In horticulture, the provision of a IPM technology packet with suitable recom-
mendations on crop production and pest control does not suffice. IPM-trained 
growers need further guidance in the form a crop specific modules for monitoring 
of pest populations, injury assessment in relation to growth stages, and advice on 
the proper means and timing of control. 
27. The organisation of such modules for 'supervised control' is beyond the capac-
ity of individual farmers and should be extended by influential bodies of expertise. 
28. Owing to relatively high level of investment needed in horticulture, growers 
are risk averse. Failing recommendations may create mistrust of long duration. 
29. The organization of large scale IPM needs not only a FFS participatory 
approach but also administrative guaranties (good extension, reliable supply of 
improved seeds and natural enemies, adequate regulatory measures) that win the 
trust of the farmers. 
30. Recent agricultural policy of the three SE Asian countries prioritizes an expan-
sion of vegetable and fruit production in view of its potential for employment in 
corollary processing industry and trade, for income generation and export rev-
enues. 
31. Strong growth of the horticultural sector can be expected in view of current 
shortages in supply in terms of quantity and quality and the growing domestic 
demand for fruits and vegetables. 
32. The FAO ICP IPM for Vegetables Programme began its cooperation with 
Indonesia and Thailand only in 1998; it has no connection with Malaysia. 
33. The current resources of the FAO ICP IPM for Vegetables Programme in S and 
SE Asia are too limited in comparison to its objectives. 
34. Notwithstanding the impressive constraints, the development and application 
of IPM in horticulture in SE Asia needs to be pursued with priority. 
Notes 
1. The borderline between vegetables and other classes is sometimes vague. Onion and hot pepper could 
also be seen as 'spices', cassave and sweet potato as 'staples' and melon and water melon as 'fruits' 
(Oomen & Grubben, 1978; Grubben & Siemonsma, 1993). 
2. Temperate vegetables grow healthier as the microclimate gets dryer and cooler. Older tomato vari-
eties e.g. required night temperatures 10°C below day temperature. Today, several heat tolerant tomato 
varieties are available (Grubben, pers. comm., 1998). 
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3. In 1993 Thailand exported seeds (including seeds of water melon, tomato, kangkong and chilli) to 
the value of 17.9 M US$ (Asian Seed, 1/6, 1994). 
4. The worst weeds of major food crops of SE Asia were described by Holm etal. (1977), and the weeds 
of Thailand by the Thai-German Weed Science Research Project (Noda, 1985) with funds of the Japan-
ese International Cooperation Agency. Weeds in the vegetables of Indonesia, in particular, were sur-
veyed by Backer (1973) and Everaarts (1981). 
5. Lim & Di (1990) listed nine organophosphate, six carbamate and three pyrethroid insecticides as the 
most common active ingredients used by vegetable farmers in SE Asia (RAPA 1990/3:112). Shallot 
growers in Brebes, C Java, considered IndobasR and DursbanR essential preventive insecticides and to 
which curative insecticides HosthathionR, CuracronR and AtabronR were to be added (Buurma & 
Nurmalinda, 1992b, undated). 
6. Talekar notes that nowhere else than in Brebes, N Java, four species of Spodoptera (S. litura, S 
exigua, S. exempta, S mauritid) concur in attacking shallot or any other crop. Several farmers applied 
five insecticide sprays per week (Talekar in a letter to Director, Central Research Institute for 
Horticulture, Pasar Minggu, Jakarta, 2 October, 1995). 
7. Around 1994, substantial resistance was detected in a DBM population from the Cameron Higlands 
against abamectin, some degree of resistance to Bt ssp kurstaki and the possibility of slight resistance 
to Bt ssp aizawai (Verkerk et al, 1996). 
8. The pesticide alternation scheme envisages an application sequence of Bta (XenTariR), IRGs 
(flufenoxuron, hexaflumeron), Btk (DipelR, BactospeinR), fipronil, carbamates (cartap), and abamectin 
in the 6th generation (Verkerk et al, 1996). 
9. The Expert Consultation was attended by experts from 10 countries in S and SE Asia, FAO Rome 
and the FAO Regional 1PM in Rice Programme, AVRDC and South Pacific Commission (FAO/RAPA, 
1988). 
10. In 1985, 4,046 cases of pesticide poisoning were reported from 55 provinces in Thailand, with 289 
deaths. Most of the cases were farmers who had been exposed to pesticides (Lim & Oudejans, 1991). 
11. In the late 1980s insecticides alone accounted for about 30% of the costs in cabbage cultivation in 
the Cameron Highlands, Malaysia (Lim, 1987, 1988). 
12. In 1985, the Extension Service of the Indonesian Directorate-General of Food Crops employed 
about 14,000 extension workers and 259 subject matter specialists. Allegedly, none had been specially 
trained in horticultural crops (Singh, 1990). 
13. The governments of the countries visited (Vietnam, Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand and the 
Philippines) expressed great interest in an early implementation of a separate FAO ICP-IPM for vege-
tables (Lim & Oudejans, 1991). The main donor, the Netherlands, approved the program only in 1995, 
for four countries. 
14. The Indonesian partners in the ICM for sweet potato project were the NGO Mitra Tani, Yogyakarta; 
Duta Wacana Christian University (UKDW), Yogyakarta; and the Research Institute for Legumes and 
Tuber Crops (RILET), Malang. 'User's Perspective With Agricultural Research and Development' 
(UPWARD) is an Asian network for participatory research in root and tuber cropping systems, affiliat-
ed with CIP (van de Fliert et al, 1995, 1996). 
15. Clubroot, an economically important disease of crucifers in N Europe, was detected in E Asia 
around mid-1970s (Ikegami, 1975; Yang, 1989). The fungal spores, released from infected cabbage 
roots, persist in the soil for many years. Breeding for host resistance to clubroot is difficult due to the 
existence of many races (Yang, 1989). Some work was done in Cameron Highlands (Reerink, 1996). 
16. The potential of parasitoids was intensively studied for the larval parasitoides (Diadegma 
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eucerophaga, D. semiclansum, Microplitis plutellae, Cotesia plutellae), egg parasitoids (Tetrastichus 
dygari, Trichogramma spp), pupal parasitoid (Xanthopimpla spp), and larval-pupal parasitoids 
(Brachymeria spp) (Sudarwohadi & Eveleens, 1977; Ooi & Lim, 1989). 
17. Bacterial genes present in B. thuringiensis (Bt) produce proteins toxic to lepidopterous, dipterous 
and coleopterous larvae. When the endotoxic protein enters the midgut of the insect larvae it causes 
their rapid death. Biotechnology companies tried to incorporate the Bt gene in cabbage plants (Kramer, 
1991), but this has not yet resulted in DBM resistance cultivars. 
18. The Brastagi area at 1200-1400 m altitude has a high production of temperate vegetables due to i:s 
fertile soils and cool humid climate, but a generally low use of pesticides. Up to 80% of the produce is 
exported to Singapore and Malaysia without reports of residue problems. 
19. Project ATA-111 provided introductory courses in plant protection for HRI and university staff, 
1975-77, and special subject courses for technical staff. Ten fellows attended courses in the Netherlands 
(Wessel, 1977). 
20. The seed program began with introduction and field testing of vegetable and potato seeds provided 
by 20 seed companies from 10 countries. Promising varieties were handed over to DoA's Extension 
Service for demonstration trials, multiplication and distribution to the farmers (Wessel, 1977). 
21. When in 1992 the project ATA-395 was terminated early because of a political dispute between 
Indonesia and the Netherlands, the ICM in hot pepper study by JM Vos (1994) was continued in 
Wageningen, the Netherlands and completed with MARDI at the Klang Station, Malaysia (ch 6.3.2). 
22. The average percentage of infestation with Potato Leaf Roll Virus (PLRV), established with the 
ELISAtest in 78 potato samples collected from Brastagi and Seribudolog, Karo , N Sumatera, was 44% 
and 46% respectively in third to fifth generation tubers after importation (Chujoy, 1995). 
23. In Cameron Highlands vegetables are grown by approximately 1,000 growers, of which the major-
ity are ethnic Chinese. Chinese growers often work in '£o«gs/'-connection, which offer communal 
advantages of production, transportation, marketing and credit to members. A kongsi makes its mem-
bers more competitive, but less accessible for non-Chinese extension personnel. 
24. In 1995, flower cultivation, largely protected by plastic and netting, had increased to 800 ha. Dutch 
companies are well represented as buyers and suppliers of planting material of e.g. rose, carnation and 
Chrysanthemum. 
25. When the author visited the MARDI station at Tanah Rata, Cameron Highlands in March 1986, 
some experts expressed their disappointment that the results of 30 years of MARDI research on vari-
eties, rotation, fertilization, and biological control had hardly been adopted by the vegetable growers. 
26. Thailand cabbage production in the late 1980s amounted to about 10,000 ha each of head cabbage 
and Chinese kale, from Chinese cabbage on about 8,200 ha, leaf mustard and pakchoi on 7,700 ha each, 
and Chinese radish on 5,400 ha (Lim & Di, 1990). 
27. Companies, such as Universal Food Company, Siam Food Products, Thai Pineapple Industry, and 
Tropical Fruits and Vegetables Co. established plantations in i.a. Chiang Mai, Chon Buri, Samut 
Prakan, and Prachuab Khiri-Khan provinces. The canned produce includes pineapple, mango, papaya, 
rambutan, baby corn, asparagus, tomatoes and bamboo shoots (O'Reilly & McDonald, 1983). 
28. The countries which imported seeds from Thailand in 1992 included Taiwan (34%), USA (26,4%), 
Hong Kong (15%) and the Netherlands (8.3%), Malaysia (2.3%) and Indonesia (1.7%) (Asian Seed 1/1, 
1994:6). 
29. Each active ingredient included in the cocktail and each seed treatment was counted as a separate 
chemical application, e.g. a mixture of chlorfenapyr, fipronil and enodosulfan was counted as 3 appli-
cations (Jourdain & Rattanasatien, 1995). 
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30. Chlorfenapyr was the second most used insecticide on Chinese kale. Farmers regarded chlorfenapyr 
as the only product giving control ofSpodoptera spp as the 'product of the year'. Chlorfenapyr did not 
yet receive full registration and was, therefore, admitted for trials only (Jourdain & Rattanasatien, 
1995). 
31. The UNDP/FAO-Thailand IPC Programme for Secondary Crops hired, in 1985, a.o. a consultant in 
mass rearing of parasites and predators from Guangdong Entomological Institute, PR. China, and a 
pathologist of the US Sugarcane Laboratory at Houma (UNDP Report 11.1984-03.1985, project 
THA/83/015). 
32. Thailand and Laos commissioned a Friendship Bridge aimed at improving exchange of goods and 
technologies (FAO ICPV, 1998). 
33. In Thailand, research on DBM began in 1985 with field studies of the DBM life-cycle on cabbage 
in Petchabun province. The DBM population went through about 17 generations per year with peaks 
observed during winter (December) and summer (June). The parasitoids Trichogramma bactrae fuma-
ta and Cotesiaplutellae appeared to be well established (Keinmeesuke et al., 1989). 
34. In highland cabbage in Petchabun, 1987, a release of Trichogramma bactrae fumata at the rate of 
375.000 parasitoids/ha resulted in a 65% parasitation of DBM eggs. In 1988, releasing egg parasites in 
combination with Bt. application gave 55 % parasitation. Concurrent lowland DBM trials at Kasetsart 
University Kamphaeng Saen Campus showed up to 45% parasitization by T. bactrae fumata and up to 
32 % parasitation by Cotesia plutellae (Keinmeesuke etal., 1989). 
35. The DOAE claimed a reduction of more than 5,000 US$/ha/y on the cost chemical control. Lower 
use of fertilizer and water, and better quality of vegetables were further propaganda. 
36. Less than 20 companies control the Thai market through a vertical integration. They control the 
entire process from production of raw material to marketing of added-value products. One of the largest 
cartels, Charoen Phokphand, controls trade in seed (Chia Thai), fertilizer, pesticide, livestock and aqua-
culture through joint ventures with other companies and contracting farmers (Levin & Panyakul, 1993). 
37. The US Agency for International Development (USAID), the Board for Science and Technology for 
International Development (BOSTID) of the US National Research Council, and Biotechnology 
International (BTI) of the University of Maryland took part in the Thailand-US Program (Commandeur 
& Pistorius, 1992). 
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Chapter 7 
The Pesticide Market 
7.1. The pesticide market world-wide and in SE Asia 
From 1945 till the end of the century, the global use of pesticides has shown a 
continuous upward trend. Global agro-chemical sales rose to 30,960 M $US at the 
end-user level in 1997 (Agrow #299:16, 1998). Discounting the effect of inflation 
and currency factors, average annual growth in real terms amounted to 3.7% over 
the period 1994-96 (Agrow #299:16, 1998). 
In 1996, all major companies reported an increase in turn-over of pesticides 
(table 7.1). For all companies, growth in the Asian market is an important target for 
new product introductions (Agrow #235:5 ,1995; #267:5, 1996; #294:16, 1997; 
#297:6, 1998). Companies set high hopes on non-selective herbicides (glyphosate, 
glufosinate) and new crop specific insecticides (i.a. imidacloprid, fipronil) and 
fungicides (i.a. carpopramid). The production of pesticides in Asia is keeping its 
position in Japan and grows rapidly in India, China, and South Korea. A large part 
of the production of China, India and Japan is exported to the rest of Asia (Agrow 
#263:6, 1996; #288:18, 1997). Major companies, such as Novartis1, AgrEvo, 
Rhone Poulenc and Monsanto are entering joint ventures for formulation and 
packaging in China, S Korea and Vietnam (Agrow #297 and #298, 1998). 
World pesticide sales by region and by product category in 1997 are depicted 
in figure 7.1.a,b. The Far East Asia market lost some of its share since 1996 due to 
grave economic problems which may affect purchasing power till beyond the turn 
of century. Herbicides dominated the world pesticide market, absorbing almost 
half of its value. In 1996, generic pesticide sales were worth 17,000 M USS, just 
over 50% of total pesticide market value (Agrow #297, 1998). 
Data concerning the development of the pesticide market in SE Asia were 
obtained from two major sources, both covering the three countries under discus-
sion (Box 7.1). Information over the period before 1980, was taken from the 
Agricultural Requisite Scheme for Asia and the Pacific2 (ARS AP). A detailed time 
series of pesticide market data, 1980 till 1996, was generously made available by 
Bayer AG, Business Group Crop Protection, Leverkusen, Germany. 
Table 7.1. World, the twelve leading agro-chemical multinationals and their 1996 sales 
(in M USS), including pesticides. Source: Agrow #287:1, 1997. 
Company MUSS Company MUSS Company M USS 
Novartis 
Monsanto 
Zeneca 
Du Pont 
4,527 
2,997 
2,630 
2,472 
AgrEvo 
Bayer 
Rhone Poulenc 
DowElanco 
2,419 
2,360 
2,210 
2,000 
Cyanamid 
BASF 
Sumitomo 
FMC 
1,989 
1,541 
693 
650 
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a. World, market shares by region, 1997. 
Global sales 30,960 M US$ at end-user level. 
Rest of World 
10% 
b. World, market shares by 
product category, 1997 
Others 
Fungicide 5% 
Figure 7.1.a,b. Global pesticide sales by region (a) and by product category (b) in 1997. Source: Agrow 
229:16, 1998. 
7.2. The pesticide market in Indonesia 
7.2.1. Indonesia's pesticide market before 1980. After Independence, Indonesia 
suffered a serious shortfall in food production. In the late 1950s, the government 
of Indonesia began to pay serious attention to the issue of food security. The gov-
ernment provided rice farmers with a subsidized technology package of which 
pesticides formed only a small component in comparison to the huge volumes of 
improved seed and fertilizer. The ample supply of insecticides was going to have 
some unexpected effects which deeply influenced agricultural policy in later years. 
During the 1960s and 1970s, the Indonesian market for pesticides consisted of 
two sectors, a subsidized food crop sector, and a non-subsidized free market sec-
tor for food and non-food crops (ARSAP, 1980). The main beneficiaries of subsi-
dized pesticides were the farmers who participated in the Bimas/Inmas intensi-
fication programs for rice and other crops (ch 2.6.3). The non-food sector consis-
ted of semi-government estate companies (Perkebunan negara), private estate 
companies, smallholder co-operatives and non-organized smallholders. 
Although the government encouraged pesticide imports for use by all sectors in 
accordance with its agricultural development policy, it left the supply of pesticides 
to the non-food sector almost entirely to private companies. Neither the plantation 
crop sector nor the farmers growing food crops outside intensification programs 
were entitled to receive either credit for bridging production costs or subsidized 
chemical inputs (ARSAP, 1980). In reality, however, a substantial amount of subsi-
dized fertilizer and pesticides were illegally transferred3 from the subsidized crops 
to the non-subsidized ones. 
The procurement and subsidized supply of insecticides for food crops by the 
Directorate of Agriculture (DoA) began around 1966. Records were kept by the 
Customs Office, the Department of Statistics and various divisions of the DoA, 
such as the Bimas Directorate and the Plant Protection Extension Service. 
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Box 7.1 
The collection and analysis of agro-pesticide data 
A data collector may be faced with two extremes, namely an ad hoc search 
for data from scattered sources, or access to a well administered time series 
of data. Generally, the keeping of data records on supply and use of agro-
pesticides is the responsibility of various government departments. Data on 
procurement and import are recorded by the Departments of Agriculture, of 
Trade and Cooperatives, the Central Bureau of Statistics and the Customs, 
and those on local manufacture by Departments of Industry, Health and the 
Environment. Systems of data keeping are seldom uniform and may show 
many deficiencies (ARSAP 1981, 1981b; Staring 1984; IRPTC, 1986a, b). 
Reasons which limit the usefulness of the data are, 1. the first collection 
and analysis of data was done by government personnel, the researcher does 
not see data from the sources, 2. the interpretation of pesticide data is hindered 
by the complexity and number of chemical compounds and formulations on 
the market, by lack of uniformity in notification, and by significant discrepan-
cies between procurement and distribution records of different institutions per-
taining to the flow of pesticides in the same years, 3. differences in formula-
tion type and concentration of individual brand products make computation of 
national use in terms of quantity of a.i or quantity of f.p. per crop and year 
practically impossible if data keeping is not designed for the purpose. 
In 1962, the 14th Commision Session of the U.N.Economic and Social 
Commission for Asia and the Pacific, Bangkok, installed the Agricultural 
Requisite Scheme for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP/ARSAP) for the promo-
tion of agro-pesticide use, particularly in food crops. The FAO Regional 
Office for Asia and the Far East (FAO/RAPA) and ARSAP were the first to 
collect and analyse data on supply and use of pesticides and fertilisers in the 
Region S and SE Asia (James & Reddy, 1977a,b; ARSAP 1980, 1981a,b; Sta-
ring 1984). In 1972, the tasks of ARSAP was taken over by UNIDO/RENPAP. 
In a parallel effort ESCAP/CIRAD prepared an Agropesticide Index for Asia 
and the Pacific, which was transcribed in the IPHYTROP databank in 1997. 
The pesticide industry prepares annual market surveys in each coun-
try. The national associations of pesticide manufacturers and distributers 
may issue an annual review summary. Detailed market information collect-
ed by companies and data consultant firms are expensive and confidential. 
In the underlying study, ARSAP data were used for the years up to 
1980. Complete time series or other aggregated data were not found for that 
period. Data from the years after 1980, collected by other researchers on ad 
hoc basis through record studies and interviews with each relevant institu-
tion, show similar shortcomings (Jungbluth, 1996). Detailed industrial time 
series of data of the total pesticide markets of Indonesia, Malaysia and 
Thailand from 1980 till 1996 were generously made available by Bayer AG, 
Leverkusen, Germany, for this study. 
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Pesticide data from the early years, however, are incomplete and difficult to inter-
pret. The Indonesian data on supply, distribution and use in the 1970s were ana-
lyzed by ARSAP. Table 7.2.1 gives an indication of the pesticide market in Indo-
nesia, 1974-78. In 1974, Indonesia imported 10,4561 a.i. equivalents of pesticides, 
the largest quantity of the decade. The procured insecticides (60%) and fungicides 
(10%) were destined mainly for subsidized use in food crop intensification pro-
grams, and the herbicides (30%) for the estates (ARSAP, 1980). Shortage of 
application equipment raised doubts about the capacity of farmers to rapidly apply 
the large stocks of pesticides which the government of Indonesia had purchased. 
The government agencies had few possibilities to control actual pesticide use or 
the efficacy of the application. Generally, huge stocks piled up in central depots 
and warehouses of cooperatives whilst a shortage existed at the farm level. The 
pesticide companies were not involved in the distribution of government stock and 
the state distributing agency Pertani was not effective (James & Reddy, 1977a). 
The decrease in government procurement during the years 1975 and 1976 reflects 
an import restriction to reduce the excessive stocks built up in 1973 and 1974 in 
the aftermath of the world oil crisis (ARSAP, 1980). 
The DoA assisted the farmers in the actual application of insecticides through 
the department's pest control units which the farmers could contract. Some 60% of 
the pesticides were applied by farmers themselves and 40% by pest control units 
which the farmers contracted (James & Reddy, 1977a). Emergency pest outbreaks 
were commonly controlled by DoA's own Aerial Unit4 and Plant Protection Briga-
des5. For this purpose, DoA received a special outbreak budget to procure the 
necessary emergency supplies, which e.g. amounted to 800 t f.p. in 1980 (ARSAP, 
1980). 
A leading formulator estimated the 1978 value of the pesticide market in 
Indonesia at 44 M US$ (ARSAP, 1980), of which 65% was used on food crops, 
35% on non-food crops of estates and smallholders. Pesticide use by these estates 
and smallholders concerned mainly herbicides for weed control in young plant-
ings. 
Table 7.2.1. Indonesia, total procurement of pesticides (tonnes a.i. equivalents) from 
import and local formulation in the period 1974-1978. Source: ARSAP, 1980 (data by 
courtesy of Directorate of Plant Protection). 
Category 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 
Insecticides 
Fungicides 
Herbicides 
Others 
6,000 
1,194 
2,968 
323 
1,121 
539 
1,018 
176 
1,134 
876 
337 
26 
2,253 
630 
772 
355 
2,945 
665 
495 
171 
Total 10,456 2,853 2,373 3,981 4,270 
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Indonesia, total pesticide market, 1980 -1996 
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Fig. 7.2.2.a. Indonesia, total pesticide market, 1980-96. Annual procurement of pesticides in relative 
values for a.i. weight, a.i. value in DM, and a.i. value in US$ (1996 = 100%). Source: Bayer AG, 
Germany, 1988. 
7.2.2. Indonesia's pesticide market since 1980. The total Indonesian pesticide 
market went through a boom and bust cycle within the period 1980-96 (fig. 
7.2.2.a). In 1996, pesticide sales rose to 14,605 t a.i., valued at about 311 M US$, 
thereby reaching the highest level ever in terms of both value and volume. 
An agreggate overview of the total pesticide sales, on basis of a.i. content, in 
the Indonesian market of the years 1980 and 1996 is given in table 7.2.2.a. Figures 
7.2.2.b,c,d show the market shares of the product categories in terms of a.i. weight 
and value, and in treatable area. Figure 7.2.2.d compares the areas which could be 
treated with the a.i. volumes sold if products were applied following dossage 
recommendations. Early in the 1980s, insecticides dominated the Indonesian mar-
ket. Sixteen years later, insecticides, falling from 75% to 44%, had ceded much of 
their share to herbicides. Figure 7.2.2.e illustrates the shift of the market shares of 
pesticides in various crops in the same period. The distribution of market shares 
over crops, which was rather stable from 1980 to 1986, changed drastically from 
1986 to 1991. The market share of rice was halved, that of soybean tripled, where-
as vegetables, rubber and 'others' increased considerably. Table 7.2.2.b indicates 
that in 1996 still half of the insecticide sales (in a.i. value) was for use on rice. The 
share of herbicides increased 35% mainly because of herbicide application in the 
extensive plantings of oil palm, rubber and cacao on the Outer Islands. The 
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b. Indonesia, market shares in a.i. value 
5 Insecticide 
6 Fungicide 
O Herbicide 
ED Rodenticide 
Figure 7.2.2.b, c, d. Indone-
sia, comparison of market 
shares of product categories 
in 1980 and 1996. Source: 
Bayer AG, Germany, 1998. 
1980 1996 
c. Indonesia market shares in a.i. weight 
H Insecticide 
S Fungicide 
• Herbicide 
0 Rodenticide 
1980 1996 
d. Indonesia, market shares in treatable area 
1980 1996 
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Table 7.2.2.a. Indonesia. Composition of the pesticide market in 1980 and 1996, ex-
pressed in a.i. weight, a.i. value of chemical classes, and treatable area if applied fol-
lowing dosage recommendations. Source: Bayer AG, Germany, 1998. 
Categories and 
chemical classes 
Year 
Insecticides 
Organophosphates 
Carbamates 
Organochlorines 
Pyrethroids 
Others 
Total 
Relative 
Fungicides 
Organophosphates 
Carbamates 
Dithiocarbamates 
Organochlorines 
Others 
Total 
Relative 
Herbicides 
Organophosphates 
Carbamates 
Sulfonyl urea 
Paraquat 
Others 
Total 
Relative 
Rodenticides 
Relative 
Grand Total 
Relative 
A.i. weight (tonnes) 
1980 
2,544 
1,177 
78 
21 
32 
3,852 
52% 
0 
0 
985 
15 
697 
1,697 
23% 
28 
0 
0 
194 
1,517 
1,739 
24% 
46 
1% 
7,334 
100% 
1996 
1,340 
1.663 
689 
120 
97 
3,909 
26% 
3 
18 
4,126 
226 
273 
4,646 
30% 
2,641 
44 
14 
1,847 
1,672 
6,218 
40% 
643 
4% 
15,416 
100% 
Trt. area (x 
1980 
5.092 
1.864 
186 
163 
122 
7,427 
55% 
0 
0 
842 
43 
964 
1,849 
14% 
1,638 
0 
0 
1,318 
1,157 
4,113 
31% 
3 
0.1% 
13,392 
100% 
1,000 ha) 
1996 
5,219 
4,883 
2,563 
6.300 
732 
19,697 
53% 
12 
30 
4,086 
309 
1,336 
5,773 
16% 
4,714 
107 
2.160 
1,841 
2,034 
10,856 
29% 
556 
2% 
36,882 
100% 
A.i. value (M USS) 
1980 
46.2 
15.93 
1.94 
1.52 
0.63 
66,22 
75% 
0 
0.28 
5.49 
0.07 
1.14 
6.98 
8% 
2.43 
0 
0 
5.38 
6.60 
14.41 
16% 
0.48 
1% 
88.09 
100% 
1996 
44.20 
31.38 
17,35 
38,20 
14.05 
145,18 
47% 
0.16 
3.64 
33.58 
3.64 
11.79 
52.81 
17% 
60.80 
0.75 
11.04 
22.14 
14.58 
109.31 
35% 
2.35 
1% 
309.65 
100% 
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Figure 7.2.2.e. Indonesia's pesticide market change in market shares (in a.i. value) in various crops, 
1981-96. Source Bayer AG, Germany 1998. 
relatively small increase of fungicides reflects the greater attention to horticulture 
and fruit sector. 
7.2.3. The pesticide market for rice before 1980. The government policy of 
implementing production intensification programs in rice since 1965 (ch 2.6.3) is 
the key to understand the trends of the Indonesian rice pesticide market. DoA pur-
chased and supplied insecticides, rodenticides and fungicides to farmers who parti-
cipated in subsidized programs such as Bimas and Inmas. The farmers obtained a 
credit package in the form of vouchers for seed of high yielding rice varieties, 
fertilizers, insecticides and rodenticides at subsidized prices and a cost of living 
allowance for bridging the growth season. Since the input packages were usually 
distributed through the village authority, their rapid adoption was stimulated 
through strict social control and occasional enforcement by the army (van de Flie-
rt, 1993; Ter Weel, pers. comm., 1998). In this way, farmers were instructed to 
apply insecticides on calender schedule as the most effective way of controlling 
rice pests. Since the Bimas Gotong Royong program covered about 4 M ha of irri-
gated (sawah) rice in 1969/70 already, the propaganda for using insecticides was 
wide-spread. To assure timely application, some of the foreign chemical compa-
nies, which were asked by the Indonesian government to become involved in the 
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Table 7.2.2.b. Indonesia, market shares of the category insecticides in various crops, 
1996. Source: Bayer AG, Germany, 1998. 
Crop A.i. value % Crop A.i. value % 
(M US$) (M US$) 
Rice 
Soybean 
Spices, herbs 
75.7 
18.0 
14.1 
52 
12 
10 
Vegetables 
Fruits 
Other 
24.5 
1.8 
11.1 
17 
1 
8 
program's execution (various personal communications), sprayed large areas of 
sawah by air (ch 2.6.3.4). 
Table 7.2.3.a indicates the quantities of pesticides allocated to the Bimas/Inmas 
programs in financial years 1973-77. Insecticide supply to farmers tripled in four 
years time in line with the increase of brown planthopper infestations (Kenmore, 
1986). When, in 1978, BPH infestation was less serious6, the supply, nevertheless, 
was kept at the same level. Neither DoA nor other parties were able to establish 
with any degree of accuracy the area actually treated by farmers but could only 
record procurement and major stock movements. 
In the period 1976-78, the proportion of farmers participating in either scheme 
shifted from Bimas (credit) towards Inmas (cash). Farmers, who failed to repay 
their loans, were excluded from Bimas credit facilities and had to purchase from 
Inmas stocks to keep the benefit of the price subsidy. The obligation to pay cash 
had a definite influence on the usage pattern as Inmas farmers applied half as 
much7 insecticides as Bimas farmers did (ARSAP, 1980). 
The prices for insecticides and fungicides distributed under the Bimas/Inmas 
schemes were fixed every year. Around 1979, subsidized formulations were sold at 
about US$ 1.5 (Rp. 900) per litre or kilogram at the village retail outlet (kiosk). 
Compared to open market prices8, the subsidies on wettable powder and liquid 
powder products varied from 40% to 75%. Granular formulations were priced at 
Table 7.2.3.a. Indonesia, pesticide supply to Bimas/Inmas programs (tonnes of f.p.) in 
period 1974-78. Source: ARSAP, 1980 (data from Bimas Directorate). 
Year 
1973/74 
1974/75 
1975/76 
1876/77 
1977/78 
Insecticides 
1,371 
2,361 
3,439 
4,202 
4,000 
Fungicides 
0 
8 
20 
41 
19 
Rodenticides 
46 
83 
159 
112 
120 
Total 
1,417 
2,452 
3,618 
4.355 
4.139 
Bimas % 
80 
88 
88 
74 
63 
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about US$ 3/kg (Rp 1,800/kg). Herbicides were not included in the subsidy package 
(ARSAP, 1980). 
Until the early 1970s, the Indonesian government had almost completely relied 
on the import of low concentration pesticide formulations, although these were rel-
atively expensive due to the high volume/low a.i. content ratio. The fear for lack 
of foreign currency drove the government to negotiate with the pesticide industry 
on the establishment of formulation capacities in Indonesia (Schonlau, pers. 
comm., 1998). Soon, various companies started to build formulation plants which 
would produce ready-for-use products from imported technical material9. Table 
7.2.3.b indicates that the local formulation plants largely substituted the import of 
ready-for-use insecticide concentrates within ten years, 1973-83. 
However, there was another issue which had to be solved in order to make the 
farmers use the pesticides in the rice intensification programs. Indonesia did not 
have enough knapsack sprayers for the treatment of millions of hectares. The 
industry was asked to support the distribution of knapsack sprayers (Schonlau, 
pers. comm., 1998; author's involvement, 1966-75). However, the development of 
low concentration (3%-10%), ready-for-use granular formulations which could be 
applied without a knapsack sprayer, was deemed to be the best solution. The suc-
cessful acceptation of granules was reflected by the rapid rise in local production, 
from 5,100 t.y in 1979 to 25,074 t/y in 1983 (table 7.2.3.b). The distribution of the 
large lots of fertilizers, seed and pesticides remained a logistic nightmare due to 
lack of organisational expertise and transport infrastructure. 
Table 7.2.3.b. Indonesia, 1973-83, supply of insecticides from import and local formu-
lation (tonnes of f.p.). Index: a. liquid and powder; b. granular; c. per cent supply from 
local formulation. Source: Staring, 1984 (data courtesy of Directorate of Plant Protection). 
Year Weight in t f.p. % 
1973 5,825 0 
1974 12,746 <10 
1975 7,705 <15 
1976 5,299 <15 
1977 8,547 15 
1978 7,411 18 
1979 5,952 5,100 70 
1980 6,515 75 
1981 8,645 6,800 75 
1982 13,931 20,425 80 
1983 19,400 25,074 85 
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Pesticide sales, rice production and subsidy in Indonesia, 1974-
96 
— • — Weight a.i. (t) 
—•—Value a.i. (US $) 
—*— Production (M t) 
Subsidy % 
Figure 7.2.4.a. Annual 
rice production, pro-
curement of pesticides 
for use in rice, and pes-
ticides subsidy in 
Indonesia, 1974-96, in 
relative values. (1996 = 
100% for national rice 
production: 1987 = 
100% for a.i. weight 
and value). Sources: 
FAO production year-
books; Bayer AG, 
Germany, 1988. 
During the decade 1970-80, rice production grew at an average annual rate of 
3.5% notwithstanding the continuous expansion of the Bimas/Inmas programs 
from zero to 6 M ha or two-third of the total rice area harvested. The growth in rice 
production was slowed down by the worsening pest situation10. Nation-wide BPH 
outbreaks occurred during 1975-77, which were temporarily brought under control 
through the introduction of the BPH-resistant rice varieties IR26 and IR36 (fig. 
2.6.3.4.d). These outbreaks invariably resulted from the indiscriminate use of 
(mainly broad-spectrum) insecticides which induced resistance11 in pests and 
destroyed natural enemies (Kenmore, 1980). 
7.2.4. The pesticide market for rice since 1980. The 1980-96 data on the pesti-
cide market for the rice sector provide an important yardstick for measuring the 
impact of the national IPM policy on farmers' behaviour and rice production. The 
data series covers almost the entire period of the FAO Inter-Country IPM in Rice 
Programme (ch 5). Figure 7.2.4.a shows the pesticide sales in the rice sector, in a.i. 
weight and value (USS), the pesticide subsidies and the national rice production 
during the period 1974-1996. Rice production rose steadily from 1974 through 
1996. Minor disturbances could not be related to other variables in the figure. 
Pesticide procurement (in a.i. weight) decreased sharply from 1974 to 1975 
because of excess purchases and over-stocking in 1973-74. Pesticide sales in USS 
value followed roughly those in a.i. weight, but recent recovery in value triples 
recent recovery in weight. 
Early in the 1980s, the government of Indonesia, fearing a further deterioration 
of the pest situation, continued the procurement of ever greater quantities of insec-
ticides for use in rice (fig.7.2.4.a) and dosage recommendations were maintained 
throughout without a second thought. In 1985/86, another devastating BPH out-
break destroyed an estimated 275,000 ha of rice. The greatest quantity of insecti-
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cides (in a.i. weight) was purchased12 in 1987. 
In November, 1986, the President of Indonesia issued the instruction INPRES 
3/86, by which IPM was declared official crop protection policy for rice. The 
instruction banned 35 a.i.s (57 brands of mostly broad-spectrum organophosphate 
insecticides) in general and particularly from use in rice. An additional measure was 
the withdrawal of the price subsidy in four steps over 1986-89 from a 85% level up 
to 1985 to the zero level of 1989. The combined measures hit the market as a dou-
ble-edged sword. In accordance with the new policy, the government drastically 
reduced the procurement of insecticides for the food sector. The farmers, spoiled by 
generous price subsidies, made fewer applications when prices went up. 
The IPM protagonists celebrated the inevitable recession of the pesticide mar-
ket as a victory for the new policy. The widely publicized figure 7.2.4.b was used 
to convince national authorities and donors participating in the FAO Inter-country 
IPM Rice Programme in SE Asia of the effectiveness of their investment in IPM 
extension efforts13. When reduced spraying enabled the natural enemy populations 
to recover and to keep the BPH from breaking the resistance of the new rice var-
ieties, the IPM ideology became everybody's creed. 
Of course, figure 7.2.4.b renders the facts correctly. But which facts? It suggests 
that the withdrawal of the government's price subsidy on pesticides caused a 
decrease in the production of pesticides. 'Production' is an aggregated denominator 
which at best accounts for domestic formulation and which ignores import of fin-
ished product. The index on the Y-axis does not show how the production was meas-
ured (quantity of either formulated or a.i. weight, or value). The figure suggests that 
the concurrent reduction of subsidies and domestic production boosted the produc-
tion of rice. The concurrence was certainly true but there is no cause-and-effect rela-
tionship because the increase in rice production is a continuous one from 1974 to 
1996 (fig. 7.2.4.a). The pesticide production curve shows two peaks, a lower in 1985 
and a higher in 1987, for which no reasons were given. Figure 7.2.2.a suggests that 
currency exchange rates14 may at least partially explain the two-topped curve. 
Rice production was not affected by the subsidy cut as there is no correlation 
between the curves showing pesticide procurement and rice production. In the late 
1980s, the improved Bimas program covered over 90% of the irrigated rice area. 
It appears that the consistent improvement of rice varieties15, water management 
and fertilization were the decisive factors for raising yield levels. The FAO pro-
gram explicitly paid attention to these three factors. 
After the rice pesticide market had hit the bottom in 1991, it resumed growth 
in terms of both a.i. weight and value since 1993 and almost recovered in 1996. 
This implies that insecticide use in rice is continuing on a significant, although 
reduced scale. The Bayer data series enables to calculate a breakdown of the 1996 
pesticide market for use in rice, which amounted to 92.4 M US$, into the cate-
gories insecticides 77.0 M$ (83%), herbicides 10.8 M$ (12%), rodenticides 2.4 MS 
(3%) and others about 2M$ (2%). 
It is questionable whether, over the period 1987-91, actual use was reduced to 
a degree suggested by the pesticide procurement curves. It should be recalled that 
by 1987-88, after years of high procurement, the stores in the public and private 
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data from the Ministry of Finance, 
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sector were loaded with pesticides. It appears that after 1987, when the Minister of 
Finance withheld the subsidy for pesticides and the budget for procurement was 
lower, the large stocks which had been carried over from year to year were gradu-
ally marketed. When, by 1992, the stocks were exhausted, the purchases of pesti-
cides went up again to meet the demand of government agencies and private par-
ties (Schonlau, pers. comm., 1998). 
7.2.5. Changing product pattern in the rice sector. In 1980, the supply of subsi-
dized insecticides to the rice sector consisted of 72% organophosphate, 25% car-
bamate, and 3% 'other' insecticides (fig. 7.2.5). By 1985, systemic carbamate 
insecticides were as popular as organophosphates, each taking almost 50 % of the 
rice market. By 1996, these two classes had decreased to about 25% each with 
pyrethroids as runner up at 20%, while endosulfan (class organochlorine) captured 
a stable 10% share. A newcomer on the rice market was the product group herbi-
cides, consisting of 5% organophosphates (glyphosate) and 7% sulfonyl urea 
(metsulfuron) and paraquat. Thus, the actual share of organophosphate insecticides 
in rice had dwindled to 19% in 1996. 
A comparison of older and newer products shows how differences in dose 
requirements complicate the interpretation of data pertaining the pesticide market. 
An analysis of the 1996 insecticide sales data for rice18 (table 7.2.5.a) shows that 
the sales of endosulfan and cypermethrin needed to treat a comparabe hectareage 
(proportion = 1) differ in price (proportion = 1.7) and quantity of a.i. (proportion = 
20.6). The costs per recommended a.i.dose/ha amounted to 6.45 $ for endosulfan 
and 3.70 $ for cypermethrin. 
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Figure 7.2.5. Indonesia, market shares of chemical classes of pesticides in rice, 1980-96. Source: Bayer 
AG, Germany, 1998. Legend: 0.p.= organophosphates, Carb.= carbamates, 0.c.= organochlorines, Pyr 
= pyrethroids, Herb = herbicides 
Table 7.2.5.b lists the most popular insecticide compounds (all formulated in 
Indonesia) which were purchased, respectively, in 1980 for the Bimas/Inmas pro-
grams, and in 1996 by the farmers directly. All organophosphates listed for 1981 
and 1996, as well as endosulfan, and the carbamates carbaryl, methomyl and car-
tap, were explicitly banned by the Indonesian Presidential Instruction No 3/1986 
dated November 5, 1986 (Southern, 1987). As a consequence, a large part of the 
local formulation industry16 was closed. The carbamates fenobucarb (BPMC) and 
carbofuran were not banned from use in rice and became major products. 
The highest ranking pyrethroids (in a.i. value) in 1996 included cypermethrin, 
deltamethrin, lambda cyhalothrin and beta cyfluthrin. The group 'others' included 
Table 7.2.5.a. Indonesia, comparison of 1996 sales of endosulfan and cypermethrin, 
expressed in a.i. weight, a.i. value and treatable area if following recommended 
dosages. Source: Bayer AG, Germany, 1998. 
Common name 
Endosulfan 
Cypermethrin 
Proportions 
(t a.i.) 
639,836 
31,044 
20.6 
Sales 
(M USS) 
15.85 
9.15 
1.7 
Treatable area 
(Mha) 
2.46 
2.47 
1 
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new products, such as fipronil, imidacloprid, which often require low a.i. dose rates 
per hectare because of their selectiveness to target pests and novel ways of applica-
tion. In particular, the Japanese insecticide ApplaudR (buprofezin) was successful. 
By 1996, the simple organophosphates/carbamates market of the 1980s trans-
formed into a complex one (fig. 7.2.5). A new development in the rice market was 
the appearance of herbicides since 1991. 
A comparison of the best selling products in 1980 and 1986 (table 7.2.5.b) 
shows that most banned products (e.g. endosulfan, monocrotophos, diazinon, 
Table 7.2.5.b. Indonesia, selection of major insecticides in the market. Listing of com-
pounds, 1980 and 1996 in a.i. weight. Source: Bayer AG, Germany, 1998. 
Active 
ingredients 
Organochlorines 
Endosulfan 
Organophosphates 
Chlorpyriphos 
Diazinon 
Fenitrothion 
Fenthion 
Monocrotophos 
Phentoate 
Carbamates 
Carbaryl 
Carbofuran 
Fenobucarb 
Isoprocarb 
Pyrethroids 
Cypermethrin 
Deltamethrin 
Lamda cyhalothrin 
Others 
Chlorfluarazon 
Fipronil 
Imidacloprid 
Toxicity 
class 
(WHO) 
II 
II 
II 
II 
IB 
IB 
II 
II 
IB 
II 
II 
II 
II 
II 
III 
III 
III 
Weight Weight 
(ta.i.) (ta.i.) 
1980 1996 
25 382 
102 107 
1,103 55 
274 24 
176 56 
36 150 
202 153 
580 95 
53 456 
179 733 
73 15 
Value (M US$) 
9.2 
8.9 
6.6 
2.0 
4.6 
1.5 
Registered 
brand names 
Thiodan 
Dursban 
Basudin, Lorsban 
Sumithion 
Lebaycid 
Azodrin, Nuvacron 
Elsan 
Sevin 
Curaterr, Furadan 
Baycarb, Hopcin 
Mipcin, Etrofolan 
Cymbush, Ripcord 
Decis, Cistin 
Karate 
Atrabon 
Regent 
Admire, Confidor 
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chlorpyriphos, methomyl and carbaryl) did not disappear from the rice market, 
which confirms the openly expressed concern that the ban did not much influence17 
the use pattern of the products (Oka, 1995). 
Although most pyrethroids are rather toxic to natural enemies, their low dose 
requirement (10-40 g a.i./ha) may make this class environmentally more accept-
able than the organophosphates and carbamates. Low dosage paired to high 
biological efficacy is a major aim in new product development. New application 
methods may help to make products more IPM-compatible. For example, 
imidacloprid granules applied to rice seedlings, 1 g a.i. per seedling box three days 
before transplanting, protect the rice plants for several weeks after transplanting. 
The granular formulation and the low dose rate of this neo-nicotine compound, 
only 25 g a.i./ha, serve the same purpose. 
The above observations shed another light on the meaning of the figure 7.2.2.e, 
which shows a halving of the share of the rice sector on the pesticide market. Table 
7.2.5.c shows that the 1996 pesticide sales for rice were approaching the US$ va-
lue of 1986, but that in 1996 71% of the area could be treated with 52% of the 
weight a.i. relative to 1986 (= 100%). In other words, the overall efficiency in 
kg/ha/year of the newly developed pesticides compared to the generic products 
increased considerably (27%). 
7.2.6. The pesticide market for vegetables and fruits. In Indonesia, pesticide 
sales for use in vegetables, potatoes19 and fruits increased rapidly since the early 
1990s (fig.7.2.6.a). In potatoes, the market share of dithiocarbamate fungicides -
mainly for control of Late Blight {Phytophthora infestans)- remained almost con-
tinuously between 50% and 74%. More fungicides were contained in the group 
'others' with a 10-20% share. 
Figure 7.2.6.b shows that pesticide use in vegetables is varied. Use of fungi-
cides, including dithiocarbamates, carbamates and 'others', increased to an esti-
mated 40-50%. Among the insecticides, the organophosphates dominated the scene 
till 1986, with carbamates trailing at about 14%. In the 1990s, pyrethroid insecti-
cides came up to the same level, around 20%, as the organophosphates. The gain-
Table 7.2.5.C. Indonesia, comparison of total pesticide sales for rice sector in 1986 and 
1996 in proportions of a.i. weight and value and of treatable area if following recom-
mended dosages. Source: Bayer AG, Germany, 1998. 
Year 
1886 
1996 
Proportions 
(t a.i.) 
6,729 
3,531 
1.9 
Sales Treatable area 
(M US$) (M ha) 
98.67 
92.44 
1.1 
23.88 
17.08 
1.4 
Dosage 
(kg/ha) 
0.282 
0.207 
1.4 
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ing popularity of pyrethroids is probably a result of an increasing pesticide resist-
ance of major vegetable pests. 
Pesticide use in fruits refers to apples and citrus mainly, data for banana and 
pineapple indicate zero use. Data on the fruit sector in Indonesia are scant, anyhow. 
7.2.7. Discussion, Indonesia. In the context of IPM, two agricultural sectors real-
ly matter. These are: a. the rice sector for which the government of Indonesia (Gol) 
committed itself to the IPM ideology because of the sector's immense economical 
and political importance; b. the vegetable and fruit sector because of increasing 
public concern about health hazards of pesticide use. The large plantation and 
smallholder perennials sector is a major customer for herbicides, a product group 
which (with presently available technology) is more a target for a 'safe, need-based 
use' approach than for IPM. 
For the rice sector, the enforcement of the input-based Green Revolution tech-
nology during the 1960s meant an important watershed in food production efforts. 
The introduction of high yielding rice varieties stimulated the use of insecticides. 
Since the early improved rice varieties lacked resistance against planthoppers, 
leafhoppers and viruses, the Indonesian farmers were drawn into a treadmill of 
higher application frequency, worsening pest outbreaks and resurgences of sec-
ondary pests. When the national rice intensification effort came in danger, the Gol 
procured ever greater volumes of insecticides and contracted international compa-
nies to help in distribution and application. Early in the 1980s, the FAO Inter-
Country IPM in Rice Programme began to advise the government on the control of 
BPH, which led to the Presidential Instruction of 1986 and the ban on insecticides 
for rice. 
Caution in the interpretation of the data on the recession in the pesticide mar-
ket is needed in view of the modalities of procurement. In 1986, procurement for 
rice was largely done by the government agencies and the bulk of the products pur-
chased took a very long time to reach the field. In 1996, purchases were made by 
dealers with short communication lines to the farmers. The 1996 sales would there-
fore more accurately represent actual use in rice than those of 1986. The composi-
tion of the pesticide market has changed drastically but farmers have certainly not 
given up spraying against rice pests. Instead, they continued to buy unsubsidized 
insecticides and may thus actually have been spending more on chemical pest con-
trol than during the 1980s. The increased costs of pesticides would then be the 
main incentive for more judiciously targeted (need-based) use. 
Another way to measure the effect of IPM policy on pesticide sales is to look 
for changes in the product assortment over time. The choice of products for rice 
changed notably after the ban. The market share of organophosphate insecticides 
fell to about 20%. Their place was take over first by carbamates and later by 
pyrethroids and new insecticides from the class 'others'. Since these relatively new 
classes of chemicals enable to treat a larger hectareage with less volume of a.i., fol-
lowing lower dose recommendations, a reduction in a.i. quantity is reached in the 
rice sector. 
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However, active ingredients and brands, which were mentioned by name on the 
ban list, are still sold for and used in rice in large quantities. This means that the 
Instruction has largely lost its effect. Within the Ministry, different departments 
were responsible for IPM implementation and for input supply. These units worked 
rather independently from each other. Chief administrators in charge of input sup-
ply were less familiar with the ecological consequences of chemical control than 
others connected with the National IPM Program. 
IPM implementation in rice had a visible effect on the market. It seems that the 
agricultural administration and services understood the danger of overdependency. 
Farmers learned that spraying in rice is not a must. The informed part of industry 
has become more cautious in its approach of pest resurgence problems. By 1996, 
about one million rice farmers, about 2% of the 48 million active farmers (FAO 
Production Yearbook, 1997), had been reached by the national IPM extension 
(Whitten, 1998). 
7.3. The pesticide market in Malaysia 
7.3.1. The Malaysian pesticide market before 1980. At the end of the colonial 
era, Malaysia inherited an efficient plantation agriculture, which had not been 
interrupted by a struggle for independence. Rubber and oil palm, occupying about 
70% of the hectareage under cultivation, formed the backbone of the private estate 
and smallholder industry. Weed control in estate crops20 accounted for 20-40% of 
total maintenance cost, especially in immature stands. Due to high labour demand 
in plantation agriculture, the structural labour shortage in Malaysia and consequent 
high wage levels, chemical weeding was standard practice (Wong, 1972). In the 
1970s, the extraordinary growth of the oil palm, cacao, and fruits sectors created a 
stable market for herbicides (Hassan, 1990). 
Until the 1960s, farmers grew traditional rice varieties, which suffered relati-
vely little from insect pests and diseases, in a single cropping pattern during the 
rain season. Rice and other field crops occupied less than one quarter of the arable 
land in Peninsular Malaysia. Although insecticide usage in maize, tobacco and 
vegetables was higher than in rice, overall use of pesticides in field crops was 
small. The coming into operation of large irrigation schemes for double cropping 
of rice caused, between 1970 and 1990, a fundamental change in cropping routine 
as well as a serious increase in pest incidence (ch 3.6.4). This change and the 
government's policy to promote production of vegetables and fruits, crops requir-
ing intensive pest control measures, stimulated a rapid growth of the pesticide mar-
ket since the early 1980s. 
The first market study on the domestic supply of pesticides in Malaysia was 
undertaken by ARSAP between 1977 and 1982. Table 7.3.1.a shows the market 
shares of various plant protection product categories for the years 1977-80, 
expressed in formulated products (f.p.) value. Over four years, the market 
increased 31% in value (ARSAP, 1979, 1981a). 
The strong and stable demand for herbicides had attracted early investment in 
a domestic formulation industry. By 1976, formulation plants in Malaysia pro-
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duced more than half of the herbicide products sold in the domestic market21 (table 
7.3.1.b). Local formulation of insecticides and fungicides concerned mainly 
production of granules and powders or dusts (aldrin, BHC, endosulfan, thiram and 
DDT). Local manufacture of technical grade material was limited to 6,000 t of 
sodium chlorate (Adam & Reddy, 1977; ARSAP, 1981a, b; Staring 1984). 
7.3.2. The Malaysian pesticide market since 1980. An overview of pesticide sup-
ply in Malaysia in the 1980s and 1990s was obtained through compilation of mar-
keting data provided by Bayer AG, Germany. Figure 7.3.2.a shows the total annu-
al sales for 1980-96 in terms of a.i. value and weight, and in treatable area. Total 
procurement of pesticides, expressed as a.i. weight, fell in 1980-83 but recovered 
steeply thereafter and reached a peak in 1988. After 1988, procurement in terms of 
a.i. weight stagnated till 1992, then rose again till in 1996 it almost matched the 
1988 level. The graph for all pesticide sales22 in a.i value followed the same trend 
as the graph for a.i. weight. 
Table 7.3.2.a represents the aggregated data for all active ingredients traded in 
the Malaysian market, 1980 and 1996 (Bayer AG, Germany, 1998). The figures 
7.3.2.b, c and d indicate the market shares of product categories, in terms of a.i. 
weight and value, and treatable area, in 1980 and 1996. The share of herbicides fell 
Table 7.3.1.a. Malaysia, total pesticide market, 1977-80, expressed in f.p. value 
(M USS). Source: ARSAP, 1981a (data from Ministry of Agriculture, Malaysia). 
Category/year 1977 1978 1979 1980 
Herbicides 
Insecticides 
Fungicides 
Rodenticides & others 
39.5 
6.4 
1.8 
1.6 
44.5 
6.8 
2.0 
1.9 
51.8 
7.3 
2.2 
2.0 
59.1 
7.7 
2.3 
2.3 
Total Value 49.3 55.2 63.3 71.4 
Table 7.3.l.b. Malaysia, production of domestic formulation industry, 1976. Source 
ARSAP, 1981a (data from the Federal Industrial Development Authority). 
Category Liquid f.p. Solid f.p. Value f.p. 
(M litres) (M kg) (M USS) 
Herbicides 9.7 6.3 22.2 
Insecticides 2.8 1.5 9.8 
Fungicides* 1.1 0.2 1.3 
Note: Fungicides inclusive of wood preservatives. 
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Figure 7.3.2.a. Total annual sales of pesticides in Malaysia, 1980-96, in relative values (1988 = 100% 
for a.i. weight; 1995 = 100% for a.i. value in US$). Source: Bayer AG, Germany, 1998. 
30% between 1980 and 1996, from 87% to 57% in terms of a.i. weight (fig. 7.3.-
2.c). Figures 7.3.2.b and d, however, show only a 10% reduction of the herbicide 
share in terms of, respectively, a.i. value and treatable area. Table 7.3.2.a confirms 
a shift to more expensive, post-emergence herbicides which require a lower dosage 
rate. The herbicides glyphosate and glufosinate (class organophosphates), with a 
combined sales volume of 2,922 t a.i. in 1996, almost completely replaced the for-
mer major products dalapon, MSMA and sodium chlorate, which together account-
ed for 4,440 t a.i. or four-fifth part of the herbicides marked 'Others' in the 1980 
market. The turn-over of paraquat increased by 70%, but that of 2.4-D products fell 
to one third, whereas 2.4.5-T and sodium arsenite were withdrawn. 
The Bayer marketing data show the distribution of total pesticide sales over 
various crops. Figure 7.3.2.e illustrates the change in market shares, expressed in 
a.i. value, in various crops during the period 1981-96. Information from various 
sources regarding developments in major food and estate crops enables an inter-
pretation of the marketing data in their agricultural context. For example, the sales 
of, in particular, insecticides and fungicides in the horticultural sector increased 
from 15% to 38% in response to the government's policy of expanding vegetables 
and fruits at the expense of rice and other field crops outside major irrigation 
schemes (Agrow #26, 1996). Decreasing pesticide use in cacao corresponds with 
a fading of interest in the crop in W and E Malaysia because of its high costs of 
pest control and labour (Chee et al, 1992). In rubber and oil palm, the relatively 
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Malaysia, market shares of crop protection products on various 
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Figure 7.3.2.e. Malaysia, change in pesticide market shares (in a.i. value) in various crops between 
1980-96. Source: Bayer AG, Germany. 
high use of pesticides is almost entirely accounted for by herbicide applications in 
immature stands. Due to large scale replanting programs, herbicide use in rubber 
and oil palm increased in the 1970s and early 1980s. Since the mid-1980s, the her-
bicide sales in oil palm decreased a little whereas the area treated remained almost 
equal due to the use of more effective herbicides23. The halving in a.i. value of her-
bicide sales in rubber, however, is mainly attributable to an actual reduction in 
replanting and maintenance due to shortage of labour for tapping (Chung, 1987, 
1989; Chung & Chang, 1989;Teoh, 1986). 
7.3.3. The pesticide market for rice. Since 1980, the market share of pesticides for 
use in rice increased from only 4% to 8%, which made the sector of minor importance 
to the industry. But a discussion of pesticide use in rice is helpful for understanding 
Malaysia's approach to IPM. Since the 1960s, application of insecticides in rice was 
promoted by the agricultural extension service through its inclusion in the Green 
Revolution technology package and the accompanying padi credit system (ch 3.6-
.4.1). The planting of non-resistant high yielding varieties and the increased applicati-
on of nitrogen and insecticides led to higher pest densities. The first major outbreak 
of BPH and WBPH24 occurred in the Tanjung Karang Irrigation Scheme in N 
Selangor State in 1977/78, and was followed by an epidemic of tungro virus disease 
(Balasubramaniam et al, 1993). Resurgence of BPH and tungro virus transmitting 
green leafhoppers recurred in Tanjung Karang throughout the 1980s (fig 7.3.3.a) (Ooi 
& Heong, 1988). From 1977, BPH and WBPH emerged as important rice pests in the 
Muda area too. A green leafhopper (Nephotettix virescens) outbreak caused an epide-
mic of tungro virus disease in Muda from 1981-84 (Ho, 1994a; Heong & Ho, 1985). 
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Table 7.3.2.a. Malaysia. Composition of the pesticide market in 1980 and 1996, ex-
pressed in a.i. weight, a.i. value of chemical classes, and treatable area if applied fol-
lowing dosage recommendations. Source: Bayer AG, Germany, 1998. 
Categories and 
chemical classes 
Year 
Insecticides 
Organophosphates 
Carbamates 
Organochlorines 
Pyrethroids 
Others 
Total 
Relative 
Fungicides 
Organophosphates 
Carbamates 
Dithiocarbamates 
Organochlorines 
Others 
Total 
Relative 
Herbicides 
Organophosphates 
Carbamates 
Sulfonyl urea 
Paraquat 
Others 
Total 
Relative 
Rodenticides 
Relative 
Grand Total 
Relative 
A.i weight 
(tonnes) 
1980 
236 
56 
64 
2 
18 
376 
5% 
1 
0 
289 
31 
285 
606 
7% 
215 
0 
0 
1,336 
5,653 
7,204 
88% 
50 
1% 
8,236 
100% 
1996 
451 
73 
50 
20 
125 
718 
8% 
9 
<1 
843 
18 
161 
1,031 
11% 
2,922 
19 
29 
1,847 
661 
5,478 
57% 
2,400 
24% 
9,627 
100% 
Trt. area 
(x 1,000 ha) 
1980 
481 
168 
158 
40 
31 
878 
5% 
2 
0 
211 
39 
161 
413 
2% 
1,043 
0 
0 
7,485 
8,656 
17,184 
85% 
1,667 
8% 
20,142 
100% 
1996 
840 
255 
137 
1,196 
329 
2,757 
7% 
23 
1 
712 
541 
431 
1,708 
4% 
14,678 
15 
4,765 
8,378 
3,14 
30,980 
75% 
5,950 
14% 
41,395 
100% 
A.i value 
(M US$) 
1980 
3.54 
1.68 
1.09 
0.71 
0.35 
7.36 
11% 
0.03 
0 
1.50 
0.30 
1.20 
3.02 
4% 
13.53 
0 
0 
21.39 
20.79 
55.71 
82% 
1.90 
3% 
68.00 
100% 
1996 
6.94 
2.59 
.13 
5.32 
9.55 
25.53 
19% 
0.29 
0.53 
5.43 
0.26 
3.7 
10.23 
8% 
44.79 
0,53 
12.96 
28.49 
10.09 
96.86 
71% 
3.18 
2% 
135.80 
100% 
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Brown planthopper infestation in Tanjung 
Karang, 1977 - 90 
o o o 
03 
Figure 7.3.3.a. Hectareage infested by brown planthopper in Tanjung Karang Scheme, Malaysia 1977-90 
Various sources. 
DoA followed two lines of action in its effort to control the outbreaks. The plant 
breeders searched for BPH, green leafhopper and TV resistant rice varieties. DoA's 
Plant Protection Service and MARDI set up a surveillance system in the Tanjung 
Karang Scheme in 1981 to provide early warning as a guide for timing insecticide 
treatments. The Tanjung Karang system became the national model for monitoring 
of the population development of BPH and other rice pests and their natural ene-
mies (Ooi, 1982). The economic threshold level (ETL) for BPH was determined at 
7 adults or 15 nymphs/hill, and the maximum level for biological control at 50 
BPH : 1 predator (Ooi & Heong, 1988; Heong, 1977). 
Early in the 1980s, farmers in Tanjung Karang sprayed insecticides whenever they 
observed damage, generally making three to four applications per season (Kenmore, 
1991b). They spent up to US$ 40 per farm on pesticides, which they bought with cash 
from pesticide salesmen (Heong, 1984). A survey, held in 1987, showed that 
Malaysian rice farmers used mostly organophosphate insecticides, which were 
banned in Indonesia shortly before. Almost all farmers used a lever operated knapsack 
sprayer25, but had not been trained in spraying technique and sprayer maintenance 
(Heong et al, 1992b). Tanjung Karang farmers preferred monocrotophos26, despite its 
official restriction to oil palm (Kenmore, 1991b; Anang et al, 1995). Another survey 
by IRRI in the Muda Irrigation Scheme reported that 98% of the farmers used pesti-
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Malaysia, pesticide sales in rice 
and rice production, 1980 - 96 
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Figure 7.3.3.b. Pesticide sales in rice and rice production in Malaysia, 1980 - 96, in relative values (1996 
= 100%fora.i. value and weight, 1995= 100% for rice production). Source: Bayer AG, Germany 1998. 
cides every season and that 65% of them made up to 5 applications per season. The 
highest number of applications recorded was fifteen times (Oka, 1996). 
Figure 7.3.3.b, which plots pesticide procurement for use in rice (in a.i. weight 
and value) against total rice production in Malaysia, helps to determine the effect 
of increasing planthopper populations and tungro virus on pesticide sales. The 
curves for a.i. value and weight appeared to rise in respons to the BPH and tungro 
outbreaks of the late 1970s and late 1980s in the Muda and Tanjung Karang 
areas27. But the major virus epidemic in Muda, 1981-84, which caused an increase 
in use of insecticides, did not influence the downward trend of the a.i. weight and 
value curves. 
Far more impact on the sales curves than from insect pest outbreaks resulted 
from the shift in method of crop establishment in the large irrigation schemes in 
the 1970s and 1980s from transplanting to direct seeding of rice (ch 3.6.4.3). Adop-
tion of the direct seeding technique in the Muda Scheme early in the 1980s was 
stimulated by the chronic water shortage and subsequent cancellation of irrigation 
for the off-season rice crop beginning January 1994. This measure necessitated 
direct seeding of 53% of the planted area of 83,100 ha in season 1984/1 (table 
3.6.4.6). The upward turn of curve for a.i. weight in 1984 indicates an increased 
use of herbicides necessitated by the much stronger weed competition in fields 
with self-sown seedlings than with transplanted rice. In 1983 and following years, 
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the majority of farmers tried to replace direct seeding of rice by self-sown seed-
lings. Since the latter method aggravated the weed problem, sales of herbicides 
jumped in 1985-1986, when 65% of the Muda Scheme was covered by self-sown 
seedlings. 
The continuous rise in herbicide sales since the late 1980s, is entirely attribut-
able to the transition to direct seeding. Transplanting of rice became obsolete for 
the off-season and fell below 20% of the cropped area for the main season. Since 
developments in the Muda Scheme were copied by the other major rice schemes, 
direct seeding and high herbicide use are current practice in all granaries of Malay-
sia (table 3.6.4.3). 
7.3.4. Rodenticides and control of field rats. In a 1981 survey, more than half of 
rice farmers in the irrigation schemes ranked field rats (Rattus argiventer) as the 
most important pest, which caused heavy losses and visual damage (Heong, 1984). 
Rat control by baiting and hunting with zinc phosphate and warfarin were common 
practice. Results were usually poor, mainly due to lack of communal approach and 
discipline (van de Fliert et al, 1994). The integrated control of field rats on a large 
scale in the states of Penang and adjacent Kedah in 1985-1986 was one of the first 
campaigns launched by the National IPM Committee of Malaysia (Asna, pers. 
comm, 1986; Zadoks et al, 1986). 
In oil palm plantations, Rattus tiomanicus was a major pest, which could be 
effectively controlled by baiting with warfarin28. Resistance to warfarin developed 
in Malaysia since 1983 and the problem was aggravated by the build-up of R. 
diardii population as new rat plague in oil palm. Baiting with second the genera-
tion of anticoagulants, brodifacoum, bromadiolone and diflocoumafen gave good 
control of both species, whereas control by the acute poisons bromethalin and zinc 
sulphate failed (Wood et al, 1972, 1990; Chung et al, 1994). 
Table 7.3.2.a shows sales in 1996 of about 2,4001 of rodenticides, representing 
a sizable market share in terms of a.i. weight and treatable area (fig. 7.3.2.C, d). 
Sales consisted of two thirds warfarin and one-third second generation anticoagu-
lants. Warfarin baiting was probably mostly practiced by rice farmers. 
7.3.5. Pesticide supply, distribution and application in Malaysia. In principle, 
the supply and distribution were handled by the private sector but various public 
sector agencies organized their own distribution networks. The Malaysian govern-
ment, at the federal or state level, exercised control over agrochemical distribution 
through farmers' associations and cooperatives, operating under the umbrella of 
the Farmers Organization Authority (FOA), and through various land development 
authorities and crop production boards. The FOAs role in distribution was impor-
tant as an instrument of indirect price control on pesticides because every farmer 
was entitled to buy from FAO outlets (ARSAP, 1981a). An estimated 60% of total 
herbicide supply and 50% of total insecticide supply reached the end-user through 
such public channels. The large private formulators had their own marketing 
organization and dealer network. 
Pesticides were not directly subsidized by the government, but prices seemed 
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to be reasonably well under control. The Pesticide Unit of DoA's Crop Protection 
Service published an annual pesticide index cum price list with retail price direc-
tives for all registered products. (Balasubramaniam et al, 1993). 
Pesticide management and application are still deficient, in particular in small 
holdings. The industry and the Malaysian Agricultural Chemicals Association 
(MACA) organized since the mid-1990s a 'safe use training' for applicators. The 
Agricultural Extension Service and other DoA divisions placed no priority on 
development and testing of spray equipment and training of applicators. 
7.3.6. Discussion, Malaysia. The pesticide industry has a strong position in most 
agricultural sectors of Malaysia. The sales of herbicides to the plantation crops sec-
tor, in particular for use in oil palm and rubber estates, account for 80% of the pes-
ticide market in terms of a.i. value. Research on biological control of weeds on 
estates has yielded few results. 
The market share for use in horticulture, mainly insecticides and fungicides, 
increased from 15 to 40% in a.i. value. Research on biological control of insect 
pests in cole crops and solanaceous crops (Lim, 1989), and prevention of virus dis-
eases in hot pepper (Vos, 1994) yielded practical results. Since the late 1980's, 
much of the IPM fervour has been lost. Chemical control is again predominant in 
cabbage cropping during the off-season and growers shifted to cut flowers grown 
for export with high pesticide use again. 
Rice production in Malaysia is concentrated in large rice irrigation schemes 
under management of powerful Scheme Authorities. Rapid adoption of modern 
high yielding rice varieties, high use of inputs, credit and guidance raised rice yields 
from 3.3 t/ha to 5 t/ha in direct seeded rice. Outbreaks of secondary insect pests and 
virus epidemics were controlled through adoption of resistant rice varieties, 
monitoring of pest and natural enemy populations, and supervised chemical control. 
No major pest outbreaks occurred since the mid-1980s. In the lesser rice schemes 
insecticide use was allegedly increasing in the late 1990s (Oudejans, 1996). 
Due to chronic shortage of irrigation water and labour the schemes have shift-
ed from transplanting rice seedlings to direct seeding. The inherent increase in 
weed densities is successfully controlled by integrated weed management (IWM). 
Training in IWM in rice was given to farmers in Muda and other schemes through 
demonstration and field assistance. The shift to direct seeding, which requires an 
increased use of herbicides, has made the market in rice much more important for 
the industry. 
7.4. The pesticide market in Thailand 
7.4.1. Thailand's pesticide market before 1980. Towards the end of the 19th cen-
tury, farmers in C Thailand broke away from self-sufficiency in rice farming and 
began to produce a surplus for export. Foreign demand for Thai rice led to a rapid 
increase in production. The government improved the infrastructure, but chronic 
labour scarcity hampered an expansion of the hectareage (ch 4.3). Early in the 20th 
century, Thai farmers changed from traditional transplanting of rice to less labour 
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intensive direct seeding. Though mechanization became available in the late 
1920s, indigenous rice technology improved little before 1950 and productivity 
remained low. Since investment and research held off for other field and planta-
tion crops too, Thai agriculture lagged behind in comparison to agriculture in 
Indonesia and Malaysia. 
Under the National Economic and Social Development Plans since 1961, the 
Thai government invested heavily in land development, irrigation infrastructure 
and establishment of agricultural centres for research and extension (AADPC, 
1984b). The farmers, however, continued to grow rice with only limited use of 
improved cultivars, fertilizer and pesticides, since extensive production methods 
brought them highest returns (ch 4.4.3) (Waibel, 1990). In an effort to alleviate 
poverty in backward provinces, the Thai government promoted secondary crops, 
such as maize, cassava, grain legumes, cotton and sugarcane through the creation 
of agricultural zones. The Green Revolution technology, which enhanced rice pro-
duction throughout S and SE Asia, was less eagerly adopted in Thailand. It appears 
that only owner-farmers made full use of modern varieties and chemical imputs, 
whilst tenant farmers kept growing local varieties at a low input level. Due to low 
farm-gate prices for rice and low productivity many farmers turned to growing 
more profitable crops such as maize, fruits and vegetables, and to raising livestock. 
The import of pesticides, initially as finished products only, began during the 
1950s. Procurement was relatively small and mostly destined for control of pests 
in rice, cotton and maize and of migratory locusts (James & Reddy, 1977b). The 
Department of Agriculture (DOA) provided the regulatory framework but left 
import and distribution almost entirely to the private sector. The Plant Protection 
Services Division (PPSD) of the Department of Agricultural Extension (DOAE) 
managed, in addition to its regular extension work, a national network of plant pest 
control units. The tasks of the Plant Protection Service Division included surveil-
lance of insect pests and diseases in crops and the organisation of emergency con-
trol operations. DOAE provided emergency control free of charge to the farmers, 
and purchased the required pesticides through tenders from local formulators and 
distributors (James & Reddy 1977b). 
For instance, over the years 1974-76, DOAE procured a total of 2,830 tonnes 
of f.p. costing 5.5 M US$ against a regular emergency control budget. With this 
supply the Plant Protection Service Division treated 2.5 M to 3 M ha/y, in particu-
lar against insects (leafhoppers and stemborers), diseases and rodents in rice (up to 
90%), and locusts29 and grasshoppers in maize and beans (10%-25%) (James & 
Reddy, 1977b). In the 1960s, the FAO assisted Thailand in controlling frequent 
outbreaks of the Bombay locust (Patanga succincta) which followed extensive 
deforestation in C Thailand (Roffey, 1969). 
Several studies30 of Thailand's pesticide market during the 1970s reveal that the 
total supply of formulated pesticides31, import and domestic formulation, almost 
tripled from 10,000 to 28,300 tonnes over the period 1973-80 (table 7.4.1). The 
import of insecticides (in tonnes of a.i. and f.p.) rose rapidly between 1977 and 1980 
because of pest outbreaks in rice (ch 7.4.3). Throughout the 1970s, imports consist-
ed for 60% of formulated insecticides. Herbicides came up to almost 30% in 1980. 
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Table 7.4.2. Thailand. Composition of the pesticide market in 1980 and 1996, expressed 
in a.i. weight, a.i. value of chemical classes, and treatable area if applied following 
dosage recommendations. Source: Bayer AG, Germany, 1998. 
Categories and A.i. weight Trt. area A.i. value 
chemical classes (tonnes) (x 1,000 ha) (M US$) 
Year 1980 1996 1980 1996 1980 1996 
Insecticides 
Organophosphates 1,245 2,699 3,536 4,662 16.58 32.49 
Carbamates 410 881 1,017 1,853 9.26 16.69 
Organochlorines 1,009 574 1,433 1,022 5.63 9.19 
Pyrethroids 27 107 574 1,987 9.03 11.94 
Others 37 450 73 702 0.61 15.81 
Total 2,728 4,711 6,633 10,226 41.11 86.12 
Relative 45% 27% 59% 34% 66% 37% 
Fungicides 
Organophosphates 
Carbamates 
Dithiocarbamates 
Organochlorines 
Others 
Total 991 3,037 1,256 3,113 4.66 28.37 
Relative 16% 17% 11% 10% 8% 12% 
Herbicides 
Organophosphates 14 2,468 42 7,726 0.59 42.0 
Carbamates 10 203 5 319 0.17 2.73 
Sulfonylurea 0 2 0 289 0 1.43 
Paraquat 420 1,363 1,108 3,079 5.33 18.64 
Others 1,937 5,927 1,489 5,552 10.22 54.41 
5 
1 
475 
5 
505 
35 
2 
1,219 
36 
1,745 
21 
<1 
475 
11 
749 
41 
<1 
907 
53 
2,112 
0.17 
0.09 
1.55 
0.06 
2.78 
0.89 
0.09 
6.93 
0.58 
19.88 
Total 
Relative 
Rodenticides 
Relative 
Grand Total 
Relative 
2,381 
39% 
17 
<1% 
6,117 
100% 
9,963 
56% 
44 
<1% 
17,755 
100% 
2,644 
23% 
805 
7% 
11,338 
100% 
16,965 
56% 
29 
<1% 
30,333 
100% 
16.30 
26% 
0.18 
<1% 
62.25 
100% 
119.21 
51% 
0.16 
<1% 
233.86 
100% 
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Malaysia, market shares of crop protection products on various 
crops, 1981 - 96 
Rice Veg. & Fr. Cocoa Oil Palm Rubber 
Figure 7.4.2.e. Thailand, change in pesticide market shares, expressed in a.i.value, in various crop cat-
egories between 1981 and 1996. Source: Bayer AG, Germany 1998. 
In 1994, total pesticide imports amounted to 32,273 t, which consisted of 7,367 
t intermediate chemicals or technical grade material for the local formulation 
industry valued at 37.5 M US$, and of 24,906 t of ready-for-use products for a 
value of 106.3 M US$. The major share of imported technical material were gener-
ic33 pesticides. The import of ready-for-use formulations concerned primarily the 
new and more complex proprietary products. These new pesticides are low volume 
specialty products which are, in general, more effective and less hazardous34, but 
far more costly. 
7.4.3. The market sectors for rice, vegetables and fruits Throughout the 20th 
century, the Thai government promoted rice production for export since the rice 
trade was a major source of revenue for the treasury. Since rice production had 
always amply covered domestic consumption, investments were rather made to 
facilitate transport and trade than research for higher productivity and pest control. 
Reports on incidence of pests and diseases in rice seem to be rare35. Pesticide use in 
rice was low in relation to its huge area of 9 M ha. Pesticide sales in 1980 for use 
in rice, which amounted to 1,406 t a.i., were barely sufficient for half of that area, 
about 4.3 M ha if treated according to dosage recommendations (Bayer AQ 1998). 
During the 1980s, sales for use in rice increased rapidly in correspondence with 
higher pest pressure. The curves for a.i. weight and value in figure 7.4.3.a show 
that sales rose early in the 1980s to a minor peak in 1984, receded a little around 
1985, and then climbed steeply to a major peak in 1990. The course of the curves 
corresponds with the pattern of brown planthopper (BPH) outbreaks in rice which 
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Figure 7.4.3.a. Pesticide sales 
in rice and rice production in 
Thailand, 1980-96, in relative 
values, (1990 = 100% for a.i. 
weight and value; 1996 = 100 
% for rice production). Source: 
Bayer AG, Germany, 1998. 
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Figure 7.4.3.b. Hectareage 
infested by brown planthopper 
in Thailand, expressed in rela-
tive values, 1978-90. Various 
sources. 
began in the late 1970s (fig 7.4.3.b). Rice production stagnated when about 
109.000 ha of rice were damaged36 by BPH and virus diseases in 1980 and a fur-
ther 85.000 ha in 1981. In the crop years 1989-90, an outbreak of BPH and Ragged 
Stunt Virus (of which BPH is the vector) damaged an estimated 0.6 M ha of rice. 
This extensive damage contributed heavily to the 1.2 M ha reduction in harvested 
area from the record 10 M ha harvested in the previous year. The concurrent reduc-
tion in yield37 was even greater and amounted to 3 M t of rough rice (fig 7.4.3.a). 
The farmers increased insecticide38 use from the usual 1-3 early season treatments, 
some even up to ten sprays, every time BPH and virus infestation threatened their 
rice crop (IRRI, 1993). Such excessive spraying in the outbreak araes led to the 
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dramatic BPH outbreak39 of 1990. Only then the government undertook a major 
effort to introduce BPH resistant rice varies as replacement for the popular but vul-
nerable cultivar Suphanburi 60. By the mid-1990s, farmers in well-managed irri-
gation areas planted only the two resistant rice varieties issued by the Department 
of Agricultural Extension (DOAE). 
Since 1993, pesticide sales for use in rice rose again to 90% of the 1990 record 
sales for rice. The chemical class marked 'Others' made the most progress, proba-
bly with the new insecticides flufenoxuron, fipronil, imidacloprid, niclosamide and 
chlorfluazuron as frontrunners (Bayer AQ 1998). 
The traditional practice of direct seeding of rice in Thailand and high labour 
costs had made chemical weeding in rice a necessity already in the 1980s. Herbi-
cides probably accounted most for the strong increase in pesticide sales for rice in 
Thailand since 1992 (ch 7.3.3). 
Since the early 1980s, Thai agriculture has shown an unrelenting decline in rice 
and in upland crop production. To compensate for the loss in farmers' income, the 
government strongly promoted diversion of land under field crops to fruit and 
vegetable growing (Jungbluth, 1996). These crops are pesticide intensive since 
consumers demand unblemished products. 
Early data from the Asian Development Bank data (ADB, 1987) showed that the 
horticultural sector used more pesticides than the rice sector (table 7.4.3). In 1984, 
the rice sector accounted for 11% of the fungicide, 22% of the insecticide and 17% 
for herbicide sales. The horticultural sector used, in the same year, over 75% of total 
fungicide and some 55 % of total insecticide supply. The use of fungicides and 
insecticides was particularly heavy on the citrus (pummelo and tangerine). 
Concerning the use of herbicides on fruits, pineapple was the major target crop 
with a 12% share in 1984. The Bayer data show that pesticide sales for fruit pro-
Table 7.4.3. Thailand, market shares of pesticide categories in major crops in 1984. 
Source: Asian Development Bank, 1987. 
Crop Insecticide Fungicide Herbicide 
% % % 
Rice 
Vegetables 
Fruits 
Citrus 
Rubber, Oil palm 
Field crops 
Others 
Total 100 100 100 
Note: (-) no data available 
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22 
29 
13 
12 
-
21 
3 
11 
29 
29 
20 
-
-
11 
17 
5 
18 
-
24 
23 
13 
duction lead the market with a stable 36% share since 1986 (fig 7.4.2.e). 
Dithiocarbonate fungicides made the greatest contribution (table 7.4.2). In 1996, 
citrus alone accounted for 11% of the total market with sales of 2,000 t.a.i. It is 
likely that, under the current crop intensification policy, the use of insecticides and 
fungicides on fruits and vegetables will further increase in spite of residue hazards 
for export and domestic consumption (Jungbluth, 1996; Nanta, 1996). 
7.4.4. Manufacture and distribution of pesticides in Thailand. In the late 1970s, 
virtually 100% of the importation, formulation and manufacturing, and more than 
80% of the distribution was done by private firms. There was neither government 
control nor intervention in the distribution chain. Due to the government's liberal 
attitude 51 companies were authorized to import, formulate, distribute and retail 
pesticides in Thailand by 1976 (James & Reddy, 1977b). By 1995, the number of 
parties operating in the pesticide market had further increased to 70 formulation 
and repackaging plants, 438 distributors and around 5,000 retailers (Jungbluth, 
1996). 
Early in the 1970s, several international and local companies built formulating 
plants in Thailand. By 1981, local formulators supplied 52% of domestic demand, 
mainly insecticides. Domestic manufacture40 of the herbicide paraquat started in 
1980. As domestic formulation capacity soon far exceeded local consumption, 
Thailand began to export pesticides within the SE Asian region. About 500 so-
called 'bath tub' formulator companies existed, which generally produced a low 
grade product and which were difficult to control due to their irregular production 
pattern and high mobility (James & Reddy, 1977b). 
An obstacle to government regulation of the pesticide trade in Thailand has 
always been its unusually large number of products and brandnames on sale. 
Whilst the 1980 pesticide trade in Thailand concerned 89 active ingredients, the 
number of a.i.s traded in 1996 had almost doubled to 172 compounds (Bayer AG, 
1998). The registration procedures do not only accept pesticide formulations but 
also individual finished products for registration41 (Jungbluth, 1996). In this way, 
monocrotophos is sold under 274 brand names, methyl parathion under 296 and 
paraquat under 55 (ARSAP/CIRAD, 1991). Such an exceptional number of trade 
names not only is highly confusing for the consumer, it also makes inspection of 
the market for quality and hazard under the pesticide law impossible for govern-
ment inspectors. 
The pesticide manufacturers and distributors of Thailand have organized them-
selves in two different bodies. The big producer cum distributor companies -37 by 
1996- belong to the Thai Crop Protection Association, member of the Asia/Pacific 
Association of the Global Crop Protection Federation42. A group of 45 to 50 small 
to medium scale producers have formed the Thai Association of Pesticide 
Manufacturers. The remainder are non-aligned and difficult to control. 
7.4.5. Discussion, Thailand. The Thai government pursued a dual policy regar-
ding the use of pesticides. By establishing a national IPM program and through 
joint IPM projects, such as the Thai-German Fruit Project, the government 
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appeared to promote judicious pesticide use by farmers. However, IPM imple-
mentation stagnated due to lack of political interest and funding. At the same time, 
the government aimed at increasing agricultural commodity production for export 
through promotion of fertiliser and pesticide use and various types of subsidies 
(Waibel, 1989, 1990a, b). 
The rice sector in Thailand showed a relative loss of importance since the late 
1970s. Government research yielded little improvement of rice growing techno-
logy and yields. Extension of modern rice technology and IPM to the farmers was 
limited. The effectiveness of the surveillance and early warning service in rice is 
little documented. Most Thai farmers still plant traditional varieties with low use 
of fertilizer and pesticides. These factors and high weed densities inherent to the 
direct seeding technique are causes of the relatively low productivity in rice farm-
ing. The serious BPH and green leafhopper outbreaks in the late 1980s followed 
increased insecticide application due to high rice prices. In the 1990s, the ecolog-
ical balance in rice seems to be reasonably intact. There is no clear relationship 
between pesticide procurement and insect pest incidence in rice. The share for pes-
ticide use in rice remained at a 20% level in the decade 1986-96. 
The horticultural sector, in particular fruit growing, influenced pesticide sales 
more than any other crop sector. Exceptionally high use of insecticides and fungi-
cides in fruit orchards threatened the economic viability of citrus, mango and duri-
an production. Since 1989, the fruit tree sector has become the target of the most 
extensive IPM program undertaken thus far, the Thai-German IPM program for 
selected fruit trees. Its effect on the pesticide market is not yet recognizable in pub-
lished documents. 
Vegetable growing is an important and technically well developed sector. 
Public research and extension on pest control for vegetables were not yet suffi-
ciently developed to reduce the high dependency on pesticide use. Agricultural 
development appeared to be left to private enterprise rather than to be orchestrated 
by public institutions. 
The government of Thailand has left the supply, distribution and use of pesti-
cides largely to the private chemical industry. The easy access to the market has 
resulted in the availability of a large number of pesticide products and brands 
(ASRAP/CIRAD, 1991; Jungbluth, 1996). The wide choice of products confuses 
the farmers and renders adequate control of quality and marketing tactics almost 
impossible. A more stringent regulation of pesticide manufacturing and use was 
introduced during the 1990s but implementation was slow. An increase of imports 
of cheaper generic pesticides has an adverse effect on the implementation of the 
declared policies of pesticide reduction. 
7.5. Comparison of the pesticide markets in SE Asia 
7.5.1. Agricultural development and pesticide markets. Agricultural develop-
ment in the three countries differed considerably (chapters 2, 3, 4). In Indonesia 
and Malaysia, under colonial administration, the emphasis was on the production 
of plantation crops for export, whereas indigenous food crops remained largely 
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neglected. Only during the Inter-bellum, 1918-41, the Departments of Agriculture 
in the former Netherlands East Indies and Malaya began to work on the improve-
ment of indigenous food crops and to find ways for raising farmers' income. 
Independent Thailand during the 19th and early 20th century spent little scientific 
effort to improve rice productivity, although rice was the main export commodity. 
The Thai Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives with its executive institutions 
was established in 1974, later than in Indonesia (1905) and Malaysia (1905) and it 
benefitted less from collaboration with private estate agriculture. 
After 1950, independent Indonesia gave priority to rice production in order to 
attain self-sufficiency in food. International and national research yielded 
improved rice varieties and technology which enabled the Indonesian farmers to 
produce a small exportable surplus over domestic consumption in the late 1980s. 
Through the combined effect of skilful transplanting, intensive crop care, fertile 
soils and adequate water management, Indonesian farmers achieved a mean padi 
yield of 4.4 t/ha by 1996. The production of vegetables and fruits, of soybean and 
other field crops was intensified. The plantation crops sector was largely renova-
ted and expanded under para-statal and smallholder management. 
The Thai intended to raise rice productivity as in Indonesia, but it could not bridge 
the gap between administration and farmers. Although research produced valuable 
innovations, Thai farmers were slow in adopting new rice technology, such as IRRI vari-
eties and fertilizer (table 7.5.1), mainly because higher input costs were not set off by 
higher income. In the 1990s, Thai rice yields averaged a mere 2.4 t/ha. More progress 
was made in the secondary crops, in particular fruits, vegetables and sugarcane. 
Table 7.5.1. Comparison of rice production and pesticide sales for use in rice in three 
SE Asian countries, 1996. Sources: FAO Production Yearbooks; Bayer AG, Germany, 
1998. 
Rice production Pesticide sales Use in rice 
Country 
Indonesia 
Malaysia 
Thailand 
1.3 
0.7 
9.2 
51.2 
2.1 
21.8 
4.4 
3.1 
2.4 
3.5 
0.4 
3.7 
92.4 
12.2 
45.7 
0.3 
0.6 
0.4 
8.2 
18.2 
5.0 
1.8 
5.9 
2.1 
Index: a. Area harvested (M ha) 
b. Production of rough rice (M t) 
c. Yield (kg/ha) 
d. Pesticide sales for use in rice in a.i.weight (M kg) 
e. Pesticide sales for use in rice in a.i.value (M US$) 
f. Pesticide use in rice in kg a.i./ha 
g. Costs of pesticide (a.i. value) in US$/ha in rice 
h. Costs of pesticide (a.i. value) in US$/t of rough rice 
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a. Pesticide markets in a.i. value 
- Indonesia 
-Malaysia 
-Thailand 
Figure 7.5.1.a,b,c. Comparison of 
total pesticide markets of three SE 
Asian countries over the period 
1981 - 1996. Source: Bayer AG, 
Germany 1998. 
b. Pesticide markets in a.i. weight 
1981 1984 1987 1990 1993 1996 
- Indonesia 
- Malaysia 
- Thailand 
c. Pesticide markets in treatable area 
50 
- Indonesia 
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d. Market shares of categories in 
a.i. value, 1996. 
e. market shares of categories in a.i. weight, 
1996 
m Indonesia 
D Malaysia 
E3 Thailand 
Figure 7.5.1.d,e. Comparison of market shares of product categories in the total pesticide market of 
three SE Asian countries, expressed in a.i. value and a.i. weight, 1996. Source: Bayer AG, Germany, 
1998. Legend: Ins.=Insecticide, Fun.=Fungicide, Her.= Herbicide, Rod.= Rodenticide 
In Malaysia, rice production remained a small affair in comparison to the pro-
duction of export commodities. The government invested heavily in land develop-
ment, irrigation and research for wet rice cultivation to alleviate the need for rice 
imports. Yields obtained in major irrigation schemes of Peninsular Malaysia were 
relatively high, 5.1 t/ha in the Muda area in the main season. The technique of 
direct seeding, which was common in Thailand since the beginning of 20th centu-
ry, was adopted and perfected in the Muda Scheme, Malaysia, under the pressure 
of acute labour shortages. 
Despite the different directions in which their agricultures developed, the total 
pesticide markets of Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand are of a comparable order 
of magnitude (figs 7.5.1.a, b and c). Each of the three markets showed an upward 
trend since the 1960s and reached a maximum in 1996. Measured in a.i. values, the 
ratio between the markets of Indonesia, Thailand and Malaysia was 2.5 : 1.7 : 1 in 
1996. 
The growth of the total pesticide markets of the three countries over the period 
1980-96 is plotted in the figures 7.5.1.a and b. The pesticide market of Malaysia 
grew steadily in value and volume without disturbance. Malaysia's market is dom-
inated by sales of herbicides for use in oil palm and rubber. Therefore, the 
Malaysian total market is leading in terms of a.i. weight due to the generally lower 
price structure for herbicides (figs 7.5.1.d and e). 
The Indonesian market peaked in 1987, and then slided into a regression that 
lasted till 1993. The Thai market followed a similar trend with a delay of three 
years, reaching a peak in 1990 and regressing until 1993. After 1993, pesticide 
sales in Indonesia and Thailand rose again to the maximum of 1996, the last year 
included in this study. 
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Comparison of pesti-
cide sales for use in 
rice in three SE Asian 
countries, 1981 - 1996. 
Source: Bayer AG, 
Germany, 1998. 
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7.5.2. Crop shares in relation to total pesticide markets. The pesticide sales for 
use in rice, horticulture and estate crops constitute major shares in the total mar-
kets (figs 7.2.2.e, 7.3.2.e and 7.4.2.e). The influence of the shares for use in rice 
and horticulture on the total markets of Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand is 
analysed separately. 
7.5.2.1. Comparison of pesticide sales for rice. The changes in the sales curves 
for rice in Indonesia and Thailand (figs 7.5.2.a, b and c) could be directly linked to 
the outbreaks of brown and whiteback planthoppers and leafhoppers and the en-
suing virus epidemics. The deep recession in sales in Indonesia was the direct 
result of Presidential Instruction 3/1986 (ch 7.2). The ban on broad-spectrum 
insecticides from use in rice testified of persuasive power of the FAO Inter-coun-
try and national IPM programmes on the President of Indonesia. In Thailand, the 
BPH and leafhopper outbreaks of 1989 were less widespread than in Indonesia, 
since Thai farmers still planted traditional varieties with low sensitivity. The Thai 
authorities brought the BPH outbreaks rapidly under control by replacing non-
resistant rice cultivars, such as Suphanburi 60. Since the Thai government did not 
adjust its pesticide registration nor excluded insecticides known to cause recur-
rence of BPH, the recession of the Thai market was minor and short-lived. 
A comparison of the growth curves of the market shares for use in rice suggests 
that the Indonesian IPM policy had a long lasting reduction effect (fig 7.5.2.g). The 
Indonesian curve representing the share for use in rice fell from 66% in 1987 to 
32% in 1993 and below 30% in 1996. In Thailand, however, the market share for 
rice fluctuated between 29% and 18%, and increased a little again after 1993. 
Except for a short period of increased insecticide use against BPH around 1990, 
there is no clear cause-effect relation between pesticide sales and pest incidence in 
rice or official IPM policy. 
In Malaysia, the relatively small but steadily increasing share for rice in the total 
pesticide market reflects the government's rice intensification policy (ch 3.6.4). The 
total replacement of transplanting by direct seeding in the large irrigation schemes 
and a gradual intensification in upland rice increased herbicide use by all quarters 
of the rice sector. In the Muda Scheme, an Integrated Weed Management (IWM) 
Program, that has been implemented since 1998, appears to be effective (Ho, 
1993). There was no large-scale IPM program of DoA in Malaysia addressing the 
issue of injudicious insecticide application by farmers in rice. The industry, how-
ever, extended its ongoing Safe Use of Pesticides campaign to include Malaysia 
(GCPF, 1998). DOA's surveillance and early warning system and technical assis-
tance provided by rice scheme authorities have effectively prevented a loss of 
resistance against major insect pests and diseases in the currently planted rice 
varieties (Ho, 1993; Ooi, 1992). 
A comparison of 1996 sales for use in rice and the treatable areas in Indonesia 
and Thailand (figs 7.5.2.a, b, c) shows that Indonesia spent double the amount in 
US dollars for an almost equal tonnage of a.i. as Thailand, but could treat almost 
2.5 times more rice area than Thailand. The IPM policy of Indonesia has clearly 
resulted in a shift to procurement of more effective, more expensive insecticides 
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Figure 7.5.2.d, e, f. 
Comparison of pesti-
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Shares of sales for rice in total pesticide markets, 
1981 -96 
10 
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-Malaysia 
- Thailand 
0 
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Figure 7.5.2.g. Comparison of sales (a.i. value) for use in rice, expressed as share of the total pesticide 
markets of three SE Asian countries, 1981-96. Source: Bayer AG, Germany, 1998. 
for use in rice. A matching of the Indonesian curves in figs 7.5.2.a and c shows, 
furthermore, that Indonesia would have needed 5,0001 a.i. in 1982 for treating 17.5 
M ha of rice, against 3,500 t a.i. in 1996 for a same hectareage. 
7.5.2.2. Comparison of pesticide sales for horticulture. In each of the three 
countries commercial vegetable and fruit growing is expanding rapidly. The pat-
tern of pests and diseaes is similar, pressure is high everywhere and non-judicious 
use of pesticides, with its inherent scala of negative effects, is common. The horti-
cultural sector is a prime target for pesticide companies and, consequently, most in 
need of adequate IPM policies and programs. 
The pesticide sales for use in horticulture in Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand 
are plotted in the figs 7.5.2.d, e, and f. The break-up of these sales (in a.i. weight) 
into separate segments for vegetables and fruits (figs 7.5.2.h, i, j) show that in 
Indonesia more than 90% of the pesticides were purchased for use on vegetables, 
whilst in Thailand over 85% were applied on fruit trees and field fruit crops. Sales 
for use in vegetables increased strongly in Indonesia, but not in Malaysia and 
Thailand. In the latter two countries, sales for use in fruit crops particularly showed 
an over-all growth. 
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ket. It caused first a reduction and later a stable reduced share for rice of the total 
market. 
4. The Indonesian Ministry of Agriculture did not entirely recall its recommenda-
tions on chemical pest control in rice, because self-sufficiency in rice remains its 
major objective. 
5. The Presidential ban changed the choice of products used in rice. 
Organophosphate insecticides lost the lead and dropped to a 20% share. Carba-
mates substituted for organophosphate insecticides, but then yielded to pyrethroids 
and new insecticides from the class 'others'. 
6. The newly developed insecticides enable to treat a larger hectareage with less 
volume of a.i., following lower dose recommendation. Thus, the reduction in a.i. 
quantity reached in the rice sector does not necessarily mean that Indonesian farm-
ers treat less hectares of rice. 
7. Several banned insecticides were still purchased in quantity for use in rice by 
1996. This observation raises doubt about the adherence to the Presidential 
Instruction 3/1986. 
8. The fact that, in Indonesia by 1997, not more than one million rice farmers, 
about 2% of the 48 million active in agriculture, had been reached by the national 
IPM extension, explaines its relative small impact on total pesticides sales. 
9. In Malaysia, the sales of herbicides to the estate sector dominates the pesticide 
market by 80%. Herbicide application by large private estate companies is based 
on research. 
10. The sales of fungicides and insecticides for use in Malaysian horticulture 
tripled since 1980. 
11. In the 1970s, Malaysian researchers developed effective biological control, 
particularly of diamondback moth in cabbage crops. Due to inadequate extension, 
IPM was little practised and farmers continued frequent application of pesticide 
mixtures. 
12. Allegedly due to heavy losses from insect damage, vegetable farmers in the 
Cameron Highlands shifted from cabbage growing to the currently more profitable 
production of cut flowers for export with high pesticide imput. 
13. Rice production in Malaysia is a small affair compared to Indonesia and 
Thailand and mainly limited to six major irrigation schemes. The use of, in partic-
ular, herbicides and insecticides is generally well supervised in the larger schemes. 
14. Since the large rice schemes of Malaysia have almost completely shifted from 
transplanting rice to direct seeding, the use of herbicides in rice increased strong-
ly. Herbicide use in direct seeded rice in the major schemes is supervised by an 
empirical Integrated Weed Management system. 
15. The pesticide market in Thailand showed an over-all growth since the 1970s. 
The market share of herbicides, in particular, doubled from 25 to over 50% since 
1980, where insecticide sales lost in relative importance. 
16. Sales for use in the fruit sector lead the market, whereas sales for vegetables 
remained at the same level. 
17. The share for rice in the total pesticide market, second after cotton in 1980, reced-
ed. Most Thai farmers gave up cotton growing due to high costs of pest control. 
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18. In Thailand, the effect of outbreaks of secondary insect pests in rice was pro-
nounced during 1989-91 only and related to high farm-gate prices for export rice 
which induced farmers to use more insecticides. 
19. The pesticide markets of Malaysia and Thailand remained unaffected by the 
National and Inter-Country IPM Programmes in SE Asia. 
20. The sales of herbicides to the rice sector is increasing in all three countries, par-
ticularly in Malaysia. 
21. In the three countries the market share of pesticides for use in vegetables is 
growing fast, with fungicides leading, particularly in potatoes. 
22. The global pesticide market expanded continuously in volume and value since 
the early 1960s. But for a temporarily recession in SE Asia in the late 1990s, pesti-
cide sales are likely to increase further in the coming decades. 
23. A strong growth in market share of generic pesticides is a disquieting develop-
ment for IPM implementation in SE Asia. 
24. Several pesticide companies operating in SE Asia use IPM idiom for promo-
tion of their product line. Most claims on IPM applicability made by the private 
industry are confusing to farmers and authorities, and may cause a devaluation of 
the IPM concept. 
25. Industrial extension on pesticide use in the framework of IPM by the staff of 
private chemical companies or distributors requires a thorough education in IPM 
principles. 
26. The three countries have Pesticide Registration Boards and adequate pesticide 
laboratory facilities. Pesticide registration procedures are strict in Malaysia and 
Indonesia, but too lenient in Thailand to protect the farmers. 
Notes 
1. In 1996, world's largest agrochemical multinational Novartis (meaning "new skills") was formed by 
a merger of the Swiss companies Ciba and Sandoz. Novartis' sales breakdown in 1996 showed weed 
control 52%, disease control 27%, insect control 18%. With seed sales valued at 872 M US$, Novartis 
ranked as second largest seed company in the world (Agrow, #261, 1996). 
2. The Agricultural Requisite Scheme for Asia and the Pacific (ARSAP) was a Netherlands financed, 
semi-autonomous project of the UN Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific estab-
lished in 1975 for the study of supply, distribution and use of fertilizers and pesticides the region. The 
project was part of the United Nations strategy to improve food security in S.and S.E. Asia through esta-
blishment of data collection systems and training. ARSAP's fertilizer work was continued as Fertilizer 
Development Network for Asia and the Pacific (FADINAP). In 1983, the work on pesticides was taken 
over by UNEP/RENPAP (supply and industry) and CIRAD, France, (development of a Pesticide Index 
and IPHYTROP Data Bank for S and S.E.Asia)(Wynn et al, 1997). 
3. At the time, rumours persisted that a lot of subsidized, imported pesticides were right away export-
ed again. The data of table 7.2.1 may therefore overstate the quantities that were actually built up in the 
Indonsian stores. Much government money might have been misappropriated (various personal com-
munications). 
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4. Emergency spraying by DoA's servicable aircraft (3 Cessna's and 1 Pilatus Porter) remained a limit-
ed affair. For example, in 1976/77, DoA's aerial unit treated 7,650 ha during the dry season and 38,000 
ha during the wet season (James & Reddy, 1977a). 
5. During the 1978/79 wet season the mobile brigades sprayed 337 t insecticides (chlorpyriphos, diazi-
non) and applied 34 t of rodenticides (almost all anti-coagulants). The Aerial Unit sprayed 110 t insec-
ticides in the same season (ARSAP, 1980). 
6. In 1978, damage from BPH was far less than in previous years due to introduction of the resistant 
IR36 cultivar and to exceptionally heavy rainfall during the wet season. DoA's Surveillance and 
Forecasting Service reported insects (in particular brown and white-backed planthoppers) and diseases 
on 20% of the Bimas rice area in the 1978/79 season (ARSAP, 1980). 
7. ARSAP (1980) calculated the 1976-78 average insecticide use by Bimas credit farmers at 0.8 kg 
a.i./ha in the dry season and 1.5 kg a.i./ha in the wet season. The corresponding average use by Inmas 
cash-paying farmers was 0.5 kg a.i./ha and 0.75 kg a.i./ha (ARSAP, 1980). The recommended annual 
rate was 4 kg a.i./ha. 
8. Some non-subsidized prices in E Java included fenitrothion (SumithionR 50EC) Rp 3,750, fenthion 
(LebaycideR 50EC) Rp 1,500, and mancozeb (Dithane* M-45 WP) Rp 2,200 (ARSAP, 1980). 
9. Synthetic pesticides are manufactured as technical grade material (TC), which contains the intended 
active ingredient (a.i.) together with associated impurities and, usually, small amounts of necessary 
additives. TCs are manufactured in various forms as chrystals, flakes, viscous oils and so on, which 
must be diluted with solvents or inert materials to concentrated formulations before they can enter dis-
tribution channels (Oudejans, 1992). 
10. Yield losses, caused by brown planthopper, rice leaffolder, stemborer and gall midge were said to 
threaten food security in Indonesia. 
11. Resistance of BPH to various organophosphates, carbamates and pyrethroids was detected in W and 
C Java (Soejitno, 1991; van de Fliert, 1993). 
12. The data for a.i. weight and a.i. value (in US$) are recorded under the year 1987. It is assumed that 
annual data refer to actual sales transactions, and not to delivery of goods. 
13. Fig. 7.2.4.b was depicted in project documents of the FAO Inter-country IPM in Rice Programme, 
third phase, as a justification for continued investment in IPM extension by participating governments 
and donors. 
14. In the Bayer data series, the a.i. value was expressed in German marks (DM) and US$. Between 
1985 and 1995 the rate of exchange varied between DM 3.07 and DM 1.43 for US$ 1. Fig. 7.2.2a 
demonstrates that exchange rate fluctuations may greatly distort the information. In chapter 7, all val-
ues are expressed in US$. 
15. An agro-economic survey, 1981, in several main rice-growing areas in Java reported that almost all 
farmers used HY-rice varieties and fertilizers, except for a small percentage planting traditional vari-
eties for a special clientele (van de Fliert, 1993). 
16. For example, the Bayer Indonesia plant, formulating 715 tonnes of fenthion technical into Lebay-
cidR 50EC in 1982, was closed after 1986. To date, Bayer Indonesia has only minor formulation of 
fenobucarb, propineb and cyfluthrin (Dollacker, pers. comm., 1998). 
17. Price differences might be a reason because a calculation of costs of recommended a.i. dose/ha 
worked out at $9.24 for carbofuran and $7.24 and $5.07 for phentoate and monocrotophos. If this cost 
differential between carbamates and organophosphates would be the real reason, then the market forces 
were stronger than government control. 
18. The retail prices of cypermethrin and endosulfan formulations for farmers were not available and 
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might show a price ratio <1.9, because of sales taxes and high profit margins on small packages of 
pyrethroids. 
19. The Bayer data series, 1998, mention use in potatoes separately for Indonesia, but not for Malaysia 
and Thailand. 
20. Heavy weed infestation in oil palm plantings may cause up to 20% reduction in yield. During the 
3-year immature phase, 13-18 rounds of chemical weeding are required costing up to US$ 530/ha or 
28% of total costs of crop establishment (Chung, 1993) 
21. In 1978, almost 85% of a.i. imports consisted of technical material for the formulation of herbici-
des (mainly dalapon, 2,4-D, sodium arsenite, glyphosate and paraquat)(ARSAP, 1981b). 
22. Local pesticide sales by the members of the Malysian Agricultural Chemicals Association account 
for over 90 % of the Malaysian market (Agrow #261, 1996). 
23. The major herbicides used in oil palm include: 2,4-D amine in the pre-felling phase; paraquat and 
glyphosate in land preparation before replanting to suppress regrowth and to protect soil against ero-
sion. In nurseries and young plantings paraquat, glyphosate and glufosinate-ammonium for control of 
soft grasses and broadleaf weeds, metsulfuron-methyl for broadleaf weeds and fluazipop-butyl peren-
nial grasses (Eleusine indica and Paspalum spp) (Chung, 1993). 
24. The Tanjung Karang outbreak followed the 1975-1976 outbreaks in N Sumatera, which is a typical 
BPH outbreak centre. 
25. A 1985 survey reported that 80% of the Muda rice farmers (n = 915) owned a lever operated knap-
sack sprayer, generally 3-6 years old and priced between US$ 20-35. Equipment maintenance was defi-
cient and nozzles were seldom replaced (Heong et al, 1992b). 
26. Monocrotophos was marketed in small containers for application as trunck injection in oil palm 
against borers. The product was largely diverted for use in rice and vegetables as the handsome con-
tainer size suited small holders better than larger oil palm estates (Newsletter Malaysian Plant 
Protection Society, 1990). 
27. The Tanjung Karang Scheme, measuring only 20,000 ha, represents about 10% of total irrigated rice 
area in Peninsular Malaysia. The data on the 1977-80, 1986-88 and 1990 outbreaks in Tanjung Karang 
serve, therefore, as a pars pro toto indication rather than giving the full picture for Malaysia. 
28. For rat control in oil palm one standard warfarin bait, cubes containing broken maize and 15% war-
farin embedded in parafin wax and costing US$ 1/kg, was placed per tree. Problems in controlling rats 
by anti-coagulent use are described by Wood, Chung & Sim (1990). 
29. In the 1960s and 1970s, the migratory Bombay locust (Patanga succincta) was regarded a major 
pest. Several DoAs in S and SE Asia (India, Pakistan, Thailand) maintained a small fleet of aircraft for 
locust control. In Thailand, 1973, a major locust outbreak infested about 233,000 ha of which 140,000 
ha were sprayed by air and 93,000 by ground application (James & Reddy, 1977b). 
30. Studies made in Thailand by i.a. James & Reddy (1977b), ARSAP (1981), Rijk & Van der Meer 
(1984) and Jungbluth (1996) contain data on pesticide imports, local production and estimated use per 
ha, expressed in a.i. and f.p. equivalents of weight and value. Since the data relationship between the 
rather diverse data is not clear, table 7.4.1 .a has been drafted as an estimate. 
31. Data on supply of active ingredients in Thailand during the 1970s (ARSAP, 1981) conflict with data 
obtained from the industry and are therefore not included. 
32. Paraquat is usually applied as post-planting, pre-emergence, inter-row spray in maize and cassava, 
as blanket spray for weeds in fruit trees, and as strip or circle spray in rubber and oil palm (Whitaker et 
al, 1991). 
33. Generic pesticides are first and second generation, off-patent and relatively low price compounds. 
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Generally, generic products require higher dosage, are more toxic and contain more impurities than 
patented products. 
34. Sometimes, new products appear to receive registration for use in rice and vegetables when the 
claim of lower hazard seems not to be fully justified. For instance, the a.i. fipronil is registered for con-
trol of migratory locust because of long residual activity, a questionable feature for use in food crops. 
35. In 1966, a rice tungro infection reportedly affected 0.6 M ha of rice. 
36. No report was found, that described the 'hectareage damaged' on basis of ETLs for rice pests, mon-
itoring results and actual yield loss assessments. Thus, it is not possible to judge whether injury figures 
were inflated for political reasons. 
37. The financial loss from BPH and RSV damage in 1990 was estimated at 308 M US$ (8 billion bahts; 
US$ 1 = 26 bht, 1991) (Rumakom et al, 1991). 
38. Favoured products were monocrotophos, methyl parathion, deltamethrin, endosulfan and carbama-
tes. In 1990, about twice as much carbamate insecticides were sold (1,180 t a.i.) as in 1989 or 1991. 
The popular carbamates methomyl, carbofuran, fenobucarb and isoprocarb were all locally formulated 
as granules (Bayer AG, 1998). 
39. The massive BHP outbreak in C Thailand in the 1990s was attributed to excessive use of pesticides. 
Damage from BPH infestation was estimated at about 70%, and from rats at 12 % (Rumakom et al, 
1991). 
40. In 1980, production of paraquat was started from the imported intermediate chemicals bipyridine 
and methylchloride. When natural gas became available from gasfields in S Thailand the intermediates 
were also manufactured in Thailand. Since 1990, two factories manufacture 5,500 t of paraquate per 
year. 
41. In the 1970s, the sole criterion for granting or refusing permission for import of any pesticide was 
whether the pesticide in question had been entered on the list of poisonous articles published in the 
Royal Gazette of Thailand. If not, the material was regarded not to be covered by any regulation. 
42. Before the 1995 decision to decentralise GIFAP, the organisations were called Thai Pesticide 
Association and International Group of National Pesticide Associations (GIFAP), Brussels, respectively. 
GIFAP was renamed Global Crop Protection Federation (GCPF) in 1996. 
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Chapter 8 
Epilogue 
The aim of this study was to describe the history and the achievements of Inte-
grated Pest Management (IPM) in SE Asia. As IPM encompasses more than a tech-
nical answer to injudicious use of pesticides, the author studied two periods, agri-
culture before and after the introduction of synthetic pesticides. My incentive was 
curiosity about the impact of FAO's Inter-Country Integrated Pest Control Pro-
gramme in Rice in S and SE Asia and the ensuing National IPM Programmes, in 
which I became tangentially involved. The historical part came in with the ques-
tion 'How did the colonial planters manage without pesticides?' 
A first question 'why, how and when did the protection of crops become an 
issue for research and institutionalisation' was answered by a brief description of 
agricultural development in three SE Asian countries. Before 1870, the European 
trading companies and the colonial administrations demonstrated the agricultural 
potential of Indonesia and Peninsular Malaya through a successful exploitation of 
their national resources. At the end of the 19th century, the promise of high returns 
attracted European investment in commodity crop production. Owing to a fortu-
nate combination of capable men, money and crops of great potential in unex-
ploited, fertile lands, agriculture prospered. When pests and diseases became pro-
duction constraints, the Botanical Gardens Departments had the expertise and 
means to organize adequate research. Early in the 20th century, the colonial 
Departments of Agriculture and private research stations made valuable contribu-
tions to estate and indigenous agriculture both. Inventive solutions were found to 
pest and disease problems, in particular through selection and breeding for resis-
tance, vegetative propagation and grafting, and biological control. 
After World War II, synthetic pesticides, which, as a panacea against injurious 
organisms, attracted almost all attention and funding, soon began to create prob-
lems of their own. Scientist detected the new phenomena of pesticide-induced 
pests and pesticide resistance in pests. Once the feasibility of integrated pest con-
trol with reduced use of pesticides was proven in N America and in Europe, inter-
national institutions and donors had an instrument to address the deteriorating pest 
situation in developing countries. The FAO obtained the support of donors for 
major IPM programmes a.o. in cotton, rice and maize in Asia and C America. 
A second question refers to the impact of the IPM efforts in SE Asia. Study of 
program reports and of the literature suggested a considerable success for IPM 
implementation in Indonesia, and some progress in Malaysia and Thailand. An 
impartial answer was sought through the analysis of records on pesticides market-
ing from the three countries over 1980-96. These records show a real impact of 
IPM policy on insecticide sales in rice in Indonesia, but not in the other two coun-
tries. In particular, the 1986 Presidential ban on insecticide use in rice in Indonesia 
had a lasting effect on the volume (in a.i. weight) of pesticides sold for rice. The 
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FAO Inter-Country Programme deserves credit for that achievement. In Indonesia, 
the change in attitude concerning use of insecticides in rice is evident with many 
civil servants, researchers and farmers. It is difficult to judge if that attitude can be 
sustained. 
In Malaysia, the intensification of rice production had a clear effect on the pes-
ticide market. Malaysian researchers were leading in bringing IPM to SE Asia and, 
in particular, to the granaries of the peninsula. Two major constraints, shortage of 
irrigation water and of labour, led to direct seeding, which became possible 
through an effective Integrated Weed Management. Sales of herbicides in direct 
seeded rice increased rapidly. The task of IPM extension in rice appears to be 
undertaken by the powerful Irrigation Scheme Authorities. 
In Thailand, IPM in rice received little attention beyond research. Rice was a 
traditional export commodity and not subject to intensification programs driven by 
concerns about food security. As in Malaysia, herbicide use in direct seeded rice is 
increasing, but IWM receives little attention yet. 
The second target of IPM implementation in SE Asia, excessive pesticide use 
in vegetables, left no mark on pesticide sales. In all three countries the sales of 
fungicides and insecticides for vegetables is increasing continuously. In Indonesia 
and Thailand the IPM for vegetables movement is yet too small to show, in 
Malaysia the initial achievement in highland vegetables was lost. 
I conclude that the introduction of IPM to SE Asia has been beneficial. 
Sustainability of IPM cannot be taken for granted, as the Malaysian highland veg-
etable example shows. Success can be expected only when farmers feel empow-
ered and when a positive attitude towards IPM pervades the whole governmental 
administration from top to bottom, as a comparison of Indonesia and Thailand 
shows. Donors should apply this insight when negotiating with recipient govern-
ments. 
A last question 'Did I serve two masters?' is answered with an ambiguous 'yes and 
no'. The answer is 'Yes', if the chemical industry and the IPM protagonists take an 
absolute stand in the promotion or rejection of pesticide use in agriculture. I was 
educated with a belief in pesticides and had, like my industry master, a blind eye 
for the ecological consequences. I have seen dedicated scientists and good research 
in that world. I was not always happy with his blunt eye, rather insensitive to other 
issues than high return on investment, necessary as it may be to run a company. 
The second master, IPM, also appears to suffer occasionally from impaired eye-
sight, when the advantages of judicious pesticide use are denied. The 'no inter-
vention' message in rice is helpful in extension, but statistics show that 1 to 1.5 
application may be needed in rice towards the end of the season. In vegetables and 
fruits, 'informed intervention' as elaborated by V. Stern cum suis is the corner stone 
for an effective IPM. The answer is 'No' if both sides agree to collaborate in 
research for and need-based application of specific synthetic pesticides of low tox-
icity in a true IPM fashion. 
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Chapter 9 
Summary 
This book deals with the history and achievements of Integrated Pest 
Management (IPM) in SE Asia. Chapter 1 explains the author's motives and the 
research questions. What is IPM? How were pests and diseases of tropical agricul-
ture controlled before synthetic pesticides became available? Why and by whom 
were IPM programs in SE Asia developed and what is their impact? The chapters 
2-4 describe agricultural developments from 1800 to the present in Indonesia, 
Malaysia and Thailand. In Indonesia and Malaysia, development began with the 
investment of foreign expertise and capital. In Thailand, where foreign influences 
were barred, development began from within. 
Early in the 16th century European trading companies began to control the cen-
turies old East-West trade lanes of S and SE Asia. The Dutch East Indies Company 
(VOC) obtained a monopoly in the spice trade which had its production centre in 
the Maluku Islands. The Napoleonic Wars in Europe upset the balance of power in 
the Malay-Indonesian archipelago. The English, who in the late 18th century had 
settled in Penang on the W coast of Malaya, confiscated the Dutch possessions in 
Indonesia and Melaka. In 1816, the Dutch returned and ruled the country as the 
Dutch East Indies under a colonial administration until 1949. 
During 1830-80, the Dutch colonial government, under the obligation of meet-
ing its own expenses, imposed a system of enforced production of agricultural 
export commodities on Java and Sumatera. The extensive plantings of coffee, su-
garcane, indigo and spices brought the Dutch huge profit but in the end caused 
food shortages and poverty to the Indonesian farmers. This period of monopolistic 
exploitation demonstrated the agricultural potential of the Dutch East Indies and 
made European capitalists eager to share in the opportunity. In the 1870s, an Agrar-
ian Law and a Sugar Law were issued on the basis of two motives. First, to secure 
the Indonesian farmers' rights to the soil and to grow sufficient rice. Second, to 
open the country for foreign private investment in plantation agriculture through 
long lease constructions. 
In Malaya during the 19th century, Chinese immigrants established a small-
holder production of spices, coconut and sugar. Increasing civil turmoil resulting 
from feuding sultans and fighting factions of Chinese immigrants had destabilized 
Malaya to the extent that the English had to restore order. From 1875 onwards, the 
English succeeded in establishing a colonial administration and in unifying the 
country. Only then, Western merchant firms began to plant commodity crops in 
Malaya on estate scale with full support from the government which provided land 
titles and planting material. 
Agricultural development in Thailand had a rather different start. In the 18th 
and 19th century Thailand remained an independent Kingdom and did not encour-
age foreign investment. Thai farmers largely produced rice and other crops for self-
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sufficiency, since the country lacked a transport infrastructure and all trade was 
monopolized by the royal court. After 1860, increasing opportunities to export rice 
induced farmers of the C Plain to produce a surplus. When revenues from ex-
porting rice increased rapidly, the Thai government began to strengthen the 
infrastructure a.o. through the digging of canals and to liberalize trade. The build-
up of estate agriculture remained limited to S Thailand and it was hardly encoura-
ged. 
In the Dutch East Indies (DEI) and Malaya the growing of estate crops, such as 
sugar, coffee, rubber, and cacao was severely hampered by pest and disease prob-
lems and by a lack of resistant planting material. The Coffea arabica culture was 
destroyed by the Coffee Leaf Rust Disease and the growing of sugarcane became 
almost uneconomical due to Sereh Disease. The planters turned to the Botanical 
Gardens' Departments, which were the early centres of expertise on commodity 
crops. The Plantentuin institutions at Bogor, Java, became the centre for public and 
private research on the improvement of commodity crops and on control of pests 
and diseases. Agriculture in Thailand was mainly directed at rice production and 
did not share in the development of agricultural research elsewhere. 
Whilst in the DEI and Malaya commodity agriculture developed rapidly, 
indigenous agriculture remained neglected for a long time. A Department of 
Agriculture was established in both the DEI and Malaya in the same year, 1905. 
The departments had the dual function to represent the interests of estate agricul-
ture with the government and to improve indigenous agriculture and farmers' inco-
me. Special divisions were established for rice cultivation and extension to small-
holder farmers. Between 1910 and 1940, estate agriculture flourished, smallholder 
production of rubber, cacao and coffee became important and the production of 
rice and palawija crops rose substantially through the construction of irrigation 
facilities and the breeding of improved varieties. Rice production in Thailand 
increased too through an expansion of the rice area and better irrigation, but 
research for improvement of productivity received less attention. 
In the DEI and Malaya, great progress in pest and disease control was made 
through the selection and breeding for higher productivity, habitus and resistance, 
through clonal propagation and through grafting. Entomological research of pests 
and their natural enemies resulted in effective biological control e.g. of pests in 
coconut, oil palm and cacao. Some early entomological studies are still regarded 
as standard works today. 
The 1930s and 1940s were unfortunate decades due to the world-wide eco-
nomic recession and to World War II. The export of commodities from the DEI and 
Malaya and of rice from Thailand decreased due to low world market prices and 
trade restrictions. The Japanese occupation, 1942-45, created great damage to peo-
ple, institutions and the estate industry. After the war, Malaysia and Thailand 
recovered rapidly. In the DEI, the struggle for Indonesia's independence caused 
additional damage and postponed the restoration of agriculture. After Indepen-
dence, in 1949, a shortage of human and financial resources hampered agricultural 
development for many years. 
During the 1960s, the governments of Indonesia and Malaysia launched rice 
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production intensification programs to improve their national food security and to 
keep up with the rapid population growth. They invested large World Bank loans 
in the irrigation infrastructure and adopted the Green Revolution technology for 
rice production. In Indonesia, the intensification programs were aimed at the farm-
ers of the main rice provinces of Java and the Outer Islands, in Malaysia at the 
Malay farmers in the large Rice Irrigation Schemes. In Indonesia, the farmers were 
strongly urged, through social pressure and the provision of credit and subsidies, 
to adopt the high yielding IRRI rice varieties, and to use fertilizers and pesticides. 
The Departments of Agriculture in the three countries established a Surveillance 
and Early Warning System with economic threshold levels for major insect pests 
of rice and operated an Emergency Control Service to assist farmers at the time of 
outbreaks. The Thai government also introduced high yielding rice varieties but 
did not strengthen the agricultural extension nor did it stimulate higher use of fer-
tilizer and pesticides. Thai farmers, generally, continued to grow favoured local 
rice varieties. 
In Indonesia and Malaysia, the recommended calender application of insec-
ticides over large rice areas caused outbreaks of secondary insect pests, in particu-
lar brown planthopper and leafhoppers, with subsequent virus epidemics. Around 
1970, IRRI scientists proved the pesticide-induced nature of the outbreaks and 
began to develop an Integrated Pest Management strategy. 
The principles of Integrated Pests Management (IPM) were elaborated by 
researchers in the West (chapter 5). Many effective methods of integrated control 
of pests and diseases had been elaborated by researchers and planters during colo-
nial days before synthetic pesticides were available. The new challenge after World 
War II was to integrate need-based pesticide use with other control techniques. 
Once the principles were well researched and formulated, international organisa-
tions and donors showed interest to develop and implement regional IPM programs 
in cotton, maize and rice. 
To solve the brown planthopper and virus problems in rice in S and SE Asia, 
the FAO established an Inter-Country Programme (ICP) for IPM in Rice in 1979 
in seven countries including Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand. The three countries 
organized National IPM Programs. Many activities were undertaken with support 
of FAO's ICP for IPM field studies and training of trainers and farmers. These 
activities prepared the road to the Presidential Instruction 1986/3 in Indonesia 
which declared IPM as national policy, banned most insecticide for use in rice and 
withdrew the subsidies on pesticides. In Malaysia, the Minister of Agriculture 
issued an official statement in favour of IPM. 
In Indonesia and Malaysia, the continuous replacement of sensitive rice vari-
eties by cultivars with a higher resistance against planthoppers, leafhoppers and 
viruses and the ban on insecticide use in rice brought the serious pest outbreaks to 
a halt. Since the area planted to high yielding rice cultivars and the fertilizer use 
continued to increase, Indonesia achieved self-sufficiency in rice in the 1980s. In 
Malaysia too, research on rice production and pest control in rice yielded good 
results, but the research findings were de facto only applied in the large rice 
schemes. Malaysia gained an advantage in Integrated Weed Management in direct 
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seeded rice. IPM in non-rice field crops and in plantation did not gain much visi-
bility. 
In Thailand, the development of agricultural institutions and research was 
delayed until the 1950s. A probable reason is that the government was more con-
cerned about the revenues of rice exports than about possible food shortages. The 
Ministers of Finance and Commerce managed the agricultural sector through price 
controls with little interest for scientific development. Because of an ample 
availability of land and low rice prices, the Thai fanners had little incentive to 
improve rice production in kg/ha. Adoption of improved rice varieties, fertiliser 
use and mechanisation remained low. 
Throughout the 1990s, the government of Indonesia was consistent in 
implementing its IPM policy and contributed considerable manpower and funds at 
the federal and provincial levels. Adopting FAO's Farmer Field School model of 
extension about one million Indonesian farmers attended a season-long IPM train-
ing. In Malaysia, the National IPM Program received little political support. 
However, in the major rice irrigation schemes, the Scheme Authorities provided 
the necessary guidance to the farmers on improved production and pest control 
technology. In Thailand, IPM remained a matter of research because of inadequate 
impact of extension on the farmers. 
In Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand, the production of estate and smallholder 
crops increased considerably after 1970. In Indonesia and Malaysia, the estate pro-
duction of palm oil is still expanding. In Malaysia, rubber and cacao decreased due 
to a shortage of labour for tapping and pest control. In Indonesia, the production of 
sugar is stimulated by a heavily subsidized nucleus estate-smallholder system, 
whereas in Thailand sugar production has increased by private investment. IPM in 
estate crops is practised by estates to some degree. In Indonesia, where cacao 
increased in Sulawesi, IPM in cacao is sponsored by an international consortium. 
Because of a growing concern about the high use of pesticides by vegetable and 
fruit growers and the serious pest and disease problems in horticulture (chapter 6), 
the Indonesian National IPM Program began to include vegetables in FFS training 
for rice-based cropping systems since 1994. In 1995, a new FAO Inter-Country 
IPM for Vegetables Programme was launched which was recently extended to 
Indonesia. 
We tried to measure the impact of the international and national IPM programs 
for rice and vegetables through an analysis of the pesticide markets in the three 
countries over the period 1980-1996 (chapter 7). The pesticide markets of Indo-
nesia, Malaysia and Thailand remained largely unaffected by national and inter-
national IPM efforts in SE Asia. A clear impact of the Inter-Country and national 
IPM programs on the sales of insecticides for use in rice is visible in Indonesia, but 
not in Malaysia and Thailand. 
The sales of herbicides to the rice sector is increasing in all three countries, par-
ticularly in Peninsular Malaysia. Only in the large Rice Irrigation Schemes, the 
herbicide use in direct seeded rice is supervised by an empirical Integrated Weed 
Management system. 
The sales of pesticides for use in horticulture increased in correspondence with 
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the rapid expansion of the sector. In Indonesia, extension of IPM for vegetables has 
become part of the National Program for IPM. IPM efforts did not, however, 
impact sales for use in horticulture. In Malaysia, biological control of insect pests 
in vegetables has been intensively researched, but no evidence was found that the 
IPM for vegetables program reduced pesticide sales. 
The pesticide companies, in general, have taken over the IPM ideology, how-
ever, with the explicit inclusion of pesticides as indispensable means for effective 
control of injurious organisms. The advance of generic pesticides, which took over 
50% of the global pesticide market in 1996, is a cause of considerable concern 
because these products are often beyond adequate regulatory control on quality and 
application. 
In the epilogue (chapter 8) the author answers the questions posed in chapter 1 
and concludes that IPM implementation in SE Asia met with considerable success 
in rice in Indonesia, but not in the other two countries. The introduction of IPM to 
SE Asia has been beneficial. To advance IPM in horticulture, the IPM programs 
and the pesticide industry should collaborate in research for and need-based appli-
cation of specific synthetic pesticides of low toxicity in a true IPM fashion. 
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Hoofdstuk 10 
Samenvatting 
Dit boek beschrijft de geschiedenis en de resultaten van Gei'ntegreerde 
Bestrijding van Plagen (IPM) in ZO Azie. Hoofdstuk 1 licht het motief van de 
schrijver toe en poneert de onderzoeksvragen. Wat is IPM ? Hoe werden de ziek-
ten en plagen in de tropische landbouw bedwongen voordat er synthetische 
bestrijdingsmiddelen waren? Waarom en door wie werden IPM programma's 
ontwikkeld in ZO Azie en wat voor een effect sorteren ze. De hoofdstukken 2-4 be-
schrijven de ontwikkeling van de landbouw in Indonesie, Malaysia en Thailand 
tussen 1800 en heden. In Indonesie en Maleisie' brachten de investering van buiten-
landse kennis and kapitaal deze ontwikkeling op gang. In Thailand, waar buiten-
landse invloeden geweerd werden, begon de ontwikkeling van binnen uit. 
Vroeg in de 16e eeuw kregen Europese handelmaatschappijen de macht over de 
eeuwenoude handelswegen tussen Oost en West door Z en ZO Azie. De 
Nederlandse Verenigde Oost Indische Compagnie (VOC) verwierf het monopolie 
over de specerijenhandel, waarvan het produktie centrum op de Molukse eilanden 
lag. Toen de Napoleontische oorlogen in Europa ook het machtsevenwicht in de 
Maleis-Indonesische archipel verstoorden, namen de Engelsen, die zich laat in de 
18e eeuw gevestigd hadden op Penang voor de W kust van Maleisie, de Neder-
landse bezittingen in Indonesie en Melaka in beslag. De Nederlanders keerden in 
1816 terug en beheersten het land als Nederlands Oost-Indie (NOI) onder koloni-
aal bestuur tot 1949. 
Van 1830-80 dwong het Nederlandse koloniale bestuur, dat zijn eigen onkosten 
moest dekken, de boeren van Java en Sumatera om export gewassen te telen. De 
uitgestrekte aanplantingen van koffie, suiker, indigo en specerijen brachten Neder-
land grote winsten op, maar veroorzaakten op den duur voedseltekorten en 
armoede onder de Indonesische boeren. Deze periode van monopolistische uit-
buiting (het Cultuurstelsel) toonde de landbouwkundige mogelijkheden van NOI 
aan en stimuleerde Europese investeerders om daarvan te profiteren. 
In 1980 werden een Landbouwwet en een Suikerwet uitgevaardigd die op twee 
beginselen steunden. Zij beoogden, ten eerste, de vastlegging van de rechten van 
Indonesische boeren op eigen land en de teelt van voldoende rijst. Ten tweede, om 
het land toegankelijk te maken voor buitenlandse investeringen van privaat kapi-
taal in de plantage-landbouw middels langjarige pachtregelingen. 
In Maleisie gedurende de 19e eeuw zetten Chinese immigranten kleine 
landbouwbedrijven op waarop zij specerijen, kokosnoten en suikerriet produceer-
den. Burgelijke onrust, veroorzaakt door machtsstrijd tussen sultans en elkaar 
bevechtende groepen van Chinese immigranten, maakte de situatie in Maleisie der-
mate instabiel dat de Engelsen de orde moesten herstellen. Vanaf 1875 slaagden de 
Engelsen erin om een koloniaal bestuur te vestigen en de staten geleidelijk in een 
unie samen te brengen. Toen pas durfden grote westerse handelsmaatschappijen 
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plantages aan te leggen voor exportgewassen. De regering verleende daaraan voile 
medewerking door landrechten en plantgoed te verschaffen. 
De landbouwontwikkeling in Thailand begon op een andere manier. Tijdens de 
18e en 19e eeuw bleef Thailand een onafhankelijk koninkrijk dat buitenlandse 
investeringen buiten de deur hield. De Thaise boeren produceerden rijst en andere 
voedselgewassen voor zelfvoorziening, omdat het land geen infrastructuur voor 
transport bezat en het koninklijk hof het monopolie hield over alle handel. Na 1860 
ontstonden er mogelijkheden om rijst te exporteren, hetgeen de boeren in de cen-
trale vlakte er toe aanzette om meer rijst te telen dan nodig voor lokaal gebruik. 
Toen de staatsinkomsten uit de rijstexport snel toenamen, verbeterde de Thaise 
regering de infrastructuur door het graven van kanalen en verruimde zij de 
handelsbepalingen. Plantagelandbouw bleef beperkt tot Z Thailand en werd niet 
aangemoedigd. 
In NOI en Malaya hadden cultures, zoals suikerriet, koffie, rubber en cacao, 
zwaar te lijden van ziekten en plagen, waartegen nog geen resistent plantmateriaal 
beschikbaar was. De Coffea arabica cultuur werd vernietigd door een roest ziekte 
en de teelt van suikerriet werd bijna verliesgevend door de Sereh-ziekte. De 
planters zochten steun bij de Botanische Tuinen, die de meeste kennis inzake 
exportgewassen hadden. De Plantentuin-instellingen in Buitenzorg werden de ba-
kermat van publiek en privaat onderzoek voor de verbetering van exportgewassen 
en de gewasbescherming. De landbouw in Thailand bleef gericht op rijst en nam 
niet deel aan de ontwikkeling van het onderzoek elders. 
Terwijl in NOI en Malaya de handelslandbouw een snelle ontwikkeling door-
maakte, werd er aan de inheemse landbouw nauwelijks aandacht geschonken. In 
NOI en Malaya werd in hetzelfde jaar, 1905, een Departement van Landbouw 
opgericht. De departementen hadden een dubbele taak, namelijk om de belangen 
van de handelslandbouw te vertegenwoordigen bij de regering, en om de inheemse 
landbouw op hoger peil te brengen en het boereninkomen te verbeteren. Speciale 
afdelingen werden opgericht voor de rijstteelt en voor de landbouwvoorlichting 
voor kleine boeren. Tussen 1910 en 1940 maakte de plantage landbouw een bloei-
tijd door, nam het aandeel van de kleine boeren in de productie van rubber, cacao 
en koffie toe en steeg ook de productie van rijst en tweede gewassen. De rijst-
productie verbeterde door de aanleg van irrigatiewerken en het veredelen van 
rassen. In Thailand nam de rijstproductie toe door een uitbreiding van het 
rijstareaal en verbeterde irrigatie, maar aan onderzoek voor verbetering van de pro-
ductiviteit werd nauwelijks aandacht besteed. 
In NOI en Malaya, werd grote vooruitgang geboekt in de beheersing van ziek-
ten en plagen door selectie en veredeling voor hogere opbrengst, plantvorm en 
resistentie, door clonale vermeerdering and door enting. Entomologisch onderzoek 
van plaaginsecten en hun natuurlijke vijanden leverden doeltreffende biologische 
bestrijdingswijzen op, zoals van insektenplagen in kokospalm, oliepalm en cacao. 
Enkele vroege entomologische studies worden heden ten dage nog als stan-
daardwerk beschouwd. 
De jaren 1930-50 waren moeilijk ten gevolge van de economische recessie en 
de Tweede Wereldoorlog. De export van handelsgewassen uit NOI en Maleisie en 
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van rijst uit Thailand leden onder de lage wereld markt prijzen en handelsrestric-
ties. De Japanse bezetting, 1942-45, bracht grote schade toe aan mensen, instellin-
gen en de plantage-landbouw. Na de oorlog herstelden Maleisie en Thailand snel. 
In NOI veroorzaakte de strijd voor Indonesia's onafhankelijkheid nog meer schade 
en duurde het langer voordat de landbouw kon herstellen. Na de Onafhanke-
lijkheid, in 1949, kwam de ontwikkeling laat op gang ten gevolge van een lang-
jarig tekort aan mensen en middelen. 
In de jaren '60 organiseerden de regeringen van Indonesie en Maleisie pro-
gramma's gericht op de verhoging van de rijstproduktie in verband met de 
nationale voedselzekerheid en de snelle bevolkingsgroei. Zij investeerden grote 
leningen van de Wereld Bank in irrigatiewerken en pasten de Groene Revolutie 
technologie toe in de rijstteelt. In Indonesie werden de programma's gericht op de 
boeren in de belangrijkste rijstprovincies van Java en de buitengewesten, in 
Maleisie op de Maleise boeren in de grote geirrigeerde rijstpolders. In Indonesie 
werden de boeren onder druk gezet, door sociale dwang en door het verschaffen 
van krediet en subsidies, om de hoogproductieve IRRI-rassen te planten en kun-
stmest en pesticiden te gebruiken. De Departementen van Landbouw van de drie 
landen zetten een bewakings- en waarschuwingsdienst op met toepassing van 
economische schadedrempels voor de belangrijkste plagen in rijst en organiseer-
den een Bestrijdingsdienst voor Noodsituaties om de boeren bij te staan in ernstige 
plaagsituaties. De Thaise regering bevorderde eveneens het planten van hoog-
productieve rijstrassen maar liet na om de voorlichting te versterken en het gebruik 
van kunstmest en pesticiden te stimuleren. De Thaise boeren, bleven de voorkeur 
geven aan het planten van lokale rijstrassen. 
In Indonesie en Maleisie veroorzaakten de kalendermatige insecticidenbe-
spuitingen op grote rijstarealen het uitbreken van secundaire insectenplagen, 
vooral van de 'brown planthopper' en 'leafhoppers' met de erop volgende virusepi-
demieen. Rond 1970 bewezen onderzoekers bij het IRRI dat de massale plaaguit-
barstingen door insecticiden werden veroorzaakt. Met die kermis begonnen zij een 
strategic voor Gei'ntegreerde Bestrijding van Plagen (IPM) te ontwikkelen. 
De beginselen van IPM werden door Westerse onderzoekers uitgewerkt (hoofd-
stuk 5). Vele doeltreffende methoden van gei'ntegreerde bestrijding van ziekten en 
plagen waren al bedacht door onderzoekers en planters in de koloniale tijd voordat 
synthetische pesticiden beschikbaar waren. De nieuwe uitdaging na de Tweede 
Wereldoorlog was het integreren van noodzakelijk geacht gebruik van pesticiden 
met andere bestrijdingsmethoden. Nadat de beginselen eenmaal goed onderzocht 
en geformuleerd waren, kregen internationale organisaties en donoren belang-
stelling voor het ontwikkelen en uitvoeren van regionale IPM programma's voor 
katoen, mai's en rijst. 
Om een oplossing te vinden voor de 'brown planthopper'- en virusproblemen 
in Z en ZO Azie begon FAO in 1979 een 'Inter-Country Programme (ICP) for IPM 
in Rice' in zeven landen, waaronder Indonesie, Maleisie en Thailand. De drie lan-
den organiseerden nationale IPM programma's. Met steun van FAO's ICP for IPM 
Rice werd begonnen met veldstudies en het trainen van trainers en boeren. Deze 
activiteiten maakten de weg vrij voor de Presidentiele Instructie 1986/3 in 
Wageningen Agricultural University Papers 99-1 (1999) 281 
Indonesia, waarin IPM werd uitroepen tot nationaal beleid, het gebruik van de 
meeste insecticiden in rijst werd verboden en de subsidies op pesticiden werden 
ingetrokken. In Maleisie' legde de Federale Minister van Landbouw een officiele 
verklaring af ten gunste van IPM. 
In Indonesia en Maleisie werden de bedreigende plaagsituaties beteugeld door 
geregeld vatbare rijstrassen te vervangen door rassen met een grotere resistentie 
tegen planthoppers, leafhoppers en virussen, en door een beperking van het insek-
ticidengebruik. Door een voortdurende uitbreiding van het areaal, waarop hoogpro-
ductieve rassen en kunstmest werden gebruikt, werd Indonesie in de jaren 1980 
zelfvoorzienend in rijst. Ook in Maleisie leverde het onderzoek inzake productie-
verbetering en plaagbestrijding in rijst goede resultaten op maar deze werden de facto 
alleen toegepast in de grote rijstpolders. Maleisie verwierf een voorsprong in ge-
Yntegreerde onkruidbestrijding (IWM) in breedwerpig gezaaide (direct seeded) rijst. 
IPM in niet-rijst veldgewassen en in plantagegewassen kreeg geen grote bekendheid. 
In Thailand begon de ontwikkeling van landbouwinstellingen en het onderzoek 
pas rond 1950. De regering had waarschijnlijk meer aandacht voor de staatsinkom-
sten uit het exporteren van rijst dan voor een mogelijk voedseltekort. De Ministers 
van Financien en Handel stuurden de agrarische sector door middel van prijsbe-
heersing en hadden weinig belangstelling voor de wetenschappelijke onder-
steuning. De mime beschikbaarheid van land en de lage prijzen hidden de Thaise 
boeren af van verhoging van de rijstproductie in kg/ha. Zij maakten weinig gebruik 
van verbeterde rassen en kunstmest. 
Gedurende de jaren 1990 hield de regering van Indonesie vast aan het uitvoeren 
van de IPM politiek door een mime toewijzing van mankracht en fondsen op het 
federale en provinciale vlak van bestuur. Ongeveer een miljoen boeren namen ge-
durende een vol seizoen deel aan de FFS IPM training. 
Het Nationale IPM Programma in Maleisie kreeg weinig politieke steun. Maar 
in de grote rijstpolders gaven de autoriteiten de noodzakelijke begeleiding aan de 
boeren inzake productieverhoging en gewasbescherming. In Thailand bleef IPM in 
de onderzoeksfase steken omdat de voorlichters de boeren onvoldoende bereikten. 
In Indonesie, Maleisie en Thailand nam de productie van handelsgewassen 
door plantages en kleine boeren na 1970 flink toe. In Indonesie en Maleisie neemt 
de productie van palmolie op plantages verder toe. De productie van rubber in 
Maleisie nam af vanwege een tekort aan tappers. In Indonesie werd de productie 
van suiker bevorderd door het zwaar gesubsidieerde systeem van productie door 
kleine boeren random een kernbedrijf met verwerkingscapaciteit, terwijl in 
Thailand de suikerproductie door private investeringen wordt gedreven. Sommige 
plantages passen IPM toe, maar geven hier weinig bekendheid aan. In Indonesie 
wordt de toepassing van IPM in cacao betaald door een internationaal consortium. 
Vanwege een toenemende bezorgdheid over het hoge gebruik van pesticiden 
door groenten- en fruittelers en de aanzienlijke ziekten- en plagendmk in de tuin-
bouw (hoofdstuk 6), begon het Indonesische Nationale IPM Programma vanaf 
1994 groenten op te nemen in de FFS training voor de rotatieteelten met rijst. In 
1995 ging een nieuw FAO Inter-Country IPM Programma voor de Groententeelt 
van start, waaraan ook Indonesie sinds kort deelneemt. 
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Wij probeerden de invloed van het internationale en de nationale IPM pro-
gramma's voor rijst te meten door het analyseren van de pesticidenmarkten in de 
drie landen over de periode 1980-96 (hoofdstuk 7). De pesticidenmarkten van 
Indonesia, Maleisie' en Thailand werden nauwelijks bei'nvloed door de interna-
tionale en de nationale IPM inspanningen in ZO Azie. Een duidelijke invloed van 
de internationale en nationale IPM programma's is slechts aantoonbaar in Indone-
sia, maar niet in Maleisie en Thailand. 
De verkoop van herbiciden voor de rijstsector neem toe in alle drie de landen, 
vooral in Maleisie. Alleen in de grote rijstpolders wordt het herbicidengebruik 
ondersteund door een empirisch systeem van gei'ntegreerde onkruidbestrijding. 
De verkoop van pesticiden voor gebruik in de tuinbouw loopt parallel met de 
snelle uitbreiding van de sector. In Indonesia werd de voorlichting over IPM in 
groententeelt een onderdeel van het Nationale IPM Programma, maar de IPM 
inspanningen brachten de verkoop van pesticiden niet omlaag. De pesticiden-
firma's hebben zich, over het algemeen, de IPM-ideologie eigen gemaakt, maar 
wel met inbegrip van het gebruik van pesticiden als onmisbare hulpmiddelen bij 
het doeltreffend bestrijden van schadelijke organismen. De opmars van generieke 
bestrijdingsmiddelen, die in 1996 al een marktaandeel van 50% opeisten, is een 
bedenkelijke zaak, omdat deze producten vaak moeilijk op kwaliteit en toepassing 
kunnen worden gecontroleerd. 
In de epiloog (hoofdstuk 8) geeft de schrijver antwoord op de in hoofdstuk 1 
gestelde vragen en komt tot de conclusie dat de toepassing van IPM in ZO Azie 
succesvol verliep in Indonesie, maar niet in de twee andere landen. Het introduc-
eren van IPM in ZO Azie was een goede zaak. Om IPM in de tuinbouw en fruit-
teelt te bevorderen zouden de IPM programma's en de bestrijdingsmid-
delenindustrie moeten samenwerken in het onderzoek naar en de toepassing van 
synthetische pesticiden met specifieke werking en lage toxiciteit. 
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